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ABSTRACT 
 
Traditionally, electricity markets around the world have been operated centrally by an 
agent of the local government, in order to minimise the cost of supplying electricity to 
all users. However, over the last 20 years, these markets have gradually been 
deregulated, producing wholesale markets in which generating companies compete for 
the right to supply electricity, through an offering system. These major structural 
changes to the operation of the electricity systems have significantly affected the 
behavioural incentives of the players in the market, and have thus presented a whole 
new realm of problems for researchers to address. Specifically, generating companies 
now operate in order to maximise their own profits, subject to various behavioural 
constraints and other considerations. In particular, these considerations include 
intertemporal constraints that the generator may face over time, such as fuel limitations 
and thus conservation, market uncertainty and correlation, uncertain fuel inflows, and 
unit operational rules. 
 
It is the optimisation of the offering process subject to these intertemporal constraints 
that we address primarily in this thesis. Some of these constraints and considerations 
have been considered previously in the literature, but they have never been dealt with 
simultaneously, or in a computationally efficient manner. We present a multi-
dimensioned dynamic program for constructing optimal offers over a planning horizon, 
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which uses a two-stage approach whose computational time increases at a substantially 
slower rate than previously published algorithms as the problem size increases, and thus 
is able to solve more practical problems.  
 
Another significant contribution of this thesis is the combination of dynamic 
programming with a decision analysis or branching structure, where the branches 
represent overall macro-states that either the market or the generator can be in at any 
given time. This technique has been developed as a general solution approach, and as 
such its application is not limited to the offer optimisation problem explored in this 
thesis. 
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Chapter 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the mid 1980s, centrally managed electricity systems around the world have 
gradually been deregulated, forming markets in which multiple generation companies 
compete for the right to supply electricity to meet demand. The idea behind such 
deregulation is that the introduction of competition will increase incentives to improve 
operational costs of these facilities and is also likely to produce competitive results, 
whereby electricity is provided at marginal cost (Gross & Finlay (2000)). However, 
under a deregulated framework, there is no requirement for the generators to reveal their 
true cost structures through offers at this level, and hence there is potential to “game” the 
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market by inflating their supply offers above costs, thus forcing the market price above 
the desired competitive levels (Hao (1999)).  
 
In the New Zealand context, deregulation began in 1996 with ownership of generation 
capabilities being split between multiple state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private 
companies, and contestability introduced to the distribution sector by allowing open 
access to the network. This produced three groups of market participants; generators, 
distributors, and retailers. Under this new market structure, the role of the government is 
to ensure that electricity is delivered in an efficient, reliable, and environmentally 
sustainable manner to all classes of consumer (Barton (2000a)).  
 
There were many reasons behind the introduction of restructuring and deregulation in 
New Zealand, in addition to the desire to produce competitive market outcomes. Barton 
(1998) proposes that one of the foremost motivations was to avoid repeating the 
mistakes of the past. Debatably, one of these key mistakes was the implementation of 
the six “Think Big” energy development projects proposed in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s, by the then Minister of Energy for the National Party, Bill Birch. In 1988, it was 
calculated by Treasury that these projects had made the nation $1.3 billion poorer. The 
problem was that uneconomical investments had been made for political reasons 
(attempting to recover economically from the oil shocks of the 1970’s) that would not 
have been made under commercial scrutiny of a privatised generation company (the 
clearest example being the Clyde Dam project).  
 
Naturally, market restructuring alters the problems and issues that are faced by the 
participants, and hence new research is required to explore these issues. Specifically, 
electricity market optimisation modelling work has traditionally focused on the cost 
minimisation of the entire market as a whole (for example, Read (1979)). Clearly this 
goal is no longer appropriate, and as such, the focus of much research work has changed 
to the optimisation of behaviour by various players in the market.  
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1.2 Background 
 
As explained in Mco (2003), the New Zealand market is predominantly hydro-based, 
with hydro generation accounting for 60% of the total generation capacity and the 
remainder made up through gas, coal, and geothermal resources. Although there are 
many market nodes, there are two distinct market regions, corresponding to the two 
main islands of the country (North and South). These regions are joined by a single 
inter-connector, known as the high voltage direct current, or HVDC, link. Resulting 
from the deregulation of the New Zealand market, there are eight generation companies 
(supply-side) along with seven electricity retailers and several large industrial companies 
(demand-side) competing in the market, with many companies falling into both the 
demand and supply categories. In every half-hour period of the day, each of the 
generators provides a set of offer stacks1 and each of the demand-side participants 
provides a set of bid stacks to the central market coordinator, for each of many coming 
periods2. From a generator’s point of view, for each of these periods they are allowed to 
provide a five-stepped offer stack for every generation unit that they operate, or 
alternatively, they can aggregate their offers to a station–level, or even a block-level3. 
These offer stacks are effectively a supply of different volumes of electricity at various 
prices, which may or may not be accepted by the market coordinator. This acceptance 
depends on many factors, including electricity demand from the retailers and some large 
consumers, the offers from competing generators, and certain physical constraints on the 
electricity network. Once all offer and bid stacks are submitted, the market coordinator, 
or New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM4), takes all this information for each single 
                                                 
1 An offer stack is a set of prices at which the generator is prepared to supply successive blocks of 
electricity to the market. 
2 Offers and bids are made for all periods from 2 hours away from the current time (offers can only be 
changed within two hours of real-time if there is a good reason behind the change), to the end of the 
current day if it is before 1pm, or to the end of the following day if it is after 1pm. The only binding offers 
or bids are those that are made on the nearest period, as there will be opportunities for all the others to be 
changed. 
3 A block is a set of units or stations that may be dispatched together. In other words, dispatch that is 
allocated by the central coordinator to a unit within the block may in fact be generated by any of the 
stations or units within that block. This concept is known as “block dispatch”. 
4 The NZEM is a commodity exchange for wholesale electricity trading in the New Zealand market, in 
which the bulk of electricity generated in New Zealand is sold to large commercial end users and to 
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period individually and produces a dispatch (or pre-dispatch) schedule to minimise the 
overall cost of meeting demand for the country as a whole, while accounting for 
transmission constraints and losses. A simplified version of this model is presented in 
Alvey, Goodwin, Ma, Streiffert, & Sun (1998). If we ignore these spatial, transmission 
aspects of the market, and thus consider the entire market to be located at a single 
market node, then this can easily be explained as the intersection of the aggregated 
market demand and supply stacks, as demonstrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.1: Single-Node Electricity Market Clearing Process 
 
Because the market coordinator optimises the market for a single period at a time, any 
internal constraints faced by the generators must be accounted for within their own 
offers, contrary to what is the case in some other markets (such as the pre-2001 England 
and Wales market, as discussed in Gross, Finlay, & Deltas (1998) and Finlay (1995)). 
 
1.3 Scope  
 
When modelling the electricity market, there are several unique features that distinguish 
it from other standard commodity or financial markets. For example:  
                                                                                                                                                
energy retailers who in turn sell their electricity to their relatively low-volume customers in the retail 
market. 
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‐ Electricity cannot be easily stored for any length of time, and so flows and 
consumption/supply must be continuously balanced in real-time in order to maintain 
the correct system frequency.  
‐ Exact directional flows of electricity cannot be decided by a human controller, as 
they are governed by the laws of physics.  
‐ Ownership of power on communal transmission lines cannot be distinguished. 
‐ In the short-run at least, there is little or no substitution for electricity, so demand is 
highly inelastic within this horizon. 
‐ Generation investment is very capital intensive, lumpy, and requires a long lead 
time, which makes entry into the market very risky. 
‐ Reservoir levels in a river system are highly inter-related, with release from one 
generator resulting in an increased level for the next reservoir downstream. 
‐ There are complicated joint constraints in the network. For example, the use of 1 
MW of incremental generation at one location could increase flow on a particular, 
constrained, transmission line elsewhere in the network. This could potentially block 
production of more than 1 MW at another location, depending on their relative 
contributions to electricity flow on the constrained line. Hence, increase in 
generation at one node in the network can decrease capacity in another. 
‐ Both supply and demand are very weather dependent, often in an inversely 
correlated manner. For example, colder weather in the winter might increase 
demand, while inhibiting snow melt and thus reducing supply. 
 
These unique features are discussed in many papers, including Rudkevich, Duckworth, 
& Rosen (1998), Hogan (1997), Counsell & Evans (2003) and MED (2000). 
 
In fact, the New Zealand market is even more challenging in its uniqueness. For one 
thing, a significant portion of generation is located far from the areas of major demand, 
making transmission especially important. Our high hydro dependency (about 65% of 
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capacity) combined with low maximum storage levels of about 15%5 of national 
demand or 8 weeks use (as opposed to some countries overseas with years worth of 
storage capacity) make New Zealand particularly vulnerable to sustained variations in 
conditions. In addition, the market is small and isolated, as opposed to areas in Europe 
and the Americas (such as discussed in Hammons, Rudnick, & Barroso (2002)), which 
have vast interconnected networks between countries. 
 
As previously mentioned, the new goal of electricity market research is commonly the 
optimisation of behaviour of various market participants, and in particular, of the 
generators providing electricity into this market. These generators face strategic and 
operational issues on varying time scales: 
 
Long-term planning models consider time horizons in the scale of many years, and 
involve decisions about the commission of new plant, in addition to other strategic 
issues. 
 
Medium-term planning models consider time horizons in the scale of many weeks or 
months. Decisions may be either strategic or operational, and may involve the overall 
plan for the use of limited fuel resources or commitment decisions for inflexible plant. 
 
Short-term decision making models consider time horizons in the scale of hours or days, 
and decisions involve the specific commitment and offering decisions of all generation 
units under their control. 
 
This thesis addresses the optimisation of short-term offers provided to the market by 
generators with fuel restrictions, both hydro and fuel-limited thermal. In particular, we 
deal with many of the intertemporal issues and constraints that they face, including start-
up and shut-down restrictions, minimum up and down times, stochastic rest-of-market 
behaviour, and the allocation of their limited fuel over the planning horizon. Our 
approach is to develop a stochastic dynamic program to optimise the offering strategy 
                                                 
5 Source: Tipping, Read, & McNickle (2004) 
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for the planning horizon, subject to market uncertainty. In the modern market context, it 
is of great importance to the generation companies to develop such tools to help select 
the offer stacks that will lead to the greatest profits in any given circumstance.  
 
In order to derive advanced analytical results in the optimisation of offering behaviour 
with respect to intertemporal issues, various simplifications are assumed throughout this 
thesis. The main simplification is in our exclusion of spatial effects. These spatial effects 
can be split into two distinct groupings; locational-type spatial effects in the 
transmission system and hydro-type spatial effects, which can possibly exist at single 
nodes of the network. Locational effects relate primarily to transmission constraints and 
losses in the network, Kirchoff’s Voltage and Current Laws (relating to the physics of 
electricity flow, and explained in Hobbs, Metzler, & Pang (2000)) and nodal pricing. 
This thesis makes the assumption that transmission is lossless and unconstrained, thus 
ignoring these locational considerations. As such, potential for congestion gaming (as 
reported by Seeley, Lawarree, & Liu (2000)) is also not considered. The hydro-type 
spatial effects relate to flow-of-river considerations. Physical distances, as such, between 
consecutive hydro-reservoirs or generators need not be considered, however the time (or 
flow) delays between consecutive reservoirs are important. Li, Hsu, Svoboda, Tseng, & 
Johnson (1997), for example, reports that the release from one reservoir affects the 
capacity of downstream reservoirs and therefore that next unit’s generating options, 
depending on flow delays. This relationship is not perfectly correlated; that is, some of 
this downstream generation can be deferred or brought forward as preferred by the 
owner of the system. This is a well-defined area of literature known as reservoir 
management, and as such is addressed only briefly in this thesis. Additionally, we 
consider energy-only offers, ignoring the complicating factors of the markets for reserve 
and other ancillary services, which are discussed in David & Wen (2000).  
 
1.4 Research Contribution 
 
Despite the importance of intertemporal issues in the electricity offering problem, which 
will be demonstrated in this thesis, relatively little work in the literature has been 
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devoted to dealing with these issues in conjunction with market uncertainty. This thesis 
presents two new stochastic dynamic programming algorithms that optimise the supply 
behaviour over a short-term planning horizon of a generator with limited fuel, where the 
stochastic rest-of-market behaviour and pricing outcomes is correlated over time. The 
difference between the two algorithms is in the way that they consider correlation 
between market states in consecutive periods.  
 
The first algorithm considers a single Markov chain for each period, which provides the 
probability of observing a particular residual demand curve in this period, given that we 
know the residual demand curve that occurred in the previous period. The main 
contribution of this algorithm is in the application of a technique known as marginal cost 
patching. This technique enables us to separate the relatively straightforward, but highly 
inefficient two-level dynamic programming algorithm into a significantly more efficient 
two-phase dynamic program which has computational times that are practical with 
respect to real-life application. 
 
The second algorithm that we develop combines the methods of dynamic programming 
and decision analysis in a new approach with a wide range of potential applications, 
beyond the offering problem faced by generators that is primarily addressed in this 
thesis. The idea of the technique is to partition the state of the system of interest at each 
stage into discrete groups of possible system states, each associated with a particular 
macro-state. These macro-states represent overall, high-level states of the system at the 
given stage, where transitions between these macro-states are either probabilistic or 
based on an internal decision by the decision maker. With respect to the application of 
this technique to the electricity offering problem, sets of residual demand curves that 
could occur under a particular macro-state are grouped together. These macro-states 
could be based on external market scenarios (such as a significant interconnector being 
binding or non-binding) or on internal operating decisions that the generator has made 
(offering aggressively or defensively, for example). Under the external scenarios, water 
value curves for the alternative future macro-states are combined probabilistically at the 
point in time where the uncertainty is to be resolved, while under internal decisions, 
 37
water value curves are combined depending on the optimal decision from each reservoir 
level at the point in time where the decision is to be made. Dividing the overall set of 
possible residual demand curves in the method proposed by this second model has many 
benefits, most notably that of an improved representation of the uncertainty and decision 
structures in the real-world. 
 
In summary, the key contributions of this thesis are: 
 
• The development of a marginal cost based offer patching theory, which can 
significantly reduce the computational complexity of the offer strategy 
development problem. Based on this theory, we will develop and implement a 
two-phase dynamic programming algorithm, which separates the construction of 
offers into separate Pre-Processing and Real-Time phases, in a manner not 
previously suggested in the literature. 
• We will determine theoretical extensions to this algorithm to deal with a 
combination of intertemporal constraints and considerations, including market 
correlation and uncertainty, fuel limitations, and unit rules (including ramp rates) 
that have not previously been considered together, while still maintaining 
feasible computational times, with respect to realistic marketplace requirements. 
These extensions will also be implemented. 
• The development of a new technique that combines the concepts of dynamic 
programming and decision analysis by building a branching structure into the 
overall state of the generator and the market at any point in time. As well as 
being able to better represent a scenario that has this type of structure, this 
branching will significantly reduce the computational complexity of the 
algorithm. 
 
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
 
As detailed in Section 1.3, the focus of this thesis is on the development of offering 
strategies by electricity generators, particularly dealing with intertemporal issues and 
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constraints that they face in the real-world. Chapters 2 and 3 provide details on the 
context of the problem and its associated literature, reviewing electricity market 
structures, along with factors that affect supply behaviour, including intertemporal 
issues. Chapters 4 and 5 address the problem of constructing optimal single-period 
offers under market uncertainty, from an analytic perspective. In particular, Chapter 5 
looks at how optimal offer segments corresponding to fixed marginal cost levels can be 
patched together to produce the optimal offer for a generator with a stepped marginal 
cost curve.  
 
Chapter 6 shows how the marginal cost patching concepts can be used to separate the 
obvious dynamic programming algorithm for offer construction into a pre-processing 
and a real-time phase, with improved computational efficiency over those currently 
presented in the literature. The algorithm is designed to consider such complexities as 
correlated stochastic market outcomes and limited fuel availability. Chapter 7 develops a 
Decision Analysis Dynamic Programming (DADP) framework and applies this new 
technique to the problem of electricity market offer optimisation. The technique enables 
us to better represent the decision and uncertainty processes of the real-world, when the 
electricity system can at any given point be considered to be in one of a set of high-level 
“macro-states”. Chapter 8 presents a detailed experimental design and tests the two 
algorithms that are developed in Chapters 6 and 7, first against a model from the 
literature that considers similar complexities, and then against simplified algorithms, to 
determine the value of considering each of these complexities. 
 
Chapters 9 and 10 then address various possible extensions to the algorithms that are 
presented in earlier chapters. In particular, Chapter 9 presents modifications to the 
algorithms to deal with a further set of intertemporal constraints, known as generation 
unit operational rules. These include: 
 
• Minimum feasible generation level 
• Start-up and shut-down costs 
• Minimum up and down times 
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• Fixed start-up process 
• Ramp rate restrictions 
 
Experimental results under these models are also presented, confirming hypotheses 
regarding offering behaviour presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 10 considers how 
we might go about dealing with more difficult extensions which are considered beyond 
the scope of this thesis, including multiple reservoir problems, and gas market 
interaction. 
 
In summary, the remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: 
 
• Chapter 2 provides context to the electricity market offer optimisation problem, 
including a discussion of intertemporal issues and their importance. 
 
• Chapter 3 outlines the literature regarding optimisation of offering behaviour, 
with an emphasis on approaches to offer construction over short-term horizons 
that deal with various intertemporal issues. 
 
• Chapter 4 looks at how optimal monotone offers for a single period can be 
constructed analytically under various forms of market uncertainty. 
 
• Chapter 5 develops a marginal cost patching technique, which enables segments 
of existing optimal offers to be patched together to create the new optimal offer 
under changed circumstances. 
 
• Chapter 6 shows how the marginal cost patching concepts can be used to 
separate the obvious dynamic programming algorithm for offer construction into 
a pre-processing and a real-time phase, with improved computational efficiency 
over those currently presented in the literature. 
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• Chapter 7 develops a Decision Analysis Dynamic Programming (DADP) 
framework and applies this new technique to the problem of electricity market 
offer optimisation. 
 
• Chapter 8 presents computational results from the two algorithms developed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
• Chapter 9 presents extensions to the algorithm presented in Chapters 6 and 7 to 
deal with the intertemporal constrains implied by generation unit operational 
rules.  
 
• Chapter 10 outlines possible extensions to the algorithms presented in the thesis, 
to consider complexities such as multiple reservoirs, and gas market interaction. 
 
• Chapter 11 draws conclusions and proposes areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2  
 
ELECTRICITY MARKETS, INFLUENCING 
FACTORS ON SUPPLY AND INTERTEMPORAL 
ISSUES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Many electricity markets around the world are currently heading in the direction of 
deregulation, and are thus facing major decisions on the structure of the new markets 
that they will create. These decisions will have a direct influence on the offering strategy 
that a participant will choose to employ, and thus their potential to gain market power. 
Therefore, we begin this chapter with a discussion of the various types of market 
structures and their likely influence on market power. This discussion will also provide a 
context for the offer optimisation problem faced by generators in the New Zealand 
market. We then go on to explore the various factors that influence supply and demand 
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decisions, before identifying and explaining the different intertemporal constraints and 
issues that are faced by generators providing electricity into a market of the described 
structure. 
 
2.2 Market Structure and Market Power 
 
2.2.1 Market Structures 
 
Throughout the world there are, and have been, many different deregulated market 
designs implemented and/or proposed, with ongoing debate about which particular 
design will obtain the closest real-world results to the ultimate goal of a completely 
efficient generation process (for example, Bower & Bunn (1999), Drayton-Bright (1997) 
and Denton, Rassenti, & Smith (2001)). This complete efficiency refers to the situation 
whereby the aggregate supply curve accurately reflects system marginal costs and thus 
the load is being met with the lowest total generation cost. The market governance body 
should be designed to minimise the loss of efficiency that occurs when we stray from the 
merit-order dispatch6, as reported by Baron (1972). For example, the market coordinator 
gets the impression that the generator offering the lowest price is the most efficient 
generator, but if all generators are offering at above marginal cost, then it may be that 
they are just the most risk averse firm, trying to ensure their own dispatch. 
 
Markets should also be designed to give pricing signals to encourage consumers to 
conserve electricity at the most important times to do so, and to encourage generators to 
build new capacity where and when it is forecast to be needed and not before7. The 
concept of nodal pricing (having a different price corresponding to the dual of the 
energy conservation constraint at each node in the transmission network) is one method 
towards giving correct operational pricing signals and signals for siting new plants 
(accounting for all costs and transmission constraints). 
 
                                                 
6 Merit-order dispatch is where electricity with the lowest generation cost, rather than electricity with the 
lowest offer price is dispatched first 
7 Barton (1998) 
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Some of the key differences between various market designs are as follows: 
 
‐ Pool vs. Bilateral Exchange Markets. In a pool market, the Independent System 
Operator (ISO) determines all dispatch levels at a fixed market clearing price, 
whereas in a market based on bilateral exchanges, each participant must arrange its 
own trades at a negotiated price. Singh, Hao, & Papalexopoulos (1998) suggests that 
the bilateral market is motivated by free market competition as opposed to the pool, 
which is motivated by the need to include special characteristics of electricity 
networks such as transmission constraints, in the trading process. Ignoring these 
characteristics is a problem with the bilateral system as, for example, individual 
firms have no reason or incentive to consider the transmission constraints. A type of 
financial instrument known as a contract for differences (or CfD) gets around this 
problem by enabling bilateral-type trades in the pool system 
‐ Double Auctions vs. One-Sided Auctions. A one-sided auction is one where the 
demand is considered to be completely inelastic (that is, elasticity = 0), and thus the 
total quantity traded will be independent of the shape of the aggregate market supply 
curve (only market price will be affected). On the other hand, a double auction 
allows demand-side bidding in addition to supply-side and so both quantity traded 
and market price are dependent on the shape of the supply curve. Demand-side 
bidding is investigated by Lamont & Rajan (1997) and Barton (1998), with respect 
to the limitations on efficient bidding due to lack of information. Barton suggests 
that the ultimate goal of disaggregation of electricity industries is to allow homes 
and businesses to shop around for electricity and benefit by changing consumption 
patterns. To do this would require smart metering and an ability to convey greater 
levels of information to these customers in real-time.  
‐ Static vs. Dynamic Auctions. This differentiation refers to whether the offer stack 
information is sealed permanently or if the market participants can observe their 
rival’s offers and update their own offers accordingly for the next (repeated) round 
of offering. 
‐ Required structure of the offer stacks (that is, complex offers vs. single-part offers). 
In some markets such as the old, pre-2001 England and Wales market, offers were 
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requested in a complex 27-part form which included offers for start-up costs and 
other complex features. However, in markets such as that of New Zealand, Australia 
and Norway, offers are submitted in the form of a single-part offer stack with a 
single price offered for each block of energy. Generators in these markets must 
therefore internalise into their offers all the complex information that is defined 
explicitly in the complex offers8. 
‐ Offer Submission and Adjustment Timelines. Some markets (again, such as the old, 
pre-2001 England and Wales market) require that a single offer stack is submitted 
for each generating unit the day before its associated period, and that this offer will 
remain in place for 24 hours. The offer can only be adjusted in the case of a 
breakdown (such changes are scrutinised by the market operator) or under special 
circumstances such as unit start-up. Alternatively, other markets allow specification 
of separate (“sculpted”) offers for each period of the corresponding day, which can 
be changed at any time up to not long before the real-time dispatch model is run. 
This changing of offers is known as re-offering, and may be restricted in the 
parameters of the offer function that you can change (that is, by allowing changes to 
either the price level, or quantity offered). This re-offering may also be restricted in 
terms of the variation allowed between consecutive offers, in a manner such as that 
proposed for market activity rules by Wilson (1997). These rules help to ensure that 
correct pricing signals are given in the early offering iterations (that is, without them, 
there is little incentive for a generator to give a meaningful offer until the latest 
possible time). 
‐ Discriminatory vs. Uniform Pricing. Discriminatory pricing means that generators 
are paid the amount at which they offered their dispatched quantity (leading to much 
flatter offers, which attempt to estimate what the market clearing point will be), 
whereas uniform pricing pays all generators the market clearing price for their 
dispatched generation quantity (adjusted for marginal loss factors). 
 
                                                 
8 There is actually a whole spectrum of possible market requirements. In the NZEM for example, the 
market clearance model does actually take into account forward-looking ramp-rates of generation units. 
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To put these market types into context, both the New Zealand and Australian electricity 
markets (NZEM and the NEM, respectively) operate a pool system, with a double 
auction (that is, demand-side bidding is possible), allowing re-offering of the offer 
stacks up towards real-time. Both the markets are repeated dynamic games, whereby 
dispatch and pre-dispatch information is released in real-time back to the market. 
Although both use single-part offers, the NEM requires specification of ten price steps, 
whereas the NZEM allows only five. 
  
Many authors have published work on this topic based on the markets of various 
countries, such as Barton (2000a) (New Zealand – structuring of market governance 
bodies), Bower & Bunn (1999) (England/Wales market – bilateral trading vs. pooled 
system), Sakk, Thomas, & Zimmerman (1997) (Generic market – iterative offering vs. 
single offers), etc. There have also been many studies into the way that markets should 
be or should have been restructured (for example, Sheble (1996a), Drayton-Bright 
(1997), Bower & Bunn (1999) and Drayton-Bright (1997)). 
 
2.2.2 Determining Market Dispatch and Pricing 
 
Market dispatch, transmission and pricing decisions in most pool markets are made by 
the central coordinator or ISO, by solving a large linear program in order to minimise 
the total cost of meeting demand at all the system nodes. This optimisation is performed 
given the offer stacks (supply) from the generators and the demand bids from electricity 
retailers and some large firms or institutions (aluminium smelters, for example). If 
transmission issues are set aside, this is simply explained as the coordination of 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply (both step functions). This concept is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.1, whereby the heavy blue line represents the combined offer 
stacks of the generators in the market, and the light blue line represents the combination 
of all demand. The large black dot denotes the dispatch point at a market clearing price 
of $15, and a total quantity traded of around 39 MWh’s.  
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Figure 2.1 Example of dispatch by equating aggregate demand and supply stacks 
 
Note that in a centralised market, the total cost minimised by the dispatch model is based 
on actual costs of generation, whereas in a deregulated market, the total cost is based on 
prices submitted by generating units, which may well be above their generation costs for 
the corresponding blocks of power. It is also important to note that although only around 
10% of all power is traded at the market clearing price as determined above (the rest 
being accounted for with pre-priced contracts for differences), the spot price has a great 
impact on the level of new contract prices.  
 
2.2.3 Market Power in an Oligopoly Market 
 
The literature generally considers the electricity market to take the form of an oligopoly 
(or duopoly in the case of the England and Wales market) due to the limited number of 
producers, the transmission constraints, the large investment costs, and transmission 
losses (which discourage some seller/buyer trades). Examples of papers that explicitly 
make this assumption are Klemperer & Meyer (1989), Garcia, Campos-Nanez, & 
Reitzes (2005), Newberry (1991) and Green (1996). Due to this structure, operators can 
be expected to wield some degree of market power and can therefore expect to profit 
 47
from offering in a strategic manner, either by pushing up the market price or by 
withholding capacity. The extent to which this market power exists depends greatly on 
the structure of the given electricity market. 
 
Hogan (1997) defines this market power as “the ability to profitably maintain prices 
above the competitive level by restricting output to lower than competitive levels”. 
According to Culy & Read (1994), there are numerous economic consequences from 
gaming (or the use of market power), including the following:  
• The structure of spot prices may not reflect the structure of marginal costs (bad 
signalling),  
• The benefits of hydro coordination and merit order operation are compromised,  
• Long-term contract prices may not reflect the long-run marginal costs of 
investment in new supply, and  
• Incentives for entry may be compromised.  
 
In addition, Anderson & Philpott (2001) note that most classical financial asset-pricing 
models are unable to deal with electricity spot prices, as they assume price is exogenous 
to the offering decisions that are made. Therefore, they cannot be used to optimise offers 
of a generator with sufficient market power to affect prices (such as an oligopolistic 
firm). 
 
Due to the negative consequences of market power described in Culy & Read (1994), 
markets should be designed in such a way to mitigate the potential use of market power 
as much as possible. Throughout the literature, many factors are identified as having 
potential to affect the degree to which market power can be exercised. These include the 
following: 
 
‐ Market concentration (as defined by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index) and nature of 
the generation break-up (Rudkevich, Duckworth, & Rosen (1998)). 
‐ Market design, structure and rules (for example, the required offer form), 
Rudkevich, Duckworth, & Rosen (1998). 
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‐ Elasticity of demand/Presence of demand-side bidding (Rudkevich, Duckworth, & 
Rosen (1998)). 
‐ Nature of the product (electricity has unique features that can be exploited), 
Rudkevich, Duckworth, & Rosen (1998).  
‐ Level of contracts held by the generation company. Both Kelman, Barroso, & 
Pereira (2001) and Villar & Rudnick (2003) demonstrate that market power is 
largely mitigated by adding physical/financial contracts (changing the objective 
function). 
‐ Capacity constraints of generators (Kelman, Barroso, & Pereira (2001)). 
‐ Threat of not being scheduled (Rudkevich, Duckworth, & Rosen (1998)). 
‐ Presence of a regulator (Green (1996)). 
‐ Transmission bottlenecks/constraints and their locations, as well as transmission 
pricing (Hobbs, Metzler, & Pang (2000)). 
‐ “Caution factors”. Culy & Read (1994) explains that it is not worth it to game for a 
small possible return, as there is risk involved and the firm’s reputation may be 
harmed. 
 
Many authors have researched this area, looking either at a) factors that affect the level 
of market power wielded by a firm, or b) choosing between a set of market structure 
choices in order to minimise the ability of firms to exercise market power. Rudkevich, 
Duckworth, & Rosen (1998) took the first approach, finding that more generating firms, 
higher capacity availability, and increased accuracy of demand forecasts lead to reduced 
potential for market power. In addition, to other papers take the first approach. Barroso, 
Fampa, Kelman, Pereira, & Lino (2002) consider a dynamic market model, where hydro 
generators attempt to maximise their revenues over multiple periods, finding that prices 
and revenues were increased by reducing output and decreasing water transfers from wet 
to dry seasons (compared with a centralised operation policy). Green & Newberry 
(1992) compares market power over a range of demand elasticities, and also under the 
assumptions of symmetric and asymmetric duopoly firms, finding that asymmetric firms 
lead to higher market prices than do symmetric.  His analysis suggests that the UK 
government had seriously underestimated the scope for exercising market power, prior 
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to their restructuring. Alternatively, Green (1996) took the second approach, comparing 
three policies for decreasing market power in the duopolistic UK market (partial 
divestiture, breaking up of large firms, and encouraging entry). He found that the first 
option is the best, as the second is politically infeasible and would lead to a loss of 
economies of scale, and the third option is inefficient if done in advance of need. Culy & 
Read (1994) also took this approach, comparing outcomes for different rules regarding 
the day-ahead form of offers (sculpted over each period versus. fixed for the whole day) 
over various contracting levels. They find that the sculpted offers actually appear to 
result in reduced gaming due to the limited ability to game up prices without explicit 
collusion. 
 
At this point, gaming and other effects on offering strategies should be distinguished. A 
generator is said to be “gaming the market” when it is attempting to influence the market 
clearing price so as to increase its own profits. This is essentially what the generators are 
attempting to achieve through the optimisation of their offers and re-offering process. 
Such gaming, which could be described as exploitation of market power, is a normal 
part of business behaviour. In an electricity marketplace, a regulator should only be 
concerned with gaming when it is suspected that a generator is abusing their market 
power. At an extreme level, market power abuse (or anti-competitive behaviour) may 
involve such strategies as capitalising on transmission constraints to raise regional prices 
to levels at which super-normal profits are achieved, or temporarily lowering prices to 
such levels that force competitors out of the market and discourage entry of new 
competitors. Although market power exploitation is legal, and abuse is not, a line 
between the two situations is very difficult and arbitrary to draw. Analytically thinking, 
it would be convenient to distinguish between any kind of gaming intended to increase 
profits and other drivers of offering patterns, such as a generator’s attitude towards risk, 
or internal linkages, which may imply similar effects for offers, but should not be 
considered gaming. For a discussion of the potential for market power abuse within the 
New Zealand market, refer to Murray & Stevenson (2005). 
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2.3 Determinants of Supply and Demand 
 
When a generator provides an offer into a pool electricity market, their resulting 
generation level, price received, and thus payoff, will clearly depend on the level of 
demand that occurs, in addition to the level and shape of the supply offers from the rival 
generators. Hence, in constructing optimal offers, these external decisions and the 
factors that influence them must be considered. 
 
2.3.1 Determinants of Demand 
 
Electricity demand is highly variable over different times of the year, different periods 
of a single day, and different days of the week. For example, demand in New Zealand 
peaks in the winter months as heating equipment is used, as opposed to Queensland, 
where demand peaks in the summer months as air conditioning use increases. Also, peak 
daily demand is usually around 6 – 6:30pm, as people arrive home from work, start to 
cook their dinners, heat/air condition their houses, and so on. In the short-run, demand is 
highly inelastic as there is very little time to move to other fuels such as gas, or for the 
general user to react at all. However, some large companies do bid demand stacks to the 
market and are thus sensitive to spot market prices (David & Wen (2000)). The general 
consumer is not affected by the spot price, as they are on fixed retail contracts, and so 
have no incentive to substitute their load away from periods of high spot prices (Barton 
(1999)). Therefore, determinants of demand levels include the time of year, time of day, 
weather, events, economic growth (long-term demand), and the availability of alternate 
fuels. There already exist many established demand forecasting methods, and as such, 
this thesis does not aim to contribute in this area. 
 
2.3.2 Determinants of Supply 
 
When constructing offers, there are a vast number of factors that need to be considered. 
Of course, the objective of the generating firm will determine the purpose for which 
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offers are constructed9. Throughout this thesis it will be assumed that the generators are 
rational, risk neutral and  incumbent (established) firms who seek to maximise their 
expected long-run profit. The various determinants of supply can be separated into those 
that affect the long-term supply strategy, and those which affect either the medium-term 
day-to-day planning problem, or the detailed hourly offering problem that the generators 
face. Some factors may fall into multiple categories. 
 
Long-Term Strategic Supply Determinants 
 
‐ Risk attitudes. A more risk averse generator would make lower-priced offers (they 
may even self-commit10 their contracted generation level and remove the possibility 
of their offers being on the margin) - Mielczarski, Michalik, & Widjaja (1999a). 
‐ Gaming attitudes. For example, a government-owned generation company may be 
less inclined to attempt to game the market than a privately-owned company11. 
‐ Threat of regulatory interventions. This relates to whether there is a credible market 
power monitoring process in place. In other words, does the regulator “punish” 
generators for behaving in an undesirable manner (from a market efficiency point of 
view)? For example, this is discussed in Barton (2000b). 
‐ Threat of new entry. There are many relevant factors that will determine the ease of 
entry for a new generator into the market. These relate to whether the political 
environment facilitates the new entry and whether existing companies can make life 
hard for the new entrants (for example, if a monopoly fuel supplier also owns a 
major existing generator). This is discussed in Newberry (1991) 
‐ Vertical market power issues. If a generation company also owns retail or fuel 
sources12, it may have implications on its wholesale offering strategy (Sheble 
(1996a)).  
                                                 
9 Many possible objectives can be hypothesised, such as maximising short-term profit, maximising 
expected value of profit in the long-run, recovering fixed costs, satisfying contract load, establishing a 
market share or presence, and signalling to competitors. 
10 Self commitment involves a generator offering part of its capacity at a very low negative price (e.g.       
-$5000/MWh) to ensure that at least this level of their capacity is dispatched. 
11 As a government-owned company are expected to be acting in the interests of the nation as a whole, 
rather than purely in the interests of their own profits. 
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‐ Supply mix of peakers13, intermediate and base load plants14 and the associated fuel 
prices. For example, South Australia has a lot of high cost peakers while Victoria has 
predominantly base load generation. 
‐ Location of the generators. It may be the case that a generator can take advantage of 
transmission bottlenecks, as discussed in Singh, Hao, & Papalexopoulos (1998) and 
Borenstein, Bushnell, & Stoft (2000). For example, if generation from the unit is 
essential to curing low voltage problems, the generation company may have a 
stranglehold on the market. This depends on the market design (e.g. there may be 
separate must-run reliability/voltage type arrangements in place for the system 
operator to be able to control the dispatch of the unit). 
‐ Ancillary service (reserve) issues. There may be implications on a generator’s 
energy offering strategy if they are a critical player in the reserve market. These 
implications are considered in both Singh (1999b) and Wen & David (2002) 
 
Medium-Term Planning Supply Determinants 
 
‐ Maintenance schedules. If a unit is broken down or having maintenance performed, 
then generation is unlikely from this unit, and will thus limit the capacity that can be 
offered (Mielczarski, Michalik, & Widjaja (1999a)). 
‐ Forced outages of generation capacity or breakdowns. This can truncate the 
aggregate offer stack by removing one or more of its (possibly infra-marginal) steps, 
potentially increasing the market clearing price. 
‐ Resource consents. Some hydro generators may be required to generate between 
certain levels for environmental reasons, such as to keep within reservoir level 
bounds. 
‐ Technical limitations (maximum generation levels, ramp rates, etc - Mielczarski, 
Michalik, & Widjaja (1999a)) 
                                                                                                                                                
12 Joint retail-generator ownership is a major issue in New Zealand and Australia. For example, Tarong 
Energy in Australia owns both a critical gas pipeline and generators at the two ends of the pipeline. 
13 Peakers are high-cost generation units that operate only in times of peak demand and thus high prices. 
14 Base load plants are low-cost generation units that should operate almost constantly, no matter what the 
market price.  
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‐ Market experience. Experience in the market may mean that a generator is able to 
recognise certain games being played by rival participants or possibly have greater 
knowledge of how demand patterns change. 
‐ Cost/availability of fuel. Availability of fuel is a big problem in New Zealand at 
present. Water reservoir levels are low due to lack of rainfall, affecting hydro 
capacity, coal stocks are too low to keep up with the desired levels of coal-fired 
generation, and it has recently been discovered that the Maui gas field is likely to run 
out of gas much sooner than expected. Because of this factor, prices in a hydro-
dominated market such as that of New Zealand or Norway tend to be highly 
correlated with weather patterns and thus hydro inflows. This issue is addressed for a 
generator in a deregulated market in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003). 
‐ Intertemporal considerations of expected price variation. For example, if a hydro 
generator expected very high demand and thus high prices later in the day, it may 
want to hold back its limited generation capacity until that time, if it has insufficient 
capacity to supply in all periods. Although, if all generators were to take this 
approach, of course the supply in that forecasted high price period would increase, 
resulting in lower prices. This is an issue that should be accounted for. 
‐ Offering strategy of rivals. This is of course a major determinant of a generator’s 
strategy, as it is these rival strategies, in combination with the market demand and 
their own strategies that determine the market dispatch quantities and prices, which 
determine profit levels. If a given generator were to persist with a given strategy 
over an extended period, it must realise that the rival’s strategies may respond 
accordingly. This is widely accepted in the literature, in papers such as Hobbs, 
Metzler, & Pang (2000), and Ferrero, Shahidehpour, & Ramesh (1997b). 
 
Short-Term Operational Supply Determinants 
 
‐ Recent market clearing prices. High-priced offers tend to follow periods with high 
prices15 (Mielczarski, Michalik, & Widjaja (1999a)). 
                                                 
15 Note that this point brings up the issue of causality. In other words, while high spot prices do drive up 
bids for future periods, in the reverse, it is also true that high bids cause high spot prices. 
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‐ Predicted peak (MW) and energy (MWh) patterns. A generator is likely to offer at 
higher prices if they expect higher demand, or that rivals will offer less capacity 
(Mielczarski, Michalik, & Widjaja (1999a)). 
‐ Government policies such as regulatory involvement in the form of price-
controls/caps, or actual market restrictions in terms of the shape of supply offers 
(Barton (2000b)). 
‐ Generation costs. 
‐ Contract levels. Many studies have looked at the effect of differing contract levels on 
the optimal choice of offer stack. Mielczarski, Michalik, & Widjaja (1999a) believe 
that contract levels are in fact one of the main determinants of an offer. It is clear 
that as contract levels increase, the generator actually receives the market clearing 
price for less of its dispatched quantity and therefore the incentive to raise prices 
decreases. In particular, Wolak (2000) demonstrates that in the extreme case where a 
generator is over contracted, then they may actually gain by encouraging the market 
clearing price below their own marginal costs. In this situation, they gain because 
they are required to buy power from the spot market and re-sell it at their contracted 
price (thus, the lower the market clearing price, the better off that they are). 
 
In addition, if a generator has a positive probability of being on the margin16, they have 
an incentive to increase the price on the corresponding offer step, in order to increase the 
price received for all infra-marginal units17 supplied. Thus, the generator is trying to 
select prices for each of its generation blocks in order to balance the gain from getting a 
higher price for all units dispatched against the increased probability of not being 
dispatched at all on the given block. Similar incentives apply to non-marginal offers, 
whereby reducing the quantity offered at lower (non-marginal) prices may force the 
dispatch point to a higher step on the aggregate supply curve and thus result in a higher 
price level (see Figure 2.1). Reflecting this, Read (2001) notes that the role of offer 
curves is to, in a given period, automatically deal with variations around the expected 
                                                 
16 On the margin means to be providing the final and most expensive unit of electricity and thus setting the 
price. 
17 Infra-marginal units are those that do not set the price 
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conditions. Therefore, beliefs about likely variations in the residual demand18 will have 
an impact on the shape of the curves. Additionally, David (1993) states that “prices 
offered by suppliers for blocks of generation reflect the portion of load that the supplier 
hopes to win”. 
 
Importantly, we note that many of the supply factors considered for the medium and 
short-term decisions are effectively moving the short-run marginal cost curve for 
generators with fuel limitations. For example, if particularly high prices have been 
observed in recent periods (or expected hydro inflow levels fall), then the expected level 
of available fuel will be lower than anticipated, thus increasing the value that should be 
placed on the fuel that remains. 
 
Supply Determinants to Consider 
 
While it is important to take into account as many of the above factors as possible, in 
any model created of a deregulated electricity market the factors taken into account will 
depend heavily on the perspective from which the research is approached. This thesis 
focuses on the medium and short-term issues in order to create models that can develop 
good offers in a real-time scenario from a generator’s perspective (thus potentially also 
enabling regulators to understand how and why the generators behave in the way that 
they do). 
 
2.4 Intertemporal Issues 
 
The focus of this thesis is on the impact of intertemporal linkages19 and considerations 
on participant supply offers, particularly with respect to those linkages that arise in 
hydroelectric systems such as that of New Zealand or Norway, or with inflexible fuel-
limited thermal units used elsewhere. 
                                                 
18 Residual demand is the net demand function obtained by subtracting the supply offers of rival 
participants from the market demand function. 
19 The term “intertemporal linkages” is taken to mean the connections between multiple periods of the 
electricity market, particularly with respect to supply offers made by the generators. 
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The nature of these intertemporal linkages is diverse, and can be broken into three 
categories: 
 
1) Linkages within a generating company. This relates to technical costs or constraints 
of the generating units, such as start-up and shut-down costs, ramp rate restrictions 
and minimum up- and down-times (these issues are more of a factor for thermal 
generators). In addition, for a hydro generator, linkages also relate to water 
considerations such as limited total water availability over time, flow delays between 
consecutive hydro reservoirs, and the need to account for reservoir balance 
constraints, given stochastic inflows over time. 
2) Effects due to forecasting of market clearing prices and system load. This relates to 
efficiently planning and preparing for upcoming peak price/load periods. For 
example, if a hydro generator forecasts that the price will be high later in the day, 
then it may wish to hold back its (limited) generation capacity until that time. 
3) Reactions of other participants in the offering process. Following from point 2, a 
particular generator may be able to estimate how its rivals will be forecasting prices 
and load, and behaving as a result. There is also a much more subtle linkage that 
involves participants hypothesising about the rival’s response to the offers that it 
might make during the re-offering20 process as real-time is approached.  
 
Song (2000a) partially sums up the motivation for this thesis when he says “The general 
literature proposes that the optimal strategy is one that maximises expected return for 
one bidding period. But, in the daily electricity market, the decision makers bid may 
influence the future market or their own market position in the future”. In other words, 
the current period’s offer will affect the state of the market in the future and the 
generator’s own future offering capabilities. Given that market participants are rationally 
concerned with expected payoff in the long run rather than pay-off in a particular period, 
such intertemporal linkages are very important. 
                                                 
20 Re-offering is the process of re-submitting theoretical offers to the market coordinator, up until the time 
that the market is going to be cleared (at which time, offers becoming binding). 
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While previous work has considered some of the above-mentioned features (for 
example, Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003), Philpott (2004) or Scott (1998)), no published 
research has successfully dealt with any of these features comprehensively, while also 
considering market uncertainty. The particular issue that this thesis addresses is that of 
the practical construction of optimal offers of electricity in the short-term from hydro or 
fuel-limited thermal stations, while considering correlated and uncertain market 
scenarios, and the various physical intertemporal costs and constraints that these units 
face. The remainder of this chapter presents some examples of the importance of dealing 
with intertemporal issues in the offering context. 
 
2.4.1 The Importance of Intertemporal Issues 
 
For both hydro and thermal generation units, the importance and significance of 
intertemporal characteristics and considerations can easily be demonstrated. Below, we 
demonstrate through a couple of simple examples how ignoring such considerations can 
be detrimental to the performance of a generating company. These examples consider 
deterministic scenarios for ease of comprehension, but the results apply equally (or 
possibly even more so) to stochastic scenarios. This is demonstrated later, in Chapter 10 
of this thesis. Also, they make the assumption that beyond the monotonically non-
decreasing requirement, there are no restrictions on the form of the offers. 
 
Non-Monotonicity of the Optimal Offer Curve 
 
It has been shown in Drayton-Bright (1997) that for a hydro operator it is not possible to 
construct a monotonically non-decreasing supply function that will achieve an efficient 
outcome over multiple periods. This is due to the linked nature of the periods, and 
therefore means that intertemporal linkages make the electricity offering problem non-
trivial even before gaming or risk are considered. The following example demonstrates 
why this is the case. 
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Figure 2.2 illustrates two potential price paths over a 48 period horizon, while Figure 2.3 
provides the associated optimal generation paths21 for a single hydro generation unit, 
taking into account many types of intertemporal constraints. Note that the price paths 
account for the fact that the unit’s generating level will affect the price, using fairly 
simple linear residual demand curves for each period. Specifically, in Figure 2.2, the 
blue line shows a long-run expected daily price path. Consider that we observe a price in 
the current period (period 1) near the start of the day that is above the long-run average. 
If we assume that this means we expect it to be a high price day (a reasonable 
assumption), then our estimates of price will increase for all periods in the horizon, up to 
the pink line. This particular example assumes that if the price is x% above the long-run 
average in this period, then it will be x% above the long-run average for all periods 
remaining in the horizon, and thus the magnitude of the increases will be more extreme 
for peak periods. 
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Figure 2.2 Two Potential Price Paths over a 48 Period Horizon 
 
                                                 
21 These paths have been determined through the use of a deterministic dynamic program that takes into 
account limited fuel, in addition to many intertemporal unit operational rules. 
 59
Generation over Time
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48
Time
G
en
er
at
io
n 
Le
ve
l
Generation Path
New Generation Path
Minimum Gen
Maximum Gen
 
 
Figure 2.3 Corresponding Optimal Generation Schedules 
 
If the unit being considered is hydro, then there may be a limited total generation 
capacity over the day associated with water restrictions. As a result of the increases in 
expected prices over the horizon, this unit’s optimal generation schedule will change. It 
will want to generate more at the peak periods (which now have even more extreme 
prices), and so must trade off on generation at the off-peak periods in order to still meet 
the limited total generation constraints. In particular, Figure 2.3 shows that in period 1, 
the optimal generation level has fallen from its previous level. In other words, despite 
the fact that price has increased for this period, the optimal generation level has fallen. 
Or alternatively, the higher the price is in this current off-peak period, the less that the 
unit will desire to generate. This implies a backward sloping optimal supply function 
rather than a traditional forward sloping one, as required by market conditions. If we 
take this example further and consider multiple potential price paths ranging from all 
prices being 50% above the long-run average down to 40% below the long-run average, 
we can form an “offer curve” for each period that will produce an optimal dispatch 
schedule if any one of these potential scenarios were to actually occur. These offers can 
hence be considered to account for the stochasticity in price under very simple 
circumstances. Take the “offer curve” for period 30 for example, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
We observe that as the price for this period increases from 30% below, up to 50% above 
the long-run average, the optimal quantity to generate in that period reduces. Thus, a 
backward-sloping offer curve is produced. Note that moving from 40% to 30% below 
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the long-run average, the total water restriction is not binding, and so the offer appears 
as forwards sloping. Examining all of these “offers” together enables an interesting, and 
logical observation of a “fan effect”. The lower the overall vertical position of the offer 
curve (and thus the more off-peak the period is), the more backward sloping the optimal 
offer curve is for that period. As we move through to periods with mid-range prices, the 
offers become close to vertical, and then for the peak periods, the offers are very 
forward-sloping. Hence producing a set of offers that resemble a fan. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Optimal Offers for all Periods Considering Eight Possible Price Paths 
 
The problem with this though, is that backward sloping offers are not generally 
permissible under market restrictions, and so the closest that can be achieved in these 
off-peak or shoulder off-peak periods is to make the offers vertical at some generation 
quantity (a Cournot-style offer), and move these quantities as time progresses, 
depending on what has been learnt about the state of the market in that day. This 
confirms the findings of Drayton-Bright (1997), that one cannot construct a 
monotonically increasing supply function that will be efficient over multiple periods. 
 
Joint Effect of Many Intertemporal Constraints on a Hydro Unit 
 
This second demonstration (Figure 2.5) of the importance of considering intertemporal 
characteristics of the generating units and of the marketplace compares three generation 
paths over a given price series: 
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1. The optimal generation path, accounting for intertemporal linkages (blue) 
2. The naïve desired generation path produced by optimising each period 
individually (brown) 
3. The actual generation path that would result if one tried to follow the desired 
generation path but ended up hitting many intertemporal constraints (turquoise). 
 
The intertemporal constraints considered in this example include ramp-rates, minimum 
up and down times of the unit, minimum and maximum generation levels, limited total 
water (and hence generation) capability over the horizon, and intra-horizon reservoir 
bounds. 
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Figure 2.5 Optimal, Desired, and Actual Generation Paths 
 
There are many points of interest in this figure: 
 
1. The naïve generation path is above the optimal path for most of the horizon 
because it does not consider the overall water restrictions. 
2. Observing periods 4 and 5, the naïve schedule implicitly assumes that the unit 
can ramp up very quickly, and as a result, the ramp up is left too late and the 
generators are unable to take full advantage of the high prices in these periods. 
This can be seen in that the line marked with crosses (“actual”) is below the line 
marked with squares (“optimal”) in these periods. 
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3. Observe the low prices periods 18 through to 26. The naïve schedule again 
ignores the restrictions of ramp rates and as such leaves it too late to shut down 
and thus gets caught generating at substantial losses in period 19.  
4. From period 40 onwards, the actual schedule that results from the naïve desired 
schedule starts to run out of water, in order to meet the end of horizon reservoir 
targets. Therefore it must ramp down and shut off for the last five periods, 
missing out on some potentially profitable generation. 
 
To illustrate the sub-optimality of ignoring these intertemporal linkages by attempting to 
follow the naïve desired path, we can compare the profits that would result over the 
horizon under this deterministic scenario. The profit from the optimal schedule, for this 
given problem instance, was around $151,000. The profit that would have resulted from 
the naïve schedule, had it been feasible was almost $158,000. However, the actual profit 
that resulted from trying to follow the naïve schedule was just over $132,000. In other 
words, 12.5% of the possible revenue was foregone by not explicitly considering 
intertemporal constraints when planning the generation path over the horizon, in 
advance. Therefore, this example reiterates the importance of considering the whole 
planning horizon when planning generation schedules and therefore offers to the market, 
even under deterministic assumptions. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have discussed the various structures that deregulated electricity 
markets may take, and identified the forms of market that exist in the New Zealand and 
Australian context. It is clearly very important to understand the market form when 
developing offering strategies for the generators that exist within these markets. We then 
explored the various factors that determine how a generator should form an offering 
strategy over the long-term and specific offers (or offer sets) in the medium and short-
runs. Finally, the concept of intertemporal issues, the main focus of this thesis, was 
introduced, and the importance of dealing with these costs and constraints presented. 
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The following chapter explores in much more detail the literature on short-term 
generator behaviour optimisation under a deregulated electricity structure, which has 
been presented briefly in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3  
 
LITERATURE ON GENERATOR OFFER 
OPTIMISATION 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Many different methods can be used to develop generation offers for the wholesale 
electricity market. The most simplistic of these is to provide an offer curve 
corresponding to the unit’s own marginal cost curve. This approach is not particularly 
satisfactory, if only because intertemporal links such as start-ups and shut-downs mean 
that a simple marginal cost may not be valid. Most offer formation methods seek to 
maximise profits by accounting for some form of estimation of offering behaviours of 
rival competitors, either explicitly, or implicitly through expectations on prices. 
Although the specifics of successful real-life applications of Operations 
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Research/Management Science (OR/MS) in development of offering strategies often 
cannot be made public for reasons of commercial sensitivity, the literature provides us 
with a plethora of analytic and empirical studies of the electricity market performed by 
(primarily) academics around the world. In David & Wen (2000), a comprehensive 
survey is provided of the various offer strategies that had been tried at that time, and 
ways of mitigating the abuse of market power. In addition, Hobbs (2001) provides a 
survey of approaches to optimal unit commitment for generators, with a focus on future 
research directions that may be desirable to pursue. 
 
Due to the recency of deregulation in electricity markets around the world, there has 
been a distinct lack of data to develop models that reflect actual market behaviours. 
Accordingly, much research has been purely theoretical, and based on common 
economic conjectures of rival behaviour, such as Cournot, Bertrand, or Stackleberg 
behaviour. It is important to realise that almost all models developed in the literature, 
even those not based on standard game theoretic conjectures, do assume that participants 
are gaming the market in some way. If they were to assume otherwise, then the implicit 
assumption would be that the electricity market was perfectly competitive (or at least 
that the player considered themselves to be a perfect competitor), and they would thus 
optimally choose to supply an offer corresponding to their marginal cost curve22. 
 
Until recently, there has been surprisingly little research that focuses on how best to 
account for intertemporal linkages and other realistic market characteristics that are met 
by firms facing the task of providing offers into a market of the type found in New 
Zealand. Hobbs (2001) is a text based on a September 1999 workshop that involved 
many leaders in the field of electricity market modelling, and presents a prioritised list 
of research needs with respect to unit commitment modelling. This list includes many of 
the features and considerations of offering that are addressed within this thesis, 
including: 
 
                                                 
22 This idea is well defined in the literature, and is proven in both Ferrero, Rivera, & Shahidehpour (1998) 
and Gross, Finlay, & Deltas (1998) 
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- Uncertainty, variability (multiple scenarios for, e.g., demand) 
- Single versus multiple bids/rebidding (ability to revise and resubmit bids in a 
multiple round auction process) 
- How to choose your bids (bids as decision variables) 
- Demand responsiveness to price (price elasticity) 
- Dynamic feasibility (limited energy plants, fuel constraints) 
 
In the last few years, research in this area has increased, and addressed some of these 
issues, but generally independently from one another, rather than in a combined fashion 
as we will present in this thesis. Considering the issues independently ignores the 
possible interaction effects that may occur. 
 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of assumptions that have traditionally been 
quite prevalent in the offering strategy literature. We then go on to explore the game 
theoretic approaches that authors have taken to equilibrium modelling of the electricity 
market, and the appropriateness of these methods in the electricity market context. The 
bulk of this chapter is then devoted to modelling approaches found in the literature that 
specifically deal with the various intertemporal issues the generators face, and which is 
the focus of this thesis. We begin at that point with a short discussion of pre-
deregulation models that deal with intertemporal considerations, specifically those 
dealing with the reservoir management problem, followed by a discussion of models 
designed to deal with intertemporal issues in modern, deregulated markets. In particular, 
we discuss the work performed by the Electric Power Optimisation Centre at the 
University of Auckland, New Zealand, and at the Power Systems Engineering Research 
Centre, made up of multiple collaborating universities in the USA. The work in this 
thesis extends the significant research contributions made by these two groups. 
 
3.2 Prevalent Assumptions in the Literature 
 
There are many assumptions or simplifications made by authors in the literature in order 
to enable detailed studies of the particular facet of electricity markets that interest them. 
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However, such assumptions often mean that the methods developed could not be 
effectively applied in the real-world due to inefficiency or possibly even infeasibility. 
These assumptions are the reason that further research needs to be performed in the area. 
Some of these assumptions are as follows: 
 
‐ Form/shape of the supply offer. Many papers assume a linear supply function or 
simple offers (one step only), rather than a fully stepped offer stack. Natarajan 
(2003) notes that empirically, offer stacks are usually flatter at lower levels of load 
and get steeper as load increases towards the maximum capacity of the generating 
unit. Thus, some authors such as Zhang, Wang, & Luh (2000) choose to approximate 
the offer curve as a quadratic function instead. These approximations decrease the 
number of decision variables and thus make analytic solutions more tractable. 
‐ Ignoring network considerations such as transmission constraints and losses, thus 
assuming that all trading occurs at a single node, is a common simplification. For 
example, Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003) and Anderson & Philpott (2002a), amongst 
many other papers. 
‐ Sometimes, such as in Sugianto & Widjaja (2001) and Gross, Finlay, & Deltas 
(1998), the assumption is made that the player believes they are unable to affect the 
market clearing price (that is, they consider themselves to be a perfect competitor or 
a price-taker). Alternatively, the assumption may be made that rivals do not offer 
strategically (as explained previously, they therefore would offer corresponding to 
marginal cost). 
‐ When optimising over a linear supply curve, authors often decide to fix one 
parameter, either the intercept (for example Ferrero, Shahidehpour, & Ramesh 
(1997b)) or the slope (for example Hobbs, Metzler, & Pang (2000)), and optimise 
over the other. However, this ignores the gaming implications of the shape of the 
supply curve23.  
                                                 
23 Read (2001) notes that strategic reactions from rivals may be affected by the shape of our curve. For 
example, it is well recognised in the literature that Cournot and Bertrand result in very different outcomes, 
even if the curve offered passes through the same point for any particular period. 
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‐ Ignoring technical constraints such as Kirchoff’s voltage and current laws is yet 
another common simplification found in many papers, including Rajaraman & 
Alvarado (2003) and Anderson & Philpott (2002a). By ignoring these, a unique 
opportunity that electricity markets provide for market manipulation is disregarded. 
‐ The assumption of independent or one-off auctions, rather than considering a 
repeated game with response by rivals to our offers is also very common, such as in 
Philpott, Pritchard, Neame, & Zakeri (2002). 
‐ Finally, but very importantly, many intertemporal constraints and considerations, 
such as those discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, are bypassed by authors. 
Overcoming this key group of assumptions is the main focus of this thesis. 
 
3.3 Game Theoretic Equilibrium Analysis and Simulation Modelling 
Approaches  
 
Game theoretic models are those that describe how rational economic agents would act 
given their beliefs on possible rival player strategies, and the resulting equilibrium 
outcome given the assumptions associated with the particular model. This category 
includes models based on a wide variety of economic conjectures of rival’s responses to 
our own actions. These include the Cournot conjecture (rivals hold output fixed), 
Bertrand (rivals hold prices fixed), Stackleberg (“leader” affects “follower’s” decisions 
but not vice versa) and Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE, rivals hold their upward-
sloping supply function fixed). 
 
There is much debate as to whether such game theoretic models are sophisticated 
enough to successfully model the electricity market. Taking into account the fact that 
generators are likely to be aware of their mutual dependencies, the oligopoly assumption 
would lead us to believe that game theoretic models are likely to be suitable for 
modelling such markets. However, we note that while game theory can be good for 
modelling uncertainty, long-term dynamic issues are not able to be easily incorporated, 
as game theory ignores intertemporal effects. Also, Sheble (1996a) claims that with the 
size and complexity of the markets to be analysed in the electricity industry, analysis of 
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micro interactions between players, with game theory, is not feasible. We do not seek 
here to settle the debate, only to present a review of work that has been performed, 
primarily with regard to the SFE model. We consider only the SFE model, as the offer-
shape assumptions of the Cournot, Bertrand and Stackleberg models are substantially 
more different to the real-world markets that we wish to consider in this thesis, than they 
are for the SFE model. 
 
3.3.1 Appropriateness of the Supply Function Equilibrium Model 
 
The Supply Function Equilibrium model looks to find the equilibrium market clearing 
price and quantities, given a set of generator offer curves and a demand curve. It does 
this by setting the derivative of each of the n individual firm’s profit equations to zero, 
and solving the set of these n equations simultaneously to give the slope and intercept 
parameters of each firms’ supply function (which can be used to find the dispatch point). 
 
The motivation for the Supply Function Equilibrium models, as developed by Klemperer 
& Meyer (1989) was the consideration that it is not optimal to commit to a given price 
or quantity (Bertrand or Cournot) when demand is stochastic. Like most areas of the 
literature, there is debate as to whether this modelling approach is appropriate for 
representing an electricity market. Although Green & Newberry (1992) claims that the 
electricity market is probably the best example of a market characterised by a Supply 
Function Equilibrium model, however all other reviews are unfavourable due to the 
major assumptions implicit in the model (such as linear supply curves, one-off trades, 
and single-location markets). Read (2001) indicates that the models are less tractable 
analytically than Cournot, and are of dubious relevance when independent offers are 
made for each period and updated dynamically. However, he notes that they were 
originally used in the old England and Wales market, where fixed offers were supplied 
for the whole day (which puts Green’s claim in context). A lot of the advantage of the 
supply function model comes from its ability to provide good solutions over a variety of 
uncertain demand outcomes. However, this benefit is largely lost in systems where half-
hourly or five-minute offering reduces these demand forecast errors (as forecasts for a 
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given period are made closer to real-time). Day, Hobbs, & Pang (2002) believes that 
Supply Function Equilibrium is not a practical modelling method if the modeller wants 
to incorporate realistic details on demand, generation, and transmission characteristics. It 
is generally accepted that these models are very difficult to compute, except for very 
simple systems, for larger systems with only a few discrete strategies allowed, or for 
offers restricted to linear with fixed slope or intercept. This is as opposed to 
complementarity models based on the Cournot conjecture, which have been solved for 
very large systems. In addition, von der Fehr & Harbord (1993) demonstrate that Supply 
Function Equilibrium does not generalise from linear to step functions. In other words, 
users don’t get good/optimal results by approximating the linear results with step 
functions, due to the large size of generating units. 
 
3.3.2 Applications of Supply Function Equilibrium Models 
 
Many applications of the supply function concept can be found in the literature, 
developing or applying the original Klemperer and Meyer model. For example, both 
Hobbs, Metzler, & Pang (2000) and Hogan (1997) develop mathematical programs with 
equilibrium conditions (MPEC’s) for calculating oligopoly equilibrium under supply 
function theory, with each firm optimising over the intercept parameter of a linear offer 
curve. A development in these papers is that both of the formulations incorporate 
Kirchoff’s power laws. Rudkevich, Duckworth, & Rosen (1998) developed the original 
Klemperer and Meyer model to relax the convexity/differentiability requirements, and 
thus allow the incorporation of step functions, in order to identify factors that affect the 
ability to use market power. However, in order to relax these requirements, many 
additional assumptions are made, such as identical firms/costs/supply curves, demand 
elasticity = 0, perfect information on rival’s costs, and so on. Conditions for a smooth 
offer that is an optimal response to a rival’s offers over a range of demands are 
developed by Anderson & Philpott (2001), who then attempt to approximate this offer 
with an offer that meets market rules (stepped, for example). 
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3.3.3 Identifying Potential Coalitions or Collusion 
 
Yet another area of the game theoretic literature relates to finding potentially stable 
coalitions or collusive partners, somewhat under the assumption that such behaviours 
will not be regulated. This falls into the category of cooperative game theory, as opposed 
to non-cooperative assumed by most of the literature. Bower & Bunn (1999) observe 
that “opportunity for generators to learn about each others bidding behaviour, and adapt 
their bidding strategies accordingly is provided by daily repetition of the day-ahead 
market and by the provision of extensive bid information”. Thus, (tacit) collusion is a 
much greater problem when participants meet repeatedly. Note that collusion or 
coalitions are both likely to hurt those who demand the electricity. Therefore, market 
regulations should be structured in such a way to prevent any coalitions other than the 
grand coalition from forming24. 
 
Hobbs & Kelly (1992) presents the idea of a “core” or “policy-restricted core”, which is 
a set of feasible profit distributions among a coalition, for which the coalition will be 
stable. This is related to the idea of the stand-alone test, as described by Singh (1999a). 
The idea of this test is simply that profits should be allocated within a stable coalition in 
a manner such that all coalition members are at least as well off as they would be if they 
weren’t part of the coalition. Krishna & Ramesh (1997a) and Krishna & Ramesh 
(1997b) develop intelligent agent approaches for performing negotiations to identify 
potentially beneficial coalitions, and for then suggesting strategies. Finally, Garcia, 
Campos-Nanez, & Reitzes (2005) address the issue of learning about a rival’s behaviour 
and adjusting a generating company’s own offers accordingly, under the assumption that 
hydro generators are engaging in dynamic price-based competition. 
 
                                                 
24 The grand coalition refers to the situation whereby all market participants are cooperating with one 
another, and the central authority, in order to produce the maximum system-wide benefits. 
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3.4 Optimal Analytic Construction of Single Period Offers 
 
As stated earlier, there are vast quantities of literature available on the topic of electricity 
market modelling and offer optimisation methods. This section provides a brief review 
of some of the authors and their work. 
 
Members of the Electric Power Research Centre (EPRC) at Iowa State University have 
looked at the application of artificial life techniques such as neural networks, genetic 
algorithms and genetic programming to electric power optimisation. Both Sheble 
(1996b) and Richter & Sheble (1998) look at evolving offering strategies using genetic 
algorithms, under a double auction with multiple periods and discriminatory pricing. 
Each population member corresponds to a generator in the market. While being more 
computationally efficient than having a separate population corresponding to each 
generator, it seems that this would require a very small population size and would thus 
restrict the solution diversity able to be achieved and therefore not be a particularly 
sophisticated approach. Reflecting this issue, and the fact that different participants have 
different cost curves and capacity limits, both Doty (2002) and Petrov (2002) apply a 
separate population of offers for each market participant represented, in their respective 
Masters theses. Within each of the population members in the work of Sheble and 
Richter, there are three evolving (mutation and crossover) parts. These are, 1) the 
number of megawatts to offer as contracts in each market round, 2) “Bid Multipliers” in 
the form of 5-bit binary coding, which are used in combination with costs and expected 
market clearing price to produce a simple offer, and 3) Which of a set of pre-defined 
prediction techniques to use for forecasting the price. Doty and Petrov differ in their 
population representation, incorporating only a 10-bit bid multiplier for each member. It 
appears that the crossover process and the use of the bid multiplier are actually very 
simplistic ideas, which do not incorporate a large amount of information. Richter, 
Sheble, & Ashlock (1999) develops these ideas further by incorporating a single-step 
offering strategy that is adaptive, and able to respond to changes in the behaviour of 
rivals. He uses a decision-tree (“parse-tree”) style approach to determine the price that 
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will be offered, while the genetic algorithm crossover works on the shape and contents 
of multiple trees. 
 
Wolak (2000) proposes two tools that he calls the best-response bidding model and the 
best-response pricing model. He looks empirically at how much profits for a given firm 
could potentially have increased using the best-response pricing model, over a set of 
historical data. Noting that “without the ability to replicate actual market prices using 
actual generator bid functions, it is impossible to compare with any degree of confidence 
market outcomes under any alternative bidding strategies”, the generated historical 
results are based on a detailed model of the Australian electricity market. The analysis 
makes the major assumption that rival’s offering strategies will not change in response 
to our strategy changes (although more recent, unpublished work may expand on this as 
he claims this factor could easily be incorporated). The paper demonstrates graphically 
the theoretical best response prices with different levels of contracts and different levels 
of demand elasticity, in (partly) an attempt to identify whether there are changes in the 
contract position of the firm under investigation that could lead to increased expected 
profits. The conclusion from this work is that fewer contracts would lead to such an 
increase, but at the expense of much increased volatility on return. In detail, the 
fundamental determinant of the optimal contract level is the elasticity of residual 
demand (more incentive to sell contracts if residual demand is flatter). 
 
The following section deals with an approach to single period offer optimisation using a 
function known as the Market Distribution Function (MDF), developed by the Electric 
Power Optimisation Centre (EPOC) at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. 
 
3.4.1 Market Distribution Function 
 
The MDF, denoted by ψ, is defined over the valid quantity and price offer combinations 
and takes a value of between 0 and 1, corresponding to the probability that an offer at 
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each (q, p) point will not be dispatched25. In other words, ψ(q, p) is the probability that if 
the supply curve passes through (q, p), the point of dispatch will lie below (q, p). 
Because the probability of being dispatched a given quantity, q, at an offer price, p, 
cannot be greater than the probability of being dispatched the same quantity at a higher 
price, p + δ (and similarly for increasing dispatch quantities at a given price), this 
function clearly must be monotonically non-decreasing in both its dimensions. The 
market distribution function is essentially a stochastic representation of a residual 
demand curve for a single period of time. For example, if we knew the residual demand 
function for certain, then the market distribution function would have values of 0 below 
the curve, and 1 above the curve. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 demonstrate sample non-
linear MDF’s, in 3-D and 2-D form respectively. In Figure 3.2, the MDF is represented 
by contours corresponding to values of 0.1, 0.2, … , 0.8, 0.9, rather than explicitly 
showing the entire function. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Example 3D MDF 
 
                                                 
25 The foundation of this approach is in the work of Friedman (1956), which estimates the probability of 
winning a bid against competitors based on market data, then uses this probability to determine the 
optimal bid. 
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Figure 3.2 Example 2D MDF, Philpott (2002) 
 
In taking this market distribution function approach, there are two issues that need to be 
dealt with. The first is how to create the market distribution function from historical data 
and how to update it using new data as it becomes available. The second is, given the 
market distribution function, how to find the optimal offer of the required form for the 
market. The following two sections describe the approaches that EPOC have proposed 
to each of these issues. 
 
Creating the Market Distribution Function  
 
In recent papers, the EPOC group propose multiple ways for estimating and updating the 
market distribution function.  
 
The first of these papers is based on Bayesian estimation and updating of the function 
(Anderson & Philpott (2001)). In this paper, they present a general Bayesian approach to 
this issue, recognising that the exact form of Bayesian update will depend on the market 
structure, and in particular, the amount of information that is made publicly available. In 
developing this approach, they make the assumption that very little information is 
actually fed back to the generator. Specifically, only their own dispatch price and 
quantity is made available. This is contrary to the market conditions in New Zealand, in 
Quantity
Price 
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which the entire supply offer and demand bid stacks for all pre-dispatch and final 
dispatch periods are available to the market participants. As a result of this assumption, 
sufficient information is gained about the regions of (q, p) space where dispatch often 
occurs, but very little is known about other areas, and so the estimation of the MDF in 
these regions is likely to be unreliable. The paper aims to construct separate, smooth 
market distribution functions for each period of the day (or group of periods), reflecting 
the fact that conditions and hence dispatch probabilities vary significantly at different 
times. For each period or group of periods, they consider there to be a whole family of 
possible market distribution functions, characterised by their varying parameter values 
over a common function. When a dispatch occurs, the probability that each member of 
this family is the true underlying market distribution function is updated, given the 
likelihood of the observation for each MDF. 
 
The second of these papers Pritchard, Zakeri, & Philpott (2002) uses a maximum 
likelihood estimation approach to create a discretised market distribution function, based 
on historical data of dispatches under conditions similar to that faced in the current 
period. They state that for a given period, you only need a single market distribution 
function, because ψ takes the same value for all offer stacks passing through a particular 
(q, p) point, regardless of stack shape. A grid is created in (q, p) space based on the 
locations of the observed dispatch points of an individual generator. The approach then 
attempts to determine the ψ values for each of the cells that are created in order to 
maximise the likelihood of observing the given sample. 
 
The most recent of these papers, Pritchard, Zakeri, & Philpott (2005), recognises that 
smooth parametric models are not easy to adapt to the discontinuous market distribution 
functions that they wish to consider, and as such they present a non-parametric 
estimation method. In addition, the paper reports that in a real electricity market, a 
generator must be thought of as facing not a single ψ function, but many ψ functions 
corresponding to different times of day, hydrological conditions, etc. 
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Applying the Market Distribution Function 
 
In recent papers, the EPOC group have proposed methods for constructing “optimal” 
offers for single periods, with a given market distribution function. 
 
Neame, Philpott, & Pritchard (2003) consider the case of a perfectly competitive market. 
It is well known in the literature that if the form of the offer is unrestricted in this market 
situation, then the optimal choice of offer will be to exactly reflect your marginal cost of 
generation. However, if stepped offers are required, then this may not be feasible, and so 
an optimal approximation must be determined. Under the assumption of piecewise linear 
marginal costs, this paper demonstrates that the breakpoints of the offer steps will occur 
only at breakpoints of the piecewise marginal cost function, and in particular, develops 
optimality conditions on the location of the steps. To then limit the number of steps to 
match market requirements, they use dynamic programming to determine where the 
steps should best be placed. Their results show, as would be expected, that the stack will 
follow the marginal cost curve more closely in regions where the price probability 
density function has high values. Unfortunately, using this approach, these results cannot 
easily be extended to the case of a price-maker. 
 
Taking another approach, Anderson & Philpott (2002a) create a set of optimality 
conditions for offer stacks, and then seek to maximise the expected return over the line 
integral of the offer curve. The focus of the paper is the derivation of the necessary 
conditions for optimality and, as such, it does not fully address the important practical 
question of efficient computation of the optimal offer. Anderson & Philpott (2002b) 
expand on these optimality conditions and demonstrate that, in the case of a convex cost 
function and inverse log concave rest-of-market supply curve, the optimal unrestricted 
offer will be monotonically non-decreasing in both the price and quantity dimensions, 
where the uncertainty in the market is in relation to the level of inelastic demand. This 
implies that, given these particular conditions, the optimal offer under uncertainty is 
simply the path, or locus, traced out by identifying the optimal dispatch point under each 
possible resulting position of the residual demand curve. However, it is likely that in a 
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real market situation, these conditions will not be met. Thus, in Philpott, Pritchard, 
Neame, & Zakeri (2002), a practical approach to more realistic scenarios of rest-of-
market supply and uncertainty is suggested. As with Anderson & Philpott (2002a), this 
paper seeks to maximise expected return over the line integral of the supply function, 
given the payoff at each point and the probability of that payoff actually occurring. In 
this paper, it is assumed that for realistically sized problems, an explicit ψ may be 
impractical. As such, they break the (q, p) plane into a grid, with known payoffs on the 
edges of the grid. The offer curve is then constructed under the restriction that it must 
follow the discrete edges of this grid. For each vertex in the grid, the maximum expected 
additional payoff of any curve passing through the vertex is calculated dynamically by 
selecting the maximum of: 
a) The expected payoff on the ‘up’ edge + maximum expected payoff from the ‘up’ 
vertex 
b) The expected payoff on the ‘right’ edge + maximum expected payoff from the 
‘right’ vertex 
Once these payoffs are all known, then it is a simple process to determine the offer 
curve, by using dynamic programming to determine the optimal path through the MDF 
surface. 
 
Limitations of the Market Distribution Function Approach 
 
This market distribution function approach, as described above, successfully considers 
the ability of a unit to affect the price, and the fact that price levels will differ at different 
times26. However, it has not yet been fully incorporated in a multiple period model that 
deals optimally with the various intertemporal linkages (including market correlation 
over time) that occur in the marketplace. More recent papers, which broach this topic, 
are discussed in Section 3.5.2.1 of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
26 Although it does not consider the impact which one party’s offers may have on offers from other 
parties, as in a “gaming” model. 
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3.4.2 Rival Generator Modelling Alternatives 
 
The market distribution approach brings to light a distinction that can be made with 
regard to literature types. Some approaches look to individually model the behaviours of 
each of the rival players, while some look at the net effect of demand combined with all 
rival behaviours, by considering a residual demand function or something similar. The 
EPOC work falls into this second category, as does work by Read (2001), David (1993), 
Green & Newberry (1992), Yang, Wen, Wu, & Ni (2002), Wolak (2000), Baillo, 
Ventosa, Rivier, & Ramos (2004), Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003) and so on. Read 
(2001) looks at creating optimal offer curves over a residual piece-wise linear demand 
curve, assuming that rivals behaviour is fully captured in the residual demand curve, and 
its variations occur independently of, rather than in reaction to, our offers. David (1993) 
combines all rivals into a single competing rival when looking at stepped offer stack 
construction and considers all the opposing offers that may be in competition with any 
of his own firm’s individual steps. Green & Newberry (1992) consider the effect of 
contracts on the shape of the residual demand curve in the duopolistic UK market, and 
its meaning in terms of optimal offering response. Baillo, Ventosa, Rivier, & Ramos 
(2004) considers both the ability of a generation company to affect the price and 
uncertainty about rival’s behaviour for a generating company operating in a day-ahead, 
24-period market. We will discuss the focus of the Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003) paper 
in the following section, as it considers RD curves in a multi-period, rather than just a 
single-period model. 
 
Note that if rivals respond to a generator’s offers, then this corresponds to a shift of the 
residual demand curve rather than a movement along it. 
 
3.5 Literature Addressing Intertemporal Issues 
 
With respect to approaches to hydro generator operation over multiple periods, we can 
partition the literature into three broad groups; dynamic programming approaches, 
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mathematical programming approaches (including stochastic linear and non-linear 
programming) and heuristic approaches. 
 
In addition, the vast majority of models found in the literature that deal with 
intertemporal issues (such as unit commitment and reservoir management models) are 
based on the pre-deregulation style structure and aim to minimise costs of meeting 
demand rather than maximise profits of offering into an electricity market. We begin this 
section with a short discussion on such models, but as the specific application to a 
centralised situation is not appropriate to this thesis, the bulk of this section focuses on 
models appropriate for a deregulated market structure. 
 
3.5.1 Pre-Deregulation Reservoir Management Models 
 
There exists a vast field of literature pertaining to pre-deregulation reservoir 
management and unit commitment models. A comprehensive survey of literature at the 
time is found in Yeh (1985), covering a broad range of techniques that had been applied 
to the reservoir management problem, including simulation models, heuristic models, 
mathematical programming models (both discrete and stochastic), and stochastic 
dynamic programming models. Yakowitz (1982), also provides a good summary of 
literature on the problem, with a focus on dynamic programming applications. A more 
recent summary of a variety of approaches to the problem of unit commitment, 
accounting for start-up and shut-down issues and other intertemporal constraints is 
presented in Read, George, Lamar, & Rosenthal (1994). In addition to dynamic 
programming, they discuss integer programming, Lagrangian relaxation, network 
optimisation, and heuristic approaches.  Although much of this literature applies 
specifically to hydro systems, the problems faced by energy-limited coal or gas are 
basically similar in structure, so that adaptations of hydro optimisation techniques can 
often be applied to deal with these too. 
 
Since this thesis is not proposing any new developments with respect to the inter-
temporal optimisation of power systems, per se, it does not seem appropriate to survey 
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this literature in any depth. The basic technique applied here is simply Stochastic 
Dynamic Programming, as first proposed by Bellman & Dreyfus (1962), assuming an 
embedded Markov chain. However, one section of the thesis does employ a technique 
known as “Dual Dynamic Programming”, which may require some explanation. 
 
Internationally, one of the primary models applied to the problem of reservoir 
management in more recent times has been the Stochastic Dual DP (SDDP) approach 
presented in Pereira & Pinto (1991) and Pereira, Campodonico, & Kelman (1999). This 
technique is similar to, but different from an SDDP approach presented in Read (1985) 
and Read & George (1986). The SDDP concept of Read and George is dual to a 
standard DP in that it finds optimal primal variables corresponding to a set of critical 
shadow prices, rather than vice versa. The technique is able to characterise the solution 
strategy without discretising the primal state-space, and produces a piece-wise linear 
approximation to the marginal value function, and it is this technique from Read & 
George (1986) which has been applied here.  
 
On the other hand, the SDDP technique developed in Pereira & Pinto (1991) comes 
from a mathematical programming base. Their technique also avoids discretising the 
primal state space, but constructs a value function which is piecewise linear, so that the 
marginal value function is made up of a set of level planes. This technique is able to be 
applied to systems with a large number of reservoirs, for which it would be impossible 
to define a complete operating strategy under the technique of Read & George (1986). 
As both of these techniques avoid discretising the primal state space, they reduce the 
computational issues caused by the “curse of dimensionality” as the problem size 
increases. For a more detailed comparison of the two techniques, refer to  Yang (1995). 
 
3.5.2 Models Addressing Intertemporal Issues under a Market Structure 
 
We consider three different groups of electricity offering models under a market 
structure: 
 
 83
1. Those that recognise the behavioural and gaming effects of the repeated nature of 
the electricity market, 
2. Those that deal with unit commitment decisions (primarily concerned with 
thermal generation units), and 
3. Those that consider the fuel conservation issues of hydro generation units. 
 
The focus is on the third group, which is the main area of research in this thesis. 
 
3.5.2.1 Behavioural Feedback Models 
 
In this section, we consider a number of models that recognise the feedback and learning 
mechanisms that are present in a realistic market. 
 
Gajjar, Khaparde, Nagaraju, & Soman (2003) presents a system using Markov Decision 
Processes to select from a range of actions from a generator’s policy (set of possible 
actions). Reinforcement learning is used to simulate intelligent agents that can learn how 
to make good decisions by observing their own behaviour (allowing Markov transition 
probabilities to evolve as a function of temporal difference error). Petrov (2002) 
develops the Roth-Erev reinforcement learning algorithm (Roth & Erev (1995) and Erev 
& Roth (1995)) such that agents learn how to offer to the auction and respectively 
develop a winning strategy. However, this is restricted by its assumption that at any 
given time, a trader knows only their last offer and the amount of profit resulting, thus 
cannot take advantage of information from prior rounds of offering. 
 
Sakk, Thomas, & Zimmerman (1997) develops a sequential offering scheme with 
feedback of information, so that generators can modify their offers after pre-dispatch 
notification, but without knowledge of the profit functions of their competitors. A simple 
market clearance model is then used to determine the combined outcome and market 
clearing price from the set of linear bids. The approach attempts to predict other 
generators offers based on past dispatch/pre-dispatch and offering histories, but does not 
account for stepped offers, start-up costs, and many intertemporal constraints. Stothert & 
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MacLeod (2000) presents offering as a control problem, with feedback of system 
marginal price and supply offer accept/reject information over multiple offering rounds. 
The model finds a Pareto optimum over the conflicting objectives of generator profit-
maximisation and consumer price minimisation. This paper makes many assumptions 
though, such as simple price based offers, a single offering period, no spatial aspects 
incorporated, and all or nothing of each offer must be accepted by the market. Likewise, 
Visudhipan & Ilic (1999) models a feedback system with generators learning market 
opportunities and evaluating their offers using available information about past market 
clearing prices. The model used is a closed-loop dynamic system, in which previous and 
current information are used as feedback signals, and outcomes are evaluated by a 
simple market clearing model. They consider single-step and linear supply functions, 
elastic and inelastic demand, and two different offering strategies, in order to establish 
determinants of the ability to exercise market power. Li, Svoboda, Guan, & Singh 
(1999) uses parametric dynamic programming to produce hourly offer stacks in order to 
meet certain revenue-adequacy conditions in an iterative offering market (but gaming 
considerations are ignored due to a requirement that bids cannot increase in price in an 
iteration, unless the revenue adequacy conditions are not met).  
 
Finally, Oren & Rothkopf (1975) shows that the concept of bidding into repeated 
auctions is neither a new concept, nor limited to the electricity market. This paper 
addresses the issue of current bidding strategies affecting rival behaviour in future 
auctions, and the gaming implications of such an effect, and develops the optimal 
infinite-horizon equilibrium strategy as a result. In this thesis, we do not look to find 
equilibrium outcomes of auctions, and so we will not consider this paper or the 
corresponding wealth of literature on this topic in a general context, any further. The 
reason for this assumption is that, as discussed in Section 3.3, game theoretic models 
that look for equilibrium outcomes are not able to produce sufficiently detailed offer 
strategy results in the context discussed in this thesis. 
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3.5.2.2 Unit Commitment Models 
 
The Unit Commitment problem faced by a generator is to determine when each of their 
generation units should be turned on and off over a given planning horizon. 
 
In the context of the deregulated electricity market structure, Hobbs (2001) identifies 
that in addition to dynamic programming, many techniques have been applied to the unit 
commitment problem, including branch-and-bound mixed integer programming, linear 
and network programming, Benders decomposition, and various metaheuristic 
approaches such as genetic programming, simulated annealing, and neural networks. In 
this section, we will briefly present the literature related to these and other approaches. 
 
Pokharel, Shrestha, Lie, & Fleten (2004) identifies that “… optimal scheduling is a non-
convex highly constrained nonlinear mixed integer optimization problem, which can 
only be fully solved by complete enumeration. Moreover, the solution must be obtained 
within a time that makes it useful for the intended purpose”. In an attempt to address 
these issues, they go on to present a new heuristic technique in coordination with 
dynamic programming and nonlinear programming that determines the optimal unit state 
decisions and dispatch quantities (rather than offers) over a planning horizon, under 
expected price levels. 
 
Pokharel, Shrestha, Lie, & Fleten (2005) uses dynamic programming to optimise 
behaviour of a set of thermal units with significant intertemporal constraints related to 
the physical operation of the units, under a stochastic price path for the planning horizon 
(but ignoring any market power). In this model, the decisions in each period are whether 
each unit should be switched on or off, and at what level the units that are ‘on’ should be 
generating. 
 
Baillo, Ventosa, Ramos, & Rivier (2001) describes an MIP for the unit commitment 
problem that includes a set of constraints ensuring a minimum market share in each 
period, while Baillo, Ventosa, Rivier, & Ramos (2004) creates an MIP solved with 
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Bender’s decomposition, that considers residual demand uncertainty within each period 
(much like a discrete market distribution function). O'Neill, Sotkiewicz, Hobbs, 
Rothkopf, & Stewart (2005) discusses the issue of non-convexities in the unit 
commitment problem in depth and presents a simple MIP that deals with this issue.  
 
In Section 3.4.1 of this chapter, we discussed the market distribution function approach 
to offer optimisation within a single period, developed by the EPOC research group. In 
addition to developing this method, they have also carried out parallel work on unit 
commitment problems and hydro scheduling over time, not using the MDF approach. 
Philpott, Craddock, & Waterer (2000) formulates a large mixed-integer program to 
optimise unit commitment and release behaviour over a short-term horizon where each 
unit faces simple operational rules and costs in addition to generation with non-linear 
efficiency.  
 
In more recent work, the EPOC group have begun to bring together the two branches of 
work described here, to consider market uncertainty within each period under a 
multiple-period horizon. Philpott (2004) considers a non fuel-limited single unit offering 
into a pool market under a known set of market distribution functions for the horizon. 
The basic DP model that the paper presents considers start-up and shut-down costs as 
well as feasible operating ranges. As such, there are two decisions needing to be made at 
each period over the horizon; whether the unit will remain in its current on/off state, and 
what the offer will be if the unit is switched on. They then extend this model to consider 
ramp-rate restrictions, increasing the dimension of the state space and thus requiring a 
different offer to be chosen, depending on the dispatch level in the previous period. 
Philpott & Schultz (2006) extends the approaches further, to consider multiple units that 
are offered collectively into the pool. The two key extensions that this thesis will 
provide on the single unit model, with respect to market complexities considered, are to 
take into account fuel limitations and market correlation between consecutive periods, 
the latter of which is suggested as a valuable extension in Philpott & Schultz (2006). 
Fuel limitations substantially increase the complexity of the problem, as the offers are no 
longer independent between periods, but rather, are highly dependent on one another 
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through opportunity cost of fuel use considerations. This increases the dimension of the 
DP, as a different offer will need to be provided for each reservoir level in each period. 
Market correlation again considerably increases the complexity of the problem, as there 
is now a probabilistic set of MDFs for each period connected by way of a Markov chain, 
rather than a single known MDF for each period. Again the dimension of the DP 
increases, as a different offer will need to be provided depending on the market outcome 
of the previous period (which thus presents the generator with a different MDF for the 
coming period).  
 
3.5.2.3 Reservoir Management Models 
 
Set just before the deregulation of the New Zealand market, Drayton-Bright (1997) 
develops a model for coordination of energy and reserve offers, incorporating a market 
clearing model that includes many important intertemporal linkages, such as water flow 
balance, storage bounds, ramp rates, and others.  His work is based not on gaming, but 
on understanding the implications of various intertemporal constraints. The thesis is 
focused on comparisons between various market designs and rules, such as the form that 
the offers will take (fixed versus sculpted over each period, for day-ahead offering 
versus re-offering). He notes that intertemporal constraints may make Linear 
Programming subproblems (decomposed by market player) respond to energy prices in 
such a way that a monotonically non-decreasing step supply function cannot be drawn 
through the observed price and response pairs. Thus, there is no stable offer curve for 
which repeatedly solving static models, (thus ignoring the presence of intertemporal 
linkages) can achieve an efficient outcome. In other words, it is not possible to create a 
single stack that will be optimal for many periods. Simulating a periodic update market 
with a rollover of planning horizon every half hour and incorporating an end-of-day 
target storage water level (to avoid end effects), he finds that re-offering along with 
sculpted offer stacks produced the most efficient results (that is closest to those that are 
expected from a perfectly competitive market). The thesis does not address the use of 
the market power associated with being in a monopoly situation, gaming, contracts, and 
some spatial aspects (transmission constraints). 
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In Scott (1998), a dual dynamic program is developed in order to deal with the 
management of a mixed hydro-thermal system in the context of the newly created 
competitive electricity market in New Zealand. The approach incorporates a Cournot 
oligopoly representation of the energy spot market. In the model, all players are 
considered to offer in a Cournot manner in order to optimise their own position, and thus 
equilibrium within each period is identified. This is similar in concept to the game 
theoretic approaches discussed in Section 3.3, and is distinct from most of the 
approaches described in this section, which consider the optimisation of a single player’s 
behaviour, subject to expectations about the behaviour of rival market participants (and 
which do not necessarily assume all players to have the same bidding constraints and 
structures). 
 
A dynamic programming simulation model is developed by Villar & Rudnick (2003), 
simulating a mixed hydro/thermal market based on simple (Cournot, quantity based) 
hourly offers. They recognise the importance of current decisions on future possibilities, 
particularly with respect to hydro. They consider all (large) firms in the market to offer 
strategically, but that only hydro stations use a dynamic model (thermals use a static 
model). The intertemporal consideration incorporated is the water usage/availability 
restriction over the short-term (24-hour) planning horizon, and thus the states of the 
dynamic model are reservoir levels. A longer term model could be developed, but the 
model would need to be adjusted to take account of stochastic inflows (the authors 
report that they are currently in the process of developing longer-term simulators). The 
paper, however, does not take into account many of the other important intertemporal 
constraints. 
 
Ladurantaye, Gendreau, & Potvin (2006) presents an MIP model for a price-taking 
generator, where price path scenarios are organised into a tree structure to reflect 
different overall states that the market could be in. The paper demonstrates the use of a 
branching method, in a different context to that which we present in Chapter 7 of this 
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thesis. However, the paper allows only for probability nodes in the branching structure, 
and not decision nodes (as we will present). 
 
Pereira, Campodonico, & Kelman (1998) provides an overview of the possible 
methodologies and tools that can be used to address the new set of operational decisions 
that need to be made under deregulated market structures. The paper considers both 
thermal systems, which are decoupled in time, and hydrothermal systems, which are 
coupled in time (face intertemporal issues). The paper discusses the internal cost 
minimising dispatch process faced by a generator with multiple units in order to meet 
load, as well as discussing the process of offering generation prices and capacities to a 
market, in order to maximise revenue. The efficiency of bidding schemes is then 
considered (i.e. whether it is possible to achieve the same operating efficiency as an 
ideal centralised dispatch), and they conclude that in a hydrothermal system, such a 
scheme is inherently inefficient, but that the specific results will be system-dependent.  
 
A range of reports have also been produced by consulting firm PSR, which introduce 
and progressively develop their techniques for optimising the hourly bidding process of 
a generator with multiple generating units, within a hydrothermal system. In Kelman & 
Pereira (1998) and Pereira, Granville, Dix, & Barroso (2004a), the bids for each of the 
units are a simple (price, quantity) pair, and a series of MIPs and non-linear formulations 
are constructed in order to address this problem. Pereira, Granville, Dix, & Barroso 
(2004c) compares these two methods, recognising that even in its most basic form 
(ignoring transmission, unit commitment, and so on) strategic bidding under uncertainty 
is a nonlinear programming problem, and hence that the two options are to solve it 
directly using a general nonlinear optimiser, or to transform it into a MILP (or MIP). 
They conclude that while the nonlinear approach is simpler to apply and more efficient 
with respect to CPU time, the non-convexities can cause the non-linear optimiser to 
reach locally optimal solutions that are not globally optimal. On the other hand under the 
MILP (which is obtained by a binary expansion scheme), accuracy can be controlled 
through the level of discretisation of the binary representation (where a more refined 
representation will of course increase CPU time).  
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Extensions to the simple model are presented in Pereira, Granville, Dix, & Barroso 
(2004a) and include dealing with uncertainty in load and in rival generator bids (through 
a set of possible scenarios), dealing with transmission networks (which is considered 
only indirectly in this thesis), dealing  with unit commitment, and the assumption of 
Cournot or Bertrand bids. Note also that Pereira, Granville, Dix, & Barroso (2004b) 
applies the binary expansion scheme mentioned above, to the problem of determining 
Nash equilibrium solutions. 
 
Both Neame, Philpott, & Pritchard (2001) and Neame, Philpott, & Pritchard (2005) 
model price, rather than market, uncertainty under the assumption that the generator is 
unable to influence the market clearing price, and thus present DP algorithms that find 
the optimal offering stacks within each half-hour period over a short-term planning 
horizon. These papers then consider a longer-term horizon, with weekly periods, and 
deal with the combined problem of firstly selecting a mean and variance release for each 
week, and then constructing stacks for use throughout each week that have this mean 
and variance. Pritchard, Zakeri, & Philpott (2004) then presents the HERO (Hydro-
Electric reservoir optimization) model that implements this approach. 
 
The remainder of this section presents a brief summary of the method presented in 
Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003). There is further discussion of this algorithm in later 
chapters, as it is this benchmark algorithm to which we will compare the algorithm 
developed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
 
In this paper, Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003) present a method for producing a complete 
offering strategy over a short-term planning horizon, accounting for complex 
intertemporal considerations that were not previously considered together in the 
literature. The intertemporal considerations in the main algorithm that they present are 
limited fuel and uncertain market outcomes (residual demand curves), which are 
correlated between periods by way of a lag-1 Markov chain. A complete offering 
strategy is therefore constituted by a set of offers that define the optimal decisions under 
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all states that could occur throughout the planning horizon, where the two-dimensional 
state-space is defined by the fuel level and the previous period’s residual demand curve 
outcome. 
 
In particular, the paper addresses three key concerns of generator offering decisions: 
 
1. The impact of offer monotonicity requirement 
2. The effect of intertemporal constraints 
3. The effect of price/market uncertainty 
 
The approach used is a multiple-level nested DP optimisation, where the upper DP level 
is the two-dimensional state transition for the planning horizon, and the lower DP level 
is the feasible offer construction for a given state in a single period. This lower level DP 
is similar to that discussed for finding the optimal offer over a MDF in Section 3.4.1, 
however, rather than having incremental payoffs located on the edge of a discrete grid, 
the incremental payoffs are located on the vertices of the discrete grid. This turns out to 
cause a computational error, and is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
The approach used is a purely primal method, where the incremental payoffs on each 
vertex include both the within-period payoff and the expected future value of dispatch at 
the given vertex. Such a primal method turns out to be quite computationally inefficient, 
and this is explored further in Chapter 7. 
 
In the formulation presented, all fuel is required to be exhausted within the planning 
horizon. In reality, this is clearly not often going to be the optimal behaviour. 
Fortunately, it would be very easy to generalise their approach to consider an end-of-
horizon fuel value curve.  
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3.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter we have discussed literature on generator behaviour and optimisation that 
covers a very wide range of assumptions regarding the structure of the market, the types 
of decisions that a generator must make, and the behaviours of other generators in the 
market. In this thesis we focus on the optimal half-hour energy-only offering decisions 
by fuel-limited generators over a short-term horizon in a deregulated market such as that 
found in New Zealand. We look specifically to extend on the work presented in two 
papers, Philpott & Schultz (2006) and Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003). The former paper 
presents a DP for unit commitment and offer optimisation over a short-term horizon, but 
ignores fuel limitations and market outcome correlation between periods, while the latter 
considers these extra complications, while ignoring unit switching considerations, in a 
computationally inefficient manner. In Chapters 7 to 9 we will present various 
algorithms that combine and extend on these complexities using a very efficient 
algorithm.  
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Chapter 4  
 
OPTIMAL SINGLE-PERIOD ANALYTIC OFFERS 
UNDER MARKET UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Given an uncertain market scenario for a single period, there are two possible ways of 
determining the optimal offer to provide under a given marginal cost curve. The first of 
those is to perform a dynamic program over an arbitrary grid on the offering space, 
where each edge (or vertex) of this grid contains the expected marginal payoff 
associated with an offer passing through this segment (or point). This approach is 
suggested in many papers discussed in Chapter 3, including Rajaraman & Alvarado 
(2003) and Philpott, Pritchard, Neame, & Zakeri (2002). The alternative is to apply a 
more accurate analytical approach to the construction of optimal offers, possibly 
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involving optimality conditions on the location of the offer. Such an approach is the 
focus of much of the market distribution function work by the EPOC group, as 
demonstrated particularly in Anderson & Philpott (2002a). As we will show in Section 
4.2, these analytic results and optimality conditions are highly complex to prove and 
apply, and as such, much of this chapter is devoted to producing much more intuitive 
analytical forms of optimal offers, under relatively simple residual demand (RD) curve 
forms and types of market uncertainty.  
 
4.2 MDF Optimality Conditions 
 
In this section, we will provide a very brief overview of the mathematics behind the 
optimality conditions used for constructing optimal offers in the market distribution 
function theory of the EPOC research group. For an in depth presentation and proof of 
the theorems discussed here, please refer to any of the papers referred to below. We will 
use the following terms in this discussion: 
 
( )sV   = Expected return of any offer s 
 ( )pqR ,  = The return from dispatch at any (q, p) point 
 ( )pq,ψ  = The market distribution function defined over (q, p) space 
qR   = The partial derivative of ( )pqR ,  with respect to q 
pR   = The partial derivative of ( )pqR ,  with respect to p 
qψ   = The partial derivative of ( )pq,ψ  with respect to q 
pψ   = The partial derivative of ( )pq,ψ  with respect to p 
Ψ   = Region of offering space in which ( ) 1,0 << pqψ  
t  = The index over which the offer is defined parametrically 
T  = The maximum value of the index t, associated with the end  
point of the offer 
0t   = The intersection between the current offer and the border of  
Ψ and the region where ( ) 0, =pqψ  
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Mt   = The intersection between the current offer and the border of  
Ψ and the region where ( ) 1, =pqψ  
( )tw    = The integral along an offer path to a certain point t 
Mq   = The maximum quantity that can be offered 
Mp   = The maximum price that can be offered 
( )tx    = The x coordinates of an offer parametrically defined over t 
( )ty    = The y coordinates of an offer parametrically defined over t 
 
In Anderson & Philpott (2002a), the expected return from any offer, s, through the 
feasible offering space is derived and defined as the line integral along the offer curve, 
as shown in Equation 4.1. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∫= s pqdpqRsV ,., ψ  
 
Equation 4.1 Expected Return of any Offer, s 
 
In order to construct an optimality condition in the absence of monotonicity conditions, 
the paper describes a function, ( )pqZ , , as shown in Equation 4.2.  
 
( ) ( )
⎩⎨
⎧ Ψ∈−=
otherwise
pqRR
pqZ qppq
,0
,,
,
ψψ
 
 
Equation 4.2 Z(q,p) Function 
 
Since both R and ψ  are continuously differentiable inΨ , ( )pqZ ,  is a continuous 
function onΨ . As such, when the optimisation of the offer curve is viewed as a problem 
in the calculus of variations, ( )pqZ ,  = 0 is the Euler (optimality) condition for 
( ) Ψ∈pq, . The paper explains that this condition can be derived using Green’s theorem 
in the plane, showing that any deviation (or ‘feasible variation’) from a curve that meets 
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this optimality condition must be suboptimal. In other words, if the curve passes through 
a region in which ( )pqZ ,  > 0, then the line integral of ψRd along the curve may be 
improved by adding an anti-clockwise traversal of a closed contour lying in this region 
(and vice versa). 
 
Therefore, in the absence of monotonicity conditions, the maximal curve lies on the 
common boundary of two regions having ( )pqZ ,  > 0 and ( )pqZ ,  < 0. This curve need 
not be either monotonic or even connected. Therefore in a real market situation, 
adjustments must be made to these to ensure monotonicity in the offers chosen. 
 
In order to derive new local optimality conditions in the face of these monotonicity 
constraints, Anderson & Philpott (2002a) redefines the offer curves parametrically over 
the rangeΨ  shown in Figure 4.1, with respect to a variable t, as shown in Equation 4.3 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Offering Region of Interest 
 
( ) ( )( ){ }Tttytxs ≤≤= 0,,  
 
Equation 4.3 Parametric Representation of an Offer, s 
 
The optimality of the offer is then described by their following theorem: 
0t  
Mt  
( ) 0, =pqψ  
s 
Price 
Quantity 
( ) 1, =pqψ  
Ψ
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THEOREM 4.1. Suppose ( ) ( )( ){ }Tttytxs ≤≤= 0,,  is an offer stack, and let w(t), 0t  and 
Mt   be defined as above. The following conditions are necessary for s to be a local 
optimum for P (the offering problem). 
1. If ( ) MM qtx = , then for every [ ] ( ) ( )MM twtwTtt ≥∈ ,,  
2. If ( ) MM pty = , then for every [ ] ( ) ( )MM twtwTtt ≤∈ ,,  
3. If ( ) 00 =ty , then for every [ ] ( ) ( )00 ,,0 twtwtt ≤∈  
4. If ( ) 00 =tx , then for every [ ] ( ) ( )00 ,,0 twtwtt ≥∈  
5. ( ) ( )Mtwtw =0  
6. For every [ ]Mttt ,0∈ , ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )00 '0' twtwtytwtwtx −≤≤−  
 
For further explanation of  these optimality conditions, the reader is referred to 
Anderson & Philpott (2002a).  Note that in the conclusion of Anderson & Philpott 
(2002a), it is stated that they do not consider “the important practical question of the 
efficient computation of an optimal solution”. 
 
In another paper, Philpott, Pritchard, Neame, & Zakeri (2002), derive and apply the 
simple form of the optimality condition in a case where offers are naturally monotone. 
Anderson & Philpott (2002b) state formally in their Theorem 4 that “if C(.) is a non-
decreasing convex function and S(.) is a differentiable inverse log concave function, then 
there is a supply-function response that is optimal for any h∈H.”, where C(.) is the 
generator’s cost function, S(.) is the rest-of-market supply curve, and h is a possible 
demand level from the set of all possible demand levels, H. In other words, there will be 
a naturally monotone offer when there is a known aggregate rest-of-market supply 
function that is inverse log concave and the uncertainty comes from a stochastic level of 
inelastic demand. Philpott, Pritchard, Neame, & Zakeri (2002) state that the optimal 
offer must at all points be vertical, horizontal, or satisfy the first-order condition shown 
in Equation 4.4 (equivalent to the Euler condition above). 
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Equation 4.4 Optimality Condition 
 
For a general market distribution function shape, the derivatives involving ψ would 
make this very difficult to solve efficiently, or at all. For example, the approach is not 
able to be applied when there are discontinuities in ψ, as would be the case if another 
player had an offer curve with a horizontal section.   
 
However, in this simpler case, they are able to define the market distribution function 
analytically, as shown in Equation 4.5 (where ( )pS  is the aggregate supply curve), and 
so the partial derivatives needed are thus easy to find, and shown in Equation 4.6. 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∫ +=+<= pSq dfpSqDPpq 0, ηηψ  
 
Equation 4.5 Market Distribution Function 
 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )pSpSqf
p
pSqf
q
', +=∂
∂+=∂
∂ ψψ  
 
Equation 4.6 Partial Derivatives 
 
For a simple payoff function, ( ) qppqR =, , the optimality condition produce the optimal 
offer form shown in Equations 4.7. 
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Equations 4.7 Optimal Offer Form 
 
In other words, the quantity level to offer is a function of the price and the slope of the 
aggregate rest-of-market supply curve at each price. 
 
This section briefly discussed the simple optimality condition produced in the market 
distribution function research performed by the EPOC research group, and demonstrated 
that for a very restrictive set of conditions, under which the optimal offer is naturally 
monotone, this is easy to apply. However, under other, possibly more realistic forms of 
uncertainty and RD curve forms, the conditions are difficult or not possible to apply. In 
the remainder of this chapter we first provide a more intuitive derivation of a similar 
offer form to that shown in Equations 4.7, and then use this intuition to determine the 
optimal analytic form of offers under more varied situations, overcoming non-
monotonicity with simple optimality conditions where necessary. 
 
4.3 Optimal Offer Forms under Single-Kinked RD Curves 
 
In this section, we establish the desired form of offers that generators should provide to a 
wholesale electricity market for a single period. We consider various scenarios including 
different RD forms and uncertainty as to the position of the RD curve. We make the 
assumption that the entire RD curve will move simultaneously in a single direction. It 
will do so in such a manner that different possible positions of the RD curve do not cross 
over one another. We also make the assumption in this section that the RD curves are 
piecewise linear with two segments, forming a RD curve that is either convex or 
concave to the origin. 
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We will observe that in certain circumstances, these desired offer forms do not meet 
conditions required by the market for valid offers. In particular, the condition that offers 
must be monotonically non-decreasing in both the price and quantity dimension is 
commonly not met, especially when the RD curve is convex. We determine the optimal 
way of dealing with this problem, thus restoring monotonicity to the offer while 
maximising the expected level of profit. 
 
4.3.1 Terminology 
 
This section is devoted to defining the key terms and concepts that will be used 
throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
 
Residual Demand Vertex Path (RDVP): In a market situation, a generator will face 
uncertainty as to the position of the RD curve for all periods in which they are required 
to offer. In particular, we will define the direction of RD curve uncertainty with a line 
referred to as the Residual Demand Vertex Path (RDVP). For example, if the entire RD 
curve will move in the quantity dimension27, as demonstrated in Figure 4.2a, then the 
RDVP will be horizontal28. If the entire curve could move up in both price and quantity 
dimensions simultaneously, then the RDVP would be positively sloped as demonstrated 
in Figure 4.2b. 
 
                                                 
27 This would be the case if we knew rest of market supply, but were unsure about the level of inelastic 
demand 
28 Note that the path does not need to be based on the path of the vertex, but rather could be based on any 
specified point on the RD curve. The vertex has been chosen for simplicity of representation. 
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Figure 4.2 Horizontal and Positively Sloped RDVPs 
 
In this section we restrict the RDVP so that alternative RD curve positions may not 
overlap, as shown in Figure 4.3. This will be generalised in Section 4.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Overlapping Residual Demand Curve Instances 
 
Contributory Line (CL): Paths formed by the generator’s optimal dispatch points 
(where marginal revenue = marginal cost) under all possible positions of RD, assuming 
a constant slope of the RD curve. Assume that marginal cost is a linear function of the 
form qMCMCMC sl+= int  (i.e. a quadratic cost function), where intMC and slMC  are the 
intercept and slope terms of the marginal cost curve respectively. For each slope, -bi, 
RDVP 
Price
Quantity
RD 
(b)
RDVP 
Quantity 
Price 
RD 
Quantity
Price 
RD 
RDVP 
(a) 
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that exists in the RD curve, there is a corresponding contributory line of form 
( )qMCbMCp sli ++= int (see Figure 4.4). For proof, refer to Appendix A. 
 
Attractor Lines (AL): The paths formed by any dispatch points of local maxima under 
all possible positions of RD. These are subsets of the contributory lines, possibly 
combined with a connecting segment along the RDVP (if this segment would be 
monotone). In particular, the sections of the contributory lines that occur on the same 
side of the RDVP as their corresponding section of the RD curve will be part of the 
attractor line (see Figure 4.5). 
 
Pseudo-Offer (PO): The path formed by the set of globally optimal dispatch points 
under all possible realisations of RD (see Figure 4.5). This may or may not be 
monotone. If it is monotone in both the price and quantity dimensions, then this is 
simply the optimal offer for the generator to provide to the market. Sections 4.3.4 and 
4.3.5 deal with establishing optimal monotonic transformations for pseudo-offers that 
are not naturally monotone. 
 
At this point, we note that the optimal condition in Equation 4.4 is equivalent to our 
contributory line equation, while the plot of all points meeting this condition is 
equivalent to our attractor line. However, we define these terms and the simple process 
required to create them, as they can be used much more easily to establish the form of 
the desired offer under more general scenarios of uncertainty direction and RD form. 
 
4.3.1.1 Interpretation of Key Terminology 
 
To understand the CL, AL, and PO terms fully, consider the example shown in Figure 
4.4. Assuming a linear marginal cost curve, take a RD curve with a constant slope 1b−  
and plot the locus of optimal dispatch points (marginal revenue = marginal cost) under 
all possible realisations of RD (regardless of direction of movement). The result is a CL 
that has the form ( )qMCbMCp sl++= 1int . Under this very simple form of RD, this CL 
is equivalent to the PO and hence also the AL. 
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Figure 4.4 CL/PO/AL for a Simple Residual Demand Curve 
 
Now consider a concave to the origin RD curve as shown in Figure 4.5, with slope 
1b− above the RDVP and slope 2b−  below. When we plot the locus of optimal dispatch 
points, we get a PO (black) that is monotonically non-decreasing in both the quantity 
and price dimensions. As defined above, the attractor line (shown in black) is composed 
of CL2 below the RDVP and CL1 above, along with a segment along RDVP connecting 
the two. In this particular case we can therefore observe that the PO is identical to the 
AL.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 CL/PO/AL for a Concave Residual Demand 
 
RD 
CL1 
CL2 
RDVP 
2b−  MC 
Quantity 
Price 
1b−  
PO/AL
CL/PO/AL 
MCint 
slMCb +1  
1b−  
Quantity
Price RD
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The interpretation of this AL, as demonstrated in Figure 4.6 is that any current offer 
(such as those shown in red) can be improved by moving it towards this line. In other 
words, it is a point wise attractor for market outcomes. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Attractor Line Concept 
 
To understand why a shift of the current offer in the direction of this attractor line will 
give a guaranteed improvement, we must consider the form of the marginal revenue 
(MR) and marginal cost (MC) curves for each RD scenario. When the RD curve kinks in 
this concave manner, the MR curve is monotonically non-increasing (see Figure 4.7), 
and thus for a constant or non-decreasing MC, there is only a single intersection possible 
between MR and MC, and thus a single point of local maximum in the profit, this being 
the global optimal. Therefore, we know that whatever the intersection between a 
particular RD curve and the current offer, the profit achieved under that outcome of RD 
would have to be improved by moving that point of the offer curve towards the attractor 
line, which is the location of the optimal dispatch point under that scenario.  
 
Quantity 
Price 
Attractor Line
 105
 
 
Figure 4.7 Optimal Dispatch Point under a single Residual Demand Scenario 
 
Finally, consider a convex to the origin RD curve as shown in Figure 4.8. For lower 
levels of RD, the optimal dispatch position is on CL2, until a certain level (RDc), where 
the optimal dispatch positions jump to CL1. Therefore, the PO is as shown by the solid 
black lines. As before, the attractor line is composed of CL2 below the RDVP and CL1 
above, as shown by the combination of the black solid and dotted lines.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 CL/PO/AL for a Convex Residual Demand 
 
We can observe that the PO is clearly not monotone in this case, and as such, does not 
meet requirements for an offer to be made to the market. We define this particular type 
of non-monotonicity as Type I non-monotonicity. 
PO 
CL2 
CL1 
RDVP 
2b−  MC 
Quantity 
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Type I Non-Monotonicity: If the pseudo-offer has a step up and to the left, then define 
that pseudo-offer as having Type I non-monotonicity. This could be considered to be 
non-monotonicity in the quantity dimension. 
 
At this point, we also define another type of non-monotonicity. 
 
Type II Non-Monotonicity: If the pseudo-offer has a step down and to the right, then 
define that pseudo-offer as having Type II non-monotonicity. This could be considered 
to be non-monotonicity in the price dimension. 
 
To illustrate Type II Non-Monotonicity, consider a concave RD curve. The black line in 
Figure 4.9 shows the form of the PO in this case, which contains a non-monotone step 
down and to the right. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Concave RD under RDVP Slope Range 4 
 
4.3.2 Form of Pseudo-Offers with respect to RDVP Slope 
 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.8 demonstrated possible RDVP scenarios under concave and 
convex RD curves where the RDVP slope was positive, but less than the slopes of either 
CL. This led to monotone and non-monotone POs, respectively. There are many other 
RD 
RDVP 
MC 
Quantity 
Price 
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RDVP slope ranges that could occur, as demonstrated in Figure 4.10. Note that for two 
of these ranges, labelled 2 and 5, meaningful POs are not able to be constructed, and 
hence we consider these to be invalid RDVP slope ranges. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Possible RDVP Slope Ranges 
 
The form of the PO will depend on the slope of the RDVP relative to the slopes of the 
two segments of the RD curve and the slopes of the two CLs, and on whether the RD is 
concave or convex. Consider the two slopes of the RD to be 1b− and 2b− , while 
( )slMCb +1  and ( )slMCb +2  are the slopes of the associated CLs, as indicated in Figure 
4.10. Therefore, we can consider six different possible RDVP slope ranges (labelled 1-
6), as shown in Table 4.1. 
 
( )slMCb +2
2b−  
1b−  
( )slMCb +1
6 
5 
4 
3 
1 
2 
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RDVP Slope   
     Range 
Convex Residual Demand Concave Residual Demand 
1 Non-Monotonicity Type II Monotone 
2 Invalid RDVP Slope Range Invalid RDVP Slope Range 
3 Non-Monotonicity Type I Monotone 
4 Non-Monotonicity Type I Non-Monotonicity Type II 
5 Invalid RDVP Slope Range Invalid RDVP Slope Range 
6 Non-Monotonicity Type II Non-Monotonicity Type I 
 
Table 4.1 General Forms of Pseudo-Offers 
 
 
Clearly there are certain (limited) RD shape and uncertainty direction (RDVP) 
combinations under which the optimal set of dispatch points for all possible RD curve 
outcomes would form an offer that is naturally monotonic in both the price and quantity 
dimensions. The remainder of Section 4.3 deals with the remaining RD shape and 
uncertainty direction scenarios, where the set of optimal dispatch points are non-
monotonic, and establishes the best way to resolve the non-monotonicity in these cases. 
We begin by determining the possible forms of the profit curve, defined over the 
dispatch level. 
 
4.3.3 Form of the Single-Scenario Profit Curve 
 
In order to determine how best to overcome the issues of non-monotonicity in POs, we 
need to consider the possible forms of the profit curve for a single RD scenario, under 
both convex and concave RD curves. In particular, in this section we will show that the 
profit curve for a concave RD curve must be unimodal, and that the profit curve for a 
convex RD curve (with two segments) must be either unimodal or bimodal. By 
understanding the forms of the profit functions, we can then understand how the non-
monotonicity in the POs comes about, and hence how best to deal with it. Sections 4.3.4 
and 4.3.5 show how knowledge of this unimodularity or bimodularity can be used to 
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create an optimal monotonic transformation of Type I and Type II non-monotonic POs, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Possible Forms of the Profit Curve 
 
Figure 4.11 demonstrates possible forms of the profit curve around the quantity level at 
which the RD curve kinks ( kinkQ ). These will be referred to throughout this section. 
 
4.3.3.1 Bimodularity of Profit Function for Convex Residual Demand Curves 
 
We will begin by proving the unimodularity/bimodularity of the profit curve for any 
convex to the origin RD scenario with a single kink. We will also demonstrate that if we 
are faced with a RD curve with multiple local maxima, then the local minimum, between 
the two points of local maxima, must be located at the quantity where the kink occurs in 
the RD curve. 
 
We can consider the RD curve to have the form: 
 
( ) ( )qqbqaP −=  
Profit 
2a
2b
3
1
kinkQ Quantity 
4
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where a(q) and b(q) are the intercept and slope terms respectively, defined in the 
quantity dimension and with respect to the particular RD scenario that is being 
considered ( ia  and ib  are the intercept and slope associated with a particular RD 
segment i). We note that these are step functions as demonstrated in Figure 4.17, where 
the values change only at kinkQ . 
 
 
Figure 4.12 Convex Residual Demand Curve and the a and b functions 
 
For such a RD curve, we also note that marginal revenue has the form: 
 
( ) ( )qqbqaMR 2−=  
 
For a linear marginal cost, we can calculate the profit at any quantity, using the formula: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−−=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−−=
2
int
2
2
int
2
1)(
2
1Profit
qMCqMCqbqqqa
qMCqMCqqbqaq
sl
sl
 
 
The derivative with respect to q gives the rate of change of profit (or the slope of the 
profit curve) as we move in the quantity dimension: 
2b  
1b  
2a  
kinkQ
Price 
1a  
b(q) 
a(q) 
RD
11 qba −  
22 qba −  
Quantity 
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( ) ( ) ( ) MCMRqMCMCqqbqa
q sl
−=+−−=∂
∂
int2
Profit  
 
As we move from q = 0 up to q = kinkQ , we can observe that a(q), b(q), MCint, and MCsl 
are all constant, hence the only terms in the profit derivative that change are the second 
and fourth, and thus the derivative (the slope) must be constantly decreasing (assuming 
that 0)( ≠qb ). This means that this segment of the profit function must contain at most a 
single local maximum. 
 
Likewise, beyond q = kinkQ , a(q), b(q), MCint, and MCsl again remain constant, and thus 
the derivative (and slope) must again constantly decrease. This means that this segment 
of the profit function also can contain only a single local maximum. 
 
At kinkQq = , both a(q) and b(q) change. This can result in four different possible 
scenarios. The first is the case where both the right and the left derivatives of profit at 
this quantity level are positive values (i.e. positive slope either side of the breakpoint). 
Mathematically, this is described: 
 
02,2 int22int11 >−−−−−− kinkslkinkkinkslkink QMCMCQbaQMCMCQba  
 
This corresponds to profit form 1 in Figure 4.11, and indicates that the curve must be 
unimodal, with the global maximum lying to the right of kinkQ . 
 
The second scenario is the case where both the right and the left derivatives of profit at 
this quantity level are negative values: 
 
02,2 int22int11 <−−−−−− kinkslkinkkinkslkink QMCMCQbaQMCMCQba  
 
This corresponds to profit form 3 in Figure 4.11, and also indicates that the curve must 
be unimodal, this time with the global maximum lying to the left of kinkQ . 
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Finally, the left derivative may be negative, while the right derivative is positive, at this 
point (as in profit forms 2a and 2b in Figure 4.11). This indicates that at kinkQ , the slope 
of the profit curve is changing from negative to positive, hence this point is a local 
minimum. This also implies that the profit curve will be bimodal, but we are unsure as to 
which side of kinkQ  the global maximum will lie. Mathematically, these cases are 
described: 
 
kinkslkinkkinkslkink QMCMCQbaQMCMCQba −−−<<−−− int22int11 202  
 
Note that under this convex RD scenario, case 4, where the global optimum occurs on 
the RDVP, can not exist. 
 
Hence, we have shown that for a convex RD curve, the profit curve must be either 
unimodal or bimodal, and if it is bimodal, then the local minimum of the curve must be 
located at kinkQ . It is interesting to understand both how this bimodularity can occur in 
the profit function for a convex RD curve, and the meaning of the non-globally optimal 
local points of optima.  
 
In order to comprehend these issues, consider the case of a convex RD curve under a 
RDVP in slope range 3, as shown in Figure 4.13. As the RD curve moves out to the 
right, it is initially optimal to be dispatched on the lower segment of the RD curve. In 
particular, for these RD curves, the profit curve is unimodal. As the RD curve moves to 
the right, there comes a point (RDmin) where the profit curve becomes bimodal 
(develops multiple local optima), while retaining a single global optimum on the lower 
segment of the RD. Once the RD passes RDc, the global optimum jumps up to the upper 
segment of the RD curve, thus causing the Type I non-monotonicity observed in the PO. 
Once the RD gets beyond RDmax, the profit curve returns to being unimodal, but with 
the global optima now on the upper segment of the RD curve. It is important to note that 
for the range of RD curves that produce bimodal profit curves (RDmin to RDmax), the 
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non-globally optimal points of local optima in the profit curve (dotted segments) 
correspond to points on the ALs that are not part of the PO. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Source of Local Points of Optima under Convex RD 
 
With respect to the profit curves shown in Figure 4.11, observe that in Figure 4.13: 
- RDmin is the position of the RD curve where the profit curve shifts from form 1 
to form 2a 
- RDc is the position of the RD curve where the profit curve shifts from form 2a to 
form 2b 
- RDmax is the position of the RD curve where the profit curve shifts from form 
2b to form 3. 
 
The multiple local optima described above for RD curves between RDmin and RDmax 
are caused by the shape of the marginal revenue (MR) curve for this form of RD. The 
particular issue is that the MR curve is not monotonically non-increasing, and thus, can 
potentially have multiple intersections with the monotonically non-decreasing marginal 
cost curve. To demonstrate, the leftmost pair of diagrams in Figure 4.14 show the 
situation where we have the RD curve RDmin, and the rightmost pair show the situation 
RDVP 
∗
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∗
maxRDQQ Q
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where we have RDmax. This case assumes that the marginal cost is constant and equal 
to zero, but the concepts are equally valid for any non-decreasing marginal cost 
function. For any RD curve in between these two, there will be multiple local optima in 
the revenue curve. Note that for a concave RD curve, the MR curve will be 
monotonically non-increasing (as demonstrated in Figure 4.7, and proven in Section 
4.3.3.2), and as such, there will be no points of local optima that are not globally 
optimal. Hence, under that RD shape, the PO will simply be the same as the ALs. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Marginal Revenue and Profit Curves 
 
Equivalent figures could similarly be drawn for other RDVP slope ranges. 
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4.3.3.2 Unimodularity of Profit Function for Concave Residual Demand Curves 
 
We will now prove the unimodularity of the profit curve for any concave to the origin 
RD scenario with a single kink. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15 Concave Residual Demand Curve and the a and b functions 
 
As in the convex case, we can easily show that the slope of the profit curve up to and 
beyond kinkQ  must be constantly decreasing.  
 
For a concave RD curve, both a(q) and b(q) increase at kinkQ , as shown in Figure 4.15. 
In this RD case, the slope of the profit curve immediately before kinkQ  is equal to 
kinkslkink QMCMCQba −−− int11 2 , while the slope immediately after kinkQ  is given by  
kinkslkink QMCMCQba −−− int22 2 . Therefore, to know what happens to the slope of the 
profit curve at kinkQ , we need to establish a relationship between these two slope 
equations. Start by re-writing the equations as follows: 
 
 
kinkkinkslkink
kinkkinkslkinkkinkslkink
QbQMCMCQRD
QbQMCMCQbaQMCMCQba
1int1
1int11int11
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2
−−−=
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and 
kinkkinkslkink
kinkkinkslkinkkinkslkink
QbQMCMCQRD
QbQMCMCQbaQMCMCQba
2int2
2int22int22
)(
2
−−−=
−−−−=−−−
 
 
By definition, )()( 21 kinkkink QRDQRD = , as this is the location where the kink occurs in 
the RD curve. Therefore, given that the marginal cost terms in each equation are 
equivalent and that 12 bb > , we can see that the slope of the profit function must be lower 
to the right of the breakpoint than it is to the left. 
 
In other words, we can conclude that the slope of the profit curve is decreasing over the 
entire valid quantity range for a concave RD curve, hence proving that the profit curve is 
unimodal. If both slopes are negative at kinkQ , then the profit maximum will lie to the left 
of this point, and vice versa if both slopes are positive at kinkQ . If the slope to the left of 
kinkQ  is positive, while the slope to the right is negative, then we have case 4 shown in 
Figure 4.11, where the maximum is at kinkQ , or in other words, on the RDVP. 
 
4.3.4 Optimal Monotonic Transformations – Type I Non-Monotonicity 
 
So far in this section, we have established two forms of non-monotonicity that need to 
be adjusted to produce monotone offers that could be provided by a generator to the 
market. Such an adjustment is required as most markets require that submitted offers 
must be monotonically non-decreasing in both the price and quantity dimensions. 
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Figure 4.16 Type I Non-Monotonicity – Range to be Transformed 
 
Type I non-monotonicity involves a PO that jumps up and to the left, as shown in Figure 
4.16. The question is therefore, how can this pseudo-offer best be transformed to a 
feasible offer that meets market monotonicity requirements? To be precise, we need to 
know how optimally to connect the points s and f. Before addressing this issue, we note 
that the optimal offer up to point s and beyond point f must follow along the PO. This is 
because there is just a single, global optimum corresponding to each of the RD scenarios 
that could lead to dispatch points in these regions, and these optimal points exist along 
the attractor lines stated. 
 
4.3.4.1 Form of the Optimal Monotonic Transformation 
 
In this section, we will hypothesise and prove the optimal form of the monotonic 
transformation of a PO that is subject to Type I non-monotonicity. 
 
Theorem 4.1: 
 
Consider a pseudo-offer with Type I non-monotonicity, such as that in Figure 4.16. The 
optimal offer will trace along the lower (right) segment of the pseudo-offer curve from 
Quantity 
s 
f 
RDc 
Price 
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point s, and then at some quantity point, will jump up to the upper (left) segment of the 
pseudo-offer curve, following this along to point f. If we take any existing offer segment 
from point s to point f that does not consist of part of each of the lower and upper 
attractor lines connected by a vertical segment in this manner, then the expected payoff 
must be improved by transforming the offer to this form, such that the vertical segment 
passes through the intersection of the original offer with RDVP. This will not 
necessarily be the optimal position for the vertical jump, but the new offer must be better 
than the original offer. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17 Demonstration of Vertical Jump 
 
Proof Using Direction of Improvement Theory: 
 
To show that the optimal connection must indeed contain a vertical jump from the lower 
to the upper AL, we need to consider the direction of improvement from any given point 
of dispatch. Take any monotone offer path from s to f, such as that indicated in blue in 
Figure 4.18, and consider the resulting dispatch points along this blue segment for each 
of the RD scenarios and how they could be improved. 
 
Quantity 
RDc 
Price 
Optimal
Offer
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Figure 4.18 A Non-Optimal Offer and Associated Directions of Improvement 
 
1) For the points of dispatch on the RD curves up to RDmin, we are currently up and to 
the left of the global optimum on this unimodal profit curve, and so know that the 
direction of improvement along the RD curve (as indicated by the yellow arrow) must be 
down and to the right. This is demonstrated by the revenue diagrams in Figure 4.14. 
 
2) The profit curves corresponding to RD curves between RDmin and RDc are bimodal 
and hence there are multiple locally optimal points of dispatch. We are presently up and 
to the left of the global optimum, and to the right of the RDVP (local minimum in profit 
curve). Hence the local direction of improvement (as indicated by the blue arrow) is 
down and to the right. 
 
3) For the points of dispatch on the RD curves between RDc and the point where the 
current offer (blue line) intersects RDVP (i.e. the point labelled Offer Intersection, OI), 
(1) 
(5)
(3)
(2) 
Offer 
Intersection (OI) 
RDc 
RDmax 
RDmin 
s 
f 
Quantity 
Price 
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there are again multiple local optima. We are now down and to the right of the global 
optimum, but also to the right of the RDVP. Hence, although the global direction of 
improvement is up and to the left, the local direction of improvement (as indicated by 
the pink arrow) is down and to the right. 
 
4) If the current offer were to intersect RDVP to the left of RDc, then the points of 
dispatch on the RD curves between these points would also have multiple local optima. 
We would be up and to the left of the global optimum, and also to the left of the 
breakpoint. Hence, the direction of improvement (not shown on this figure) would be up 
and to the left. 
 
5) For the points of dispatch on the RD curves between the point where the current offer 
(blue line) intersects RDVP and RDmax, there are multiple local optima. We are down 
and to the right of the global optimum and to the left of the RDVP. Hence, the direction 
of improvement (as indicated by the red arrows) is up and to the left. 
 
6) If the current offer were to intersect RDmax before reaching point b, then for the 
points of dispatch on the RD curves beyond RDmax, we would be down and to the right 
of the global optimum, and so we know that the direction of improvement (not shown on 
this figure) would be up and to the left. 
 
To summarise, we know that for all points of dispatch that are currently below the 
intersection with the RDVP, the direction of improvement is down and to the right, 
while the direction of improvement for all points above this intersection is up and to the 
left. Put another way, a point of dispatch is attracted to the intersection between its RD 
curve and the AL on the same side of the RDVP as that point is currently located. 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 4.19, this implies that we can construct an offer that follows 
along the lower AL up until the level jumpQ  (which is the quantity level at which the 
original offer intersected RDVP), then jumps up to the upper AL, and carries on along 
this line. The new offer is then guaranteed to have a better payoff than the original offer, 
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as all the dispatch points have moved in their local direction of improvement, towards 
their attractor lines.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.19 A Transformation of the Offer, Guaranteed to be an Improvement 
 
This same logic can be applied to any curve through this range that is not of this form. 
Therefore, for any such curve, there must be a feasible improvement to be made by 
adjusting the offer to make it vertical between the lower and upper attractor lines, 
passing through the offer intersection point with RDVP. 
Q.E.D. 
 
4.3.4.2 Vertical Jump Location Optimality Condition 
 
We have shown above that the optimal monotone offer must involve a segment of the 
lower AL, a segment of the upper AL, and a vertical jump between the two. The 
question remains as to where exactly this jump should occur. Clearly, the optimal 
location of the jump will depend on the payoffs and probability distribution of the 
particular case that is being considered. In general though, we can form an optimality 
condition on the derivative of the profit with respect to the quantity level of the jump, 
which will determine the optimal position of the jump in all cases. 
jumpQ  
s 
f 
Quantity 
Price 
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The profit equation that we need in order to create an optimality condition on the 
position of the vertical jump is the integral over all possible RD curve scenarios. 
 
Term Definitions 
 
sc is a RD position scenario index used to define the level of the RD curve. 
 
pr(sc) is the probability density function of RD scenario level. 
 
a(sc,q) is a surface defined over the dimensions of RD scenario level and quantity, 
which provides the intercept term for the RD curve. 
 
b(sc,q) is a surface defined over the dimensions of RD scenario level and quantity, 
which provides the slope term for the RD curve. 
 
u(q) is the highest RD scenario level that leads to a dispatch on the vertical segment of 
the offer curve for the current quantity position of that segment. 
 
l(q) is the lowest RD scenario level that leads to a dispatch on the vertical segment of the 
offer curve for the current quantity position of that segment. 
 
q is the quantity level where the vertical connection segment will be placed in the offer 
curve.  
 
For a given scenario, we know the functions a(sc,q), b(sc,q) and pr(sc) in advance, q is 
the decision that we are making, while l(q) and u(q) will directly depend on this 
decision. 
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Figure 4.20 The a(sc,q) and b(sc,q) Functions 
 
 
 
Figure 4.21 The l(q) and u(q) Terms 
 
Note: l(q) and u(q) are the RD scenario levels that lead to these RD curves 
 
q 
l(q) 
u(q) 
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a(sc,q), 
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sc 
q 
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Figure 4.22 The pr(sc) Probability Density Function 
 
Optimal Dispatch Points before Vertical Jump 
 
From the concept of contributory and attractor lines, we know that the AL below the 
RDVP has slope equal to the negative of the slope segment of RD that is below RDVP 
plus the marginal cost curve slope. Likewise, we know that the AL above RDVP has 
slope equal to negative of the slope segment of RD that is above RDVP plus the 
marginal cost curve slope. We can therefore denote the slope of the AL below RDVP 
as ( ) slMCscb +inf, , and the slope on the AL above it as ( ) slMCscb +− inf, . This is 
because -b(sc,inf) is the slope that occurs at all points beyond the kink in the RD curve 
(and hence must always occur at q = infinity), and -b(sc,-inf) is the slope that occurs at 
all points before the kink (and hence must occur at q = -infinity). This information is 
shown in Figure 4.23. 
 
Probability 
Density 
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pr(sc) 
Demand 
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Figure 4.23 Attractor Line Slopes 
 
If, under the current position of the RD curve, we are to be dispatched on the lower AL, 
we can analytically determine our dispatch quantity and price levels. We know from 
Section 4.3.1.1 that the optimal point is at the intersection of the AL 
(form ( )slMCscbqMCp ++= inf),(int ), and the associated RD segment 
(form inf),(inf),( scqbscap −= ). Therefore, we find that the optimal dispatch quantity 
and price are: 
 
( )
( ) slMCscb
MCscaQ +
−=
inf,2
inf,* int  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−−=
slMCscb
MCscascbscaP
inf,2
inf,inf,inf,* int  
 
Therefore, given a cost function c(q) and a simple revenue term pq , we can show that 
the profit contribution from the RD scenario levels up to l(q) is as follows (with all 
dispatch points on the lower AL): 
 
a(sc,inf) ( ) slMCscb +− inf,  
Q*
AL-b(sc,-inf)
AL
( ) slMCscb +inf, -b(sc,inf) 
P* 
Quantity 
Price 
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Optimal Dispatch Points after Vertical Jump 
 
Similarly, we can show that the profit contribution from the RD scenario levels beyond 
u(q) is as follows (with all dispatch points on the upper AL): 
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Optimal Dispatch Points on the Vertical Jump 
 
For all RD scenario levels between l(q) and u(q), the form of the profit equation is 
slightly different, due to the fact that we know the quantity level in this range (as it is the 
vertical section of the offer): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]dscqcqqscbqscaqscprprofit qu
ql
.,,
)(
)(
∫ −−=  
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Profit Formula and Derivative 
 
Hence, the total profit equation is: 
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The derivative of profit is therefore: 
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Of the five terms in the derivative above, the first three are the derivative of the profit 
term for demand levels from l(q) up to u(q), while the fourth and fifth terms are from the 
derivatives of the profit terms for 0 to l(q) and u(q) to infinity respectively. Hence, the 
only terms in the profit derivative for demand levels up to l(q) and beyond u(q) relate to 
the breakpoints themselves, as the rest of the terms are unaffected by a marginal change 
in the level of the quantity jump-point. These terms then cancel out with the final two 
terms of the derivative of profit between l(q) and u(q). In other words,  
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Although the terms appear to be slightly different, by substituting 
( )
( ) qMCqscb
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sl
=+
−
,2
, int (as previously defined), it can easily be shown that the two pairs of 
terms are equivalent. Therefore, the profit derivative reduces down to the equation: 
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Optimality Condition 
 
In the specific case that we are considering here, with a single kink in the piecewise 
linear RD curve, this equation can be simplified significantly. The derivative of both the 
a and b functions with respect to q is equal to zero at all points, giving the optimality 
condition: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ][ ] 0.,2,)(
)(
int =+−−∫
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ql
sl dscqMCMCqqscbqscascpr  
 
Given that the RD curve is equal to ( ) ( )qqscbqsca ,, − , we know that the marginal 
revenue curve must be given by the equation ( ) ( )qqscbqsca ,2, − , as observed within the 
optimality condition. Therefore, the optimality condition says that we take the integral of 
the probability distribution of demand multiplied by MR - MC over the range of RD 
curve scenarios that would lead to dispatch on the vertical segment of the offer, and find 
the quantity for which this equation is equal to zero. 
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If, rather than having a continuous probability density function for the RD level, there 
was actually a set of discrete demand levels that could occur (with a corresponding 
probability of each occurrence being pr(sc)), we could rearrange the original profit 
equation to be a summation of the individual expected profit terms. It can be shown that 
the optimality condition would be: 
 
( )[ ] 0)(Profit Marginal)(
)(
=∑qu
ql
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The optimal position of the step could thus be solved by a simple algorithm that iterates 
through the possible range of positions. 
 
4.3.5 Optimal Monotonic Transformations – Type II Non-Monotonicity 
 
 
 
Figure 4.24 Type II Non -Monotonicity – Range to be Transformed 
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Type II non-monotonicity involves a PO that jumps down and to the right, as shown in 
Figure 4.24. The problem is again how best to transform this pseudo-offer into a feasible 
offer that meets market monotonicity requirements (i.e. how do we optimally connect 
points s and f). Just as with the Type 1 non-monotonicity case, the optimal offer up to 
point s and beyond point f will follow along the PO. 
 
We propose that the optimal offer will trace along the upper (left) segment of the 
pseudo-offer curve from point s, and then at some price point, will step across to the 
lower (right) segment of the pseudo-offer curve, following this along to point f. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 4.25, and can easily be shown to be true by applying direction of 
improvement theory on any alternative offer form, similar to that demonstrated in 
Section 4.3.4.1. Stated more formally, 
 
Theorem 4.2: 
 
Consider a pseudo-offer with Type II non-monotonicity, such as that in Figure 4.24. If 
we take any existing offer segment from point s to point f that does not consist of part of 
each of the left and right attractor lines connected by a horizontal segment, then we 
know that we can make an improvement to the expected payoff by transforming the 
offer to this form, such that the horizontal segment passes through the intersection of the 
original offer with RDVP. This is not necessarily the optimal position for the vertical 
jump, but we know that it is a better offer than the original. 
 
 132
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 10 20 30 40 50
Quantity
Price
 
 
Figure 4.25 Demonstration of Horizontal Jump 
 
Given that the optimal monotone offer in this case must involve a segment of the left 
AL, a segment of the right AL, and a horizontal jump between the two, we must form an 
optimality condition on the position of the jump in a similar way to that presented in 
Section 4.3.4. 
 
4.3.5.1 Profit Formula and Derivative 
 
The following additional terms are needed to define the optimality condition on the 
position of the horizontal jump. 
 
a(sc,p) is a surface defined over the dimensions of RD scenario level and price, which 
provides the intercept term for the RD curve. 
 
b(sc,p) is a surface defined over the dimensions of RD scenario level and price, which 
provides the slope term for the RD curve. 
 
u(p) is the highest RD scenario level that leads to a dispatch on the horizontal segment 
of the offer curve for the current price position of that curve. 
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l(p) is the lowest RD scenario level that leads to a dispatch on the horizontal segment of 
the offer curve for the current price position of that curve. 
 
p is the price level where the horizontal connection segment will be placed in the offer 
curve.  
 
For a given scenario, we know the functions a(sc,p), b(sc,p) and pr(sc) in advance, p is 
the decision that we are making, while l(p) and u(p) will directly depend on this 
decision. 
 
The total profit equation is the sum of optimal dispatch points on the horizontal jump 
(with a known price level), before the horizontal jump (on the left AL) and after the 
horizontal jump (on the right AL): 
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The derivative of profit is therefore: 
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As in the vertical jump case, using the substitution ( )( ) qMCpscb
MCpsca
sl
=+
−
,2
, int enables the final 
four terms of the above condition to cancel out. Therefore, the profit derivative reduces 
down to the equation: 
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4.3.5.2 Optimality Condition 
 
In the specific case that we are considering here, with a single kink in the piecewise 
linear RD curve, this equation can be simplified significantly. The derivative of both the 
a and b functions with respect to p is equal to zero at all points, giving the optimality 
condition: 
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Let us consider the meaning of this condition. If there is a linear marginal cost, then the 
profit for a particular RD curve that intersects the horizontal segment is: 
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Therefore, marginal profit with respect to price is: 
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Which simplifies to: 
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In other words, as we increase the price, the revenue increases at a rate of ( )( )pscb
ppsca
,
2, − , 
while the quantity decreases at a rate of ( )pscb ,
1 . Therefore, as we increase the price 
level, the total cost decreases at a rate of ( )
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,
int is the marginal cost at the quantity where the RD curve 
crosses the horizontal), thus increasing profit at the same rate. So, effectively, our 
optimality condition is: 
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Therefore, the optimality condition says that we take the integral of the probability 
distribution of demand multiplied by the marginal profit with respect to price and find 
the price for which this equation is equal to zero. 
 
Recall that the optimality condition for the location of the vertical step under horizontal 
uncertainty was:  
 
( )[ ] 0.)( ProfitMarginal)(
)(
=∫
qu
ql
dscqscpr  
 
This is clearly a very similar optimality condition, the only difference being the direction 
of the derivatives (in the p direction for the horizontal jump and in the q direction for the 
vertical jump). 
 
Again, if rather than having a continuous probability density function for the RD level, 
there was actually a set of discrete scenario levels that could occur (with a corresponding 
probability of each occurrence being pr(sc)), we could rearrange the original profit 
equation to be a summation of the individual expected profit terms. It can be shown that 
the optimality condition would be: 
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pl
pscr  
 
The optimal position of the step could thus be solved by a simple algorithm that iterates 
through the possible range of positions. 
 
4.4 Optimal Offer Forms under Multiple-Kinked RD Curves 
 
In this section we develop the concepts of Section 4.3 further, to consider how the 
optimal monotone offers will look under RD curves that have multiple kinks, potentially 
of both convex and concave nature.  
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When we consider a RD curve with multiple kinks, there will be multiple RDVPs. In 
particular, if there are n segments to the RD curve, there will be (n-1) kinks in the curve 
and hence (n-1) RDVPs. Just as in the single kink case, we can establish the appropriate 
attractor lines in each range between the consecutive RDVPs, corresponding to the slope 
of the RD curve in that region. The combination of these ALs will then determine the 
pseudo-offer (or desired offer) for that RD scenario. 
 
As a result of each of these (n-1) kinks that occur in the RD curve, there is potentially a 
region of uncertainty as to how the optimal offer should be constructed (from is to if ). 
These regions of uncertainty can come about from either Type I or Type II non-
monotonicity.  
 
For example, Figure 4.26 demonstrates a RD curve with three kinks, and hence four 
different RD curve slopes, denoted 1b  to 4b , where 1b  is the flattest segment and 4b  the 
steepest. Therefore, each of these slope segments has a corresponding CL, as with the 
single kink case. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.26 Construction of the ALs for a Multi-Kink Residual Demand Curve 
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The ALs are then determined by the regions in which each of these CLs are valid. In 
other words: 
 
- AL1 is the segment of CL1 below RDVP1 (i.e. where 1b  is valid) 
- AL2 is the segment of CL2 between RDVP1 and RDVP2 (where 2b is valid) 
- AL3 is the segment of CL3 between RDVP2 and RDVP3 
- AL4 is the segment of CL4 above RDVP3 
 
Therefore, in this case we encounter three kinks that lead to Type I non-monotonicity in 
the PO. This produces three regions of uncertainty, with start and finish points 
denoted 332211  and  , , , , fsfsfs , as shown in Figure 4.27. 
 
 
Figure 4.27 Regions of Uncertainty 
 
4.4.1 Direction of Improvement Theory under Multiple Kinks 
 
The direction of improvement theory in Section 4.3 was largely based on the fact that for 
a single kink in a given RD curve, the payoff function with respect to quantity supplied 
was either unimodal or bimodal. When it was bimodal, the local minimum between the 
two points of local maxima was located at the kink in the RD curve (i.e. at the RDVP). 
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This implied that any current dispatch point would be attracted to the AL on the same 
side of the RDVP as it was currently located. Likewise, it can easily be shown that if 
there are (n-1) kinks in the RD curve, then the payoff function will be at most n-modal, 
with points of local minima again located on the RDVPs. This implies that any current 
dispatch point will be attracted to the AL in the same region (between consecutive 
RDVPs) as it is currently located. 
 
Returning to our example, consider any current offer, such as that shown in blue in 
Figure 4.28. We produce a new offer (bold black) that has a vertical segment passing 
through each intersection between the current offer and one of the RDVPs. We know 
that this new offer must be an improvement on the original, as all dispatch points have 
moved in their local directions of improvement (i.e. towards the AL in the same region). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.28 New Offer with Guaranteed Improvement 
 
This example shows that the connections between the ALs to overcome these Type I 
non-monotonicities must be vertical segments, but does not define where the optimal 
position of these individual segments will be, and whether the combination of them will 
be monotone. 
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Consider all the regions of non-monotonicity that result from kinks in the RD curve. 
There are four possible outcomes: 
 
1) All kinks lead to Type I non-monotonicity in the PO 
2) All kinks lead to Type II non-monotonicity in the PO 
3) Some kinks lead to Type I non-monotonicity and some lead to Type II non-
monotonicity, but there are no areas where the regions of uncertainty 
corresponding to the different types of non-monotonicity overlap.  
4) Some kinks lead to Type I non-monotonicity and some lead to Type II non-
monotonicity, and there are areas where the regions of uncertainty 
corresponding to the different types of non-monotonicity overlap.  
 
If any of outcomes 1-3 occur, then the optimal offer can be formed relatively simply, 
using the same logic and optimality conditions of Section 4.3. In these cases, the regions 
of Type I and Type II non-monoticities are dealt with separately. This is explained in 
Section 4.4.2. If outcome 4 occurs, then, although the same logic of Section 4.3 still 
applies, the optimality condition on the placement of the corresponding vertical and 
horizontal segments must be adjusted (as they may overlap). This is explained in Section 
4.4.3. 
 
4.4.2 Dealing with Multiple Type I or All Type II Non-Monotonicity 
 
When faced with consecutive regions of Type I or Type II non-monotonicity, the first 
step is to find the optimal resolution of each region of uncertainty independently. To 
demonstrate, we will return the example started above, which deals with consecutive 
Type I non-monotonicity. In general, there are three possible scenarios that could result 
from this first step. 
 
Scenario 1: The combination of the independent steps is naturally monotone. The 
optimal offer is therefore determined by the combination of these steps and the AL 
segments in between. 
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Scenario 2: The combination of a subset of the first or last i independent steps is 
guaranteed to be monotone (all to the left or all to the right of all other possible steps). 
All that remains is to determine the optimal monotonic resolution of the remaining non-
monotone steps (this may effectively lead you to Scenario 3). 
 
Scenario 3: Multiple independent steps are non-monotone. We must determine how to 
optimally resolve this non-monotonicity. 
 
Let us consider the possible scenarios that could be encountered when trying to resolve 
the non-monotonicity in our example. Figure 4.29 – Figure 4.32 show in blue, a 
selection of possible combinations of optimal vertical step positions between each pair 
of consecutive ALs, one associated with each of the three possible scenarios. The 
possible resolutions of non-monotonicity discussed are shown in red. We shall denote 
the quantity level of the optimal vertical step between iAL  and jAL  as ijqv . 
 
 
 
Figure 4.29 Scenario 1 
 
Figure 4.29 demonstrates Scenario 1, where 342312 qvqvqv ≤≤ . Therefore, we 
immediately have a monotone offer. 
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Figure 4.30 Scenario 2 – Instance 1 
 
Figure 4.30 shows one possible occurrence of Scenario 2. Here, the first vertical step, 
12qv , is to the left of both the other vertical steps. Therefore, we immediately know that 
it must be part of the optimal offer. However, 23qv is to the right of 34qv , and so this non-
monotonicity must be resolved. The optimal solution to this problem must be a single 
vertical step, 24qv , from the second AL up to the fourth. Clearly, the quantity position of 
this vertical step must be between the quantities of the two vertical steps whose non-
monotonicity it is overcoming. i.e. 232434 qvqvqv ≤≤ . 
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Figure 4.31 Scenario 2 – Instance 2 
 
Figure 4.31 shows another possible occurrence of Scenario 2, but this time the last 
vertical step, 34qv , is to the right of both other vertical steps. Similarly to the previous 
case, we therefore immediately know that this will be part of the optimal offer. The non-
monotonicity of 12qv  and 23qv  must therefore be resolved, with a step 13qv  that lies 
between the two. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.32 Scenario 3 
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The case demonstrated in Figure 4.32 demonstrates Scenario 3, where there is non-
monotonicity between all three steps. We know the optimal monotonic resolution of any 
two consecutive non-monotonic steps will be a new vertical that falls between the 
original two verticals. Expanding on this, we therefore know that the resolution of any n 
consecutive non-monotonic verticals is a single new vertical lying somewhere between 
the first and last original verticals.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.33 Scenario 3 – Instance 2 
 
This final case, as shown in Figure 4.33, is slightly different as there are two possible 
results. As with the previous case, we start by resolving the non-monotonicity of the n 
consecutive non-monotone vertical steps (n = 2 in this case). If the optimal resolution is 
a 13qv  that lies to the left of 34qv  (as indicated by line 1), then we have a monotone offer 
at this point. If, however, the optimal resolution lies to the right of 34qv , (as indicated by 
line 2), then we have a new non-monotonicity between 13qv  and 34qv . The process of 
resolving non-monotonicities therefore repeats until the resulting offer is completely 
monotone. If there are many consecutive sections of Type I or Type II non-
monotonicity, this may take a few iterations. 
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4.4.3 Dealing with Overlapping Regions of Type I and Type II Non-Monotonicity 
 
This section determines the process that should be followed if there are overlapping 
regions of Type I and Type II non-monotonicity. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.34 Non-Overlapping Regions of Type I and Type II Non-Monotonicity 
 
Consider Figure 4.34 In this case, we have both a Type I and a Type II non-
monotonicity in the PO. However, because their regions of uncertainty do not overlap, 
the optimal resolutions of their non-monotonicities can be performed independently. 
This is an example of PO outcome 3, as described in Section 4.4.2. 
 
Now consider a case such as that shown in Figure 4.35, where the regions of uncertainty 
do overlap. Assume that we have a current offer from s1 to f2, such as that shown in blue. 
We use the term Critical Intersection Points (CIPs) to refer to the intersections between 
the current offer and the RDVPs. 
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Figure 4.35 Overlapping Regions of Type I and Type II Non-Monotonicity 
 
Recall that, as explained in Section 4.4.2, a point of dispatch on any current offer is 
attracted to the AL in the same region as it (i.e. between the same pair of RDVPs). For 
this reason, in this case, we can observe that the bold offer in Figure 4.36 is a guaranteed 
improvement over the original offer. Again though, we need an optimality condition to 
determine the exact position of the optimal vertical and horizontal steps.  
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Figure 4.36 Overlapping Regions of Type I and Type II Non-Monotonicity – Improved Offer 
 
In general, for multiple overlapping regions of Types I and II non-monotonicity, we can 
define an algorithm for the generation of an improved offer over any current offer that 
does not have the optimal form. This process will tell us the general form that the 
optimal resolution of the non-monotonicity should take. The algorithm is as follows: 
 
1) Create the vertical and horizontal segments for each Type I and II non-
monotonicity. 
a. These are lines through the CIPs – see Figure 4.36. 
b. The vertical and horizontal segments exist only between the RDVPs in 
which the associated kink is relevant, and within the two associated CLs. 
2) The improved offer must pass through all the CIPs, so remove all parts of the 
vertical and horizontal segments that could not be included in a monotonic offer 
that meets these requirements. For example, we are left with the bold lines in 
Figure 4.36. 
3) The remaining vertical and horizontal segments, along with the monotonic 
segments of the ALs are the new, improved offer. 
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Figure 4.37 shows the range of possible optimal vertical and horizontal segment 
positions for this example. Note that some positions have them overlapping, and others 
do not. For the cases where they are optimally not overlapping, this can be found by 
solving each separately first, and then leaving offer as is, if they don’t overlap. If they do 
overlap, then a new optimality condition is needed, and can be constructed under the 
assumption that the optimal horizontal and vertical steps will definitely intersect. The 
goal of this optimality condition will be to find the Turning Point (TP) of the optimal 
horizontal and vertical segments, as shown in Figure 4.37.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.37 Overlapping Regions of Type I and Type II Non-Monotonicity – Possible Optimal Offer 
Positions 
 
4.4.4 Optimality Condition for Overlapping Regions of Types I and II Non-
Monotonicity 
 
Because we have already established that the vertical and horizontal segments must 
intersect, the optimality conditions for the horizontal and vertical segments are linked 
via the requirement that ( ) ( )qlpu = . In other words the highest RD curve that intersects 
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the horizontal segment is the lowest RD curve that intersects the vertical segment. This 
could be generalised so that they were consecutive RD curves, rather than the same one, 
but if we assume a continuous (or close to) distribution of RD curves, there will 
effectively be no difference. 
 
Recall that our optimality conditions for independent horizontal and vertical steps were: 
 
( )[ ] 0.)( ProfitMarginal)(
)(
=∫
pu
pl
dscpscpr  and ( )[ ] 0.)( ProfitMarginal)(
)(
=∫
qu
ql
dscqscpr  
 
So, our new optimality condition is: 
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where ( ) ( )qlpu =  
 
Therefore, the optimality condition says that (quantity, price) space must be searched for 
a TP that satisfies this equation. 
 
If rather than having a continuous probability density function for the RD level, there 
was actually a set of discrete scenario levels that could occur (with a corresponding 
probability of each occurrence being pr(sc)), we could rearrange the original profit 
equation to be a summation of the individual expected profit terms. It can be shown that 
the optimality condition would be: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] 0)( ProfitMarginalp)( ProfitMarginalp )(
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4.4.5 Offer Construction Algorithm under Multiple Kinked RD Curves 
 
To summarise, in order to produce the optimal offer under a multiple-kinked RD curve, 
this process should be followed: 
 
1) Break the two-dimensional (quantity, price) space into regions by the multiple 
RDVPs. In each of these regions, establish the appropriate ALs and hence 
produce the overall PO (as in Figure 4.26). 
2) Independently determine the optimal vertical or horizontal step to use for each 
Type I and Type II non-monotonicity respectively, that occurs in the PO. 
3) If any of these steps are clearly valid, then include that step automatically and 
consider only the ranges that have non-monotone or crossing steps. A step is 
clearly valid if it is further to the left or the right than any other step, and retains 
monotonicity, no matter what the optimal resolution of the remaining region of 
uncertainty (for example, as explained in Scenario 2 of Section 4.4.2). 
4) If there are optimal steps from Types I and II non-monotonicity crossing one 
another, then find the optimal Turning Point to determine the position of the 
horizontal and vertical steps, as described in Section 4.4.4. 
5) If there are optimal steps from non-monotonicity of the same Type (I or II) 
forming a non-monotone offer, then find the optimal position of the monotone 
step(s) to replace them, as described in Section 4.4.3. 
 
4.5 Optimal Offer Forms under MDF Contours rather than RD Curves 
 
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we have considered the optimal analytic forms of offers based 
on alternative possible forms of the RD curves. We first considered the optimal dispatch 
points under each possible curve, and then resolved the non-monotonicities that 
occurred. We did this by forming CLs corresponding to each possible slope that 
occurred in the RD curve, and then defining ranges for which these CLs were valid, 
based on the direction of movement of the RD curve. The combination of these valid CL 
segments produced the AL or PO, and from here, monotonicity was restored if need be. 
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The offer was constructed such that it passed through each RD curve once, as we know 
must occur. 
 
However, this approach was quite restrictive. The alternative RD curves could not cross 
one another which meant that they all had to have an identical shape, and that the 
uncertainty had to be in a single direction. 
 
Now, rather than considering alternative RD curves and the optimal dispatch point on 
each, we consider each of the contours of an MDF, and the optimal dispatch point on 
each of these (i.e. the point with the highest payoff). As with the RD curve case, we 
know that the optimal offer must pass through each of these contours once, and only 
once. Therefore, if we know the optimal point at which each contour is intersected, then 
the combination of these is the PO. If the PO is monotone, then this must be the optimal 
offer. If the PO is not monotone, as it will likely not be, then we must resolve this non-
monotonicity as we did under the RD problem. 
 
4.5.1 Constructing Pseudo-Offer under MDF Contours 
 
In Section 4.3 we showed that if we have a linear RD curve segment, then the payoff 
along that segment as it sloped down through (q, p) space is unimodal, with its 
maximum point at the intersection with its CL. This must be the same for a straight 
segment of a MDF contour. This helps us determine the direction of improvement along 
a given contour from any existing offer, and will help us determine the shape of the 
guaranteed improved offer. If the contours were allowed to take very general, non-linear 
shapes, then the payoff function would not have such nice properties. However, this is 
not the case if the implied MDF is being constructed from a set of piecewise linear RD 
curves (the contours will also be piecewise linear). 
 
Consider an example, as shown in Figure 4.38, where there are only two slopes to the 
contours, and therefore only two possible CLs. The optimal dispatch points, marked on 
each contour, do not form a monotonic set. Specifically, we can observe “Type I” non-
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monotonicity (resolved with a vertical step in the RD case). As with the cases in Section 
4.3, we can show the direction of improvement along each contour (blue arrows) from 
any given offer (such as the blue one shown). From these, we can see that a vertical step 
between the two CLs must clearly be the optimal resolution of the non-monotonicity, 
where the vertical step is placed somewhere between s and f. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.38 Simple Set of MDF Contours - Two Slopes Only 
 
4.5.2 Optimality Condition 
 
As with the analysis in Section 4.3, we can construct an optimality condition on the 
position of the vertical step within this range of uncertainty. We know from this 
previous analysis that the terms for expected payoff outside and on the start and end of 
the vertical step will cancel one another out, so we just need to consider the expected 
payoff on the contours that intersect the vertical segment of the offer. For these, q is 
given, and price is given by qslopep *int−= , where slope is the local slope of the 
contour at the intercept point, and int is the price axis intercept of a line with that slope, 
extended out. 
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Therefore, expected payoff from dispatches on these contours is given by: 
 
( ) ( )( )∑ −−= )(
)(
*int*)(
qu
ql
qcqslopeqctprpayoff  
 
Where pr(ct) is the difference in probability between the current contour and the 
previous contour (i.e. marginal probability that dispatch would occur on that contour, in 
a discrete sense), and u(q) and l(q) are the highest and lowest contours that would 
intersect a vertical at the given quantity level. 
 
Take the derivative with respect to q, under the assumption that MC is fixed: 
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The optimality condition is therefore: 
 
( )[ ] 0)(Profit Marginalp)(
)(
=∑qu
ql
qctr  
 
This aligns with that found in Section 4.3.4.2, the only difference being in the definition 
of the probability terms used. 
 
 155
4.5.3 More Complex MDF Contour Examples 
 
The examples shown in Figure 4.39 and Figure 4.40 give directions of improvement and 
guaranteed improved offers under two differing original offers for the same MDF. These 
guaranteed improved offers have been created by modifying the original offer by 
moving in the direction of improvement along all contours of the offering space. Note 
that the offer in each case is only one specific choice of many possible improved offers. 
 
In these examples, the MDF is a much more general shape, allowing for RD curves that 
cross one another, and oddly shaped (but still linear) contours. For simplicity, the 
example MDF contains only two different slopes in the contours, flat and steep, each 
with their own CL (CL1 and CL2 respectively). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.39 Complex Set of MDF Contours – Starting Offer 1 
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Figure 4.40 Complex Set of MDF Contours – Starting Offer 2 
 
We can see that in both of these cases, the optimal offer forms, with examples shown in 
bright green, must indeed consist of parts of the positively sloped CL’s, connected by 
horizontal and/or vertical segments. 
 
4.5.4 Summary of Offer Forms under MDF Contours 
 
In this section, we have briefly shown that the techniques for constructing optimal 
analytic offer forms apply to MDF contours, as well as to sets of possible RD curves. 
This extension enables the technique to deal with any set of possible RD curves, 
including alternatives that cross one another. However, we also note that as the number 
of different contour slopes and overlapping regions of Types I and II non-monotonicity 
increase, the optimality conditions on the position of the horizontal and vertical 
segments would quickly become very complex to define and solve. As such, in these 
more complex cases, it is likely that a DP on a pre-defined grid, while losing some 
accuracy, would be significantly more computationally efficient to apply. 
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4.6 Optimal Offer Shifts under Progressive MC Curve Shifts 
 
In this section, we will identify rules for translation of (shifting) an existing offer, if the 
marginal costs were to move horizontally, under the simple forms of RD curve 
uncertainty presented in this chapter. This is highly relevant for operators of generation 
units with limited fuel resources. In such situations, the marginal cost curve for the 
current period can be determined directly from the marginal fuel value (MFV) curve for 
the following period, for the range of fuel levels that could potentially be reached. This 
is demonstrated in Figure 4.41, where the black lines indicate the initial situation, and 
the blue lines indicate the possible situation if the storage level at the current time was 
one unit higher. We can observe that the range of possible storage levels at the end of 
the period has moved to the right, and as such our marginal cost curve has also shifted 
horizontally to the right. Note though that a new segment of marginal cost has appeared 
(as shown in red), corresponding to the marginal fuel value at the new end-of-period 
storage level that could potentially now be reached. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.41 Shifting Marginal Cost Curve 
 
Ideally, if we have constructed an optimal offer for a given storage level, s, in the 
current period, but it turns out that the storage level is actually (s+1), we would prefer 
not to have to recalculate the optimal offer from scratch. By developing rules for 
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translation of the previously optimal offer under such changes, there is potential for 
large computational benefits in the updating of such offers.  
 
4.6.1 Explanation of Translation Rules 
 
In Section 4.3, we developed simple analytic expressions for the form of the optimal 
offer under piecewise linear RD curves and linear marginal costs. In particular, we have 
shown that the optimal offer is made up of segments of line that are defined by: 
 
( )qMCbMCp sli ++= int  
 
in the appropriate ranges for the RD slope ib−  and marginal cost curve:  
 
qMCMCMC sl+= int       (if linear MC) 
      intMC=   (if stepped MC) 
 
4.6.2 Case 1 – Linear RD Curve and Stepped Marginal Cost 
 
Consider a simple example, where there is a single step in the marginal cost curve at Q = 
5, from MC = 5 to MC = 10, and the RD curve is linear (slope of -2), and exhibits 
uncertainty in a horizontal direction. Now, let us move the marginal cost curve to the 
right by one unit. This situation is depicted in Figure 4.42, where the original marginal 
cost and offer are shown in black, and the adjustments shown in blue.  
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Figure 4.42 Change in Offer from Shifting Marginal Cost Curve – Case 1 
 
Here, we can see that as a result of the one unit shift to the right of the marginal cost 
curve, the offer has translated up on an angle equivalent to the (negative of the) slope of 
the RD curve. The offer has shifted a total horizontal distance of one unit, meaning that 
the distance of the angled shift is 22 1+ib , or in this case, 5 . We also observe, as 
indicated, that there is a new segment of offer created from scratch. This is the offer 
segment corresponding to the part of the marginal cost curve that has just appeared. 
 
4.6.3 Case 2 – Linear RD Curve and Linear Marginal Cost 
 
Now consider a slightly more complicated case, where the marginal cost curve is linear 
rather than stepped. In particular, we will assume the same RD curve as above, but a 
marginal cost curve with the form qMC 5.02 += . If we were to move the marginal cost 
curve to the right by one unit, the new marginal cost curve would have the 
form qMC 5.05.1 += , and the offer would change as shown in Figure 4.43. 
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Figure 4.43 Change in Offer from Shifting Marginal Cost Curve – Case 2 
 
Although not quite as obvious as in the previous case, we can see by inspection here that 
as a result of the one unit horizontal shift to the right of the marginal cost curve, the 
offer has again translated up on an angle equivalent to the (negative of the) slope of the 
RD curve. The offer has also again shifted a total horizontal distance of one unit, 
meaning that the distance of the angled shift is 22 1+ib , or 5 . To confirm this, 
consider the original offer point (0, 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.44 Translation Confirmation 
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Figure 4.44 shows us that this offer point, translated a distance of 5  at a slope of 2 to 1 
(angle of o6.66 & ), should now be located at (1, 4). We can easily confirm that this point 
is indeed on the new offer line, qp 5.25.1 += .  
 
Note that as again indicated, a new segment of offer has had to be created from scratch. 
 
4.6.4 Case 3 – Concave RD Curve and Stepped Marginal Cost 
 
To generalise these results beyond a single-slope RD curve, consider the translation 
required under a concave RD curve. Assume that the RD curve has slope -1 above a 
price level of 30, slope of -2 below this price level, and is subject to uncertainty in the 
horizontal direction. In addition, assume that the marginal cost curve steps from 5 to 10 
at a quantity of 5, and from10 to 15 at a quantity of 22. This case is shown in Figure 
4.45.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.45 Change in Offer from Shifting Marginal Cost Curve – Case 3 
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We observe that the new optimal offer has been translated in sections bounded by the 
RDVP(s). In other words, the segment of the original offer that was below the RDVP 
has been translated at a slope of 2, by 5 , while the segment of the original offer above 
the RDVP has been translated at a slope of 1, by 2 . Additionally, we note that there are 
two new offer segments that have been created from scratch in this case, and they are 
indicated in Figure 4.45. The same results as shown here apply when we consider a 
linear marginal cost over a concave RD curve. 
 
4.6.5 Case 4 – Convex RD Curve and Stepped Marginal Cost 
 
Finally, consider the translation that is appropriate under a convex RD curve. Assume 
the same marginal cost curve as in case 3, but now the RD slopes are reversed, so that 
the slope is -2 above a price level of 30, and -1 below. This case is shown in Figure 4.46.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.46 Change in Offer from Shifting Marginal Cost Curve – Case 4 
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We observe that the new optimal pseudo-offer has again been translated in sections 
bounded by the RDVP(s). The segment of the original offer that was below the RDVP 
has been translated at a slope of 1, by 2 , while the segment of the original offer above 
the RDVP has been translated at a slope of 2, by 5 . Again, there are two new offer 
segments that have been created from scratch in this case. The same results apply when 
we consider a linear marginal cost over a convex RD curve 
 
4.6.6 Translation Summary 
 
In summary, the above cases have demonstrated that if the marginal cost curve shifts 
horizontally, then we can translate the previously optimal offer to create most of the new 
optimal offer. In particular, between iRDVP  and jRDVP , the slope of the RD curve will 
be ib− . When the marginal cost curve shifts horizontally by n units, the original offer 
segment in this range will be translated at a slope of ib , a distance of 
22 nbi + . The 
new offer segments that are adjacent to the price axis or each of the RDVPs must then 
be created separately to complete the offer. 
 
We have seen that this process works successfully to translate the raw pseudo-offers, 
regardless of any non-monotonicity that they may contain. However, the optimal offer 
that we initially have for the original marginal cost curve position would likely be the 
monotone offer, possibly formed using the optimality conditions presented in Section 
4.3. If the marginal cost has not changed at the position of the previously optimal 
vertical step or over any part of a horizontal step, the optimal position of that vertical or 
horizontal step will be unchanged. If however, the marginal cost has changed over any 
part of these ranges, the translation would need to be performed on the pseudo-offer, and 
the position of the vertical or horizontal steps recalculated with the new marginal cost 
information.   
 
 164
4.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we have discussed the optimal analytic form of single-period offers 
under restricted forms of market uncertainty. We have shown that when there is a 
piecewise linear residual demand curve subject to uncertainty in a single direction only, 
the optimal desired offer can be constructed by combining segments derived from easily 
constructed analytic expressions, over appropriate regions of the offering space. Due to 
offer monotonicity conditions in the market, when the combined offer segments do not 
form a monotonic set, we can apply optimality conditions to determine the optimal 
position of vertical or horizontal steps through the non-monotone regions. For small 
regions of non-monotonicity, these optimality conditions can be quite simple. However, 
as the regions of non-monotonicity increase in size, the optimality conditions can 
quickly become significantly more complicated.  
 
We have also shown that these analytic offer construction concepts apply to general 
forms of residual demand curve uncertainty, but that again, in these cases, the optimality 
conditions quickly become more complex as the structure of the uncertainty becomes 
less straightforward. 
 
In the following chapter, we will use the optimal analytic offer concepts developed here 
to prove a marginal cost-based offer patching approach, which will later be embedded 
within a dynamic program to significantly improve optimal offer construction 
computational efficiency. 
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Chapter 5  
 
MARGINAL COST PATCHING 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In real-life, offers made to the pool market by generators need to be constructed on the 
go, in real-time, so ideally the operators need an approach to offering that is very fast to 
apply. Hence, having a pre-computed table of optimal responses to various 
circumstances that can be searched quickly would be very helpful. In this chapter we 
present a marginal cost based “offer curve patching” approach. For a given (expected) 
form of uncertain RD curve, a family of offer curves corresponding to a range of 
constant marginal costs (or marginal fuel values) can be constructed. In a continuous 
sense, this family of curves would effectively form an offer surface.  
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Our basic proposition is that given the marginal cost curve for the current period and 
fuel storage level, segments of members of these offer curve families can be joined 
together, to produce the optimal offer for the coming period. Specifically, the motivation 
for the development of this patching approach lies in the production of a dynamic 
programming model for the generation of an offering strategy in real-time, for a short-
term planning horizon. This model is described in Chapter 6. 
  
In this chapter, we begin by demonstrating that marginal cost based offer patching is 
appropriate when the underlying pseudo-offers for the constant marginal costs are 
naturally monotonic. We then show that this approach is also appropriate under the more 
complex scenario of underlying non-monotonic pseudo-offers. In this case, the proposed 
patching is no longer just the combination of previously optimal dispatch points, but also 
the combination of the vertical or horizontal segments that have been applied to the 
underlying pseudo-offers to resolve their non-monotonicity (using the methods 
described in Section 4.3). In this chapter, we begin by retaining the assumption that the 
RD curve moves as a whole in any defined direction, but then extend the analysis to 
consider any form of RD curve uncertainty. 
 
5.2 Patching Naturally Monotonic Offers 
 
In Section 4.3.2, we showed that under certain RD shape and uncertainty direction 
(RDVP) combinations, the optimal set of dispatch points for all possible RD curve 
outcomes could form an offer that is naturally monotonic in both the price and quantity 
dimensions. These results concurred with Theorem 4 in Anderson & Philpott (2002b). 
Further to that theorem, we now define the following corollary.  
 
Corollary 5.1: 
 
When the set of optimal dispatch points under all possible residual demand curve 
outcomes forms a naturally monotonic offer, the optimal offer price at any particular 
quantity level will depend only on the local marginal cost level. It is therefore 
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independent of the marginal cost levels that have come before that quantity and those 
that will occur beyond it. In other words, the optimal offer for a firm with a marginal 
cost curve that steps from 1MC to 2MC at the quantity BP will be the combination of: 
 
- The section of the offer from 0 to BP under the assumption that marginal cost is 
equal to 1MC over the entire range, and 
 
- The section of the offer from BP to Qmax under the assumption that marginal 
cost is equal to 2MC over the entire range. 
 
Proof. The key to this proof is simply that the optimal price at which to offer electricity 
under each quantity level is dependent on the marginal cost at that quantity level, and no 
other. In Section 4.3.2, we explained that in order for the set of optimal dispatch points 
to be naturally monotonic, the RD curve must be concave. We know that under such a 
concave form, as the RD curve moves to the right, the optimal dispatch quantity will 
always increase. Therefore, there can only be a single RD curve that will lead to 
dispatch at any given quantity, and it is this curve that is used to determine the optimal 
price level at which to offer that quantity. Figure 5.1 shows such a single RD curve 
scenario, where the optimal dispatch point is at the quantity where marginal revenue 
(MR) is equal to marginal cost (MC). With a convex cost function (non-decreasing 
marginal cost function) and concave RD curve (non-increasing marginal revenue curve), 
there must be a unique point of intersection between these curves. Further, observe that 
this point of intersection is dependent only on the local marginal cost (i.e. the optimal 
point would not change if marginal costs at other generation levels were different, as 
indicated by the arrows). This is confirmed by the explicit restriction on the marginal 
cost curve to be non-decreasing. 
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Figure 5.1 Optimal Dispatch Point for a Single Residual Demand Scenario 
 
 
5.2.1 Examples of Patching Naturally Monotonic Offers 
 
Assume that a generator faces an uncertain linear RD curve with slope ib−  and a 
constant marginal cost of either 1MC  or 2MC (> 1MC ). It was shown in Section 4.3.1 
that the optimal form of the offer for each of these cases would be qbMCp ii +=  (lines 
with slope ib  and intercept iMC ). Figure 5.2 shows the offer for the lower marginal cost 
in blue, and for the higher marginal cost in black. Now consider the form of the new 
optimal offer if the marginal cost stepped from 1MC  to 2MC  at the quantity level BP. 
Corollary 5.1 tells us that when each of the original offers is naturally monotone, the 
optimal price to offer for any quantity level is dependent on the marginal cost at that 
quantity, but independent of the marginal cost at any other quantity. Therefore, the new 
offer should be the same as the original offer for 1MC , up to BPq = , and the same as 
the original offer for 2MC beyond BPq = . In other words, to get the new optimal offer, 
we patch together the segments of the original offers for 1MC  up to the breakpoint, and 
for 2MC  beyond the breakpoint, as shown with the dotted line. 
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Figure 5.2 Patching Example – Linear Residual Demand 
 
Now consider a slightly more complicated example, where the RD curve contains a 
concave kink, and is now subject to uncertainty in the direction indicated by the 
positively-sloped RDVP in Figure 5.3. The RD curve now has slope 1b−  below the 
RDVP, and 2b−  above (where 21 bb −>− ). Again, the results from Section 4.3.1 
require that the pseudo-offer for each marginal cost will have the form qbMCp i 1+=  
below the RDVP, and qbMCp i 2+=  above, with a connecting segment along the 
RDVP in-between. Again, if we plot the optimal offer for a marginal cost curve that 
steps from 1MC  to 2MC  at the BP, we observe that this is equivalent to patching 
together the segments of the original offers for 1MC  up to the breakpoint, and for 2MC  
beyond the breakpoint. On examination, it can be shown that this marginal cost patching 
will work no matter where the breakpoint is located in the quantity dimension. 
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Figure 5.3 Patching Example – Concave Residual Demand 
 
Therefore, the theorem from Philpott et al (2002), in conjunction with our corollary 
shows that under the assumption of an inverse log concave rest-of-market supply curve 
with demand uncertainty, offers corresponding to constant marginal costs can be patched 
together to produce the optimal offer for the case of stepped marginal costs. However, it 
is highly likely that the actual rest-of-market supply curve faced by a generator will not 
meet these conditions29. Therefore, in the following sections we investigate the 
applicability of marginal cost patching under offers corresponding to any set of 
uncertain RD curves. 
 
5.3 Patching Naturally Non-Monotonic Offers  
 
The proof provided for Corollary 5.1 is restricted to the case where the shape of the RD 
curve leads to naturally monotonic sets of optimal dispatch points. We now state and 
prove a new theorem, which says that the marginal cost patching approach will work 
regardless of the form of the set of optimal dispatch points. Therefore, this is applicable 
to both the non-monotonic cases presented in Section 4.3 or to any other set of uncertain 
RD curves that has a non-monotonic desired set. 
 
                                                 
29 For example, any concave piecewise linear rest-of-market supply curve does not satisfy this condition. 
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Theorem 5.1: 
 
Regardless of the form of the set of optimal dispatch points under all possible residual 
demand curve outcomes, segments of the optimal offers for constant marginal costs can 
be patched together to provide the optimal offer for a marginal cost curve that is 
stepped. 
 
Proof. We have already shown that this theorem is true when the set of optimal dispatch 
points is monotonic. Therefore, all that remains is to prove it to be true when this set of 
points suffers from each of Type I or Type II non-monotonicity. In these cases, it is 
possible that the marginal revenue curve will not be monotonically non-increasing. As a 
result, we can no longer say that the dispatch quantity for a given RD curve will remain 
the same when the marginal cost in other quantity ranges change.  
 
  
 
Figure 5.4 Dispatch Quantity Affected by Marginal Cost in other Ranges Changing 
 
For example, Figure 5.4 shows the original optimal dispatch point for a given RD curve 
in black. The blue lines indicate a possible new optimal dispatch point if the marginal 
cost in a range other than that of the original dispatch quantity changes (there are now 
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two possible local optima, the previously optimal point and the new intersection as 
market in blue). Clearly, under this scenario, the optimal dispatch point is not dependent 
only on the local marginal cost level, and hence a new proof approach is required for 
these cases. 
 
Marginal Cost Patching under Type I Non-Monotonicity 
 
Recall that the optimal resolution of Type I non-monotonicity is to insert a vertical offer 
segment between the lower and upper attractor lines, at a position such that the 
following optimality condition is met: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )
0=−∑qu
ql
qMCqMRscpr  
 
This optimality condition requires that we select a quantity level for the vertical segment 
such that the sum of the probability of a scenario occurring multiplied by its marginal 
profit at that quantity, for all RD scenarios that would pass through the vertical segment, 
must sum to zero. Importantly, we note that this formula relates to a given quantity, and 
is dependent only on the marginal cost at that quantity. We also observe that if the level 
of the constant marginal cost is increased over the entire range, the optimal position of 
the vertical step that is produced from this optimality condition must move to the left. 
This is clear when you consider that all terms will decrease under these circumstances.  
 
Now let us consider the form of the offers that we are attempting to patch. Figure 5.5 
shows two offers, each corresponding to a different marginal cost, where vertical steps 
( ( )1MCV  and ( )2MCV ) have been used to overcome non-monotonicity in the pseudo-
offers. 
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Figure 5.5 Offer Forms from Type I Non-Monotonicity 
 
There are effectively just three different quantity regions for the marginal cost jump that 
we must consider. These regions are:  
 
- ( )21 MCVBP < : before the optimal vertical step for the higher marginal cost,  
- ( ) ( )221 MCVBPMCV << : between the optimal vertical steps for the two 
marginal costs,  
- ( )13 MCVBP > : beyond the optimal vertical step for the lower marginal cost.  
 
Marginal Cost Breakpoint in Region 1BP :  
 
Start by considering a marginal cost jump from 1MC to 2MC in region 1BP , as indicated 
by the dotted line BP  in Figure 5.6. The heavy dashed lines indicate the new locally 
optimal points of dispatch associated with all possible RD curve scenarios, giving the 
new attractor line and hence defining the new region of offer uncertainty from s to f. 
This is clarified in Figure 5.7.  
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Figure 5.6 Marginal Cost Jump BP1 
 
The Direction of Improvement theory, discussed in Section 4.3, tells us that the optimal 
resolution of this region must involve a vertical step from the segment of the attractor 
line below the RDVP to the segment above. If we were to place the vertical step in the 
range labelled a in Figure 5.7, the lower marginal cost would be applied in the 
optimality condition. We know that the quantity at which the optimality condition is 
satisfied for this marginal cost, ( )1MCV , is to the right of BP , and hence forces would 
push this vertical to at least BPq = . For any current vertical step position in the ranges 
labelled b or c, the higher marginal cost would be used in the optimality condition. We 
know that when this marginal cost is used, the optimal position of the vertical step is 
at ( )2MCV . In other words, the optimal offer to provide under this stepped marginal cost 
curve (as shown in red), consists of the optimal offer for the lower marginal cost curve 
up to BP  patched together with the optimal offer for the higher marginal cost curve 
beyond this point (including the vertical step). 
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Figure 5.7 Marginal Cost Jump in Region BP1 – Optimal Vertical Position 
 
Marginal Cost Breakpoint in Region 3BP : 
 
Very similarly, we can show that the patching approach is appropriate for a marginal 
cost step in region 3BP , as indicated by the dotted line BP  in Figure 5.8. This diagram 
shows the region of offer uncertainty under this new marginal cost curve. If the vertical 
step was placed to the right of BP , there would be forces pushing it to the left (as far 
as BP ). If the vertical segment was placed anywhere below BP , then the forces would 
attract it to the same position as it would be under a constant lower marginal cost level. 
Hence, for a marginal cost step at BP , the new optimal offer consists of the original 
optimal offer for a constant marginal cost of 1MC up to BPq =  (including the vertical 
step), patched together with the original optimal offer for a marginal cost of 
2MC beyond BPq = . 
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Figure 5.8 Marginal Cost Jump in Region BP3 
 
Marginal Cost Breakpoint in Region 2BP :  
 
Again, for a marginal cost step in region 2BP , as indicated by the dotted line BP  in 
Figure 5.9, we can prove that patching the optimal offer segments together is 
appropriate, by considering the forces acting on a vertical step placed at any position 
within the range of offer uncertainty. The heavy dotted lines on Figure 5.9 show the new 
locally optimal points of dispatch associated with all possible RD curve scenarios, under 
each of the two MC levels. A key observation at this point is that both: 
 
- The optimal position of the vertical jump for the lower marginal cost, ( )1MCV , 
is not within the new range for which the lower marginal cost is valid, and 
 
- The optimal position of the vertical jump for the higher marginal cost, ( )2MCV , 
is not within the new range for which the higher marginal cost is valid. 
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Figure 5.9 Marginal Cost Jump in Region BP2 
 
Therefore, if the vertical step was placed to the right of BP  (in the range where 2MC  is 
valid), forces would push it left towards ( )2MCV , as far as BP  (beyond which the 
marginal cost changes). Likewise, if the vertical step was placed to the left of BP  (in the 
range where 1MC  is valid), forces would push it right towards ( )1MCV , as far as BP  
(beyond which the marginal cost changes. Therefore, the optimal position for the new 
vertical step must be at the quantity BP , and we can say that for a marginal cost step 
at BP , the new optimal offer consists of the original optimal offer for a constant 
marginal cost of 1MC  up to BPq = , patched together with the original optimal offer for 
a marginal cost of 2MC  beyond BPq = , along with a completely new vertical segment 
at BP . 
 
Marginal Cost Patching under Type II Non-Monotonicity 
 
Recall that the optimal resolution of Type II non-monotonicity is to insert a horizontal 
offer segment between the left and right attractor lines, at a position such that the 
following optimality condition is met: 
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( )
( )
0=−∑pu
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This optimality condition requires that we select a price level for the horizontal segment 
such that the sum of the probability of a scenario occurring multiplied by its marginal 
profit at that quantity, for all RD scenarios that would pass through the horizontal 
segment, must sum to zero. We observe that if the level of the constant marginal cost is 
increased over the entire range, the optimal position of the horizontal step that is 
produced from this optimality condition must move up.  
 
Now let us consider the form of the offers that we are attempting to patch. Figure 5.10 
shows two offers, each corresponding to a different marginal cost, where horizontal 
steps ( ( )1MCH  and ( )2MCH ) have been used to overcome non-monotonicity in the 
pseudo-offers. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Offer Forms from Type II Non-Monotonicity 
 
Again, there are effectively just three different quantity regions for the marginal cost 
jump that need to be considered. These regions are:  
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- 1BP : before the left end of both of the optimal horizontal segments, shown in 
bold blue and black at the levels of ( )1MCH  and ( )2MCH . 
- 2BP : in the middle of either or both optimal horizontal segments,  
- 3BP : beyond the right ends of both of the optimal horizontal segments.  
 
Patching can be shown to give the new optimal offers under these three positions in the 
same way as for Type I Non-Monotonicity. For example, Figure 5.11 shows all new 
points of locally optimal dispatch associated with a marginal cost jump from 1MC  to 
2MC  at BP, located in region 1BP . It is clear that the optimality condition on the 
position of the horizontal step will still be met at the same price, as it includes only 
terms on the step itself, and the MC and MR has not changed for any of these terms. 
Therefore, the optimal offer can be patched together in the same way as it was for a 
vertical step. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Marginal Cost Jump – BP1 
 
When we consider general RD uncertainty and produce the optimal offer by performing 
a DP over a discrete grid on (price, quantity) space (as explained in Section 3.4), we are 
implicitly locating the optimal positions of any necessary horizontal or vertical steps. As 
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discussed in Chapter 3, under anything other than very simple forms of market 
uncertainty, this is a simpler process than the analytical methods to achieving the same 
goal. As it is just a different approach to the same problem, then the MC patching 
presented in this chapter must hold true when the optimal offers are constructed using 
this DP approach. This information is applied in Chapter 6. 
 
5.3.1 Examples of Patching Naturally Non-Monotonic Offers 
 
In this section, we will demonstrate two examples of patching under naturally non-
monotonic offers, where all offers (for both fixed and stepped marginal costs) have been 
constructed using a dynamic program on a discrete grid over the offering range, as 
discussed in Section 3.4. The first example considers Type I non-monotonicity, where 
the offers contain vertical steps (the results from the DP confirms our analytical 
expectations), while the second example considers both Types I and II non-monotonicity 
and the offers contain both vertical and horizontal steps. 
 
Example 1: Type I Non-Monotonicity 
 
Consider an uncertain RD curve that is subject to horizontal uncertainty and that 
corresponds to a rest-of-market supply curve that is not inverse log concave, and thus 
violates the assumptions of Theorem 4 of Anderson & Philpott (2002b). Specifically, the 
expected position of the RD curve is defined by: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
≥−
<−=
1644
165.030
pq
pq
p  
 
In Section 4.3.2, we showed that an uncertain RD curve of this (convex) shape will 
produce a non-monotonic attractor line, and the optimal resolution of this Type I non-
monotonicity was to provide an offer containing a vertical segment (at a position 
determined by a simple optimality condition). 
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Consider Figure 5.12. The stepped red, black and blue lines represent offers 
corresponding to constant marginal costs, in this case, of 5, 10 and 25 ($/MWh) 
respectively. By considering a stepped marginal cost function which steps between these 
marginal cost levels at the breakpoints of 12 and 20 MWh, this numerical example, 
which has been used by solving a DP to maximise profit for any feasible offer over a 
discrete grid on the offering space, confirms that the offer obtained (green line) 
corresponds to patching together the appropriate segments of the offers for constant 
marginal costs. 
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Figure 5.12 Optimal offers with fixed and stepped marginal costs 
 
Example 2: Types I and II Non-Monotonicity 
 
Consider a rest-of-market supply function that has a very general form, with concave 
and convex segments, as well as horizontal steps and vertical jumps, implying a very 
general expected RD curve (as shown in Figure 5.13). In this example, the red, black 
and blue lines represent the optimal offers under this RD curve form if the marginal cost 
was fixed at the levels of 0, 10 and 25 ($/MWh) respectively, starting from the lower-
most curve. The green line shows the optimal offer if we knew in advance that the 
marginal cost was going to step between these three levels at the breakpoints of 12 and 
31 MWh’s.  It is clear that this is the same as the offer that would be achieved under 
BP 12,20 
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RD 
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BP 
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patching, and thus this confirms that marginal cost patching is appropriate for the offers 
produced under general RD curve forms. 
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Figure 5.13 Optimal offers with fixed and stepped marginal costs 
 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have introduced a concept that we have termed as marginal cost 
patching, which states that the optimal offer for a firm with a marginal cost curve that 
steps from 1MC to 2MC at the quantity BP can be obtained by joining together the 
section of the offer from 0 to BP under the assumption that marginal cost is equal to 
1MC over the entire range, and the section of the offer from BP to maxQ under the 
assumption that marginal cost is equal to 2MC  over the entire range. We began by 
presenting and proving a corollary on Theorem 4 from Anderson & Philpott (2002b) 
which shows that this marginal cost patching is appropriate under the restricted 
conditions of horizontal uncertainty in the RD curve, and log concave RD curve. We 
then went on to propose and prove a theorem which states that this marginal cost 
patching is appropriate under any set of possible RD curves. This means that the offer 
RDVP 
RD 
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curve family concept can be used to produce the optimal offer under any marginal cost 
curve, quickly and efficiently. 
 
In the next chapter, the marginal cost patching concept will be applied to the problem of 
constructing an offering strategy over a multiple-period horizon. We will show that it 
can be used to separate an existing two-level nested dynamic program into a 
significantly more computationally efficient two-phase dynamic program. In this two-
phase DP, the optimal offers for fixed MC levels can be constructed in advance of real-
time and then combined quickly when needed, to produce optimal offers for any 
marginal cost curve that is faced by a generator. 
 
 184
 185
 
Chapter 6  
 
OFFER CONSTRUCTION ALGORITHMS USING 
MARGINAL COST PATCHING 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we describe two algorithms for the construction of the optimal offer set 
for a generator. The algorithms we propose have significantly lower computational 
complexity than those found in the literature and hence increased potential for solving 
more complex scenarios within the limited available time-frame of online offer 
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construction30. Computational complexity has been reduced by applying Theorem 5.1, 
regarding marginal cost-based offer patching, developed in Section 5.3. 
 
We begin the chapter by describing the purpose of the algorithms and introduce a new 
approach to optimal offer construction over time, which we call the Two-Phase 
approach. We then describe the algorithms underlying each of these phases in detail, 
including proofs that the approaches will consistently produce concave value curves (i.e. 
decreasing MV curves). 
 
6.2 Algorithm Purpose 
 
The goal of the algorithms studied in this thesis, including those described in this 
chapter, is to produce an optimal company-wide offering strategy for an energy-limited 
generator that provides electricity into a wholesale market, in a solving time that would 
be practical for online implementation. Note that the term energy-limited does not 
restrict its application to just hydro generators, as it is relevant to any generator with a 
significant constraint on fuel with respect to the short-term planning horizon (a coal-
powered generator with a contract to purchase a fixed amount of coal, for example). We 
define an offering strategy as a set of monotonic (and hence feasible) offers that would 
be provided under any state (with respect to reservoir level and market situation) that the 
operator can face over the planning horizon. 
 
The models consider either a single generating unit or a set of units attached to the same 
reservoir. The extension to a hydro reservoir chain is discussed in Section 10.5. The 
reason that this problem is especially complex is due to the consideration of energy 
generation limitations over a planning horizon, reflecting either a resource-constrained 
thermal unit, or a normal hydro unit. This intertemporal constraint effectively links the 
decisions made in all periods, as trade-offs that have to be made to ensure the most 
profitable expected use of fuel. An additional major complexity considered is that the 
                                                 
30 This specific time-frame is dependent on the market considered and the other processes that need to 
occur between market offering rounds. In the New Zealand market, offers must be provided once every 30 
minutes, and as such, we define a reasonable computational time to be up towards 10 minutes. 
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uncertainty in the (discrete) market outcomes is correlated.  This is modelled  through a 
set of Time-Varying Markov Chains representing the probability that if residual demand 
curve “A” is observed in period t, then residual demand curve “B” will be observed in 
period (t+1).  
 
There are many offering strategy algorithms reported in the literature, but most of these 
either make significant unrealistic assumptions (such as a restriction to quantity-based 
offers, as in Stothert & MacLeod (2000) or Pereira, Granville, Dix, & Barroso (2004a)) 
or are computationally too complex to be used in any sort of practical setting (as in 
Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003)). In particular, the literature provides three particularly 
interesting DP models used in the supply of electricity over time. Philpott & Schultz 
(2004) considers market uncertainty within a single period, in addition to many realistic 
intertemporal constraints. Scott (1998) deals with inflow uncertainty, while trying to 
optimise the use of limited fuel over a horizon (an important constraint which the former 
ignore). Finally, one of the most comprehensive, although computationally demanding, 
algorithms in the literature to date is described in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003). Not 
only does their algorithm consider offers restricted by monotonicity, it also considers 
correlated (discrete) market uncertainty. To the author’s knowledge the latter extension 
has not been dealt with in any of the previous literature. However, the algorithm as 
reported is quite inefficient and, as a result, intractable within a feasible solving time31 
for all but very small models. Even improving the efficiency of the algorithm does not 
do enough to bring the computational time down to a practical level. Hence, a 
significantly new approach is required in order to achieve the goal of practicality. The 
algorithm described in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003) is hereafter referred to as the 
R&A algorithm.  
 
This chapter develops two alternate marginalistic DP approaches that combine the 
desirable features of each of these existing models, in order to achieve the goal of 
practicality. The new models have been designed as practical tools for developing 
                                                 
31 We consider a maximum feasible period for solving an online model for offering would be around 10 
minutes on a P4 3.2GHz, 1GB machine. 
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optimal (or near-optimal) offers, with minimal computational complexity. This low 
complexity will be made possible by applying the knowledge gained about analytic offer 
forms in earlier chapters, rather than using complex optimality conditions and 
maximising complicated path integrals as Philpott & Schultz (2004) requires. 
 
To summarise, the algorithms discussed in this chapter consider the following key 
issues, or complexities of the modelling situation: 
 
- Market uncertainty within each individual period 
- Correlated market outcomes between periods, using a Markov Chain 
- Fuel limitations over the horizon 
- Fuel inflow uncertainty 
- Construction of feasible (monotone) offers for every possible state throughout 
the horizon. 
- Limited solving time for real-time calculations 
 
6.3 R&A Algorithm 
 
The R&A algorithm is structured as a two-level nested dynamic program. The upper 
level is two dimensional, and works backwards from the end of the horizon, establishing 
the value at each state, where a state is defined by the previously observed residual 
demand curve (hence implying a particular uncertain market scenario, or UMS32 for the 
following period), and the current reservoir level. The lower level of the algorithm is 
implemented at each of these states in order to determine this value. The dynamic 
program at this level works backwards from (qmax, pmax) to (0, 0) through a grid of 
expected payoffs, constructing the feasible offer that gives the optimal expected value 
(current period payoff plus expected future value) for this (previous RD, reservoir level) 
state (demonstrated in Section 6.5.3). A feasible offer is one that is monotonically non-
                                                 
32 Note that a UMS is effectively a discrete market distribution function, as reported in Philpott, Pritchard, 
Neame, & Zakeri (2002). 
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decreasing in both its (p, q) dimensions. A simplified representation of this algorithm is 
presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
  
Figure 6.1 R&A Algorithm Flow Diagram 
 
There are many ways in which we can compare algorithms discussed in this thesis with 
one another and previous models found in the literature. These include: 
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2. The theoretical computational complexity of the algorithms 
3. The quality of the results that the models produce 
4. The actual computational times required on test data sets  
As discussed in the previous section, the three approaches compared in this chapter all 
consider the same issues. This chapter considers the theoretical computational 
complexity of the algorithms, while Chapter 8 is devoted to comparing the quality of 
results and actual computational times. Unfortunately, unlike a Travelling Salesperson 
and similar problems, where the size of a problem can be defined by a single parameter, 
here there are many parameters that affect the computational complexity of the 
algorithm. 
 
We define the following five parameters for use in expressing the computational 
complexity of the R&A algorithm: 
 
 t = Number of periods in the horizon 
 r = Number of reservoir levels 
 d = Number of dispatch levels 
 p = Number of possible RD curves per period33  
 i = Number of possible inflow levels 
 
From the source code for the R&A algorithm, we can show that the computational 
complexity can be approximately summarised by Equation 6.1. 
 
( )
2
216183228430210 2322222 pdrdrpdrpdrppdrrpdrpriprpit ++++++++++  
 
Equation 6.1 Computational Complexity of the R&A Algorithm in Full 
 
Simplifying this down to the terms of the largest orders of magnitude, we can see that 
the algorithm is of order of complexity 232 tpdrdtrp + . 
                                                 
33 for simplicity, we consider this to be constant over all periods 
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This shows us that the computational complexity of the R&A algorithm will increase 
polynomially as the values of the various parameters which define the problem size 
increase (excluding t, in which the computational complexity increases only linearly). 
 
6.3.1 Problems with the R&A Algorithm 
 
There are a couple of important issues with the R&A algorithm, with respect to 
computational burden, that have led us to develop the two-phase approach presented in 
the remainder of this chapter. 
 
1. In the R&A approach to offer construction, a Markov chain is incorporated to 
describe the correlation between the occurrences of RD curves. As the horizon 
progresses, no changes are made to the Markov chain as market outcomes are 
observed, as this information is incorporated into the chain. Changes to the chain 
would occur only as a result of external events. Therefore, if the horizon was of a 
fixed length34, and no external events were to occur over the horizon and thus no 
probabilities or expectations were to change over time, then there would be no need 
to re-solve the model throughout the horizon (as the initial solve would provide the 
offers for every reservoir and market state combination that we could observe 
through the horizon). However, it is highly likely that external events will occur and 
there will need to be changes made to some of these future expectations as time 
progresses. Such external events could be either: 
 
a. Pre-dispatch outcomes for future periods 
b. Information that comes from outside the model. For example, if we were to 
suddenly learn that maintenance was likely to shut down the main generation 
unit of a rival generator later in the day. 
                                                 
34 In a practical sense, it is likely that there would be a discrete form of a rolling horizon, to reflect the 
real-life offering requirements. In the New Zealand case, this means that at 1pm every day, an additional 
48 periods would be added to the horizon, and in all other periods, the horizon would just progressively 
shorten.  
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 If such changes to expectations occur35, then under the R&A algorithm, the entire 
model (including all of the lower-level, time-consuming offer construction DPs) 
would have to be completely re-solved before the new set of offers can be made to 
the market. This severely restricts the detail and complexity that can be considered 
by this approach, in order to get the new offers into the market in the required time 
available. 
 
2. In the R&A algorithm, offers must be calculated for all possible system states in all 
periods, regardless of whether identical scenarios are considered to occur in 
multiple periods. For example, if a possible UMS from period 6 (off-peak) is the 
same as one of the possible UMSs in period 30 (also off-peak), the R&A algorithm 
is not be able to capitalise on this repetition due to its reliance on a purely primal 
DP approach. The algorithm that we will propose in this section will be able to 
avoid these wasteful lower-level DP calculations being performed. Specifically, if 
the same UMSs are likely to be repeated over longer periods of time, then the new 
approach that we will present would enable a Solution/Offer Curve Family (OCF) 
Database to be implemented. This would involve storing all offers produced in a 
long-term database, so that they could be recalled in future periods when needed. 
 
6.4 Two-Phase Algorithm Concept 
 
It is clear from investigating the computational complexity described in Section 6.3 that 
most of the computational complexity of the R&A algorithm is in the lower level DP 
(the two main terms, 32dtrp  and 2tpdr , of Equation 6.1 come from the lower level DP). 
As such, one of the key features of the two-phase algorithms that we describe in this 
chapter is that this lower level DP is effectively brought out of real-time and done in 
advance for each UMS that could be faced throughout the horizon. However, it is not 
                                                 
35 Note that with the R&A algorithms and the Two-Phase approaches described in this chapter, it would be 
relatively difficult to update these probabilities. For example, if you have 100 possible RD curves in each 
period, then the Markov Chain for each period has 10,000 elements, of which you would have to select the 
correct ones to update. This issue will be dealt with in Chapter 7. 
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until real-time that we will know the particular form of the marginal value of storage 
curve (or, effectively, the marginal opportunity cost, MOC, curve for this state) that we 
will face. This might make it seem like we would need to solve an infinite number of 
such DPs for each market scenario in order to cover all possible MOC outcomes in real-
time. However, recall from Chapter 5 the concept of marginal cost patching: 
 
Let us say that we have optimal offers under a given market scenario for fixed marginal 
costs of MC1 and MC2 (>MC1). If the true marginal cost jumps from MC1 to MC2 at a 
quantity of q1, then the optimal offer for this new MC curve will be that found by 
patching together the appropriate segments of the fixed marginal cost offers. 
 
This concept implies that for each UMS, we can solve the lower level DP for a range of 
fixed MC levels, and then in real-time patch segments of these together as appropriate. 
This implies that the more fixed MC levels that are solved for in advance, the greater the 
accuracy that is able to be achieved with optimal offers in real-time. Of course though, 
there is a trade-off between the benefits of this accuracy and the solving time required 
for these advance calculations.  
 
Therefore, we can reduce this algorithm to two separate phases; a Pre-Processing phase 
(PP phase) and a Real-Time phase (RT phase). 
 
Phase 1: Pre-Processing Phase 
 
The PP phase occurs before the planning horizon begins, as shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Overall Two-Phase Approach Solving Process 
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For each period of the horizon there is a set of p possible RD curves that may occur, 
whose probabilities are given by a Markov chain as described in Section 6.2. Hence, if 
there are p possible RDs in period t, then there will be p possible UMSs in period t+1. 
The PP phase produces an OCF for every one of these possible UMSs throughout the 
horizon (i.e. pt of them), where we define an OCF for a given UMS as the set (or family) 
of optimal offers for all MC levels that we consider. The construction of these optimal 
offers is described in Section 6.5, while an example OCF is shown in Figure 6.3. We can 
see that, as you would expect, when the fixed MC level increases, the pre-processed 
offer becomes more restrictive. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Example OCF 
 
Note that although the upper level DP is two dimensional, we only need to produce an 
OCF for each UMS over the horizon, as opposed to producing one for each combination 
of UMS and reservoir level. The reason for this is that under a given UMS, as the 
reservoir level increases, all that changes is that the MOC curve slides horizontally to 
the right. Therefore, the same OCF is still valid (and further still, the same members of 
the OCF are still used, but just different portions of them). This idea is shown in Figure 
Offers for Fixed 
MC Levels of: 
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6.4, where A and B are two possible beginning reservoir levels, maxQ  is the maximum 
dispatch level of the generator, MV is the marginal value, and MOC(A) and MOC(B) 
are the MOC curves associated with the beginning reservoir levels A and B respectively. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Shift in MOC Curve as Reservoir Level Increases 
 
Phase 2: Real-Time Phase 
 
The RT phase occurs at the beginning of each period in the horizon, as shown in Figure 
6.2, and needs to be designed with near-linear computational complexity. 
 
This phase takes any new information about our expectations for the remaining horizon, 
and works backwards through the remaining periods, constructing fuel value curves, 
expected marginal opportunity cost of generation curves (EMV curves), and then offers 
for each possible unit state at each period (where the two-dimensional unit state is 
defined by the reservoir level and the previously observed RD curve). These offers are 
constructed by patching together the appropriate sections of the pre-processed offers (as 
defined by the marginal opportunity cost of generating each additional unit), and thus 
can be designed with a much lower level of computational complexity than the R&A 
algorithm. Figure 6.5 shows an example set of offers over all reservoir level states, for a 
MOC(A) 
MOC(B) 
Dispatch maxQ  
maxRes  
BA B- maxQ  
A- maxQ  
MOC 
Reservoir 
Level
MV 
 196
given previous RD curve, as produced by the RT phase, and is the equivalent of the 
output produced by the R&A algorithm. We can see that as the reservoir level increases, 
the offers become more generous. The reason for this is that the costs of generating fall 
as the reservoir level increase – this is explained in greater depth in Section 6.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 An Example Set of Offers 
 
6.4.1 Dynamic Program Approaches 
 
The R&A algorithm is a primal DP approach to offer construction. It directly considers 
the value of current and all possible future generation when making the offering decision 
at each state, and therefore has no need for marginal value or cost curves. Two 
algorithms are developed in this chapter. They are 
 
1. Value Curve Approach (VC approach).  
2. Direct Marginal Value Curve Approach (DMVC approach) 
 
Both of these algorithms apply a DP approach that is different to that of the R&A 
algorithm. They are marginalistic DP methods, where at each stage and under each state 
we balance expected potential marginal returns within the period with the expected 
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marginal opportunity costs of dispatch. In other words, this is equivalent to the condition 
used in many previous models (for example, Read, George, & Macgregor (1994)) for 
quantity-based dispatch, that: 
 
(Expected) MV of generation = (Expected) MV of storage 
 
The difference between these older models and our new model is that we are considering 
the effects of market uncertainty within a period, and hence how best to deal with this 
uncertainty (in addition to the correlated UMS structure). In these earlier models, a 
technique known as Dual DP (see Read, George, & Macgregor (1994) or Yang (1995)) 
was implemented which directly constructed MV curves working back through the 
planning horizon. This involved finding guidelines, or breakpoints in the storage space 
at which point it would prove optimal to shift from one particular strategy to another. As 
explained in both these references, dual DP was found to be a very efficient algorithm, 
where much of the benefit was gained through the fact that there were large sections of 
the reservoir level state space in which the optimal operating decision did not change. 
The efficiency of the approach fell back towards that of the primal DP as the decision 
changed more frequently. Traditionally, these decisions were either to turn an additional 
unit on or possibly related to a particular additional release quantity. However, in our 
model, the decisions to be made are the specific offer to supply to the market, and as this 
provides another whole dimension of alternatives, you would therefore expect the 
decision to change much more frequently as the storage level changes (in fact it is likely 
that it will change continuously). Thus, the potential benefits of a dual approach are 
negated36. Theoretically, we could create a set of possible offers to be used, and break 
up the storage space appropriately. However, this would either be too restrictive, or quite 
inefficient, depending on the number of alternatives made available. Our second 
algorithm, the DMVC approach, employs some of the facets of the Dual DP technique, 
in bypassing the construction of a value curve and thus directly constructing MV curves 
                                                 
36 Note that the dual DP is considered to be more accurate too, as it does not require discretisation of the 
reservoir level state space. However, as we will show, the approach proposed is efficient enough that a 
very fine discretisation can be applied to this dimension, and this dual DP benefit is also negated. 
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for a given period from those for the following period, based on probabilistic 
expectations of the state in which the generator will end up. 
 
In terms of the dimensions that are being discretised, the R&A primal approach 
discretised only the storage and dispatch levels, a dual approach would discretise 
possible offers to be made and marginal fuel values, while the marginalistic approaches 
presented in this chapter discretise the storage and dispatch levels (in the same way as 
the primal approach) and the marginal fuel values (through the discretisation of the MCs 
in the pre-processing phase). 
 
We have called these new approaches Structured Marginalistic Dynamic Programming 
methods, as they consider the particular structures apparent in this problem and apply 
the knowledge gained about how offers should change in various circumstances, 
developed through the analytic work described in earlier chapters. For example, we 
know that if the fixed MC level is increasing, then the offer must shift up and to the 
left37, and thus there is no point considering an offer that would pass through the rest of 
the offering space. 
 
6.5 Pre-Processing Phase 
 
In this section, we present a flow diagram representing the PP phase algorithm, discuss 
the options that were chosen with respect to the approach of this phase, and identify the 
computational complexity of the algorithm. 
 
6.5.1 The Pre-Processing Algorithm 
 
Figure 6.6 presents the PP phase at a very high-level. The bulk of the computational 
complexity of the algorithm is found within the component labelled “Find Offer for MC 
                                                 
37 As implied by Section 4.3, for simple types of market uncertainty, and in the remainder of Chapter 4 for 
more complex uncertainty. 
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level under this UMS”. The details of this component are explained in Sections 6.5.3 
and 6.5.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 PP Phase Flow Diagram 
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6.5.2 Options for Finding Offers  
 
There are two possible ways of going about the construction of the offers in the pre-
processing phase: 
 
1. Using DP, in a similar, but more structured and hence more computationally 
efficient manner to that used in the R&A algorithm, such as discussed in Section 
3.4.1. 
2. Using the analytic concepts for optimal offer construction developed throughout 
Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
Both of these approaches have their merits, and would be appropriate under certain 
circumstances, where the most appropriate approach is determined purely by the method 
that would produce the results in the fastest time. In particular, it is fairly easy to show 
that under simple UMSs, the latter method would be the most efficient, while under 
complex UMSs, the DP approach would be appropriate. 
 
Example 6.1 Simple UMS 
 
Consider an example as shown in Figure 6.7, whereby the rest-of-market supply curve is 
known, but there is demand uncertainty. Therefore, we have an expected residual 
demand curve that is subject to horizontal uncertainty only. From Section 4.3.4, we 
know some parts of the pseudo-offer will definitely form part of the optimal offer, and 
these are very easy to define. We also know that there is a region of uncertainty that will 
be optimally overcome with a vertical step from the lower segment of the pseudo-offer 
to the upper, and we can use our optimality conditions to find the position of that step, as 
shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7 Simple UMS with MC=0 
 
Figure 6.8 Simple UMS with MC=1
 
When we then incrementally increase our fixed marginal level, we know that there are 
again portions of the easy-to-find pseudo-offer that will form parts of the optimal offer, 
but we also know that the position of the vertical step must be to the left of where it 
previously occurred. This therefore gives us a very good starting point when searching 
for the new vertical position. This is shown in Figure 6.8. For this example, producing 
the OCF through this process would be much faster than forming and solving the low-
level DP for each MC level. 
  
Example 6.2 Complex UMS 
 
Consider another example, this time where there is more complex uncertainty in the 
residual situation faced by the competitor. Here we consider that there are four possible 
linear residual demand curves that could be faced, forming a UMS as shown in Figure 
6.9. Note that the stars indicate positions of local optimality along the contours of the 
MDF that is implied by the UMS.  
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Figure 6.9 Complex UMS 
 
We have shown in Section 4.3.1 that if monotonicity is not an issue, then the optimal 
offer would pass through the optimal position on each contour of the MDF38. If 
monotonicity is an issue, then the optimal offer will consist of vertical and horizontal 
segments through the region of uncertainty. In this case, we can see that monotonicity is 
an issue, and hence some sort of algorithm, or possibly heuristic would be needed to 
determine the optimal path through this region of uncertainty. As in the simple case, 
when we increase MC incrementally, we again know that the offer must shift up and to 
the left, but the variety of alternative movements make the process of finding the new 
optimal more complex than the first example. Although this is a very simple example of 
the more complicated type of case, we can see that when the region (or regions) of 
uncertainty become large, covering a greater portion of the offering space39, the 
complexity of an analytic approach to pre-processing would increase greatly, and thus 
the DP approach would become more desirable. 
 
                                                 
38 Note that when we are considering only discrete possible residual demand curves, the only points on the 
offer that are actually important are those where the offer intersects with the residual demand curves. The 
directions of improvement along linear contours of the MDF are still driven by the positions of the ALs, 
but the sloped sections of these attractor lines no longer need be contained within the solution. 
39 Because we are considering downward sloping residual demand curves, the non-zero expected vertex 
payoffs would occur (generally speaking) down the diagonal from (low quantity, high price) to (high 
quantity, low price), and hence would most likely lend themselves to creating larger regions of uncertainty 
than would likely result if the non-zero expected payoffs were more evenly spread out. 
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6.5.3 Basic Vertex-Traversing Algorithm 
 
In addition to the benefits of removing the low-level DP calculations from the real-time 
calculations into a separate pre-processing phase, there are many other ways in which 
the general efficiency of these lower-level DP calculations can be improved on that 
presented in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003). This section describes the basic DP vertex-
traversing algorithm used, while Section 6.5.4 discusses some of the algorithmic 
improvements that have been applied, by recognising the structure of the particular 
problem. 
 
The scenario for the basic vertex-traversing algorithm is defined by a (Q*P) grid with an 
expected payoff, ( )pqEP , , defined on each of the QP  vertices, where the objective is to 
find the path with the greatest total expected payoff from ( )0,0  to ( )maxmax , PQ  that is 
monotonically non-decreasing in both the quantity and price dimensions. This is done by 
first performing a backwards recursion, finding the optimal “Value-To-Go” (VTG) from 
each vertex to ( )maxmax , PQ . This is a very straightforward calculation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1,,,1max,, +++= pqVTGpqVTGpqEPpqVTG  
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Figure 6.10 The Basic Vertex Traversing Algorithm 
 
The offer is then traced forward from ( )0,0 , using the rule: 
 
If ( ) ( )1,),(, ++= pqVTGpqEPpqVTG  then go up (increment p). 
If ( ) ( )pqVTGpqEPpqVTG ,1),(, ++=  then go right (increment q) 
 
Note that in the R&A algorithm, the calculation of the Value-To-Go is different from 
this, and unnecessarily complicated. Rather than just restricting the path of the offer to 
edges of the grid, the R&A algorithm allows angled offer segments, by determining its 
Value-To-Go with the equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1,,....,1,1,1,max,, max +++++= pQVTGpqVTGpqVTGpqEPpqVTG  
 
This method covers a very similar range of potential solutions (the differences are 
discussed in Section 6.7.1), but is significantly less efficient than the standard approach 
described above. If we were to apply the approach above to the R&A algorithm, then the 
P vertices 
down  
( )pqVTG ,  
( )0,0  
( )maxmax , PQ  
Q vertices across  
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order of computational complexity would be reduced from 232 tpdrdtrp +  to 
222 tpdrdtrp + . 
 
6.5.4 Problem-Specific Vertex-Traversing Algorithm 
 
In this particular offer construction problem, there is a specific structure that lends itself 
to improved computational methods over those required for the basic vertex-traversing 
algorithm. The expected payoffs on the vertices are non-zero only on the vertices that 
residual demand curves pass through (as indicated by stars in Figure 7.6). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 The Problem-Specific Vertex Traversing Algorithm 
 
Therefore, if we have p residual demand curves and d possible dispatch levels, then we 
will have a grid of vertices d wide by pd tall, and hence a total of pd2 vertices for which 
to potentially calculate the expected payoffs and values-to-go. In our model, we need to 
repeat this Vertex-Traversing Algorithm M times with the same set of residual demand 
curves, where M is the number of different MOC levels that we are considering. 
 
pd vertices 
down  
( )0,0  
( )maxmax , PQ  
d vertices across  
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The remainder of this section describes improvements over the basic vertex-traversing 
algorithm that we have implemented, in addition to improvements over its 
implementation in the R&A algorithm. Most of these improvements relate to the 
calculation of the VTG matrix, as this is the section of the algorithm to which most time 
is devoted in the algorithm. The following is a list of six different, but complimentary, 
improvements. 
 
1. We know that there is only a single non-zero payoff in each row of the grid, as 
each of these rows corresponds to one of the prices on one of the RD curves. 
Hence the calculation of the expected payoffs can be limited to only these 
vertices, immediately reducing the calculation effort for expected payoffs to 
(1/d) of its original size. Note the calculation required is: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )occuringRDassociatedqTotalCostpqpqEP Pr*, −=  
  
2. Rather than repeatedly calculating the revenue portion (pq) of the expected 
vertex payoff for each of the M different MOC levels, we can calculate it once 
outside this loop of the algorithm. 
 
3. Rather than having a rule based forward recursion to trace out the optimal offer, 
the optimal direction of movement from each vertex is recorded in the 
calculation of the Value-To-Go stage. This substantially reduces the 
computational complexity of the offer finding process. 
 
4. From the analytic work in the earlier chapters of this thesis, and general logic, we 
know that as the fixed MOC level rises, the optimal offer cannot move below 
(down and to the right of) the offer for the previous MOC. Therefore, as we 
successively move up the fixed MOC levels, we keep track of the lower bound 
price that should still be considered at each dispatch level. We do not calculate 
any expected payoffs that occur below this lower bound. 
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5. This previous modification leaves some rows with no non-zero expected payoffs. 
Therefore, we keep track of these rows and jump over them entirely when 
calculating the Values-To-Go and when tracing out the optimal offer. 
 
6. An improvement has been made to the Value-To-Go calculations by recognising 
that the matrix of expected payoffs is very sparse. In particular, that there is only 
a single non-zero payoff in each price row of the matrix. Using this fact, we can 
simply copy many of the Value-To-Gos from either the right or above, rather 
than recalculating them. The process is: 
 
a. Work back from the last quantity level that is not below our lower bound, 
copy the VTGs from the row above until we reach the non-zero expected 
payoff. 
b. Do the normal VTG calculation for this vertex of the matrix. 
c. Keep working backwards, copying the VTG to the right while it is greater 
than the VTG above. 
d. Once, the VTG above is greater than the VTG to the right, simply copy 
all VTGs from above, back to the lowest quantity. 
  
In Section 6.7, we will discuss a further addition to the algorithm, whereby payoffs on 
the edge of the grid are considered, in addition to payoffs on the vertices. When this 
addition is included, the first six improvements described here are unaffected, but the 
benefits of improvement six is lost to a large extent because the matrix of edges with 
positive payoffs is no-where near as sparse as the matrix of vertices with positive 
payoffs. 
 
6.5.5 Computational Complexity of Pre-Processing Phase 
 
We define the following additional parameter for use in expressing the computational 
complexity of the PP phase: 
 
 208
 M = Number of MC levels at which to find offers in the OCF 
 
From the source code for the PP phase, we can show that the computational complexity 
can be approximately summarised by Equation 6.2. 
22222 875.08610667.0127 MdtptpMtpMCdMdtpptdtdptp ++++++  
 
Equation 6.2 Computational Complexity of the PP Phase in Full 
 
Simplifying this down to the terms of the largest orders of magnitude, we can see that 
the algorithm is of order of complexity 22Mdtp . 
 
Note that a decision must be made in the PP phase, as to the level of discretisation in 
MC levels, or in other words, the number of different MC levels for which to produce a 
pre-processed offer. Observe that the PP phase complexity is approximately linear in 
this parameter. In a preliminary trial, we have observed that anywhere between 50% and 
85% of pre-processed fixed MC offers have been used in the RT phase. Of course, as the 
level of discretisation increases (and hence we have more MC based offers produced), 
the percentage decreases. In addition, if a pre-processed offer is used at all, then 
generally, most of it will be relevant (as opposed to just a small segment of it). This is 
because as we slide down the reservoir storage levels, that particular MC becomes 
appropriate at different segments of the dispatch range. This issue is discussed further in 
Section 6.6.5, with respect to the effect on the expected payoff of this decision. 
 
6.6 Real-Time Phase 
 
In this section, we present a flow diagram representing both RT phase algorithms, 
discuss the options that were chosen with respect to the approach of this phase, prove the 
consistency of this algorithm in constructing concave value curves (decreasing MV 
curves) and identify the computational complexity of the algorithm. 
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6.6.1 The Real-Time Algorithms 
 
Figure 6.12 presents the RT phase algorithms at a very high-level. The bulk of the 
computational complexity of the RT phase of the Value Curve approach is found within 
the component labelled “Value Curve Approach: Find Offer Value and add it to the 
Value Curve for this Market and Reservoir State”, while the bulk of the computational 
complexity for the Direct MV Curve approach is located in the corresponding 
component labelled “Direct MV Curve Approach: Find Expected MV and add it to the 
MV Curve for this Market and Reservoir State”. 
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Figure 6.12 RT Phase Flow Diagram (both approaches) 
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The remainder of this section is dedicated to explaining certain components of this 
algorithm in greater detail. Each of the numbered notes corresponds to a component 
labelled with a superscript in Figure 6.12. 
 
1. Make MV Curves 
 
In order to produce monotonically non-decreasing offers, our algorithm needs to 
produce monotonically non-decreasing MOC curves. In order to achieve this, the Value 
Curve needs to be concave (i.e. the MV curve must be decreasing). Logically speaking, 
we would expect this to be the case: as the reservoir level gets higher and higher, the 
MV of increased storage should fall (this is proven in Section 6.6.4). However, the 
discretisation of the fixed MC levels and the discretisation of the grid on which the 
offers must traverse the edges can result in some minor inconsistencies in this respect. 
Additionally, when we limit our model to quantities and prices that must be positive, we 
have an additional effect that can produce a convex kink in the Value Curve. For low 
reservoir levels it may be that the MOC curve is too high to warrant an offer that would 
lead to any dispatch (and hence the expected payoff will be zero). As the reservoir level 
increases, there may then come a point where it becomes optimal to provide an offer that 
could lead to a positive dispatch (and hence would have a non-zero expected payoff). 
Figure 6.13 shows that this would result in a clear convex kink in the Value Curve. 
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Figure 6.13 Convex Kink in the Value Curve 
 
In order to overcome these non-concavities, the algorithm: 
 
a. Produces the MV curve from the Value curves by taking the derivative 
b. Smoothes the MV curve so that it is non-increasing 
 
The smoothing procedure is demonstrated by the red line in Figure 6.14, and involves an 
adjustment to the marginal value curve over the range in which the MV is not 
monotonically non-increasing. 
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Figure 6.14 Convex Kink in the Value Curve 
 
Note that the adjustments are made to the MV curve rather than the value curve, as this 
was found to be more computationally efficient. 
 
2. Make EMV Curves 
 
These are vertically weighted averages of the Marginal Value curves for the following 
period, and they provide the Marginal Opportunity Cost (MOC) curves for generation in 
this period.  
 
3. Rounding EMV Curves 
 
EMV curves are rounded up to the nearest fixed MOC level, as this provides more 
conservative result and hence leads to a more conservative use of fuel. 
 
Note that offers have been pre-processed for a range of fixed MOC levels and parts of 
these pre-processed offers are patched together in real-time to determine the optimal 
offer under any specific Rounded MOC curve. This raises the question of whether we 
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should interpolate between the pre-processed offers, rather than round the MOC curve. 
Due to the discrete nature of the problem, we find that in the pre-processing stage, the 
optimal offer will stay the same for a variety of MC levels, and then will suddenly jump 
up to a new position (by-passing various non-optimal alternatives in-between). 
Therefore, to interpolate between the offers would often not actually give a different 
result to just rounding the MOC, and on other occasions it could give a worse result than 
would be achieved by rounding the MOC either way. In addition, to interpolate between 
these offers would greatly increase the necessary calculations performed in the RT 
phase. Therefore, the best option is to simply pre-process offers for more fixed MC 
levels, particularly around the ranges where MOC is likely to sit, especially since the 
computational time for the RT phase is unaffected by the number of fixed MOC levels 
that have been pre-processed. 
 
4. Make MOC Curve 
 
This MOC curve is constructed either from the rounded EMV curve for the period, or by 
shuffling along the MC curve from the previous reservoir level. Note that this means the 
EMV curve only needs to be produced once for each market state, as the MOC curves 
for all reservoir levels can be derived from it. 
 
6.6.2 Constructing the MV Curves under the Value Curve and Direct MV Curve 
Approaches 
 
This section considers the core component of the two two-phase approaches, the 
construction of the MV curves as the algorithms work backwards through the horizon, 
on which offering decisions are based. This is the component that differentiates the two 
approaches. These differences are indicated in Figure 6.12. Note that the explanations 
given could be modified easily to account for inflow uncertainty, but this is ignored here 
for clarity.  
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To explain these two approaches, we define the following notation: 
 
rtV ,     Value curve at the end of period t, given that residual demand 
curve index r occurred in the previous period (t-1) 
( )trt RV ,     Value of storage at the end of period t, at reservoir level tR , and 
given previous RD curve index r 
rtMV ,     MV curve at the end of period t, given that residual demand curve 
index r occurred within this period 
( )trt RMV ,     MV of storage at the end of period t, at reservoir level tR , and 
given that residual demand curve index r occurred within this 
period  
rtEMV ,  Expected MV curve at the end of period t, given that residual 
demand curve index r occurred in the previous period (t-1) 
tR   Reservoir level at beginning of period t 
( )trt Rθ  The optimal offer provided to the market in period t from 
reservoir level tR , given previous residual demand curve index 
outcome r 
( )( )trtpt RQ θ  Release in period t, given residual demand curve outcome index p 
in this period, and offer ( )trt Rθ  (which is based on residual 
demand curve index r having occurred in the previous period)  
( )( )trtpt RP θ  Price in period t, given residual demand curve outcome index p in 
this period, and offer ( )trt Rθ  
P   Total number of possible market outcomes per period 
prpr ,  Probability of residual demand curve outcome index tp , given 
residual demand curve outcome index r in the previous period. 
it ,infl   Level of inflow in period t under possible inflow index i 
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Value Curve Approach 
 
To construct the rtMV ,1−  curves from the rtMV ,  curves under the VC approach, the 
following steps are followed: 
 
i. Construct the rtEMV ,  curves from the rtMV ,  curves (one for each market 
outcome). These are vertically weighted averages, based on the probabilities in the 
Markov chain between the two periods. 
ii. Construct the rtV ,  curves, one for each previous RD state  
For each reservoir level, 
a. Construct the MOC curve from the appropriate rtEMV ,  curve 
b. Determine the optimal offer 
c. Find the expected release under all possible market outcomes (the 
intercept of the offer and each of the RD curves) 
d. Determine the expected current and future value from this point for all 
possible RD curves (weighted by their probability of occurring under the 
current UMS). 
• Current value is revenue in the current period from this offer and 
given the market outcome. 
• Future value is determined from the point that you would end up on 
the following period’s value curve, under the release level for this 
market outcome, given the optimal offer, and for the inflow level 
that occurs. 
iii. Construct the rtMVS ,1−  curves by taking the derivative of the rtV ,  curves. 
 
Steps (i) to (iii) are demonstrated in Figure 6.15, while step (d) is shown in Figure 6.16 
(along with a numerical example for a single point). 
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Figure 6.15 Producing the MV Curves under the Value Curve Approach 
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Figure 6.16 Calculating the Value Curve 
 
In step (ii), for a given offer, if market outcome p and inflow index i occur, the new 
storage level can be defined mathematically as: 
 
( )( ) ittrtpttt RQRR ,1 infl+−=+ θ  
 
The value at the current reservoir level tR  under a previous RD curve 1−tp  can be 
defined as: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]1,1
1
,, * ++
=
+= ∑ trttrtpttrtptP
p
prtrt RVSPSQprRV θθ  
 
Direct Marginal Value Curve Approach 
 
The 1−tMV  curves are constructed from the tMV  curves in a similar way under the 
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expected MV is just the weighted average of the marginal values at the reservoir levels 
at which we could possibly end up, based on the selected offer and the current UMS. 
This is a much simpler process than the VC approach. Appendix B demonstrates the 
basic theory of these approaches, under the simpler scenario of inflow (rather than 
market) uncertainty and correlation. 
To construct the 1−tMV  curves from the tMV  curves under the DMVC approach, the 
following steps are followed: 
 
i. Construct the tEMV  curves from the tMV  curves (one for each market outcome). 
These are vertically weighted averages, based on the probabilities in the Markov 
chain between the two periods. 
ii. Construct the tMV  curves, one for each previous RD state  
For each reservoir level, 
a. Construct the MOC curve from the appropriate tEMV  curve 
b. Determine the optimal offer 
c. Find the expected release under all possible market outcomes (the 
intercept of the offer and each of the RD curves) 
d. Determine the expected future MV from this point for all possible RD 
curves (weighted by their probability of occurring under the current 
UMS). The future MV is determined from the point that you would end 
up on the following period’s value curve, under the release level for this 
market outcome, given the optimal offer, and for the inflow level that 
occurs. 
 
Steps (i) and (ii) are demonstrated in Figure 6.17, while step (d) is shown in Figure 6.18 
(along with a numerical example for a single point). 
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Figure 6.17 Producing the MV Curves under the Direct MV Curve Approach 
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Figure 6.18 Calculating the MV Curve 
 
For a given offer, if market outcome p occurs, the new storage level is defined in exactly 
the same way as for the VC approach. However, in the recursion, the MV at the current 
reservoir level tR  under a previous RD curve 1−tp  can be defined mathematically as: 
 
( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
+− =
P
p
trtprtrt RMVprRMV
1
1,,,1  
 
This shows that the value curve can be bypassed in the construction of the MV curves as 
we move backwards through the planning horizon.  
 
Note that for the algorithm to be completely consistent, we would actually consider a 
separate MOC curve for each RD curve, rather than a weighted aggregate one, because 
the MOC of release depends on which MV curve we will end up on in the following 
period (which is dependent on the RD curve that occurs in this period, thus creating a 
circular problem). However, in Appendix C we show that basing the offers on a MOC 
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curve that is produced from a vertically weighted average MV curve is both necessary 
(due to computational complexity of the alternatives) and acceptable. 
 
6.6.3 Equivalence of the VC and DMVC Approaches 
 
In this section we will prove that, in the continuous case, the VC and DMVC approaches 
will always produce the same offers, the same release levels, and the same MV curves 
and are therefore equivalent approaches. 
 
Proof 6.1 
 
Assume that the value and MV curves for the end of period t correspond to one another 
(that is, the MV curve is the derivative of the value curve). Under the VC approach, we 
construct a MV curve by taking the (discretised) derivative of the value curve. 
Therefore, the MV curves for the two approaches are identical. As explained in Section 
6.6.2, the MOC curves on which the offers are based are determined from these MV 
curves, and as such, the offers (and thus dispatch) for the two approaches in period t will 
also be identical.  
 
Now let us consider the construction of the MV curves as the respective DPs move back 
through the horizon. Start by dealing with the simplest case where there is only one 
possible RD curve in period t. We ignore inflows here, as they provide a fixed shift up in 
reservoir level for both approaches, which simply leads to a change in the MOC curves 
on which the offers are based and thus does not affect the results presented. 
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Figure 6.19 Different MV Points under the VC and DMVC Approaches 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6.19, the DMVC approach calculates a MV at each reservoir 
level breakpoint, and the VC approach calculates a MV between consecutive reservoir 
level breakpoints (it calculates the value curve at the breakpoints). As such, we cannot 
compare the MV found from the two approaches directly at a single point. We must 
show that rMV  falls between rrMV →−1  and 1+→rrMV , and that the difference between the 
terms tends towards zero as the width of the reservoir intervals tends towards zero. To 
show this we define the following terms: 
 
rMV   = MV at reservoir level r under the DMVC approach 
rrMV →−1  = MV on segment between reservoir levels r-1 and r under the 
VC approach 
rV   = Value curve at reservoir level r 
rq             = Quantity dispatched as a result of the offer from reservoir  
level r 
rqr
FV −   = Future Value of End-of-Period (EOP) reservoir level rqr −  
rq
PV   = Present Value of dispatch of quantity rq  
1+→rrMFV  = Marginal Future Value between reservoir levels r and r+1 
rMV  
(DMVC) 
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1+→rrMPV  = Marginal Present Value between reservoir levels r and r+1 
G  = Gain of MV from calculating the segment below r 
L  = Loss of MV from calculating the segment above r  
 
The first requirement defined for this proof is: 
 
rrrrr MVMVMV →−+→ ≤≤ 11  
Or, equivalently: 
 
11 −+ −≤≤− rrrrr VVMVVV  
1111 11 −−++ −+−≤≤−+− −−−−−+ rrrrrrrr qqqrqrrqqqrqr PVPVFVFVMVPVPVFVFV
rrrrrrrrr MPVMFVMVMPVMFV →−→−+→+→ +≤≤+ 1111  
 
In other words, the MV produced by the VC approach on the sections below and above 
reservoir level r must be less than or more than the MV produced by the DMVC 
approach at reservoir level r, respectively. 
 
The second requirement of the proof is that these inequalities to tend to equalities as the 
discretisation in the reservoir levels becomes finer. 
 
Figure 6.20 shows an example situation with a single linear RD curve where the optimal 
dispatch quantity (offer) for both approaches is the same, and is at the point of 
intersection between the marginal revenue (MR) and MOC curves (with the price given 
by the RD curve at this quantity). The marginal value from the DMVC approach for 
reservoir level r is given by this intersection ( rMV ). 
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Figure 6.20 Optimal Dispatch Point under Both Approaches 
 
Figure 6.21 demonstrates the change in the present value component as a result of the 
marginal increase in reservoir level from r to r+1. The additional value is the area under 
the MR curve from the dispatch level of rq to 1+rq .  
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Figure 6.21 Value Curve Approach MV Calculation - Present Value Component 
 
Figure 6.22 demonstrates the change in the future value component as a result of the 
marginal increase in reservoir level from r to r+1. The additional value is the area under 
the 1+tMV curve between the reservoir levels of rqr − and ( ) 11 +−+ rqr . 
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Figure 6.22 Value Curve Approach MV Calculation - Future Value Component 
 
If we consider this in terms of a MOC curve based on a Beginning-of-Period (BOP) 
reservoir level of r+1, then: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1111 ++ =−+−+= rr qqrra , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) 11 +=−−+= rr qqrrb  
 
These points are shown on Figure 6.23, along with regions corresponding to increased 
current and future value. We can see that the total width of additional payoff on this 
diagram is: 
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Price Value 
MV 
Quantity 
rMC  
1+rMC  
 228
Because the maximum point of the shaded area is at the level of rMV  and the total width 
of the area is 1, then we know that: 
 
rrrrr MVLMPVMFV =++ +→+→ 11  
rrr MVLMV =++→ 1  
rrr MVMV ≤+→ 1  
 
 
 
Figure 6.23 MV Comparison - Higher Reservoir Level 
 
Figure 6.24 shows a similar result, comparing rMV  with rrMV →−1 . We can see that: 
 
GMVMPVMFV rrrrr +=+ →−→− 11  
GMVMV rrr +=→−1  
rrr MVMV ≥→−1  
 
1 
1+rq  rq  1+rq  
rMV  
1+→rrMPV  
1+→rrMFV  
L 
Price 
RD 
MR 
Quantity 
rMOC  
1+rMOC  
(a) (b) 
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Figure 6.24 MV Comparison - Lower Reservoir Level 
 
It is clear from Figure 6.23 and Figure 6.24 that as the discretisation of the reservoir 
levels becomes finer (less shift in the MC curve at each incremental move), the MV for 
the segments above and below a particular reservoir level point found from the VC 
approach become progressively closer to the MV found at that reservoir level point from 
the DMVC approach. 
 
Therefore, we can see that under a scenario with a single RD curve, the VC approach 
and the DMVC approach are equivalent – they produce the same offers, the same 
dispatch level, and the same MV curve for the previous period, on which earlier offers 
will be based. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Throughout this thesis we consider scenarios with multiple RD curves under 
consideration. This situation is the same as that presented here, except that the offer is 
G 
1−rMC  
1 
11 +−rq  rq  1−rq  
rMV  
rrMPV →−1  
rrMFV →−1  
G 
Price 
RD 
MR 
Quantity 
rMC  
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constructed to optimally trade-off between alternative residual demand curves, and the 
analysis demonstrated above would be performed separately for each possible market 
outcome, where the weighted average of these cases would give a consistent result. 
 
6.6.4 Proof of Algorithm Convexity 
 
In Section 6.6.3, we have shown that the VC and DMVC approaches are equivalent, and 
in the continuous case should produce the same results. Therefore, in order to prove that 
both algorithms will continue to naturally produce monotonically non-increasing MV 
curves (and thus monotonically non-decreasing offers) as the DP recursion moves 
backwards through the horizon, this just needs to be shown for one of the algorithms. 
Here, we demonstrate this for the DMVC, as the proof is simpler.  
 
Recall that all offers pass along a grid of edges, and thus for each single unit of 
generation, our decision is essentially at what price to offer that tranch of width 1MW, 
based on the MOC on that tranch and determined by the pre-processed OCF for the 
relevant UMS. As with Section 6.6.3, we ignore inflows as the effect is again just to 
shift the MOC curve, independently of starting reservoir level or any other factor. 
 
Proof 6.2 
 
For this proof we define the following terms: 
 
 maxQ   =  Maximum capacity of the generating unit 
rqMOC ,  =  Marginal opportunity cost for q
th unit, given reservoir level r 
( )rqq MOCOP ,  =  Offer Price for qth unit of capacity, given the MOC at the qth 
unit, given a reservoir level of r 
RDrd ,  =  Dispatch level under the optimal offer from reservoir level r 
and under RD curve outcome RD 
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1. Begin with a set of monotonically non-increasing MV curves at the end of period 
t, with respect to reservoir level. 
 
2. Construct the set of Expected MV curves, also for the end of period t, by taking 
weighted averages, as described in Section 6.6.2. These new curves must also be 
monotonically non-increasing, as taking a vertically weighted average of n 
monotonically non-increasing curves will produce a monotonically non-
increasing curve, regardless of the weights. 
 
3. As reservoir level increases, the MOC curve used to construct the offer moves 
horizontally to the right (shown in Figure 6.25). Specifically, when r increases 
by 1MW from oldr  to newr : 
 
For q = 1 to maxQ  
oldnew rqrq
MOCMOC ,1, −=  
 
 
 
Figure 6.25 Constructing the MOC Curve 
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4. As a result, the offer: 
a. Becomes more generous, but 
b. For a given q, will not drop below ( )
oldrqq
MOCOP ,11 −−  because the offer 
must be at least as high in this q as it was for the same MOC in the 
previous q level (as pre-processed offers for fixed MC levels are 
monotone). This is demonstrated in Figure 6.26. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.26 Monotone Pre-Processed Offer for Fixed MC Level 
 
 
For q = 1 to maxQ  
( ) ( ) ( )
oldnewold rqrqrq
MOCOPMOCOPMOCOP ,,,1 ≤≤−  
 
In other words, when the reservoir level increases, giving the fall in MOC 
curve shown in red in Figure 6.27, the new offer will be somewhere in 
the highlighted range.  
 
Condition aCondition b
Price 
Quantity 
( )rqMOCOP ,1−  
( )rqMOCOP ,  
(q)(q-1) 
Pre-
Processed 
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Figure 6.27 Shift in Offer as Reservoir Level Increases 
 
5. Figure 6.27 tells us that under a monotonically non-increasing RD curve, RD, the 
following must be the case: 
 
1,,1 +≤+ RDrRDr dd  
  
 In other words, there is no way that the dispatch level can increase by more than 
one unit of generation when the reservoir level increases by 1. For example, 
assume that the offer moves as far as it feasibly can in Figure 6.27, to the bottom 
of the highlighted range. Under RD1, dispatch increases by less than 1 unit, from 
a-b, while under RD2 (a very flat curve), dispatch increases by the maximum 
possible amount, that being exactly 1 unit (from c-d). 
 
4 Quantity 
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c
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6. If we rearrange the equation above and add r to both sides, we get: 
 
  
( ) RDrRDr
RDrRDr
RDrRDr
drdr
drdr
dd
,1,
,1,
,1,
1
)1(
)1(
+
+
+
−+≤−
−≤+−
−≤+−
 
 
This means that when the BOP reservoir level increases, the EOP reservoir level 
must also increase. 
 
7. Now consider how the MV in the current period is calculated for market state 
2p ,  and reservoir levels r and (r+1), under the DMVC approach. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.28 MV Calculation under the DMVC Approach 
 
 Figure 6.28 shows that to find the MV at this particular point, we take a weighted 
average of the MV levels that could be reached under the possible RD curve 
outcomes, given the optimal offer from the appropriate reservoir level. 
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In step 6, we showed that if the BOP reservoir level increases, then the EOP 
reservoir level that results must also increase. Given that the MV curves from 
which we are taking our weighted values are downward sloping, this means that 
under all RD curve outcomes, the corresponding MV must not increase when we 
calculate the BOP MV under a higher reservoir level. Hence, each of the MV 
curves in the period (t+1) must be monotonically non-increasing. 
 
8. So, if we begin with a set of monotonically non-increasing MV curves at the end 
of period t, all the offers within period t will be monotone, and will lead to a set 
of monotonically non-increasing MV curves at the end of period (t-1). 
 
Q.E.D. 
 
6.6.5 Computational Complexity of Real-Time Phase 
 
From the source code for the RT phase based on the Value Curve and Direct MV Curve 
approaches, we can show that the computational complexities can be approximately 
summarised by Equation 6.3 and Equation 6.4. 
 
( )rddpMdMprrirtp 13020102865140230204001.0 ++++++++  
 
Equation 6.3 Computational Complexity of the RT Phase Value Curve Approach in Full 
 
( )rddpMdMprrirtp 1328.25.61411216 ++++++++  
 
Equation 6.4 Computational Complexity of the RT Phase Direct MV Curve Approach in Full 
 
Simplifying these down to the terms of the largest orders of magnitude, we can see that 
both algorithms are of order of complexity ( ) tpMddptpr ++ . 
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When compared to the simplified form of Equation 6.1, this shows us that the 
computational complexity of the RT phase for both the Value Curve and Direct MV 
Curve approaches will increase at a considerably slower rate than the R&A algorithm 
(which had complexity 232 tpdrdtrp + ) as the values of the various parameters which 
define the problem size increase. In other words, as the scenarios considered increase in 
size and detail, the two-phase approaches will become increasingly faster in comparison 
to the R&A approach. 
 
Recall from Section 6.5.5 that the order of computational complexity of the PP phase, 
which is performed just once per horizon, is 22Mdtp . By comparing computational 
complexity with the R&A algorithm, we can observe that as the values  of the various 
parameters which define the problem size increase, the computational time required will 
increase at a significantly slower rate than the  R&A algorithm. 
 
Note that the number of fixed MC levels at which pre-processing occurs does not greatly 
affect the computational complexity of the RT phase algorithm. Of course, as the 
discretisation of the MC levels becomes finer, we would expect the solution quality to 
improve. Although testing has shown this to be true to a certain extent, we have found 
that the optimal offers and payoffs in the RT phase are quite robust to the number of MC 
levels considered. Therefore, we should not be too concerned about the number of MC 
levels that are solved for in the PP phase (whose computational complexity is linear in 
this parameter). 
 
6.7 Expected Solution Quality Comparison: Two-Phase and R&A 
Approaches 
 
In Section 6.2, it was noted that the Two-Phase and R&A algorithms considered in this 
chapter all deal with the same market complexities and issues, and as such, we would 
expect that the solution quality from all three approaches would be very similar. This 
section explores the reasons for slight deviations that we expect to observe between the 
actual solution qualities produced by the three approaches. 
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6.7.1 Two-Phase Approaches versus R&A Approach 
 
There are three differences between the Two-Phase and R&A algorithms which will 
mean that the outcomes achieved are not identical. 
 
The first two of these have been discussed earlier in this chapter, and favour the R&A 
algorithm very slightly. These were the choice of factors/dimensions that were to be 
discretised (Section 6.4.1), and the fact that the construction of the MOC curves in the 
Two-Phase approaches comes from a weighted average rather than a perfect 
representation (in the Value Curve approach, which we have chosen to programme, as 
described in Section 6.6.2). 
 
The final difference weighs the advantage heavily on the side of the Two-Phase 
algorithm, especially when the shape of the RD curves considered is “steppy” and 
conducive to market power exploitation, such as those found in the real world. The 
remainder of this section explains this difference. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.29 Inaccuracy in R&A Algorithm 
Price RD Curves with Intersections 
Quantity 
RD Curve with No Intersection 
Optimal Offer 
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Horizontal Edge Intercepts 
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The problem lies in the fact that the R&A algorithm considers only the payoffs that 
occur on the vertices of the grid, as shown in Figure 6.29. The example here 
demonstrates a case where the expected values on the vertices indicated by the blue and 
red dots are very high, and as such, the optimal offer should pass through these points. 
Under such a case, there is no way that an intersection with a vertex of the black RD 
curve can be recognised. This is because the offer must pass through this RD curve at 
one of the purple dots, on a horizontal edge of the offering grid. By ignoring this 
intercept, not only is the additional expected payoff within the current period omitted, 
but so is the future value associated with being dispatched on this ignored RD curve. 
 
For example, Figure 6.30 shows a case where the solid pink line represents the R&A 
algorithm offer, while the dotted pink line represents the deviation from this for the VC 
approach offer. Quite clearly, the only difference between the two offers is the point at 
which they intercept RD curve 2. Given the rest of the offer beyond this point, the R&A 
algorithm considers only the possibility of intersecting this RD curve at point b (with a 
payoff + future value of 63.647)642414.26*2(1.0 =+ ), as point a would require 
shifting around the remainder of the offer to maintain monotonicity40. On the other hand, 
the VC approach also considers the possibility of intersecting this RD curve at (amongst 
others) point c (with a payoff + future value of 20.673)6475220*168.1(1.0 =+ ). In 
other words, expected total payoff associated with this RD curve has increased by 
around $25.56, or almost 4%. by considering payoffs on the horizontal edges of the 
offering grid, in addition to those on the vertices. 
                                                 
40 Note that 0.1 is the probability of this RD curve occurring under the given UMS 
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Figure 6.30. Problem with Ignoring Horizontal Intercepts 
 
6.7.2 Value Curve Approach versus Direct Marginal Value Curve Approach 
 
We expect that the VC approach will perform marginally better than the DMVC 
approach with respect to the optimality of the solutions, because of the way that the 
interpolation is performed, when we choose to find the value or MV at only a portion of 
reservoir levels.  
 
Let us assume that the general shape of the value curves is increasing and concave, 
giving a MV curve that is decreasing and convex, as shown in Figure 6.31. 
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a 
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Figure 6.31. Standard Shape of Value Curve and Marginal Value Curve 
 
Start by considering the MV curve. The offering decisions are based on the marginal 
value of each incremental unit of fuel. Therefore, if we have not explicitly calculated the 
marginal value of each of these units, then we must perform a linear interpolation on the 
MV curve. As we can see from the red lines on the right diagram of Figure 6.31, this 
will always bias the MV curve upwards, and hence lead to more restrictive offers than 
are optimal. On the other hand, if we use the Value Curve approach, the linear 
interpolation occurs on the Value Curve, as shown on the left hand side of Figure 6.31. 
It is apparent that this will produce a stepped MV curve, where each step is at a level 
somewhere in-between the maximum and minimum true marginal values over that 
range. With this approach there is no clear bias causing us to offer in either too 
conservative or too aggressive a manner in the long run. As such, we expect that the VC 
approach (which performs interpolation on the value curve) to produce slightly better 
results than the DMVC approach (which performs interpolation on the MV curve). 
 
On the other hand, there is potential that the MV curve approach may be slightly more 
computationally efficient, as it avoids the need to construct the value curves, in 
constructing the MV curves for a given period directly from those for the following 
period. 
 
Stepped MV Curve 
MV CurveValue Curve
True MV Curve
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6.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we have described two new algorithms for the production and updating 
of an optimal offering strategy over a planning horizon for either a single fuel-
constrained generation unit or a set of parallel units. The key complications that these 
algorithms consider are two of the important intertemporal considerations: stochastic 
market correlation between periods and limited fuel resources. The algorithm 
incorporates knowledge gained earlier in this thesis about the way that optimal offers 
should be formed and how they should change as a result of outside influences. In 
particular, it has capitalised on the idea of Marginal Cost Patching, introduced in 
Chapter 5. 
 
We have proven that both algorithms will consistently produce concave value curves 
(decreasing MV curves), which is necessary for the construction of monotonically non-
decreasing offers under the two-phase approach presented. 
 
We have also compared, on a theoretical basis, the two new algorithms to an algorithm 
presented in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003), which considers the same market 
complexities, but uses a very different approach. We have determined that the payoffs 
from the two new algorithms should be slightly higher for most RD curve types, and 
significantly higher under one specific (and realistic) type. We have also determined 
that, in terms of computational complexity, the two new algorithms are significantly 
superior to the algorithm found in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003). These two hypotheses 
are tested in Chapter 8. 
 
The following chapter considers incorporating a branching tree structure to the Markov 
chain system in an effort to further simplify the two-phase approaches and more closely 
reflect reality. 
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Chapter 7  
 
DECISION ANALYSIS DYNAMIC 
PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes what appears to be a new solution technique that combines 
traditional stochastic dynamic programming methods used to this point in the thesis with 
a decision analysis or branching tree type structure. This structure implies that the 
overall state of any system of interest at any stage is dependent on the various events 
that have occurred to this point. The combination of these events defines the Macro-
State that the system is in at that time, and the optimal decision would therefore depend 
on the value of this macro-state. Note that these macro-states contain different 
information (the general, high-level state of the system) from that implied by a regular 
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state (which in the algorithms presented in this thesis is generally defined by the 
previous residual demand curve outcome and the reservoir level). 
Such an approach has many applications. We begin this chapter by describing the 
technique generically and describing its possible application to two different electricity 
generating problems that are not directly related to the offering problem addressed in 
this thesis. We then consider this new method in the context of the problem faced in this 
thesis, that being the construction of optimal offering strategies for a planning horizon. 
By applying this method to our problem of interest, we recognise that there are two 
types of correlation that may be occurring throughout the planning horizon. The first 
type is the direct correlation between the market states (or RD curves) that was included 
in the algorithm already presented, in the form of a Markov chain. The second type is 
the correlation between the overall macro-states. Ladurantaye, Gendreau, & Potvin 
(2006) presents an approach that is similar to that described in this chapter, but the 
branches used in their approach are purely of the probabilistic variety that are described 
in Section 7.2.2, and thus do not consider decision branches as described in Section 
7.2.3. In addition, that approach considers deterministic pricing outcomes along each 
multi-period branch, rather than the stochastic and correlated RD curve outcomes that 
we consider here. For a fuller study and description of applied decision analysis, refer to 
Bunn (1984). 
  
We show how applying this structure to an optimisation method enables us to better 
represent real-world scenarios that are themselves of this form, and as a consequence the 
computational complexity of a dynamic program can be significantly reduced. Finally, 
we show how it can be used to consider the effect on a generator’s offering behaviour 
where many events and phenomena, such as the reaction of rival generators to the 
generator’s own offering strategy, need to be taken into account. 
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7.2 Decision and Probability Tree Structure 
 
In this section, we will discuss the combination of decision analysis with stochastic 
dynamic programming in a generic sense, and provide two brief examples of its possible 
application to problems other than that of short-term offer strategy optimisation 
primarily addressed in this thesis. 
 
In a traditional stochastic dynamic program, a single Markov chain is considered to 
represent the transition probabilities between possible system states between consecutive 
stages. In combining decision analysis with dynamic programming, we incorporate a 
branching-type structure to represent the decision maker being faced with entirely 
different groups of possible system states, as a result of various events that could occur 
within the problem scenario between stages. We refer to each of these sets of possible 
system states as a macro-state. The events are represented by nodes in the decision tree 
and can be one of two distinct types. 
 
Chance Nodes: 
 
‘Nature’ can make decisions that are beyond the control of the decision maker, leading 
to chance nodes within the decision analysis branching structure. As explained in Bunn 
(1984) and demonstrated in Figure 7.1, chance nodes (or outcome nodes, as the text 
refers to them) are conventionally represented by circles and indicate that the set of 
subsequent nodes connected to this circle will be reached according to some 
probabilistic process over which the decision maker has no control. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 A Chance Node (Source: pg 182, Bunn (1984)) 
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Decision Nodes: 
 
The decision maker can make internal decisions, leading to decision nodes within the 
decision analysis branching structure. Bunn (1984) explains that decision nodes are 
conventionally represented by a square box, and indicate that subsequent nodes 
connected to this box can be reached according to a deterministic choice on the part of 
the decision maker at this point.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 A Decision Node (Source: pg 182, Bunn (1984)) 
 
First let us consider the two techniques of dynamic programming and decision analysis 
separately. 
 
7.2.1 A Simple Dynamic Program Based on a Markov Chain 
 
Consider a single Markov chain, such as that represented in Figure 7.3, which describes 
the transition probabilities between four possible system states between two consecutive 
stages, for a given problem.  
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Figure 7.3 Markov Chain Structure for System States 
 
Assume that a decision maker must make a certain decision for the given stage based on 
the initial system state, before observing the probabilistic outcome of the final system 
state, where the payoff for this decision is dependant on the final system state. 
Therefore, we define the following notation: 
 
i,j = System state indices 
tNS =  Total number of possible system states in stage t 
jipr , =  Probability of transition from system state i in stage t to system state j in 
stage (t+1) (the values in Figure 7.3) 
tiEV , =  Expected value from the beginning of stage t onwards, associated with 
being in system state i 
tiD , = Decision in stage t, given that the system started the stage in system 
state i ( *,tiD  is the optimal decision) 
( )titj DEP ,,  =  Expected payoff to the decision maker within stage t for a decision tiD , , 
given that the system will end the stage in system state j  
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In this situation, the recursion equation can be defined as: 
 
( )[ ]⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ∑+
=
+
1
, 1
1,,,,, max
t
ti
NS
j
tjtitjjiDti
EVDEPpmEV  
 
For example, the expected value formula if the system began stage t in system state 2 
would be: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+++
++++=
++
++
1,4,2,41,3,2,3
1,2,2,21,1,2,1
,2 16.004.0
56.024.0
max
,2 tttttt
tttttt
Dt EVDEPEVDEP
EVDEPEVDEP
EV
t
 
 
Note that the relevant probabilities appear in bold in Figure 7.3. We continue this 
convention throughout the examples in this chapter. 
 
7.2.2 A Simple Decision Analysis Tree Based on a Markov Chain – Chance Nodes 
 
Taking the set of system states presented in Figure 7.3, let us now assume that system 
states 1 and 2 in each stage can only occur under a specific macro-state that the world is 
in at that given time, and conversely, states 3 and 4 can only occur under the alternative 
value of that macro-state. We will also assume that there is a higher level Markov chain 
on these macro-states, as presented in Figure 7.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Markov Chain Structure for Macro-States 
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This information could be reflected by chance nodes in a decision tree, combined with a 
set of smaller Markov chains, as shown in Figure 7.5. This structure implies that we 
have two levels of uncertainty; uncertainty with respect to the macro-state (observed 
first, at the chance nodes), and uncertainty with respect to the system state (observed 
second, given the macro-state observation). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Branching Tree Representation of a Markov Chain with Macro-States 
 
Given that this example considers only chance nodes, there is a simple, probabilistic 
formula to calculate the expected value from each node onwards, moving backwards 
across the decision tree towards the source node. In order to define this formula, we 
present the following additional notation: 
 
k,l = Macro-state indices 
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tNM =  Number of possible macro-states in stage t 
lkm , =  Probability of transition from macro-state k in stage t to macro-state l in 
stage (t+1) (the values in Figure 7.4) 
tNSM =  Number of possible system states associated with each macro-state in 
stage t (for simplicity we will assume that there are the same number of 
system states associated with each macro-state within a single stage, i.e. 
ttt nmnsnsm /= ) 
lkjipm ,,, =  Probability of transition from system state i in stage t to system state j in 
stage (t+1), given that there has been a transition from macro-state k to 
macro-state l between these stages (the values in the Markov chains in 
Figure 7.5)41 
tkiEV ,, =  Expected value from the beginning of stage t onwards, associated with 
being in system state i, which is associated with macro-state k at the 
beginning of stage t 
 
The expected value is calculated using: 
 
∑ ∑+
= ∈
+ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= 1
1
1,,,,,,,,
tNM
l lj
tljlkjilktki EVpmmEV  for 0, ≠lkm  terms 
 
Consider calculating the expected value of being in system state 2, which is associated 
with macro-state 1 in stage t, i.e. tEV ,1,2 , for the example in Figure 7.5. 
 
[ ] [ ]
1,2,41,2,31,1,21,1,1
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41 Note that the macro-state indices k and l are technically redundant here, as they are implied by the 
market states i and j. However, we include them for clarity regarding the current macro-state. 
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Note that these final probabilities defined above are the same as those in the second row 
of the original non-branched Markov chain presented in Figure 7.3. The reason for this 
is that in the special case where all macro-states can be reached from all other macro-
states, the two methods are equivalent to one another, despite the fact that they use 
different structures to represent the stochasticity in the system being modelled. 
Specifically, the probabilities are related through the formula: 
 
lkjilkji pmmpr ,,,,, =  for all ljki ∈∈ ,  
 
However, it is reasonable to assume that some macro-states transitions may not be 
possible between certain periods, as is the case for the transition from macro-state 2 to 
macro-state 1 in our example (infeasible transitions are represented by a probability of 
zero). For this node, the expected value calculation, assuming system state 3, simplifies 
to: 
 
1,2,41,2,3,2,3 5.05.0 ++ += ttt EVEVEV  
 
Section 7.2.5 explains more about these types of structures and the computational 
benefits of infeasible transitions such as this one. 
 
7.2.3 A Simple Decision Analysis Tree Based on a Markov Chain – Decision Nodes 
 
Again let us take the set of system states presented in Figure 7.3 assuming that system 
states 1 and 2 can occur under macro-state 1, while system states 3 and 4 can occur 
under macro-state 2. However, now let us assume that rather than a higher level Markov 
chain defining stochastic transition between the macro-states, these transitions are based 
on an internal decision by the decision maker. In other words, the decision maker 
chooses which branch to traverse.  
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This information could be reflected by decision nodes in a decision tree, combined with 
a set of smaller Markov chains to represent the system state uncertainty, as shown in 
Figure 7.6.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Branching Tree Representation of a Markov Chain with Macro-States 
 
The expected value from any decision node onwards is evaluated in a similar general 
formula to that for a chance node, but rather than probabilistically determining the 
expected value over the possible branches, the expected value is the maximum value out 
of these branches. Therefore, the expected value formula is: 
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Note though, it is quite likely that there may be a cost associated with switching between 
macro-states. In this case, let us define: 
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lkTC , = Transition cost from macro-state k in stage t to macro-state l (for k=l, 0, =lkTC  ) 
 
Therefore, the expected value formula becomes: 
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For simplicity though, we will leave this term out of the remaining equations in this 
chapter, as this has no significant impact on the complexity of the algorithm. 
 
Considering the same example as before, the expected value of being in system state 2, 
which is associated with macro-state 1 in stage t can be calculated as follows: 
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7.2.4 Combining DP and DA: Chance and Decision Nodes 
 
In Section 7.2.1, we described a simple DP based on a Markov chain, where a decision 
was made within the stage, in order to maximise expected benefit to the decision maker, 
given uncertainty with respect to the system state at the end of the stage. In Sections 
7.2.2 and 7.2.3, we described simple decision trees, where at the beginning of each 
stage, either a probabilistic event was resolved, or a decision was made, that determined 
the macro-state that the system would be in at the following stage. For the remainder of 
this chapter, we will consider the combination of these two concepts in a new decision 
analysis and dynamic programming (DADP) framework. 
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For chance nodes in the branching tree the decision making and uncertainty resolution 
process in each stage is shown in Figure 7.7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Decision Making and Uncertainty Process under Chance Nodes 
 
For decision nodes in the branching tree, there is a two-level decision making process, 
and the process in each stage is shown in Figure 7.8. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Decision Making and Uncertainty Process under Decision Nodes 
 
For both of these node types, the operational decision is made after the high-
level/macro-state transition has been resolved, once the decision maker knows the 
general realm of the system states that may occur, while the value of that decision to the 
decision maker remains dependent on the specific system state that occurs. 
 
This information is demonstrated in Figure 7.9. 
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Figure 7.9 Process for each Stage 
 
In order to define the recursion equation for the DADP framework, we present the 
following additional notation: 
 
tlkiD ,,, = Decision in stage t, given that the system started the stage in system 
state i (associated with macro-state k) and given that the decision maker 
has observed or caused a shift to macro-state l ( *,,, tlkiD  is the optimal 
decision) 
( )tlkitj DEP ,,,,  =  Expected payoff to the decision maker within stage t for a decision 
tlkiD ,,, , given that the system will end the stage in system state j  
 
The expected values and payoffs are demonstrated in Figure 7.10, for both a chance and 
a decision node. 
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Figure 7.10 Values and Expected Values 
 
For the chance node, the expected value is calculated for the recursion as follows: 
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In other words, this is a weighted value of the expected payoffs and future values that 
the decision maker would receive under the optimal decisions along each possible 
branch. 
 
Alternatively, for the decision node, the recursion equation is defined as: 
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In other words, this selects the branch that has the greatest expected payoff and future 
value associated with its optimal decision. 
t 
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 257
 
Consider the same simple example as in Section 7.2.2, but within this DADP 
framework. We can calculate the expected value of being in system state 2, which is 
associated with macro-state 1 in period t, i.e. tEV ,1,2  as follows: 
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Alternatively, consider the expected value of being in system state 3, associated with 
macro-state 2 in period t. There is a decision node associated with this macro-state, and 
as such, given an optimal macro-state transition l*, the expected value is defined as: 
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There are significant advantages to structuring the stochasticity and decision making 
process with the DADP framework, not least of which is the potentially more accurate 
representation of the form of the stochasticity and decisions that exists in the real system 
that is being modelled. These advantages are dependent on the particular system to 
which the technique is being applied and are explained more fully for the generator offer 
optimisation problem addressed in this thesis, in Section 7.5. 
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7.2.5 Possible DADP Node and Transition Structures 
 
In this section, we will present a small set of possible structures that the nodes and 
transitions between macro-states could take within the DADP structure. Specifically, the 
aim of this section is to highlight the differences, both practical and computational, 
between macro-states that are captivating for a given number of stages and those that are 
not. In addition, we will differentiate between the concepts of captivating and absorbing 
macro-states.  
 
In Markov chain theory, an absorbing sub-chain is defined in Norris (1997) as a closed 
class, from which there is no escape. In our context, this would therefore mean that once 
an absorbing macro-state is entered, the system could never leave that macro-state. This 
could be the case if a decision maker would make a decision, or an external event could 
occur, from which there is no reversion. In the problems that we address in this thesis, 
the Markov chains that we apply are non-stationary between different periods42, and thus 
it is also useful to define a captivating macro-state in a given period to be a macro-state 
from which it is not possible to escape in that period. A captivating macro-state would 
represent a situation where, if the system goes into a certain macro-state, then it will 
remain in that macro-state for a number of periods. Note it is possible that a macro-state 
may be absorbing over a short horizon, but only captivating over a longer horizon. As 
such, the diagrams presented in this section may appear to be absorbing, as they do not 
converge to a single macro-state in the final period, however, the diagrams show only a 
subset of the entire planning horizon. 
 
Let us begin by noting that Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 represented a branching tree with 
an underlying Markov chain that represented macro-state 2 as being captivating, and 
macro-state 1 as not captivating between the given stages. 
 
                                                 
42 Note that this concept of varying Markov chains is similar to the area of Periodic Markov Chains, 
except that we do not limit our method to a periodically repeating set of probabilities.  
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In Figure 7.11, we present a two macro-state structure over four periods, in which it is 
possible to reach both macro-states from any beginning macro-state in all periods. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Non- Captivating Macro-States 
 
Alternatively, it is possible that the macro-states of the system might be captivating in a 
particular period, meaning that it is not possible to shift to an alternative macro-state 
once a particular macro-state is observed. This situation might occur if a system is in a 
particular macro-state up to, say, t = 1, at which time it may or may not switch to a 
different macro-state, with a certain likelihood. Figure 7.12 illustrates this scenario, 
where the system may not return to the original macro-state at any point in the shown 
portion of the planning horizon. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12 Captivating Macro-States 
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It is under structures like this where the major benefits of the DADP framework are 
evident. The lower level DP is performed backwards along each branch over multiple 
periods (as indicated by the red arrows in Figure 7.12), until the chance node is reached, 
at which point the values (or value curves, depending on the application) are combined 
probabilistically (or based on a maximum if it is a decision node). 
 
Figure 7.13 represents a scenario with three possible macro-states, demonstrating a 
combination of captivating and non-captivating macro-states in various time periods 
over the short horizon. Observe that macro-state 3 is captivating within the portion of 
the horizon shown, macro-state 2 is captivating only in t = 1 and 2, and macro-state 1 is 
captivating only in t = 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.13 Captivating versus Non- Captivating Macro-States 
 
Let us consider how the mathematics simplifies when we have two captivating (or 
absorbing) macro-states. Figure 7.14 demonstrates the branching tree and set of small 
Markov chains in this case. 
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Figure 7.14 Branching Tree Representation of a Markov Chain with Captivating Macro-States 
 
The corresponding overall Markov chain is demonstrated in Figure 7.15. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.15 Markov Chain for System States with Transient Macro-States 
 
Observe that by using the branching structure under this captivating macro-states 
scenario, we automatically ignore the irrelevant regions of the overall Markov chain, 
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which would otherwise have been included in the analysis. In other words, the expected 
value recursion for a macro-state that is captivating in a given period is simplified to: 
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kj
tkjtkkitjkkjiDtki
EVDEPpmEV
tkki
1,,,,,,,,,,,
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This recursion equation assumes that the system will remain in the existing macro-state, 
and as such, the outer maximisation (relating to the choice of macro-state) has been 
removed. As such, the computational complexity of the expected value calculation is 
substantially reduced. 
 
7.3 Possible Applications of the DADP Framework Methodology 
 
The possible applications of the DADP framework presented in this chapter are very 
wide-ranging, both within dynamic programming applications in the field of energy 
market modelling and outside this field. In fact, the technique could be applied to any 
situation in which you have alternative dynamic programs that are valid under certain 
assumptions, and you do not yet know which one of those assumptions is valid. 
 
In this section, we will consider just a few of these applications. In the following 
sections, we will consider the application of this framework to the problem of interest in 
this thesis, the optimal short-term offer strategy of an electricity generator, in much 
more detail. 
 
7.3.1 Application 1: Long-Term Hydro Reservoir Management 
 
Firstly, within the area of energy market modelling, this new framework could be 
applied to long-term (annual, for example) reservoir management, where the events that 
determine the macro-state of the system are based around longer time-frames. Consider 
one such macro-state, relating to whether the year that is being modelled is an El Niño 
year, which will affect hydrological reservoir inflows and thus has the potential to 
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substantially change the operating strategy of a generator. Let us assume a simplified 
version of this model, where: 
 
- Each stage is one month 
- There is a value curve for water at each node defined over the reservoir level (the 
states of the DP) – as opposed to a single value at each node, as presented in 
Section 7.2. These would be calculated by the dynamic program. 
- Within each month, there will be many decisions made, and many possible 
system states within each macro-state. 
- There are three approaching months (Feb – April) in which we may or may not 
discover whether it is an El Niño year.  
 
The branching diagram for the macro-states (ignoring the decisions and the system 
states) is shown in Figure 7.16, assuming that by the end of those three months, we will 
know one way or the other if it is such a year. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.16 Branch Diagram for Long-Term Reservoir Management - El Niño Year 
 
We can see that the El Niño macro-state is reflected by an captivating macro-state 
system, implying that once a year has been recognised as being or not being an El Niño 
year, it will not switch to the alternative. It will only revert to the common uncertain 
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state at the end of the year/horizon (EOY). In February and March, there are expected 
probabilities that the year will be either recognised as an El Niño year (e%), recognised 
as not being an El Niño year (n%), and that we won’t be able to tell at this point whether 
or not it is an El Niño year (1-n-e%). April is similar, but we assume that we will know 
by this time whether or not it is an El Niño year. As the DP works backwards through 
the horizon down each of the branches, the water value curves are combined 
probabilistically at each state to produce expectations over the likelihood of this weather 
phenomenon occurring. 
 
If there is a major event such as the recognition of an El Niño year that could occur over 
the planning horizon in a case like this, it is beneficial to model the system in this 
manner, as it provides a more accurate representation of the problem situation and the 
cause of the uncertainties. For the example provided, compared with ignoring this 
structure, the number of nodes considered has effectively increased from 6 (one for each 
period – not shown) to 12 (one each for January and February, three each for March and 
April, and two each for May and June) over this 6 period horizon. This might imply that 
that although we are gaining a more accurate representation of the system, that the 
computational effort will increase substantially. However, it would be reasonable to 
assume that we are able to consider a smaller set of system states associated with each 
macro-state node under this branched representation, reducing the computational effort 
per node and as such, the overall computational effort may not be harmed, or in fact, 
may even be reduced. This is discussed further in Section 7.7.2. 
 
7.3.2 Application 2: Managing a Gas Generator 
 
Consider the owner gas-powered electricity generator, who must manage the amount of 
gas purchased and supplied along a pipeline, as well as the pressure of the gas in the 
pipeline, while simultaneously offering its generation into the electricity market. Both 
the input and output rates of gas are controllable by the decision maker, as it trades off 
storage costs and limitations with minimum/maximum rates of gas flow, and the value 
of saving gas to enable greater electricity generation in a later period. 
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Let us assume a simple version of this model, where: 
 
- Each stage is one week 
- Within each week, there will be an electricity generation decision made, and a 
stochastic distribution of price that may be received for that generation. 
- At the start of each month (weeks 3 and 7 in Figure 7.17), the owner must decide 
whether to enter into a contract with an electricity market demand-side 
participant to sell a certain quantity of electricity at a fixed price each period for 
the remainder of the horizon. Note that for the first three weeks of the horizon 
shown there is no contract in place, and hence only a single macro-state. 
 
The branching diagram for the macro-states (ignoring the lower-level operational 
decisions and the system states) is shown in Figure 7.17. The DP algorithm will work 
backwards through the horizon producing a value curve for gas availability at each node.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.17 Branch Diagram for Gas Pipeline Management Problem – Entering a Contract 
 
This structure could easily be extended to consider the possibility of an electricity 
market price shock at some point after the contract decision, which would affect the 
revenue from any non-contracted sale of electricity (use of gas). There are various 
possible causes of such a price shock, such as the outage of a major rival generation unit. 
Based on an x% chance that an event will occur to cause the electricity market prices 
will be significantly higher (a different macro-state) than normal from day 3 onwards, 
Figure 7.18 shows the appropriate branch diagram, for a subset of the horizon. 
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Figure 7.18 Expanded Branch Diagram for Gas Pipeline Management Problem 
 
7.3.3 Application 3: Thermal Generation Unit Commitment Problem  
 
The final application that we will discuss very briefly here relates to a thermal 
generation unit commitment problem under a deregulated market structure. The decision 
nodes would in each period relate to the decision of whether to switch the unit state 
(from on to off, or vice versa). The macro-states would therefore be the state of the unit, 
and could either take a very simple on/off form, or they could be more complex, and 
consider minimum up and down times, and shut-down and start-up phases. In many of 
the states of the more complex alternative, there would be no decision for the operator to 
make, as the behaviour/decision is implied by the state of the unit. In this problem, the 
DP states could represent fuel reservoir level (if it is a fuel-constrained thermal station), 
and/or previous price level or RD curve (if market correlation is being considered). 
Chapter 9 expands on this idea significantly, and presents the formulation for this 
problem. 
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7.4 Application of the DADP Framework to the Electricity Offer 
Optimisation Problem  
 
Let us now consider the application of the DADP framework to the offer optimisation 
problem faced by hydro generators in an electricity market, and addressed in this thesis. 
In Section 6.6, the RT algorithm that was presented can be thought of as representing the 
simple situation where there is only one macro-state in each period, but many system 
states associated with this macro-state, representing all the possible residual demand 
curves that could possibly occur within the period. Typically, the real-world can be 
approximately represented by this type of branched structure, and thus, the system states 
(or RD curves) can be combined into groups that could only occur under certain macro-
states. As such, there is value in applying the DADP framework to this problem. In the 
remainder of this chapter, we will demonstrate how this framework could be applied, 
and describe the benefits of such an implementation.  
 
This section begins by briefly summarising the structure of the problem under a single 
macro-state structure, equivalent to the non-DADP framework presented in Section 6.6. 
The section goes on to consider how chance nodes and then decision nodes could be 
added on to this basic structure. 
 
7.4.1 Single Macro-State Structure 
 
The probabilities in the Markov chain on the left of Figure 7.19 represent the probability 
that if RD curve A has occurred in period t, then RD curve B will occur in period (t+1), 
assuming just four possible RD curves per period. The UMS that the generator would 
face in period (t+1), given that they had observed RD curve 3 in period t is shown on the 
right of this figure. 
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Figure 7.19 Markov Chain Interpretation 
 
The overall process of the RT phase is shown in Figure 7.20, where there is a single 
Markov chain between the possible RD curves in each consecutive period, and the 
algorithm works backwards through the horizon (as indicated by the red arrow) 
determining the optimal decision (offer) under each combination of market and reservoir 
states, at each of these periods. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.20 Current Market Uncertainty Structure 
 
Under the DADP framework proposed in this chapter, the algorithm still works 
backwards through the horizon, but there is a separate Markov chain along each branch 
connecting macro-states in consecutive periods, as was demonstrated in Figure 7.5. The 
following two sub-sections of this chapter deal with chance and decision nodes, 
respectively. 
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7.4.2 Chance Nodes 
 
Chance nodes within the offer optimisation problem scenario could be used to represent 
a wide range of possible events in the marketplace over which the generator of interest 
has no control. These could include: 
 
- Weather Events43 
- Interconnector binding status 
- Rival breakdowns 
- Initiation of rival offering strategies (aggressive or defensive, or maybe as a 
result of a change in the plant operator). These may be placed at the start of 
strategic periods, such as the start or end of peak and off-peak phases. 
- General or rival-specific reservoir level indicators 
- Demand shocks/realisation of errors in forecasted demand 
 
Related to the last point, one possible idea for sourcing the RD curves to be used in each 
period under each probability branch macro-state is to base them purely on uncertainty 
in the rest-of-market supply curves, while assuming that the demand component of RD 
is fixed. This assumption is reasonable in a short-term model such as this, as good 
demand forecasting models are available in the literature (as reviewed, for example, in 
Fatai, Oxley, & Scrimgeour (2003)). If there were some potential external shock that 
could affect these forecasts significantly, then this could be covered through the use of 
the branch structure. 
 
Figure 7.21 demonstrates a very simple example of the new structure, where in period 3 
there is a chance that the HVDC link (an interconnector with a major effect on the 
residual situation faced by this generator) will become binding for the remainder of the 
short horizon (a captivating macro-state). Note that only a subset of the planning horizon 
                                                 
43 While weather events will directly affect demand, they may also affect contractual positions of a 
generator. In other words, through their retail-side interests, they may be contracted to provide all 
electricity demanded by their customers at a fixed price. However, the level of this demand is stochastic, 
and highly subject to weather events. 
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is shown, and these macro-states are captivating, rather than absorbing. Also, we make 
no assumption with respect to the end-of-horizon value curves; they may either be 
different under each macro-state, or the same. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.21 Probability Node Example 
 
Mathematically, the key adjustment that needs to be made to the generic description of 
the DADP framework for chance nodes, in order to apply this framework to the offering 
problem, is to recognise that at each node, there is an expected value curve defining the 
total value of water for the remaining horizon from each level in the reservoir, as 
opposed to just a single expected value at these points. As such, the notation must be 
modified and expanded slightly. 
 
r = Reservoir level index, from 0 to maxR , where maxR  is the maximum 
reservoir level index. 
trlki ,,,,θ = Offer in period t, given a starting reservoir level index r and given that 
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( )trlkitjEP ,,,,, θ  =  Expected payoff to the generator within period t for the offer trlki ,,,,θ , 
given that RD curve index j occurs 
trkiEV ,,, =  Expected value from the beginning of period t onwards, given previous 
RD curve index i, which is associated with macro-state k, and given a 
starting reservoir level of r  
trkiEMV ,,, =  Expected marginal value at the beginning of period t, given previous RD 
curve index i, which is associated with macro-state k, from a reservoir 
level of r. It is the expected marginal value curves that are used to 
construct the marginal opportunity cost (MOC) curves on which offers 
for the previous period are based. 
tinfl  = Expected hydro inflow in period t 
44 
 
The expected value for a given reservoir level at a particular node and given a previous 
RD curve (system state) is calculated using Equation 7.1. 
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Equation 7.1 Expected Value Calculation for a Given State under a Chance Node 
 
The expected marginal value curve is then calculated as a simple difference between 
consecutive points on the expected value curve, as shown in Equation 7.2. 
 
                                                 
44 Note that it is straightforward to extend this to model stochastic inflows, rather than a simple expected 
inflow level for each period. The results presented in Chapter 8 are based on a model that considers 
stochastic inflows. 
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Equation 7.2 Expected Marginal Value Calculation under a Chance Node 
 
Note that in practice, a value curve is produced first for all macro-states based on 
expected current and future values for the optimal offer from each reservoir level. A 
marginal value curve is then produced, calculated as the derivative of this value curve. 
The expected marginal value curve is calculated finally as a simple weighted average of 
these marginal value curves, based on the lkm ,  probabilities. 
 
7.4.3 Decision Nodes 
 
Decision nodes within the offer optimisation problem scenario could be used to 
represent a wide range of possible decisions over which the generator of interest has 
control, other than the specific offers themselves (which are the second level of 
decisions, made after the branch decision has been resolved). These could include: 
 
-  Unit start-ups or shut-downs 
- Contracting Decisions 
- Decisions regarding other offering units under the generator’s control 
- General offering strategy decisions (e.g. aggressive versus conservative, etc) 
 
With regard to this last point, this implies that decision nodes can effectively be used to 
model the expected reactions of rivals to changes in this generator’s behaviour. In other 
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words, if we shift our strategy, then this changes our expectations about the supply 
curves that other generators may provide to the market and thus our expectations on the 
possible RD curves that we may face. A separate branch could be created, associated 
with each of the alternative set of expected rival reactions. 
 
Figure 7.22 demonstrates a very simple example of the new structure, where there is a 
decision to be made in periods 3, 4 and 5 regarding whether the generator should embark 
on an aggressive (high-priced) or defensive (low-price) offering strategy, from the 
existing moderate strategy (neither are captivating macro-states – the generator is free to 
switch to the other strategy at any time45). The decisions would be defined by the 
generator itself and probably correspond to regions of the offering space through which 
offers under the given strategy are permitted to pass. For each state (as defined by 
reservoir level and previous RD curve) in period 3, the algorithm compares: 
 
1) The payoff of the optimal aggressive offer within this period plus the expected 
future value down the upper branch, with 
2) The payoff of the optimal defensive offer within this period plus the expected 
future value down the lower branch 
 
The higher of these two values implies the decision to be made from this state, and 
provides the value from that point. Note that in this example, the macro-states are 
absorbing at the end of the horizon, and thus have a potentially different end-of-horizon 
value curve associated with each. 
 
                                                 
45 Note that this example essentially assumes that rivals have no extended memory of previous behaviour, 
as we consider there to be no difference in a generator’s market expectations once they reach a particular 
macro-state, based on the macro-state path that they followed to reach that point.  
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Figure 7.22 Decision Node Example 
 
As with chance nodes, the key adjustment that needs to be made to the generic 
description of the DADP framework for decision nodes is to recognise that we have a 
value curve at each node, rather than just a single value. The new expected value for a 
given reservoir level at a particular node and given a previous RD curve (system state) is 
calculated using: 
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This equation recognises that the decision the generator makes regarding macro-state 
transition will depend on both the reservoir level and the previous RD curve observed. 
 
Note that in practice, a value curve is produced first for all macro-states based on 
expected current and future values for the optimal offer from each reservoir level. The 
expected value curve defined above is then produced at the source node of these macro-
states, by taking the maximum value down each of the possible macro-states that could 
be chosen. Finally an expected marginal value curve is produced as a simple difference 
between consecutive points on the expected value curve, as shown in Equation 7.3. 
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Equation 7.3 Expected Marginal Value Calculation under a Chance Node 
 
It is this expected marginal value curve from which the marginal opportunity cost curves 
are produced for the previous period, on which offers are based. 
 
7.5 Comparison of the DADP Framework with Alternative Approaches  
 
In this section, we consider the alternatives with respect to representing and dealing with 
a system that inherently contains a branching type structure and can thus be identified at 
any given point in time as being in one of a limited number of macro-states. Clearly, the 
two basic options are to consider this branched structure explicitly, or to ignore it and 
apply an approximation. The DADP approach that we have suggested in this chapter 
considers the structure explicitly, and it is important to recognise that this explicit 
representation could also be achieved through the use of a (possibly very large) 
Markovian Decision Process (MDP) matrix, covering all periods in the horizon. The 
main conceptual differences between this Structured MDP, and a basic MDP 
representation would be that the latter assumes that transfer probabilities and decision 
rules are constant over time, and that the system loop through the same set of possible 
states indefinitely. This means that once the decisions for all states have been 
determined, so that combined with the uncertain system outcomes, they define transition 
probabilities between any possible pair of system state, the representation simplifies 
from a MDP to a (possibly very large) stationary Markov Chain in which all states are 
recurrent. These stationary/recurrent assumptions are not made with the DADP 
representation, and the corresponding MDP, and eventual optimal Markov Chain, would 
be non-stationary, and include both transient and (possibly) recurrent states and sub-
chains, along with what we have termed “captivating” sub-chains. Techniques exist to 
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analyse Markov Chains with such structures, albeit in a somewhat ad hoc fashion, and 
one could imagine applying such techniques, iteratively, to determine the optimal 
decision strategy for the MDP, and hence the optimal Markov Chain representation. But 
the point is that, at least if they are to be efficient, such techniques need to account for 
and exploit the specific structure of the MDP and, in the limit, the hybrid DADP 
technique we have proposed is simply the logical expression of such an efficiently 
structured technique.   
 
Thus, there is no point discussing a “comparison” between our DADP approach and a 
large structured MDP representation. The former is merely a practical way of solving the 
latter.46 The real issue is whether there is anything to be gained by representing and 
analysing whatever natural structure may exist in this way, or more exactly whether the 
gains to be made by attempting such a representation can be justified in terms of the 
increased effort, or whether, perhaps better value might be delivered by, say, adopting a 
more fine-grained, but unstructured, representation. Thus, for example, an Unstructured 
stationary Markov Chain could be constructed to represent the uncertain system state 
transitions over the horizon, considering the same overall set of possible system (micro-) 
states as the Structured MDP, but ignoring any macro-state structure which may exist. 
And such a representation could be refined by increasing the number of states modelled, 
and/or allowing transition probabilities to vary over time. Such an approach would be 
consistent with both the algorithm developed in Chapter 6 and the R&A algorithm. 
 
In this section we will compare this type of unstructured MDP approach with the 
structured MDP/DADP framework set forward in this chapter, with respect to the 
representation of the real-world structure, data construction and data management issues, 
and the complexity of the algorithms needed to represent these approaches. 
 
                                                 
46 Note that, in all of our examples, the MDP is not stationary, because load levels, and hence generation, 
vary over time. The underlying Markov Chain describing market state transitions has been assumed to be 
stationary, though. But, while this simplifies the notation and reduces the data requirements, neither the 
R&A algorithm, nor any of ours, actually require this assumption.  
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Representation of Real-World Structure and Data Construction 
 
 
As described above, a Structured MDP representation would be capable of the same 
structural representation of the system as could be achieved by the DADP Framework. 
On the other hand, by ignoring the specific structure, an Unstructured MDP would result 
in a different, and more detailed data collection and construction process than the 
Structured MDP. 
 
There are two possible ways in which this data construction could occur: bottom-up or 
top-down. A bottom-up approach would take information about all possible macro-states 
of the market and determine what the possible RD curves might look like in each of 
these macro-states. A top-down approach would use historical RD curve data to forecast 
an overall set of possible RD curves for each period of the horizon. If the former 
approach were applied, then the RD curves would automatically be grouped according 
to macro-states, and thus no extra effort is required in order to get them into this form. 
However, if the latter approach is applied, then further effort is needed to break these 
RD curves down into groups associated with each macro-state, using a method such as 
that presented in Hernaez et al. (2004). In this case, a more accurate real-world 
representation would come at the cost of increased data construction effort. With respect 
to estimation of transfer probabilities, the number of probabilities to be estimated has the 
potential to be substantially lower under the Structured MDP and DADP Framework 
approaches, compared with the Unstructured MDP, given the same total number of 
possible RD curves. The reason for this is that the structured methods eliminate 
consideration of a large number of possible RD curve transfers between consecutive 
periods. 
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It is our belief that, if the real-world can reasonably be represented by a branched 
structure, then the quality of the solution achieved can, in principle, be improved by 
recognising this structure, as in the Structured DADP Framework. However, if the 
underlying branched structure is weak or non-existent, then the unstructured algorithm 
presented in Chapter 6 may well be sufficient. Therefore, the decision as to the choice of 
approach in any given scenario will be dependent on the strength of the underlying 
branched structure.  
 
Data Management 
 
We have noted earlier that, while the underlying Markov Chain describing market state 
transitions has been assumed to be stationary, neither the R&A algorithm, nor any of 
ours, actually require this assumption.  Thus there is no reason why those algorithms can 
not cope with situations where probabilities change with time, per se. Conversely, we 
have also noted that the Markov chain probabilities should not change in response to 
actual dispatch results, as these outcomes are already built into the Markov chain. 
However, it is also possible that the Markov chain should change in response to changes 
in expected market supply and demand, if and when they occur. These changes may be 
exogenous changes that can be observed by a generator (such as break-downs, etc), or 
they may be changes to our expectations of events occurring as a result of observing pre-
dispatch market outcomes. 
 
Under the DADP framework, chance nodes and macro-states could be used to represent 
the probabilities of events such as these occurring. When new probabilistic information 
becomes available, then this would involve changing just the probabilities in the high-
level macro-state transition Markov chain (the lkm ,  terms), as shown in Figure 7.4, and 
hence the probability of any particular lower-level Markov chain occurring.  But this 
would not necessarily imply a need to change the probabilities on the lower-level system 
state (or RD curve) transition Markov chains, per se. Computationally, the effect of this 
would be simply to change the calculation of the EV curve at each node, as explained in 
Section 7.4.2. As such, this would be very simple to implement, whether the new 
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probabilities are produced by an outside decision (manual input from the user), or using 
some sort of Bayesian updating process.  
 
On the other hand, if an Unstructured SDP were used, then the branch probabilities of 
the underlying system would be built into the system state transition probability 
matrices, and thus it is likely that many elements of these matrices would need to be 
changed. This would mean that the UMSs on which the offers are based would change, 
and so a whole new set of OCFs would need to be produced. Computationally, this is far 
more expensive than the effect on the same problem considered under the Structured 
MDP or the DADP framework. 
 
Also, as we move forward through the planning horizon, we are likely to be able to 
update our expectations of macro-state transition probabilities as a result of pre-dispatch 
outcomes and other information learned from the market far more easily under the 
Structured MDP or DADP framework approaches than under an Unstructured MDP 
approach. No simple analogous solution to this event would be available under an 
Unstructured SDP approach. In the limit, in the case of an event occurring which 
eliminates the whole set of system states associated with a given macro-state, then under 
the Structured MDP or DADP Framework approaches, this could be dealt with very 
simply by eliminating that set of system states from consideration.  
 
Algorithmic Complexity 
 
As we progress through the planning horizon, we will actually be able to observe the 
occurrence (or non-occurrence) of the events to which the chance nodes relate, and will 
know the decisions that we have made at past decision node. We have already noted the 
way in which this may simplify the task of updating data, but it also means that if the 
generator finds itself in a macro-state that has no way of transitioning to a particular 
macro-state in some future period, then there is no need to consider the decisions that 
would be made under this unreachable macro-state. Under a static end-of-horizon point, 
this would mean that the computational time of the RT phase would reduce dramatically 
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as time progresses, for the DADP algorithm, but not for the non-branched algorithm 
(which, as explained earlier, is unable to disregard this set of system states). A static 
end-of-horizon is a reasonable assumption in electricity markets such as that of New 
Zealand, as the final period for which offers must be provided, changes only once every 
24 hours. Of course, if a rolling horizon was used, then in each period, a whole new set 
of macro-states would open up for the new period considered, and therefore this 
computational benefit would be eliminated.  
 
The remainder of this section compares the likely computational efficiency of the DADP 
Framework, with the non-branched algorithm presented in Chapter 6 (which is 
equivalent to the Unstructured MDP approach).  
 
Under the DADP framework, the decisions at each node consider only the RD curves 
that could occur under the associated macro-state, which reflects the overall position that 
the market is in at that point. Under the non-branched algorithm these macro-states are 
not distinguished, and hence all the possible RD curves under each of these macro-states 
must be considered simultaneously, rather than separately. This simplification means 
that computational time increases much more slowly under the DADP algorithm as the 
total number of RD curves (or system states) considered increases, in both phases of the 
two-phase algorithms. Alternatively stated, for the same computational resource, this 
method is able to consider a more detailed representation of the possible residual 
scenarios that might be faced. More detailed computational complexity comparisons are 
presented in Sections 7.6.2 and 7.7.2. 
 
7.6 Offer Optimisation Problem: Pre-Processing Phase under DADP 
Framework 
 
In this section, we present a flow diagram representing the PP Phase algorithm under the 
DADP framework and identify the computational complexity of the algorithm. 
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7.6.1 The Pre-Processing Phase Algorithm under Branch Structure 
 
Figure 7.23 presents the PP Phase at a very high-level, where the additional components 
of the algorithm are highlighted. In the non-branched algorithm, we defined a term p as 
the total number of possible RD curves per period. Assuming that under the DADP 
framework, all macro-states have the same number of possible RD curves, we define: 
 
b = Number of macro-states per period 
P = Number of RD curves per macro-state 
 
Note that: 
 
 p = bP 
 
Therefore, although there is now an extra loop to the algorithm, the total number of 
times that we iterate through the core components is unchanged. It is the computational 
complexity of those components themselves that will determine the change in 
computational complexity of the branched algorithm as a whole. Note that the PP phase 
is the same regardless of whether the DADP structure contains decision or chance nodes.  
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Figure 7.23 PP Phase Flow Diagram 
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7.6.2 Computational Complexity of the Pre-Processing Phase under Branch Structure 
 
From the source code for the PP Phase under the DADP framework, we can show that 
the new computational complexity can be approximately summarised by Equation 7.4. 
 
222222 875.08613667.0214811 tbMdPPtbMPtbMdtbMdPdtbPtbPPtbdPtbtb ++++++++
 
Equation 7.4 Computational Complexity of the Branched PP Phase in Full 
 
Simplifying this down to the terms of the largest orders of magnitude, we can see that 
the algorithm is of order of the complexity shown in Equation 7.5. 
 
22MdtbP  
 
Equation 7.5 Order of Computational Complexity for Branched PP Phase 
 
Substitute p = bP to give Equation 7.6. 
 
b
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Equation 7.6 Comparable Computational Complexity for Branched PP Phase 
 
In Section 7.5, we discussed the fact that if the real world can be represented by a 
branched structure, we can choose to recognise this structure (through the DADP 
Framework), or ignore it, and apply an approximation, as represented by the non-
branched algorithm presented in Chapter 6. Let us now compare the computational 
requirements of the two alternative approaches. Recall the simplified version of 
Equation 6.2 from Chapter 6: 
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Equation 6.2 Order of Computational Complexity for PP Phase 
 
Note that the order of complexity for the PP Phase algorithm under the DADP 
framework is 
b
1  that of the non-branched algorithm47. Consider a simple numerical 
example with 24 periods, 30 fixed MC levels, 20 possible dispatch levels, starting with a 
single branch of 10 RD curves and a computational time of x, and then increasing to 
consider 40 RD curves (either split equally over four branches, or grouped all together 
for the branched and non-branched algorithms respectively). From the equations above 
we would expect the computational time for the non-branched algorithm would increase 
to 16x, while the computational time for the branched algorithm should increase to only 
4x.  
 
In other words, if we hold the number of RD curves under each macro-state constant, the 
computational time for the PP phase under the DADP framework will increase only 
linearly in the number of macro-states that we have. However, under the non-branched 
algorithm, computational time would increase quadratically with respect to the total 
number of RD curves. 
 
7.7 Offer Optimisation Problem Real-Time Phase under DADP Framework 
 
In this section, we present a flow diagram representing the RT Phase algorithm under 
the DADP framework and identify the computational complexity of the algorithm. 
 
                                                 
47 Note that this factor is also achieved if the full complexity equations are compared, as the coefficients of 
the terms in the two equations are very similar. 
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7.7.1 The Real-Time Phase Algorithm under Branch Structure 
 
Figure 7.24 presents the RT Phase algorithms at a very high-level, where the additional 
components of the algorithm are highlighted (assuming the Value Curve approach 
presented in Section 6.6.1, rather than the Direct MV Curve approach – where the 
adjustments to the algorithm would be the same as presented in Figure 6.11). 
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Figure 7.24 RT Phase Flow Diagram (Value Curve Approach) 
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7.7.2 Computational Complexity of the Real-Time Phase under Branch Structure 
 
From the source code for the RT Phase for the DADP framework (assuming chance 
nodes), we can show that the new computational complexity for the Value Curve and 
Direct MV curve approaches can be approximately summarised by Equation 7.7 and 
Equation 7.8, respectively. 
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Equation 7.7 Computational Complexity of the Branched RT Phase Value Curve Approach in Full 
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Equation 7.8 Computational Complexity of the Branched RT Phase Direct MV Curve Approach in 
Full 
 
 
Simplifying these down to the terms of the largest orders of magnitude, we can see that 
both algorithms are of order of complexity shown in Equation 7.9. 
 
rdtbPtbPMdrPtbrtbP +++ 22  
 
Equation 7.9 Order of Computational Complexity for Branched RT Phase 
 
Substitute p = bP to give Equation 7.10. 
 
( ) tpMddbPtpr +++  
 
Equation 7.10 Comparable Computational Complexity for Branched RT Phase 
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Recall again that in Section 7.5, we discussed the fact that if the real world can be 
represented by a branched structure, we can choose to recognise this structure (through 
the DADP Framework), or ignore it, and apply an approximation, as represented by the 
non-branched algorithm presented in Chapter 6. We can compare the computational 
requirements for the RT phase of the two alternative approaches. Recall the simplified 
version of Equation 6.3 from Chapter 6. 
 
( ) tpMddptpr ++  
 
Equation 6.3 Order of Computational Complexity for RT Phase Value Curve Approach 
 
Note that the orders of complexity for the RT phase under the DADP framework and 
under the non-branched approach are quite similar. The only difference (other than 
coefficients and minor terms) is that one of the components of the complexity order 
expression has simplified from p to (P+b). Generally speaking, ( ) bPpbP =≤+ . For 
example, if there were four macro-states of ten RD curves each, then p = 40, while 
(P+b) = 14. 
 
As we discussed in Section 6.6, the majority of time spent in the RT Phase can be 
attributed to the process of finding the value of the proposed offers. Under each UMS, 
for each reservoir level, the intersection between the proposed offer and each of the 
possible RD curves for that UMS is found. If there are non-zero transition probabilities 
between all possible macro-states between two consecutive periods, this means that the 
number of intersections that need to be found will be unchanged. However, if there are 
some zero transition probabilities, this means that we do not need to consider a UMS 
along the associated branch, thus reducing computational effort. This was demonstrated 
in more detail in Section 7.2.5. 
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7.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we have presented a new approach to dynamic programming, which 
incorporates a decision analysis or branching tree type structure to the possible macro-
states that a system can be in at any point in time. We have presented this DADP 
framework in a very general manner and suggested that it has a wide range of possible 
applications, both within the electricity market and beyond. We have then presented the 
application of this framework to the main issue of this thesis, electricity market offer 
optimisation strategies. The key benefit of this new technique is that it potentially 
enables much more accurate representation of the uncertainty and decision making 
processes that occur in the real world. In addition, with respect to the application in the 
offer optimisation problem, we have shown that when there are only chance nodes, there 
are additional computational benefits compared with an alternate approximate algorithm, 
as presented in Chapter 6. 
 
The next chapter presents results of experiments on both two-phase algorithms (value 
curve and direct MV curve), with chance nodes, compared with the R&A algorithm. We 
consider only chance nodes for these comparisons because the R&A algorithm cannot 
deal with the complexity related to the future impact of current decisions. 
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Chapter 8  
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND RESULTS 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapters of this thesis, we have proposed two two-phase electricity 
generator offer construction algorithms and hypothesised that they will produce similar 
results to the model presented in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003) with respect to expected 
payoffs over the planning horizon, but with substantially reduced computational 
requirements. The reason for these hypotheses was that they are essentially three 
different approaches to the same problem, but the algorithms have vastly different 
complexities. In this chapter we describe an experimental design to test these hypotheses 
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and to investigate the value of including the various complexities considered within 
these models, and then present the results of the experiments.  
 
8.2 Experimental Design 
 
There is a need for a formal experimental design to test the hypotheses on the relative 
quality and efficiency of the various algorithms considered in this chapter, for two 
reasons: 
 
1) We want to explore how the values of various parameters that describe a 
particular problem scenario’s size or nature affect the two measures of algorithm 
performance (algorithm speed and solution quality). 
2) The conclusions need to be justified statistically. 
 
Here, we present a design based on suggestions in Rardin & Uzsoy (2001). Although the 
paper is targeted at experimental design for heuristic optimisation algorithms, the 
techniques are equally applicable to the DP optimisation approach presented in this 
thesis. The terminology used throughout this chapter is that proposed in Rardin & Uzsoy 
(2001). 
 
8.2.1 Problem Parameters 
 
There are seven parameters that describe the size and nature of a particular problem 
scenario. These are the: 
 
1) Number of periods in the horizon 
2) Number of reservoir levels 
3) Number of possible dispatch levels 
4) Number of residual demand curves per period 
5) Number of possible inflow levels in each period 
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6) Type of transition probability structure to have (i.e. whether the Markov chain 
should be highly or loosely correlated). 
7) Type of residual demand curve structure to have (i.e. nominal data relating to the 
type of shapes that the residual demand curves have). 
 
The first five parameters are numeric and thus describe the size of the problem, whereas 
the last two are qualitative and describe the nature of the correlation and RD curve 
structure used in the problem. 
 
8.2.2 Outline of Experimental Design 
 
Unfortunately, there is no library of problems available for testing the performance of 
the algorithms presented in this thesis. As such, we must design a set of problems with 
various possible characteristics, in order to cover a broad range of the problem domain. 
Therefore, we use the following definition: 
 
Instance: a given set of values for the seven model parameters.  
 
An instance, however, does not fully define a problem ‘scenario’, as the transition 
probabilities between macro-states, the exact form and shape of the residual demand 
curves, the Markov chains indicating correlation between market outcomes in 
consecutive periods, and the end-of-horizon value curve are randomly constructed 
within the general restrictions implied by the values of the last two parameters. The 
specific ‘scenarios’ tested are therefore referred to as replicates. The definition we will 
use is: 
 
Replicate: an actual set of model inputs defining all facets of the scenario faced. We 
could produce infinite replicates for a given instance if we desired, based on different 
random number seeds.  
 
 294
Our specific design is the commonly used full-factorial approach, where all algorithms 
are run on replicates representing all instances. In particular, we submit the same 
replicates to all algorithms, utilising an approach known as blocking. 
 
Number of Replicates 
 
Rardin & Uzsoy (2001) states that at least three replicates sharing each parameter 
combination are needed to get a reasonable idea of algorithm robustness. We have 
chosen to test five replicates for each instance, where possible48, in order to trade off 
between increased confidence in algorithm robustness and computational resource 
restrictions. 
 
Model Process 
 
For a single replicate and single algorithm implementation, successive trials can produce 
quite different outcomes because of the impact of random choices along the way. As 
such, several runs need to be made, with different random number seeds controlling the 
evolution of computation, to get a sense of the robustness of the procedure (Rardin & 
Uzsoy (2001)). 
 
To evaluate a given algorithm for a replicate we carry out the following: 
 
1) An optimisation is performed, which determines the optimal offer to provide for 
each situation throughout the horizon (market states, reservoir level state, etc).  
2) A simulation is performed, consisting of 1000 runs49, where each run is a 
randomly created series of market and inflow outcomes for the planning horizon. 
Again using blocking, the same series of outcomes is applied to each of the 
                                                 
48 Except for two of the algorithms tested, where we used just a single replicate. The reasoning behind this 
is explained in Section 8.4 and Section 8.5. 
49 We have chosen 1000 runs as it is sufficiently large such that the percentage deviations from the 
optimal payoff under perfect information for each of the iterations forms an approximately normal 
distribution. 
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algorithms, and the expected value for each algorithm under the given replicate 
is the mean of the payoffs achieved under the 1000 runs. 
Simulation 
 
Rather than the real-time dynamic program expected payoff, a simulation is used to 
measure the solution quality performance of the various algorithms, for two reasons. 
1) Simulating these results gives us a distribution of payoffs that could occur under 
various demand and inflow scenarios, rather than just a single value, and hence 
we are able to analyse the results in a more in-depth manner. Such a distribution 
is an important feature of risk management within a generation company, as it 
enables them to identify worst case scenarios, variation of possible outcomes, 
etc. 
2) We want to be able to determine the relative optimality of our results for 
different modelling assumptions. Because of the stochastic nature of the results, 
we need to have actual scenarios of market and inflow outcomes in order to 
determine optimal values and hence relative optimality. 
 
Of course, the expected value from the dynamic program is equal to the long-run 
expected value from the simulation. 
 
Algorithm Performance Measures 
 
There are two measures of algorithm performance that must be considered. These are: 
 
1) Algorithm speed 
2) Solution quality 
 
Measures of Algorithm Speed 
 
The main comparisons made throughout this chapter on algorithm speed will be based 
on the solving time required in the Real-Time phases of the various algorithms 
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proposed. This is the fairest comparison, as it is what determines whether a particular 
algorithm could be used in a real-life generator offering situation. The average Pre-
Processing phase times50 will also be reported in this chapter but, as explained in 
Section 6.4, these need only be performed once for the whole horizon (rather than each 
period), and can be completed in advance.  
 
Note that all model runs and simulations are performed on an Intel Pentium 4 3.20GHz 
machine, with 1 GB of RAM. 
 
Measures of Solution Quality 
 
As stated earlier, the value taken initially to represent the performance of a particular 
algorithm on a particular replicate is the mean of the expected payoffs over 1000 
simulation runs. As each of these simulation runs represents a deterministic set of 
market and inflow outcomes over the horizon, the optimal payoff that could have been 
achieved under each of these paths under this perfect information (or hindsight) scenario 
can be determined. In order to measure a solution quality we therefore use the mean 
percentage difference between the algorithm performance and the optimal payoff. This 
is a preferable measure for two reasons: 
 
1) It standardises results, and as such, overall results will not be affected by the 
magnitude of the profit that can be achieved under each replicate.  
2) It provides an absolute measure of performance, enabling a comparison with an 
optimal solution, rather than just a relative measure of performance against 
alternative algorithms. 
 
                                                 
50 Note that the PP phase is identical for both of the two-phase approaches. 
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Algorithm Analysis and Comparison Methods 
 
In order to determine the statistical significance of various parameters (including the 
algorithm used) on the solution quality, we have followed a two-stage process, using the 
statistical package MINITAB. The two stagers are: 
 
1) Performed a General Linear Model (GLM) ANOVA on the datasets, including 
the approach and all input parameters individually, in addition to interaction 
variables for the combination of each of the input parameters with the 
approach51. 
2) Performed Bonferroni Multiple Comparison Significance Tests and produced 
Bonferroni Confidence Intervals on all individual and interaction ANOVA 
variables which appeared as significant in the GLM ANOVA. 
 
When the GLM ANOVA has identified a factor (such as the approach used) as 
significant, we can not be sure52 whether this is caused by: 
 
a) A single value of that factor producing a significantly different performance 
measure. For example, computational time being significantly less under a 
particular technique A than under the other techniques B and C, which are not 
statistically significantly different from one another.  
 
Or 
 
b) Multiple values of that factor producing a significantly different performance 
measure. For example, computational time being significantly less under a 
particular technique A than under another technique B, which, which in turn is 
significantly less than the computational time under the remaining technique C. 
 
                                                 
51 Note that for each run of the GLM ANOVA in this chapter, I removed the insignificant factors and re-
solved the model, but there was no change to the significance of the remaining factors. 
52 Harraway (1997) 
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We have performed a GLM ANOVA rather than a Balanced ANOVA because under a 
GLM ANOVA, it is possible to perform multiple comparison tests (such as Tukey or 
Bonferroni), which are not possible under the Balanced Model. We need these multiple 
comparison tests in order to distinguish between the two causes of significant factors (a 
and b) identified above, while ensuring that the probability of incorrectly rejecting the 
null hypothesis for any of the comparisons in the family does not exceed α (Harraway 
(1997)). 
 
We have chosen to use Bonferroni Multiple Comparison Tests (as opposed to 
alternatives such as Tukey, etc) in order to produce the most conservative results 
regarding the significance of variables. Conservatism, in this context, means that the true 
family-wise error rate is less than the stated one. We produce both Bonferroni 
Significance Tests and Confidence Intervals because the significance tests easily show 
whether a factor (or an interaction) is statistically significant, while the confidence 
intervals give a better indication of whether a factor is practically significant (Rardin & 
Uzsoy (2001)).  
 
To determine statistical significance in the computational time differences between the 
Value Curve approach and the various alternative offering approaches, we have used 
simple paired comparison t-tests. This is because ANOVA ignores the fact that the 
samples are paired, and thus overestimates the variance in the datasets. 
 
Note that a level of significance of α = 0.05 is assumed throughout the analysis in this 
chapter. 
 
8.2.3 Instances Used For Simulations 
 
As listed in Section 8.2.1, there are seven parameters that define the size and nature of a 
particular problem scenario, or instance. In order to cover a broad range of the problem 
domain, we have selected two values for each of the first 6 parameters, and five values 
for the RD curve type parameter, and produced instances based on every possible 
 299
combination of these parameters ( 32025 6 =× instances). As stated earlier, five 
replicates were then created randomly based on each of these instances, producing an 
overall total of 1600 replicates on which the models could be tested and compared, 
covering a large area of the problem domain. The values of these parameters that were 
used are shown in Table 8.1. 
 
Parameter Levels 
1. Number of Periods 20, 40 
2. Number of Reservoir Levels 100, 300 (0-99 and 0-299 MWh) 
3. Number of Dispatch Levels 20, 40 (0-19 and 0-39 MW/period) 
4. Number of Residual Demand Curves per Period 25 (over 5 macro-states), 100 (over 
10 macro-states) 
5. Number of Possible Inflow levels per Period 1, 5 (both with an expected inflow 
level of 4 MWh/period) 
6. Transition Correlation type Loose, Strong 
7. RD Curve Structure type Single Similar, Single Different, 
Branch Different, Naturally 
Monotone, Stepped 
 
Table 8.1 Parameter Values Used 
 
Note the following definitions of the RD Curve Structure types: 
 
Single Similar: All RD curves under all macro-states are of the same general shape, that 
being slightly convex. 
 
Single Different: Within each macro-state, the RD curves are randomly selected to be 
either 1) Slightly convex, 2) Strongly convex, 3) Concave, 4) Linear 
 
Branch Different: Each macro-state has a different type of RD curve, selected from 1) 
Convex, 2) Concave, 3) Linear and Steep, 4) Linear and Flat, 5) Stepped 
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Naturally Monotone: The possible RD curves within each macro-state run parallel to one 
another within the range of minimum and maximum possible prices. In Section 4.3, it 
was shown that under such a structure, the optimal offer was able to be theoretically 
determined and would be naturally monotone. As such, we would expect that under this 
RD structure, we could achieve very close to optimal results, despite the stochasticity in 
the market outcomes. 
 
Stepped: The possible RD curves under all macro-states take a stepped form, which 
recognises that if you hold back generation, then in some cases, it can lead to a large 
jump in the market clearing price. It also recognises the convex shape that the market 
supply curve is generally considered to take. Such recognition of market power makes 
this the most realistic kind of RD curve to use.  
 
In setting the parameter values of Table 8.1, many factors were taken into account, such 
as the ability to: 
 
1) Produce realistically-sized and scaled instances across the problem domain. 
2) Produce instances that demonstrate a range of market dominance levels. 
3) Produce instances that are able to be solved in realistic times (for testing 
purposes) under all algorithms on the computers available (P4, 3.2GHz). 
4) Produce instances that are able to be solved and simulated, given the memory 
restrictions of the computers available (1GB RAM). 
5) Produce instances that represent a variety of types of offering patterns from rival 
generators. 
 
These considerations of scaling and reality of instances were dealt with in the following 
ways: 
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1. Number of Periods 
 
In the New Zealand market, the number of future periods that a generator is able to 
provide offers for at any given time ranges from 24 to 72 periods, depending on the time 
of day. For simplicity, we have used rounded values of 20 and 40 periods. We have 
chosen relatively short horizons to enable us to solve instances with greater values for 
the other parameters in the time that we have had available. The results will not be 
significantly different from those that we would find over longer horizons, for two 
reasons: 
 
- We know from the computational complexity formulations in Section 6.6.5 that 
solving time will increase linearly as the number of periods increases. 
- We know that the possible market outcomes towards the end of the horizon don’t 
have as much of an effect on our behaviour now, as more impending periods do, 
because we are much more uncertain about these market outcomes in the 
relatively distant future53,54.  
 
2, 3. Number of Reservoir Levels and Dispatch Levels 
 
Due to computer memory restrictions and the large computational time required under 
the R&A approach, we chose to set our parameter values for the number of reservoir 
levels and number of dispatch levels to reflect small to medium sized (up to 40MW) 
generating units (hydro and coal) and reservoirs. Note, however, that the Value Curve 
approach developed in this thesis is capable of handling much bigger scenarios than 
those considered in the experimental design. This is demonstrated in Section 8.8.  
 
The reservoir levels that we have chosen are set such that, allowing for inflows, a 
generator running at full capacity could empty its small to medium sized reservoir 
                                                 
53 Note that the level of certainty that we have about these outcomes decreases gradually as the horizon 
extends, and as such there is no specific cut-off point after which we don’t need to consider possible 
outcomes. It is a subjective decision. 
54 Note also that an alternative set of horizon lengths might have been 24 and 48 periods, enabling us to 
cover one and two price cycles, respectively, as demonstrated in Figure 8.1. 
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within 12 to 24 hours. This is comparable to reservoirs found in New Zealand, such as 
those on the Waikato River, operated by Mighty River Power. Note that, most 
importantly, the expected inflows and reservoir sizes were set (in most cases) to create 
scenarios where sufficient fuel would be available to enable offering patterns to emerge 
that would produce non-zero release levels in most periods. However, a small number of 
the cases do consider the extreme situations of water shortage or surplus water, as would 
periodically be observed in a real hydro system. The focus is not on these types of 
situations, though, as the short term optimal offering strategy would generally be a 
straightforward decision in these cases (i.e. reduce or increase release as much as 
possible).  
 
4. Number of Residual Demand Curves per Period 
 
The number of RD curves to consider per period, and the number of macro-states on 
which to place them, would be completely up to a generator, who is using the model, to 
determine. This decision would be based on the data available to the generator, and their 
belief regarding the reliability of that data to predict future outcomes. We selected the 
values of 25 and 100 RD curves per period, as we believe that this represents a range of 
possible numbers of market scenarios a generating firm could estimate, without 
performing in-depth research into the topic. 
 
The instances that we use all reflect an underlying world in which the branched macro-
state structure of information and macro-states exists, as presented in Section 7.2. 
Because the R&A algorithm ignores this information, we include in Section 8.4 a 
comparison between that algorithm and the VC algorithm presented in Section 6.6, 
which ignores the branched structure. This provides the most direct comparison between 
the two approaches, while our concurrent analysis of the VC algorithm under the DADP 
framework with branching and macro-states shows how capitalising on such an 
underlying real-world structure can further improve the performance of the model.  
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5. Number of Possible Inflow levels per Period 
 
Inflow levels are likely to be well known or easy to predict over the short-term horizon 
that is considered by this offering model. As such, we have considered only the case of 
inflow certainty (with a value of 4 MW/period) and the case of five possible inflow 
levels (with values of 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 MW/period). The issue of the expected inflow 
levels is addressed in the reservoir size section above. 
 
6. Transition Correlation type 
 
As with the number of RD curves per period, the level of correlation between market 
outcomes in consecutive periods is a highly subjective measure, and should be set based 
on the data available to a generator using this model and according to their beliefs about 
the future. As such, we have considered two possible broadly-defined levels of 
correlation, those being “weak” (stability factor 1) and “strong” (stability factor 5). The 
probabilities and RD curves are structured such that we consider a shift between RD 
curves with similar indices to be more likely than a shift between RD curves with highly 
different indices. A stability factor of 1 implies that transitions are almost completely 
random, while a stability factor of 5 implies that a RD curve with the same index in the 
following period is approximately 5 times more likely to occur than a RD curve with an 
index with a difference of one (which in turn is approximately 5 times more likely than a 
RD curve with an index with a difference of two, and so on). 
 
7. RD Curve Structure type 
 
The five RD curve structure types that we have considered under this experimental 
design cover a broad range of possibilities that could occur, with respect to offering 
patterns of rival generators and demand fluctuations. From observing market offers, we 
believe the most likely shape of the RD curves faced by a generator to be either convex 
or stepped, reflecting the fact that most of the time, the price will be relatively low, but 
is subject to sharp price spikes which can be created and exploited by generators with 
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market power. These shapes are reflected in the five RD curve structure types described 
above, which also account for other less-likely possibilities. Note that stepped RD 
curves produce the highest levels of market power, followed by convex RD curves. At 
the other extreme, flat linear RD curves provide the least market power (as holding back 
generation has little effect on the market clearing price). 
 
An additional factor built into the replicates was to account for the relative peakiness of 
periods throughout the horizon. This was done by providing a weighting factor to each 
period, such that the height and position of the RD curves reflect whether the period is a 
peak or an off-peak period. These weighting factors are shown for 40 periods, in Figure 
8.1. 
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Figure 8.1 Peakiness Factors for 40 Periods 
 
The actual price ranges used for the RD curves was taken from approximate price ranges 
for electricity at the three reference nodes of Haywards, Benmore, and Otahuhu in New 
Zealand, from the beginning of February 2000 to the end of June 200355.  
 
The final consideration with respect to the data construction that needed to be 
considered was with respect to the reservoir cycle as the price (or RD curve) level cycles 
                                                 
55 http://www.comitfree.co.nz/fta/ftapage.main, 31/8/03 
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through peak and off-peak periods in the short-term. We would expect that the reservoir 
level would be approximately a quarter-phase out of sync with price levels. In other 
words, the reservoir level should reach its peak level as the price is in the shoulder-peak 
zone heading into the peak period (e.g. period 6 in Figure 8.2), and it should reach its 
lowest levels as the price is in the shoulder-peak zone heading out of the peak period 
(e.g. period 18). The reason for this is that the generator would desire to maximise 
release between these two periods, when price is at its highest, and to minimise release 
in other periods, when price is at its lowest. 
 
For all instances, we have assumed that the generator is starting in a relatively off-peak 
period, where the reservoir level is relatively near to full (as shown in Figure 8.2 – note 
that we have assumed that the reservoir begins completely full for simplicity). Under 
both the 20 and 40 period instances, the figure shows that the horizon is ending on 
shoulder peak periods, and as such we would expect the reservoir level to be near its 
lowest point in the cycle. As such, the end-of-horizon value curves (or marginal value 
curves) have been constructed to ensure that this reality is reflected in the test instances, 
and thus that the net result over both horizon lengths is that the reservoir level is being 
run down from a high level to a low level. 
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Figure 8.2 Reservoir Cycle Factors for 40 Periods 
 
Note that many of the model inputs described in this section have been produced 
randomly, based on the various parameters defined, or arbitrarily. The construction and 
prediction of realistic market-data based data is beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
reason for this exclusion is two-fold. Firstly, for much of this information, a generation 
company would be far better placed to construct realistic data. Secondly, other 
researchers have performed work on predicting and grouping together information such 
as RD curves and macro-state probabilities (although for much different purposes). For 
example, Hernaez et al. (2004) uses clustering and artificial neural network techniques 
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to group together historical RD curve types, providing a good basis for prediction of 
future possible RD curves. 
 
8.3 Simulation Model 
 
For a given replicate, the simulation model begins by producing 1000 schedules of 
possible residual demand and inflow scenarios for the horizon, based on the probabilistic 
information available. The model then takes the set of optimal offers (i.e. offers for all 
possible states throughout the horizon) for the given algorithm being considered, and 
simulates forward through the horizon, to obtain 1000 point estimates of the profit that 
would be achieved under the given scenario (or of percentage deviation from the optimal 
profit). Specifically, the logical process and order of events simulated is as follows: 
 
a) Start out with knowledge of the MDF (uncertain market scenario) that we expect 
for the coming period (most likely based on the RD curve that occurred in the 
previous period, and on the macro-state that we are currently in) 
b) Identify the optimal offer for this period based on that MDF and the current 
reservoir level. 
c) Observe the RD outcome for this period, the inflow for the period, and the 
outcome of the event that defines which macro-state we will be in for the next 
period. The RD, combined with the offer determines our dispatch level and 
combined with the observed inflow will provide our new reservoir level. 
d) Identify the MDF that we are expecting in the next period, based on the macro-
state we are in and the previous RD that occurred. 
e) Repeat b-d for all periods until the end of the horizon 
 
Figure 8.3 demonstrates this process, showing where steps a-d listed above are applied. 
Note that under the R&A algorithm and the VC algorithm without branching, this 
process is simplified to ignore the different possible branches or macro-states. 
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Figure 8.3 Simulated Event Process 
 
8.4 Comparison between Full Complexity Algorithms without Branching 
 
This section of the thesis compares the results of the simulation from two algorithms 
considering the same complexities and with the same modelling assumptions. They are: 
 
1. The Rajaraman and Alvarado Offer Construction Algorithm 
2. The Value Curve Approach Offer Construction Algorithm ignoring branched, 
macro-state structure 
 
Both these algorithms make the modelling assumption that there is no underlying 
branched, macro-state structure to the real-world. The first algorithm is simply that 
described in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003), while the second is the Two-Phase Value 
Curve approach without branching, described in Section 6.6. 
 
The results used in this section relate to only a single replicate for each of the 320 
instances. To solve all 1600 replicates under these algorithms would have been 
a) 
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impractical, due to their long computational times, but the 320 replicates actually used 
still provide good coverage of the problem domain and is more than sufficient to prove 
the results presented. All relevant MINITAB output regarding computational times on 
the two models being compared can be found in Appendix D, while solution quality 
information can be found in Appendix E. 
 
8.4.1 Algorithm Speed Comparison 
 
A comparison between the overall mean computational times for the two models under 
the 320 replicates described above is shown in Table 8.2. 
 
Model Mean Computational Time (seconds) 
R&A Approach56 80,324 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 99 
  
PP Phase57 (not branched) 4578 
 
Table 8.2 Mean Computational Times 
 
We can see that Real-Time phase of the Value Curve approach without branching 
requires far less computational time than the R&A Model, although the PP phase for this 
approach is still relatively slow. Specifically, on average, using the Value Curve 
approach saved 99.7% of the Real-Time computational time required by the R&A 
approach. In other words, the computational time for the R&A approach is on average 
554.3 times that required for the Value Curve approach without branching, as 
demonstrated in Figure 8.458. 
                                                 
56 Note that the R&A algorithm had been programmed as it is reported in Rajaraman & Alvarado (2003). 
This is to enable the best possible comparison between the approaches presented in this thesis and that 
presented in the referenced paper. 
57 Note that this PP Phase is required to be performed once in the horizon for the VC (branched and non-
branched) and DMVC approaches, but not the R&A approach. 
58 Note that under all 320 replicates tested, the computational time is smaller for the Value Curve 
approach than it is for the Direct MV Curve approach, which in turn is less than that for the R&A 
approach. 
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Figure 8.4 Histogram of Relative Computational Time for R&A Approach vs VC Approach 
 
Recall that the instances being considered here correspond to small to medium sized 
generating units and reservoirs. For larger scenarios, the computational time savings 
would be even more substantial, as the computational complexity of the R&A algorithm 
increases at a much faster rate than the Value Curve approach without branching. For 
example, the largest instance took 851,506 seconds (9 days, 20.5 hours) to solve under 
the R&A approach, but just 538 seconds under the Value Curve approach; a saving of 
99.94%. In a half hour offer based system, such as that found in New Zealand, this 
computational time for the Value Curve approach is fast enough to be used in real time. 
However, the computational time of almost 10 days under the R&A approach is clearly 
not practical. 
 
Table 8.3 presents a two-way break-down of mean computational times by approach and 
parameter value. The shaded regions represent factors that do not have a statistically and 
practically significant effect on the computational times (approach held constant), while 
the un-shaded regions represent factors that are both statistically and practically 
significant. The statistical significance of these factors has been shown using paired 
554.3 
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comparison tests, and is presented in Appendix D. The shading practice used in this 
table is repeated in the equivalent tables in Sections 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 of this chapter. 
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Approach Mean Computational Times 
(seconds) Value Curve (without branching) R&A 
   
Number of Periods    
20  60 53709 
40  138 106939 
   
Number of Reservoir Levels   
100  59 38303 
300  138 122344 
   
Number of Dispatch Levels   
20  72 25439 
40  126 135208 
   
Number of RD Curves    
25  30 9391 
100  168 151256 
     
Number of Inflows    
1  101 76548 
5  97 84100 
     
Spread Type    
Weak  102 80108 
Strong  96 80539 
     
RD Type    
Single Similar  98 82744 
Single Different  89 87745 
Branch Different  95 75595 
Naturally Monotone  89 74906 
Stepped  124 80628 
   
Overall Mean  99 80324 
Overall Worst  933 883565 
Overall Best  7 882 
 
Table 8.3 Mean Computational Times broken down by Factor and Approach 
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To summarise, Table 8.3 contains many pieces of statistically and practically significant 
information, which confirm our expectations of computational complexity presented in 
Section 6.4. For example: 
 
- Computational time appears linear in number of periods for both approaches 
(Figure 8.5a). 
- Computational time appears to be less than linear in number of reservoirs for the 
Value Curve approach, but more than linear for the R&A approach (Figure 8.5b). 
- Computational time is approximately linear in the number of dispatch levels 
under the Value Curve approach, but substantially more than linear under the 
R&A approach (Figure 8.5c). 
- Computational time is less than quadratic in the number of RD curves per period 
under the Value Curve approach, but approximately quadratic under the R&A 
approach (Figure 8.5d). 
- The difference between the overall mean computational times for the two 
techniques is statistically significant. 
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Figure 8.5 Effect on Mean Computational Time of the Parameters under each Model 
 
8.4.2 Solution Quality Comparison 
 
As reported in Section 6.7, we would expect that the two-phase approaches developed in 
this thesis would perform moderately better than the R&A approach with respect to 
mean percentage error in payoff under some RD curve structures, and significantly 
better under others. A comparison between these mean errors in payoff for the R&A and 
Value Curve approach without branching under the 320 replicates described earlier is 
shown in Table 8.4.  
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Model Mean Percentage Error (%) 
Value Curve Approach without Branching 1.681 
R&A Approach 4.983 
 
Table 8.4 Mean Percentage Error Comparison: R&A vs Value Curve Approach without Branching 
 
On an aggregate basis, we can see that the Value Curve approach without branching 
performs substantially better than the R&A approach. Table 8.5 presents a two-way 
breakdown of mean percentage error by approach and parameter value. Un-shaded 
regions again represent factors that are both statistically and practically significant, for 
the given approach. Note that for RD type, where there are five possible parameter 
values, summary figures with matching groups in brackets are not statistically different 
from one another. For example, under the R&A approach, the mean percentage error 
from “Single Different” and “Naturally Monotone” are not different from one another at 
a statistically significant level (because they are both in group ‘a’, but the mean 
percentage error for “Branch Different” RD curves is statistically different (and worse) 
from both of these RD types (as it is in group ‘b’). The shading and grouping practice 
used in this table is repeated in the equivalent tables in Sections 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 of this 
chapter. The statistical significance of the un-shaded factors has been shown using a 
general linear ANOVA model along with Bonferroni comparison tests, and is presented 
in Appendix E. 
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Approach Mean Percentage Error 
Value Curve without Branching R & A 
      
Number of Periods    
20  1.789 5.125 
40  1.573 4.841 
     
Number of Reservoir Levels   
100  1.952 5.581 
300  1.410 4.386 
     
Number of Dispatch Levels   
20  1.896 6.300 
40  1.466 3.666 
     
Number of RD Curves   
25  1.653 4.580 
100  1.709 5.386 
     
Number of Inflows    
1  1.524 4.813 
5  1.838 5.153 
     
Spread Type    
Weak  1.784 5.953 
Strong  1.578 4.013 
     
RD Type    
Single Similar  0.782 (a) 1.077 (a) 
Single Different  0.939 (a, b) 1.734 (a) 
Branch Different  2.074 (b) 5.376 (b) 
Naturally Monotone  1.157 (a, b) 1.248 (a) 
Stepped  3.453 (c) 15.480 (c) 
     
Overall Mean  1.681 4.983 
Overall Worst59  6.856 27.601 
Overall Best  0.000 0.098 
 
Table 8.5 Mean Percentage Errors broken down by Factor and Approach 
                                                 
59 Note that in just 23 or the 320 replicates, the DMVC approach performed better than the VC approach, 
with a maximum of only 0.03% closer to the optimal payoff. In the remaining 297 replicates, the VC 
approach performed better, with a maximum of 1.43% closer to the optimal payoff. 
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To summarise, Table 8.5 reveals the following interesting pieces of statistically and 
practically significant information: 
 
Number of Reservoir Levels and Number of Dispatch Levels 
 
Under the R&A approach, the mean percentage error is significantly less for instances 
with 300 reservoir levels, as opposed to those with 100 reservoir levels. This is because 
the instances with the lower available fuel over the horizon are more constrained and, as 
with any mathematical program, a tighter constraint will cause the solution quality to be 
the same or worse. For the same reason, the mean percentage error is significantly less 
for instances with 40 dispatch levels, as opposed to those with 20 dispatch levels, under 
the R&A approach. There is no statistically significant difference in mean percentage 
error under the Value Curve Approach without branching. 
 
Spread Type 
 
Under the R&A approach, the mean percentage error is lower (better) by almost 2% 
under strong correlation between market outcomes between periods, compared with 
weak correlation. This is because under a strong correlation, the generator has greater 
knowledge of what is going to happen in the future from any given current state, and as 
such can make better informed generation offers.  
 
Residual Demand Curve Type 
 
Figure 8.6 summarises the mean percentage error information in Table 8.5, broken down 
by RD curve structure. We can see that the performance is quite similar under all RD 
curve structures except “Branch Different” and in particular under “Stepped”, which 
performs significantly worse under both models. As explained in Section 8.2.3, this is 
the most realistic type of scenario. In particular, we note that the R&A approach 
performs especially poorly under this structure. The reason for this is that given the way 
the R&A algorithm was presented, it is possible for some payoffs to be overlooked, 
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particularly when RD curves have steep, stepped segments, as explained in Section 
6.7.1. 
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Figure 8.6 Mean Percentage Errors broken down by RD Curve Structure 
 
Finally, note also that the difference between the overall mean percentage error values of 
1.681% for the Value Curve approach without Branching and 4.983% for the R&A 
approach, presented in Table 8.5 is statistically significant. 
 
8.4.3 Summary of Full Complexity Algorithm Comparisons without Branching 
 
In this section of the chapter we have compared two approaches that consider the same 
complexities of the problem scenario and make the same assumption regarding the data 
not taking a branched form, but contain very different methods of dealing with them. 
Table 8.11 provides a summary of mean computational times and mean percentage 
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errors for both approaches, over the 320 replicates described at the beginning of this 
section. 
 
 Approach 
Value Curve 
without Branching 
R&A 
Approach
Mean (seconds) 99 80,324 Computational 
Time    vs VC Approach without Branching - Worse 
Mean Percentage Error 1.681 4.983 
   vs VC Approach without Branching - Worse 
Worst RD Curve Structure Stepped Stepped 
Mean Percentage Error under the 
Worst RD Curve Structure 
3.453 15.480 
Algorithm 
Performance 
Worst Case 6.856 27.601 
 
Table 8.6 Summary of Results for Full Complexity Algorithms 
 
We have shown that the Value Curve approach without branching is significantly 
superior to the R&A approach in terms of the expected payoff that can be achieved, 
particularly in the case of stepped RD curves, which we believe to be the most realistic 
case. We have also shown that it is significantly superior to the R&A approach in terms 
of computational time. The extent of this saving is such that we go from having a model 
that could only be solved in real time for very small and simplistic examples, to a model 
that can now be solved in real time for large problems that incorporate great amounts of 
complexity. Quite clearly, the Two-Phase Value Curve approach without branching is a 
preferable algorithm to the R&A approach. The following section of this chapter will 
investigate the further gains that can be made by considering that the real world can be 
approximately represented with a branched structure and thus applying the DADP 
framework developed in Chapter 7.  
 
Note also that another benefit of the two-phase approaches is that they provide MV and 
MC curves for all states throughout the horizon, hence providing less of a “black-box” 
solution than that provided by R&A. 
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8.5 Comparison between Full Complexity Algorithms with and without 
Branching 
 
In this section we compare, with respect to both solution quality and computational time, 
the Value Curve approach without branching (proven to be the best of the full 
complexity non-branching algorithms from Section 8.4) to the branched, macro-state 
version of the two Two-Phase algorithms developed in Chapter 7. Therefore, the three 
models for comparison are: 
 
1. The Value Curve Approach Offer Construction Algorithm ignoring branched 
structure 
2. The Value Curve Approach Offer Construction Algorithm considering branched 
structure (DADP framework)  
3. The Direct Marginal Value Curve Offer Construction Algorithm considering 
branched structure (DADP framework) 
 
The first algorithm makes the modelling assumption that there is no underlying 
branched, macro-state structure to the real-world, while the final two algorithms 
recognise that such a structure is recognised in the instances, and capitalise on this added 
information appropriately. All three algorithms are variations on the Two-Phase 
approach developed in this thesis and described in the preceding chapters. 
 
As in the previous section, the results used in this section relate to only a single replicate 
for each of the 320 instances. To solve all 1600 replicates under the DMVC approach 
would again have been impractical, due to the long computational times, while the 320 
replicates actually used continue to provide good coverage of the problem domain and 
are more than sufficient to prove the results presented. All relevant MINITAB output 
regarding computational times on the three models being compared can be found in 
Appendix F, while solution quality information can be found in Appendix G. 
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8.5.1 Algorithm Speed Comparison 
 
A comparison between the overall mean computational times for the three models under 
the 320 replicates described above is shown in Table 8.7. 
 
Model Mean Computational Time (seconds) 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 99 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 74 
Direct MV Curve Approach (branched) 999 
  
PP Phase (not branched) 4578 
PP Phase (branched) 235 
 
Table 8.7 Mean Computational Times 
 
We can see that the Real-Time phase of the Value Curve approach is substantially faster 
than the Direct MV Curve approach, whether or not branching is considered. 
Specifically, the computational time for the Direct MV Curve approach is on average 
12.1 times that required for the Value Curve approach, as demonstrated in Figure 8.7. 
We recognise that the computational complexities presented in Section 7.7.2 implied 
that these computational times should have been similar, and we leave for further 
research investigating the cause of this anomaly, and thus whether the implementation of 
the Direct MV Curve approach could be improved. 
 
Further, we can see that a 25% improvement in Real-Time computational requirements 
is achieved under the Value Curve approach by considering branching. The biggest 
effect of considering branching, though, is the 95% computational saving in the Pre-
Processing phase of the algorithm. 
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Figure 8.7 Histogram of Relative Computational Time for the Direct  MV Curve Approach vs VC 
Approach 
 
In Section 8.4, we noted that the largest instance took 538 seconds to solve the Real-
Time phase when branching was ignored. When we consider branching under the Value 
Curve approach, this instance takes just 295 seconds to solve, a further computational 
saving of 45.17%. 
 
Table 8.8 presents a two-way break-down of mean computational times by approach and 
parameter value. The statistical significance of the un-shaded factors has been shown 
using paired comparison t-tests, and is presented in Appendix F. Recall from Section 
8.4.2 that the comparisons are made between the parameter values within each 
technique, and that the letters after the figures under the RD Type break-down indicate 
groups that are statistically significantly different from one another. 
 
12.1 
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Approach Mean Computational Times 
(seconds) Value Curve 
without Branching 
Value Curve  
with Branching 
Direct MV 
Curve 
        
Number of Periods      
20  60 50 663 
40  138 99 1335 
      
Number of Reservoir Levels    
100  59 42 449 
300  138 106 1550 
      
Number of Dispatch Levels    
20  72 54 1131 
40  126 94 867 
      
Number of RD Curves     
25  30 29 235 
100  168 120 1764 
      
Number of Inflows     
1  101 76 978 
5  97 72 1021 
      
Spread Type     
Weak  102 74 992 
Strong  96 74 1007 
      
RD Type     
Single Similar  98 72 971 (b) 
Single Different  89 73 740 (a) 
Branch Different  95 76 971 (b) 
Naturally Monotone  89 74 743 (a) 
Stepped  124 76 1571 (c) 
      
Overall Mean  99 74 999 
Overall Worst  933 390 7148 
Overall Best  7 7 34 
 
Table 8.8 Mean Computational Times broken down by Factor and Approach 
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The results presented in Table 8.8 reveal very similar trends over all three models with 
respect to changing parameter values, where the computational times are lowest under 
the Value Curve approach with branching, one third slower under the Value Curve 
approach without branching, and substantially slower still under the Direct MV Curve 
approach. One difference of note though, is that the Direct MV Curve approach 
performs significantly worse under the stepped RD type than under any other type. A 
selection of the results are demonstrated in Figure 8.8, showing simple comparisons 
between the computational times of the three approaches. 
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Value Curve without Branching
Value Curve with Branching
Direct MV Curve
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Figure 8.8 Effect on Mean Computational Time of the Parameters under each Model 
 
Note also that the differences between the overall mean computational times for all three 
pairs of techniques are statistically significant. 
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8.5.2 Solution Quality Comparison 
 
As reported in Section 7.5, we would expect that the two-phase approaches with 
branching would perform moderately better than the Value Curve approach without 
branching, with respect to mean percentage error in payoff. A comparison between these 
mean errors in payoff for the three models under the 320 replicates described earlier is 
shown in Table 8.9.  
 
Model Mean Percentage Error (%) 
Value Curve Approach without Branching 1.681 
Value Curve Approach with Branching 1.300 
Direct MV Curve Approach 1.404 
 
Table 8.9 Mean Percentage Error Comparison: R&A vs Two-Phase Models 
 
On an aggregate basis, we can see that the Value Curve approach with branching 
performs marginally better than the Direct MV approach, which in turn performs 
marginally better than the Value Curve approach without branching. 
 
Table 8.10 presents a two-way breakdown of mean percentage error by approach and 
parameter value. The statistical significance of the un-shaded factors has been shown 
using a general linear ANOVA model along with Bonferroni comparison tests, and is 
presented in Appendix G. Again, the significance is calculated between the parameters, 
within each technique, rather than between the techniques. 
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Approach 
Mean Percentage Error Value Curve 
without Branching 
Value Curve with 
Branching 
Direct MV 
Curve 
       
Number of Periods     
20  1.789 1.313 1.417 
40  1.573 1.287 1.390 
      
Number of Reservoir Levels    
100  1.952 1.628 1.802 
300  1.410 0.972 1.005 
      
Number of Dispatch Levels    
20  1.896 1.338 1.405 
40  1.466 1.262 1.402 
      
Number of RD Curves    
25  1.653 1.252 1.365 
100  1.709 1.348 1.443 
      
Number of Inflows     
1  1.524 1.141 1.306 
5  1.838 1.459 1.501 
      
Spread Type     
Weak  1.784 1.368 1.442 
Strong  1.578 1.232 1.365 
      
RD Type     
Single Similar  0.782 (a) 0.565 (a) 0.671 (a) 
Single Different  0.939 (a) 0.742 (a, b) 0.912 (a, b) 
Branch Different  2.074 (b) 1.469 (c) 1.569 (c) 
Naturally Monotone  1.157 (a) 1.153 (b, c) 1.245 (b, c) 
Stepped  3.453 (c) 2.570 (d) 2.621 (d) 
      
Overall Mean  1.681 1.300 1.404 
Overall Worst60  6.856 5.601 5.598 
Overall Best  0.000 0.001 0.0001 
 
Table 8.10 Mean Percentage Errors broken down by Factor and Approach 
                                                 
60 Note that in just 23 or the 320 replicates, the DMVC approach performed better than the VC approach, 
with a maximum of only 0.03% closer to the optimal payoff. In the remaining 297 replicates, the VC 
approach performed better, with a maximum of 1.43% closer to the optimal payoff. 
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Table 8.10 reveals that only the RD Curve Type has a statistically and practically 
significant effect on the mean percentage error under these three models. 
 
Residual Demand Curve Type 
 
Figure 8.9 summarises the mean percentage error information in Table 8.10, broken 
down by RD curve structure. We can see that the performance is quite similar under all 
RD curve structures. The worst structure under all three approaches, though, is 
“Stepped”, which, as explained in Section 8.2.3, is the most realistic type of scenario. In 
addition, we can observe that the Value Curve approach with branching performs the 
best under all RD Curve types. 
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Figure 8.9 Mean Percentage Errors broken down by RD Curve Structure 
 
Note also that the differences between the overall mean percentage error values for each 
pair of these three approaches is statistically significant. 
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8.5.3 Summary of Full Complexity Algorithm Comparisons with and without 
Branching 
 
In this section of the chapter we have compared three approaches that consider the same 
complexities of the problem scenario, one of which ignores the underlying branched 
structure of the data, and two of which capitalise on this structure. Table 8.11 provides a 
summary of mean computational times and mean percentage errors for all three 
approaches, over the 320 replicates described at the beginning of this section. 
 
 
Approach 
Value 
Curve 
without 
Branching
Value 
Curve 
with 
Branching 
Direct     
MV 
Curve 
Mean (seconds) 99 74 999 Computational 
Time    vs VC Approach with Branching Worse - Worse 
Mean Percentage Error 1.681 1.300 1.404 
   vs VC Approach with Branching Worse - Worse 
Worst RD Curve Structure Stepped Stepped Stepped 
Mean Percentage Error under the 
Worst RD Curve Structure 
3.453 2.570 2.621 
Algorithm 
Performance 
Worst Case 6.856 5.601 5.598 
 
Table 8.11 Summary of Results for Full Complexity Algorithms 
 
We have shown that although the Direct MV Curve approach is nice analytically, 
practically the Value Curve approach performs marginally better in terms of percentage 
payoff error (when they both consider branching) and substantially better in terms of 
computational requirements. As the Value Curve approach is also easier to interpret, we 
will not consider the Direct MV Curve Approach in the remainder of this thesis. 
 
We have also shown that the Value Curve approach with branching is significantly 
superior to the same approach without branching with respect to both computational 
time and mean percentage error. 
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Given these comparisons, the Two-Phase Value Curve approach with branching is by far 
the best of the three algorithms discussed in this section when the real world can 
reasonably be approximated with a branched structure, and as such will be the only 
model considered in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
8.6 Comparison between the Full Complexity Algorithm and the Simplified 
Algorithms 
 
In this section we compare, with respect to both solution quality and computational time, 
the Value Curve approach with branching (proven to be the best of the full complexity 
algorithms from Section 8.5, and hereafter referred to simply as the Value Curve 
approach) to various alternative simplified algorithms. These algorithms are simplified 
in various ways, either changing the allowable form of offers, or by reducing the amount 
of available information that we actually consider when determining the choice of offer. 
The purpose of this is to establish if there is value in considering these various 
complexities, or alternatively, if the simplified approaches will provide solutions of 
similar quality in less computational time. 
 
Specifically, we consider five different modelling simplifications. 
 
1. Quantity-Based Offer Simplification 
 
This simplification requires that the offers provided to the market by the generator are 
quantity-based (similar to a Cournot-style game), rather than sculpted (as assumed by 
the three models considered in Section 8.4). In other words, the generator decides the 
quantity that they will be dispatched from any given system state, and the price is 
determined by the stochastic outcome of the market scenario. With such a simplification, 
the Two-Phase approach with offer patching can still be applied. The Pre-Processing 
Phase is greatly simplified, and thus far quicker to apply, while we would expect the 
Real-Time solving requirements to be very similar to that for the sculpted offer Two-
Phase Approach. 
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2. Price-Based Offer Simplification 
 
This simplification requires that the offers provided to the market by the generator are 
price-based (similar to a Bertrand-style game, but with a maximum quantity level). In 
other words, the generator decides the price that they will offer their maximum 
generation output to the market, and the quantity that they are actually dispatched is 
determined by the stochastic outcome of the market scenario.  
 
With such a simplification, the Two-Phase approach with offer patching can no longer 
be applied. The reason for this is that through patching, we would not end up with a 
single-price offer.  As such, the Price-Based Offer approach is really a different model to 
the Value Curve approach entirely, where all calculations are performed in a single 
phase (as they are for the R&A approach) at the expense of computational efficiency. 
Therefore, despite reduced complexity associated with this simplification, we would 
expect the real-time solving requirements to increase over the VC approach. 
 
3. Naïve Correlations Simplification 
 
This simplification ignores the correlation between market scenarios in consecutive 
periods, in addition to ignoring the branching structure of the problem along with the 
associated branch probabilities. The probabilities of each RD occurring in each period is 
therefore established in advance, and is defined to be independent of any other market 
events or scenarios that occur61. The result of this simplification is that the state-space of 
                                                 
61 To produce these RD curve probabilities, the first step is to work through from the start of the horizon 
and establish the probability of being in each branch at each period. We then produce the average 
probabilities for each RD on a given branch, calculated as shown in the table below. Finally, we multiply 
these RD probabilities by the probability of reaching that branch. This is shown in the table below. 
 
RD Transition 
Probabilities 1 2 3 4 
1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 
2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 
3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0 Previous RD 
4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Averages 0.225 0.225 0.250 0.300 
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the DP model becomes one-dimensional (as there is no longer a need to consider the 
previous RD curve observed). A simplified Two-Phase Model can be applied with this 
simplification, where we would expect the solving times in both phases to be 
significantly reduced as a result of the reduced number of dimensions in the DP. 
 
4. Naïve Water Simplification 
 
This simplification is to completely ignore the reservoir level when determining offers. 
In Chapter 3 we demonstrated how this would adversely affect our outcomes in simple 
deterministic cases, but we extend this here to show how our model can be used to 
demonstrate that the effect is just as bad in more complex, stochastic scenarios. The 
effect of this simplification is that we consider the marginal cost to be zero over the 
entire feasible generating range, regardless of the reservoir level state. If we were to run 
this in a DP, we would not need to store the Value or MV curves at any point, as the 
offers would be based simply on the uncertain market scenarios. For the purposes of this 
study, we have not actually produced a separate DP model for this scenario. Rather, we 
have simply applied the Pre-Processed offers for a marginal cost of zero, at all states and 
times, and as such, the solving time required is zero. 
 
We know from simple mathematical programming theory that the optimal expected 
payoff achievable in any problem situation must either stay the same or decrease if 
additional constraints are added to the scenario. This is exactly what is occurring if we 
require the offers to be purely quantity-based or price-based, rather than sculpted. We 
know this because each of these feasible offer sets form a subset of the feasible sculpted 
offers, as illustrated by Figure 8.10. 
 
5. Perfect Competitor Simplification 
 
The final simplification is to assume that the generator considers themselves to be a 
perfect competitor, and thus unable to affect the market clearing price. As such, the 
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optimal offer is simply to provide electricity at the generator’s marginal cost, which is 
determined by the marginal value curve. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.10 Feasible Offer Sets 
 
Assuming that the information available to be used is accurate, we can expect that when 
a decision does not use all available information, the expected payoff will again be 
lower (at least in the long-run). Both the Naïve Correlations and Naïve Water 
simplifications are based on such a reduction in information. 
 
Note that all of these simplified approaches, other than the Naïve Correlation approach, 
assume that the real-world can reasonably be represented by a branched structure, and 
thus apply this structure. 
 
The results used throughout this section relate to all 1600 replicates described in Section 
8.2.3. All relevant MINITAB output regarding computational times for the five 
approaches (the four described above, plus the Value Curve approach) can be found in 
Appendix H, while output regarding solution quality is located in Appendix I. 
 
Feasible Sculpted Offers 
Feasible 
Quantity-Based 
Offers
Feasible  
Price-Based 
Offers
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8.6.1 Algorithm Speed Comparison 
 
A comparison between the overall mean computational times for the five models over 
the 1600 replicates described in Section 8.2.3 is shown in Table 8.12. 
 
Model Mean Computational Time 
(seconds) 
Value Curve Approach 52 
Quantity-Based Offers 52 
Price-Based Offers 410 
Naïve Correlation Approach 1.4 
Naïve Water Approach  0 
Perfectly Competitive Approach 50 
  
PP Phase – Value Curve Approach 131 
PP Phase – Quantity-Based Offers 56 
PP Phase – Naïve Correlation Approach 17 
 
Table 8.12 Mean Computational Times 
 
We can see that the mean computational times for the Quantity-Based Offers and 
Perfectly Competitive approaches are very similar to that for the Value Curve approach, 
and any differences would certainly not be practically significant62. However, the mean 
computational time for the Naïve Correlation approach is extremely small (due to the 
reduced dimension of the DP), at just 3% of that required for the Value Curve approach, 
while the mean computational time for the Price-Based Offers is substantially larger, at 
almost eight times that required for the Value Curve approach. Table 8.13 presents a 
two-way break-down of average computation times by approach and parameter value. 
We can see that under the factors that do present both a practical and a statistical 
significance (un-shaded), the effects are very similar under all approaches, and thus the 
                                                 
62 With respect to spread of computational times, note that the standard deviations for the three approaches 
are similar, and the worst case scenario was far worse under the Quantity-Based Offers and Perfectly 
Competitive approaches, than under the Value Curve approach (as presented in Table 8.13). 
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analysis would be very similar to that presented in Section 8.5.1, and so is not repeated 
here. 
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Approach 
Mean Computation 
Times (seconds) Value 
Curve
Quantity-
Based 
Offers 
Price-
Based 
Offers 
Naïve 
Correlation 
Approach 
Naïve 
Water 
Approach 
Perfectly 
Competitive 
Approach 
              
Number of Periods         
20 38 38 318 1 0 36 
40 66 66 501 2 0 65 
Number of Reservoir 
Levels       
100 33 31 211 1 0 32 
300 72 73 608 2 0 69 
Number of Dispatch 
Levels       
20 37 37 329 1 0 37 
40 68 68 490 2 0 64 
Number of RD Curves       
25 30 30 196 1 0 27 
100 74 75 623 2 0 73 
Number of Inflows       
1 51 51 413 1 0 47 
5 53 53 406 1 0 53 
Spread Type       
Weak 52 52 409 1 0 51 
Strong 52 53 410 1 0 50 
RD Type       
Single Similar 51 51 466 1 0 53 
Single Different 51 50 442 1 0 51 
Branch Different 54 55 416 1 0 54 
Naturally Monotone 52 52 421 1 0 47 
Stepped 53 53 303 1 0 47 
        
Overall Mean 52 52 410 1 0 50 
Overall Worst 390 633 9992 11 0 959 
Overall Best 6 5 31 0 0 5 
 
Table 8.13 Mean Computational Times broken down by Factor and Approach 
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Note that the differences between the overall mean computational times for all possible 
pairs of techniques (other than those between the Value Curve, Quantity-Based Offers, 
and Perfectly Competitive approaches) are statistically significant. 
 
8.6.2 Solution Quality Comparison 
 
Overall, we would expect that the Value Curve approach developed in this thesis would 
perform better than each of the simplified algorithms with respect to mean percentage 
error in payoff, due to the reasons regarding increased constraint or reduced information 
levels, explained earlier in this section. A comparison between these mean errors in 
payoff for the Value Curve approach and the five simplified algorithms under the 1600 
replicates is shown in Table 8.14.  
 
Model Mean Percentage Error (%) 
Value Curve Approach 1.186 
Quantity-Based Offers 4.132 
Price-Based Offers 2.304 
Naïve Correlation Approach 3.080 
Naïve Water Approach  36.009 
Perfectly Competitive Approach 9.393 
 
Table 8.14 Mean Percentage Error Comparison: Value Curve approach vs Simplified Algorithms 
 
On an aggregate basis, we can see that the Value Curve approach performs substantially 
better than all of the simplified algorithms, as would be expected. All of these 
differences are statistically significant, according to the Bonferroni tests presented in the 
appendices. 
 
Table 8.15 presents a two-way breakdown of mean percentage error by approach and 
parameter value, showing how the approaches perform under different groupings of 
instances. Un-shaded regions again represent factors that are both statistically and 
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practically significant. The blue shading is used under the RD type parameter to signify 
approaches whose performance is not significantly different to the Value Curve 
approach, under each given RD curve type. 
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Approach 
Mean Percentage Error Value 
Curve 
Quantity-
Based 
Offers 
Price-
Based 
Offers 
Naïve 
Correlation 
Approach 
Naïve 
Water 
Approach 
Perfectly 
Competitive 
Approach 
Number of Periods           
20   1.109 3.494 2.246 2.640 36.174 7.717 
40   1.262 4.771 2.362 3.520 35.843 11.070 
Number of Reservoir 
Levels         
100   1.588 5.317 3.099 4.032 35.636 11.814 
300   0.784 2.948 1.509 2.128 36.381 6.973 
Number of Dispatch 
Levels         
20   1.129 4.320 2.053 3.224 31.379 10.484 
40   1.242 3.944 2.555 2.935 40.638 8.303 
Number of RD 
Curves         
25   1.194 4.117 2.307 2.963 36.069 9.507 
100   1.177 4.148 2.301 3.197 35.948 9.280 
Number of Inflows         
1   0.823 3.747 2.054 2.834 35.816 8.994 
5   1.549 4.517 2.554 3.326 36.201 9.793 
Spread Type         
Weak   1.117 5.443 2.214 2.910 36.501 8.905 
Strong   1.254 2.822 2.394 3.250 35.516 9.882 
RD Type         
Single Similar   0.688 0.825 (c) 0.973 (a,b) 1.090 (c) 47.627 (b) 5.848 (d) 
Single Different   0.993 3.284 (b) 2.611 (b) 1.783 (b,c) 45.551 (c) 2.461 (e) 
Branch Different   1.825 2.431 (b) 2.313 (b,c) 3.146 (b) 51.396 (a) 7.543 (c) 
Naturally Monotone   1.686 7.790 (a) 4.801 (a) 1.768 (b,c) 31.843 (d) 11.387 (b) 
Stepped   0.737 6.333 (a) 0.822 (c) 7.614 (a) 3.626 (e) 19.727 (a) 
Overall Mean   1.186 4.132 2.304 3.080 36.009 9.393 
Overall Worst   5.601 25.455 10.935 22.390 67.860 50.829 
Overall Best   0.001 0.071 0.075 0.018 0.038 0.419 
 
Table 8.15 Mean Percentage Errors broken down by Factor and Approach 
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Some of the significant information presented in Table 8.15 is consistent with that 
analysed in Section 8.5.2, and so we will not repeat the analysis here63. Below we will 
highlight some new insights from Table 8.15. Note that the differences between the 
overall mean percentage error values for each pair of these six approaches is statistically 
significant. 
 
Number of Periods 
 
Table 8.15 shows us that under the Value Curve, Price-Based Offer and Naïve Water 
approaches, there is no statistically significant difference between the mean percentage 
errors with respect to the number of periods in the horizon. For the remaining 
approaches, the mean percentage error is greater for the instances with a longer planning 
horizon. The reason for this is that with more periods, all else held constant, available 
generation capacity must be used more sparingly. This results in a higher marginal value 
of fuel available and hence the cost of non-optimality in the offering policy is greater. 
 
Number of Reservoir Levels and Number of Dispatch Levels 
 
Under all approaches other than the VC and Naïve Water, the mean percentage error is 
significantly higher in the replicates with only 100 reservoir levels. This is because 
under the scaling of these instances, the cases with the smaller reservoir require much 
greater conservation of fuel resources (i.e. a greater constraint), and as such it is more 
difficult to achieve a close-to-optimal result64. Likewise, regarding the number of 
dispatch levels, the instances that have a lower maximum generation level are more 
constrained and as such, a greater mean percentage error results. 
 
                                                 
63 Note, however, that under the Value Curve approach with 1600 replicates shown here, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the mean percentage errors of the different RD types. This is 
different from the smaller sample of 320 replicates, as shown in Table 8.10. The 320 replicate sample was 
not large enough to recognise this lack of significant difference between the groups. 
64 Note that similarly, the percentage error will be higher under scenarios with lower expected inflows of 
the horizon. 
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Residual Demand Curve Type 
 
Table 8.15 shows us that under all five RD curve types, the Value Curve approach 
performs at least as well if not better than all five other approaches, with respect to mean 
percentage error in payoff, consistent with our expectations from the beginning of this 
section (recall that differences with the VC approach that are not statistically significant 
are highlighted in blue). The worst mean percentage error for the Value Curve approach, 
of 1.825%, corresponds to the “Branch Different” RD curve type. While each of the 
other approaches work very well on certain RD curve types, each of them also works 
particularly poorly on other RD types. These relative performances are detailed below: 
 
Quantity-Based Offers: 
 
Although the Quantity-Based offer approach performs very well on the “Single Similar” 
RD curve type (with a mean percentage error of just 0.8255), it performs particularly 
poorly under “Naturally Monotone” RD curve types (mean percentage error of 7.790%) 
and under the “Stepped” RD curve type (mean percentage error of 6.333%), which we 
believe to be the most realistic RD curve type. The worst case percentage errors over the 
1600 instances for these two RD curve types were 25.455% and 24.125% error 
respectively. 
 
Price-Based Offers: 
 
The Price-Based offer approach has a statistically significant difference in performance 
with the VC approach under only the “Single Different” and “Naturally Monotone” RD 
curve types. The worst performance was in the “Naturally Monotone” cases, with a 
mean percentage error of 4.801%, and the worst-case percentage error under this RD 
curve type was 10.935%. 
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Naïve Correlation Approach: 
 
The Naïve Correlation approach performs particularly poorly under the “Stepped” RD 
curve type, with a mean percentage error of 7.614%. The worst-case percentage error 
under this RD curve type was 22.390%. Under all other RD curve types, there was no 
statistically significant difference in performance with the VC approach. 
 
Naïve Water Approach: 
 
Because the Naïve Water approach is so simplistic, it performs very poorly over most 
RD curve types, with an overall mean percentage error of 36.009%. The only RD curve 
type under which this approach performs well is the “Stepped” RD curves, with a mean 
percentage error of just 3.626%. The reason for this is that under the “Stepped” RD 
curve type, the optimal decision is generally to restrict generation output in order to 
produce higher market clearing prices. The effect of this is to naturally conserve fuel, 
reducing the marginal value of this fuel, and thus bringing it closer to the marginal value 
of zero implicit in the Naïve Water approach. The worst-case percentage error under all 
RD curve types for this approach was 67.860%. 
 
Perfectly Competitive Approach: 
 
The Perfectly Competitive approach has a relatively high overall mean percentage error, 
of 9.393%. The difference between mean percentage errors for the Value Curve 
approach and the Perfectly Competitive approach can be attributed to market power. The 
Perfectly Competitive approach performs particularly poorly under the “Stepped” RD 
curve type (mean percentage error of 19.727%). The reason for this high percentage is 
that under the “Stepped” RD curve type, the optimal behaviour is generally to restrict 
output, thus exerting the market power which the Perfectly Competitive approach 
assumes the generator is unable to exert, and thus ignores. The worst-case percentage 
error under this RD curve type was 50.829%. 
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Figure 8.11 summarises the mean percentage error information in Table 8.15, broken 
down by RD curve structure. It can clearly be seen that the Value Curve approach 
performs better, on average, than each of the other approaches, under all RD curve 
structures. 
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Figure 8.11 Mean Percentage Errors broken down by RD Curve Structure 
 
8.6.2.1 Reasons for the Differences between Performance of Value Curve and 
Simplified Algorithms 
 
In this section, we explore the reasons for the (sometimes substantial) differences 
between the quality of the solutions produced by the simplified algorithms considered 
above when compared to the Value Curve approach, using specific examples from the 
1600 replicates on which the analysis has been performed. 
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Quantity-Based Offers: 
 
We know that the Value Curve approach can trade off between the likelihood of each 
RD occurring, and thus create a sculpted offer that has relatively good outcomes under 
each RD curve that could occur in a given scenario. However, under the Quantity-Based 
Offer approach, we must determine the fixed quantity that will be dispatched, regardless 
of the RD curve that occurs. Therefore, under middling RD curve outcomes, the offer 
may perform acceptably, but under very high or very low RD curves, it is likely to do 
poorly.  
 
Figure 8.12 demonstrates a possible set of offers for period 12. This replicate has a 
“Single Different” RD curve, and as such, there are a wide variety of RD curves 
positioned all over the offering space. The figure shows a scenario where the RD curve 
is relatively low. Point (a) indicates the optimal dispatch point in this period under 
perfect information, while points (b) and (c) indicate the dispatch points under the Value 
Curve and Quantity-Based Offer approaches respectively. Observe that the offer from 
the Value Curve approach results in a dispatch (and price) quite close to that which 
should be chosen under perfect information, while the dispatch under the Quantity-
Based Offer approach is much greater (and price much lower). 
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Figure 8.12 Offers for Value Curve and Quantity-Based Offer Approaches – Low RD 
 
On the other hand, Figure 8.13 shows the scenario in period 14 of the same replicate, 
where the RD curve is relatively high. The offer from the Value Curve approach again 
results in dispatch (and price) very close to that which should be chosen under perfect 
information, while the dispatch under the Quantity-Based Offer approach is now much 
lower (and price much higher). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.13 Offers for Value Curve and Quantity-Based Offer Approaches – High RD 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(b) 
(c) (a) 
 346
Price-Based Offers: 
 
As in the Quantity-Based Offer approach, offers under the Price-Based approach must 
trade-off between the likelihood of various RD curves occurring, and provide the best 
compromise price level to offer.  
 
Figure 8.14 and Figure 8.15 demonstrate possible sets of offers for periods 16 and 8, 
under a new replicate, where the RD outcomes are low and high, respectively. Point (c) 
now indicates the dispatch point under the Price-Based Offer approach. Observe that the 
offer from the Value Curve approach yet again results in dispatch (and price) very close 
to that which should be chosen under perfect information, for both these periods. 
However, when using the Price-Based Offer approach, under a low RD, dispatch is 
much lower (and price much higher) than the desired point, and under a high RD, 
dispatch is much higher (and price much lower) than the desired point. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.14 Offers for Value Curve and Price-Based Offer Approaches – Low RD 
 
(c) 
(b) 
(a) 
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Figure 8.15 Offers for Value Curve and Price-Based Offer Approaches – High RD 
 
Naïve Correlation Approach: 
 
Under the Value Curve approach, when it comes time to make the offer on the coming 
period, we know which branch (or group of possible RD curves) we are on and so have a 
specific type (or subset) of RD curves to consider. On the other hand, if we use the 
Naïve Correlation approach, we do not know which branch we are on when it comes to 
making an offer for a period, and hence a much larger number of possible RD curves (or 
portion of the offering space) need to be considered65. 
 
One simple interpretation of considering correlations is to say that if we observe a low 
RD curve in one period, then it is very likely that we will observe a low RD curve in the 
following period as well. Therefore, we would be more inclined to provide a relatively 
restrictive offer in that following period. If, however, we did not consider these 
correlations, we would believe that a high RD would be more likely, and the offer would 
be adjusted accordingly. 
 
                                                 
65 This would be even more of an issue if the approaches were modified to allow only limited tranches. 
(c) 
(b) (a) 
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Figure 8.16 demonstrates a possible set of offers for period 10 under a new replicate. 
Points (c) now indicate the dispatch points under the Naïve Correlation approach. This 
replicate is of RD curve type “Stepped”, and thus provides the generator with 
opportunities to apply market power, if they have sufficient knowledge of the market 
conditions as to exploit it. Under perfect information and the Value Curve approach, 
generation capacity would be held back such that dispatch would occur before the large 
drop-off in the RD curve, thus raising the market clearing price substantially. However, 
as a result of ignoring correlations between market outcomes, the Naïve Correlation 
approach has not exploited this RD curve step, and his lead to dispatch (c) at the bottom 
of the step, with only marginally higher quantity, but a much lower price. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.16 Offers for Value Curve and Naïve Correlation Approaches – Low RD 
 
Figure 8.17 demonstrates the opposite scenario, where the actual RD curve does not step 
down in price until a very high dispatch level is reached. This behaviour is expected 
under perfect information and the Value Curve approach, and so high dispatch is 
exploited at high prices. Under the Naïve Correlation approach, we would not realise 
that we would be able to achieve a high price for such a high dispatch level, and so a 
more restrictive offer would be provided, leading to a much lower dispatch level (c). 
 
(c) 
(b) 
(a) 
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Figure 8.17 Offers for Value Curve and Naïve Correlation Approaches – High RD 
 
Figure 8.18 shows another interesting scenario, in period 11 of a different replicate. 
Because of the flatness of the possible RD curves on this branch, the MV of dispatch 
remains high throughout the dispatch range, rather than falling off and becoming 
negative at higher reservoir levels. As a result, the dispatch under both Perfect 
Information and the Value Curve approach is around 15 MW/period. However, because 
the Naïve Correlation model considers all the RD curves on other branches, most of 
which have much more rapidly falling MV curves, it provides a much more restrictive 
offer than what is optimal, and hence leads to a much lower dispatch of only 11 
MW/period. 
 
(c) 
(b) 
(a) 
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Figure 8.18 Offers for Value Curve and Naïve Correlation Approaches – Flat RD 
 
Naïve Water Approach: 
 
Under the Naïve Water approach, the offers provided to the market by the generator 
ignore the reservoir level, and as such assume a marginal cost of zero across the entire 
generating range. This will clearly lead to very generous offers, and thus high levels of 
dispatch. The result is that fuel resources will be run down very quickly, and little or 
none will be available to generate electricity later in the horizon. This will be 
particularly disadvantageous if all fuel is used up in off-peak periods, leaving the 
generator unable to benefit from higher electricity prices in the peak periods. 
 
Figure 8.19 demonstrates this for period 3 (off-peak) of a different replicate, where (c) is 
now the dispatch point under the Naïve Water approach. 
 
(c) 
(b) (a) 
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Figure 8.19 Offers for Value Curve and Naïve Water Approaches 
 
Perfectly Competitive Approach: 
 
Under the Perfectly Competitive approach, the generator does not believe it has any 
market power, and as such, its optimal offering decision is to offer at marginal cost. 
These offers are clearly more generous than those which would be provided by a 
generator that is exploiting its market power. 
 
Figure 8.20 demonstrates this for period 7 of a different replicate, where (c) is now the 
dispatch point under the Perfectly Competitive approach. We can see that the offer is 
indeed more generous than the offer under the Value Curve approach, and as such 
dispatch is higher, and market clearing price lower. 
 
(c) 
(b) 
(a) 
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Figure 8.20 Offers for Value Curve and Perfect Competitor Approaches 
 
8.6.3 Summary of Simplified Algorithm Comparisons 
 
In this section of the chapter we have compared the best model from Section 8.3, the 
Value Curve approach, to various simplifications of this model. These simplifications 
have included changes to the allowable form of the offers and to the model’s approach 
in dealing with market outcomes, water limitations, and market power. Table 8.16 
provides a summary of mean computational times and mean percentage errors for all 
approaches considered in this section, over all 1600 replicates. 
 
(c) 
(b) 
(a) 
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Approach Value Curve 
Quantity-
Based 
Offers 
Price-
Based 
Offers 
Naïve 
Correlation 
Approach 
Naïve 
Water 
Approach 
Perfectly 
Competitive 
Approach 
Mean (seconds) 52 52 410 1 0 50 Comp. 
Time  vs VC Approach - Same Worse Better Better Same 
Mean Percentage Error 1.186 4.132 2.304 3.080 36.009 9.393 
 vs VC Approach - Worse Worse Worse Worse Worse 
Worst RD Curve 
Structure 
Branch 
Different 
Naturally 
Monotone 
Naturally 
Monotone Stepped 
Branch 
Different Stepped 
Soln. 
Quality 
Mean Percentage Error 
under the Worst RD 
Curve Structure 
1.825 7.790 4.801 7.614 51.396 19.727 
 
Table 8.16 Summary of Results for Simplified Algorithms 
 
We have shown that there is no practical difference between the computational time for 
the Value Curve, Quantity-Based offer, and Perfectly Competitive approaches. Because 
of its algorithm structure, the Price-Based offer approach actually requires significantly 
more computational time than the Value Curve approach, while the Naïve Water and 
Naïve Correlation approaches require zero and almost-zero solving time respectively. 
 
With respect to mean percentage error, the performance of each of these simplified 
approaches is significantly worse than the Value Curve approach over the full set of 
replicates. Specifically, each of the simplified approaches performs especially poorly 
under at least one type of RD curve structure. 
 
The summary in Table 8.16, combined with the more detailed information in Table 8.13 
and Table 8.15, implies that the only simplified approaches worth considering as an 
alternative to the full complexity Value Curve approach are the Naïve Correlation and 
Naïve Water approaches with their negligible computational times and mean percentage 
errors of 7.614% and 3.626% under the “Stepped” RD curve type, respectively. The 
choice between the Value Curve, Naïve Correlation and Naïve Water approaches would 
depend on the computational time available and the RD curve structure, but we believe 
that the Value Curve approach, with its mean computational time of 52 seconds, is 
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preferable, as this time is still realistic for use in practical applications, and it avoids the 
expense of greater deviation from optimality associated with the Naïve Correlation 
approach (which is particularly large under the most realistic RD curve structure). 
 
8.7 Interpolating the Value Curve under the Value Curve Approach 
 
In this section, we consider the possibility of interpolating the value curve under the 
Value Curve approach. As explained in Section 6.6, for each period and market state, the 
Value Curve approach currently determines the optimal offer to provide, and thus the 
total expected current and future value of being at every possible reservoir level (up to 
300 of them in the replicates used in this chapter). Here we propose a simplification of 
this, whereby these offers and values are determined for just a subset of evenly-spaced 
reservoir levels, and estimates are produced for the values in between, via simple linear 
interpolation. Figure 8.21 illustrates this idea, under the assumption of a concave value 
curve. We can see that the value curve is underestimated using this approach, but there 
is no consistent bias to the marginal value curve, on which offering decisions are based. 
As such, we would expect to have a deterioration in solution quality as the resolution of 
the reservoir levels considered decreases, but it is unlikely that the deterioration will be 
too large. Here, we consider the interpolation options of solving for every 2nd, 5th or 10th 
reservoir level. 
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Figure 8.21 Interpolated Value and Marginal Values Curves 
 
The results used throughout this section relate to all 1600 replicates described in Section 
8.2.3. All relevant MINITAB output regarding computational times for the interpolation 
levels can be found in Appendix J, while output regarding solution quality is located in 
Appendix K. 
 
8.7.1 Algorithm Speed Comparison 
 
A comparison between the overall mean computational times for the original Value 
Curve approach and the three levels of interpolation models over the 1600 replicates 
described in Section 8.2.3 is shown in Table 8.17, and plotted in Figure 8.22. Note that 
Table 8.17 contains a mean computational time for using the interpolation approach 
solving at all reservoir levels. The difference between this mean time of 67 seconds and 
the mean time of the original Value Curve approach of 52 seconds can be attributed to 
the computational overhead associated with applying the value curve interpolation code. 
For the analysis in this section, we will use the original times, which provide the fairest 
representation of the computational time achievable with no interpolation. 
 
True MV Curve 
Interpolated VC 
Stepped MV Curve 
Value  
Curve 
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Model Mean Computational Time 
(seconds) 
Original Value Curve Approach 52 
Interpolation – Every 2nd 42 
Interpolation – Every 5th  25 
Interpolation – Every 10th  19 
  
Interpolation – Every Level 67 
 
Table 8.17 Mean Computational Times 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Reservoir Solve Frequency
M
ea
n 
C
om
pu
ta
tio
na
l T
im
e
 
 
Figure 8.22 Mean Computational Times for Interpolation Frequencies 
 
Appendix J shows that the computational time is falling by a statistically significant 
amount as we compute the actual value of the value curve at fewer and fewer points. 
However, we can see that the marginal gains are reducing as the level of interpolation 
increases. Table 8.18 shows us that the rate at which computational times increase with 
instance size is fairly independent of the interpolation level. In other words, the 
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computational gains from the interpolation approaches are not lost as the instance size 
increases. 
 
Approach Mean Computation Times 
(seconds) Value Curve Interp 2 Interp 5 Interp 10 
       
Number of Periods      
20  38 26 16 13 
40  66 59 35 25 
       
Number of Reservoir Levels     
100  33 23 15 12 
300  72 62 36 26 
       
Number of Dispatch Levels     
20  37 26 16 12 
40  68 58 35 26 
       
Number of RD Curves     
25  30 21 13 9 
100  74 64 38 28 
       
Number of Inflows      
1  51 40 24 17 
5  53 44 26 20 
       
Spread Type      
Weak  52 42 26 19 
Strong  52 42 25 19 
       
RD Type      
Single Similar  51 43 26 19 
Single Different  51 41 25 18 
Branch Different  54 42 27 19 
Naturally Monotone  52 40 25 18 
Stepped  53 45 25 20 
       
Overall Mean 52 42 25 19 
 
Table 8.18 Mean Computational Times broken down by Factor and Interpolation Frequency 
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8.7.2 Solution Quality Comparison 
 
As explained above, we would expect that as the resolution of the value curve decreases, 
the mean percentage error of the approach should increase. A comparison of these mean 
errors for all interpolation levels, including the original Value Curve approach with no 
interpolation, is shown in Table 8.19, and plotted in Figure 8.23. 
 
Model Mean Percentage Error (%) 
Original Value Curve Approach 1.186 
Interpolation – Every 2nd 1.242 
Interpolation – Every 5th  1.487 
Interpolation – Every 10th  1.867 
 
Table 8.19 Mean Percentage Error Comparison: Interpolation 
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Figure 8.23 Mean Percentage Errors for Interpolation Frequencies 
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We can see that there appears to be an almost perfectly linear relationship between the 
level of interpolation and the mean percentage error that results, within the ranges 
considered. Figure 8.24 illustrates how the shapes of the distributions of the percentage 
errors change and increase with the interpolation level. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.24 Percentage Error Distributions by Interpolation Level 
 
Table 8.20 presents a two-way breakdown of the mean percentage error by interpolation 
frequency and parameter value. 
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Approach Mean Percentage Error 
Value Curve Interp 2 Interp 5 Interp 10 
       
Number of Periods      
20  1.109 1.171 1.424 1.827 
40  1.262 1.314 1.550 1.907 
       
Number of Reservoir Levels     
100  1.588 1.667 2.006 2.537 
300  0.784 0.818 0.968 1.196 
       
Number of Dispatch Levels     
20  1.129 1.188 1.429 1.797 
40  1.242 1.297 1.546 1.937 
       
Number of RD Curves     
25  1.194 1.250 1.494 1.872 
100  1.177 1.235 1.480 1.862 
       
Number of Inflows      
1  0.823 0.905 1.191 1.420 
5  1.549 1.580 1.783 2.314 
       
Spread Type      
Weak  1.117 1.175 1.424 1.814 
Strong  1.254 1.310 1.550 1.920 
       
RD Type      
Single Similar  0.688 (c) 0.789 (c) 1.153 (c) 1.737 (c) 
Single Different  0.993 (b) 1.086 (b) 1.479 (b) 2.055 (b,c) 
Branch Different  1.825 (a) 1.870 (a) 2.107 (a) 2.437 (a,b) 
Naturally Monotone  1.686 (a) 1.726 (a) 1.918 (a) 2.252 (a) 
Stepped  0.737 (c) 0.741 (c) 0.778 (d) 0.854 (c) 
       
Overall Mean  1.186 1.242 1.487 1.867 
 
Table 8.20 Mean Percentage Errors broken down by Factor and Interpolation Frequency 
 
Some of the significant information presented in Table 8.20 is consistent with that 
analysed in Sections 8.5.2 and 8.6.2, and so we will not repeat that analysis here. Below 
we will highlight some new insights from Table 8.20. 
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 Number of Reservoir Levels 
 
We can see that under the instances with 100 reservoir levels, the mean percentage error 
increases by 59.7% (1.588% → 2.537%) when we compare the Value Curve approach 
with no interpolation to the case with an interpolation frequency of 10. However, under 
the instances with 300 reservoir levels, the mean percentage error increases by only 
52.7% (0.784% → 1.196%) under the same comparison. In other words, as the size of 
the instances increases, with respect to number of reservoir levels considered, the cost of 
performing interpolation on the value curve falls. 
 
Number of Inflows 
 
As stated in Section 8.2.3, the expected hydro inflow of 4 MWh/period is the same in all 
instances, regardless of whether the number of possible inflow levels is one or five. As 
such, the difference in mean percentage error between these two sets of instances is 
caused purely by the uncertainty that results from the increased number of possible 
inflow levels. We can see that as the number of possible inflows is increased from one to 
five, the mean percentage error increases over half a percent under all levels of 
interpolation. 
 
The reason for this increased percentage error is as follows. A change in the inflow level 
moves the marginal cost curve horizontally. It can easily be shown analytically that with 
a convex marginal cost curve (as we have in this problem and explained in Section 6.6), 
the vertically weighted average marginal cost curve will be above the MC curve 
corresponding to the expected value of inflows. In other words, the marginal cost curve 
is slightly higher in the uncertain case, and as such the resulting offer provided to the 
market would be slightly higher (more restrictive), and thus marginally less profitable. 
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Figure 8.25. Marginal Cost Curves under Inflow Certainty and Uncertainty 
 
Figure 8.25 illustrates this point comparing the expected marginal cost curve over the 
five possible inflow levels (in blue), and the marginal cost curve associated with the 
expected inflow level of 4 MWh/period (in red).  
 
8.7.3 Summary of Value Curve Interpolation Comparisons 
 
In this section, we have shown that when interpolation is used on the value curve, 
computational times reduce but at the expense of greater mean percentage errors. This 
trade-off is summarised in Table 8.21. Further, we have shown that as the resolution of 
the interpolation falls, the marginal reductions in computational time fall quickly (see 
Figure 8.22), while the marginal costs (increases in mean percentage error) are constant 
(Figure 8.23). This indicates that reducing the resolution beyond the frequency of 10 
explored in this section would not produce much further computational time 
improvement, but the mean percentage error would get progressively worse.  
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Approach Value Curve Interp 2 Interp 5 
Interp 
10 
Mean (seconds) 52 42 25 19 Computational 
Time    vs VC Approach - Better Better Better 
Mean Percentage Error 1.186 1.242 1.487 1.867 Algorithm 
Performance    vs VC Approach - Worse Worse Worse 
 
Table 8.21 Summary of Results for Interpolation Levels 
 
The best choice of interpolation level from the options above depends on the real-life 
scenario to which the model is being applied. If the computational time of the Value 
Curve approach with no interpolation is acceptable in the circumstances, there is no 
point interpolating the value curve to save time at the expense of a greater mean 
percentage error. On the other hand, if the scenario has high parameter values such that 
computational time becomes a factor, then the user should consider one of the 
interpolation options. Both interpolation levels 2 and 5 provide good trade-offs in this 
case, while the low computational time saving of an interpolation level of 10 (compared 
with 5) may not justify the increase to the mean percentage error.  
 
Specifically, compared with not interpolating, the interpolation level of 2 leads to a 19% 
computational saving at the expense of 0.056% additional mean percentage error, while 
the interpolation level of 5 would result in a further computational saving of 40% (52% 
saving on no interpolation) at the expense of an additional 0.245% mean percentage 
error (0.301% expense compared to no interpolation). However, if the interpolation level 
of 10 were used, this would result in a further saving of 24% of the computational time, 
at the expense of 0.380% additional mean percentage error. 
 
8.8 Value Curve Approach on Large Scenarios 
 
In Section 8.2.3, two of the considerations in setting the parameter values related to time 
and computer memory constraints. In this section, we will consider the feasibility and 
potential of the Value Curve approach developed in this thesis to be applied to larger 
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problems than those considered throughout this chapter. By doing this, we are 
recognising that: 
 
- The restrictions placed on size of the instances used in this chapter due to 
computational time reflected the large solving times under the R&A and Direct 
MV Curve approaches, not the Value Curve approach. 
- The main constraint on instance sizes used in this chapter due to computer 
memory restrictions are caused by large multi-dimensioned array variables in the 
simulation phase of the process, rather than the optimal offer determination 
phase. This simulation phase is needed in this thesis to evaluate the relative 
optimality of the various approaches, but would not be needed in the real-world 
in order to just produce the offers.  
 
Note that instances proposed in this Section were run on an Intel Pentium D 3.20GHz 
machine, with 2GB of RAM available, as opposed to the 1GB considered in this chapter 
up to this point. 
 
8.8.1 Some Larger Instances 
 
Here, we consider four larger instances, solved only under the Value Curve approach, 
and based on the “Stepped” RD Curve type, which we believe to be the most realistic. 
The parameters sizes for each of these instances are listed in Table 8.22. 
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Parameter Instance 1 Instance 2 Instance 3 Instance 4 
Number of Periods 24 24 24 24 
Number of Reservoir Levels 1400 700 500 300 
Number of Dispatch Levels 40 80 60 35 
Number of Residual Demand 
Curves per Period 
25 25 50 200 
Number of Possible Inflow 
levels per Period 
1 1 1 1 
Transition Correlation type Medium Medium Medium Medium 
RD Curve Structure type Stepped Stepped Stepped Stepped 
 
Table 8.22 Large Instance Parameter Values 
 
Table 8.23 presents the results from these four instances, based on an interpolation level 
of 5. 
 
Instance # Percentage Error (%) Computational Time
66 
(seconds) 
1 0.502 52 
2 0.567 41 
3 0.567 46 
4 0.895 98 
 
Table 8.23 Results for Large Instances 
 
Quite clearly, despite the fairly large increases in instance size that these four cases 
represent, computational times remain feasible. In addition, the percentage errors remain 
very small. 
 
                                                 
66 Note that computational time is approximately linear in the number of periods considered. 
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8.8.2 Potential Instance Sizes without Simulation 
 
Through experimentation, I have been able to determine the approximate maximum 
sized instances that could be solved on a computer with 2GB of RAM available. The 
size limits are based on a combination of the sizes of various parameters, and as such 
certain trade-offs could be made to increase one parameter size at the expense of 
another. Table 8.24 shows two example combinations of parameters that are feasible 
within this available memory.  
 
Parameter Example 1 Example 2 
Number of Periods Unlimited Unlimited 
Number of Reservoir Levels 50,000 110,000 
Number of Dispatch Levels 170 650 
Number of RDs per Period 
500 
(10 branches of 
50 RDs each) 
400 
(40 branches of 
10 RDs each) 
Number of Possible Inflow 
Levels per Period 
Unlimited Unlimited 
other…   
Number of MC Levels that OCF 
is solved at 
Unlimited Unlimited 
 
Table 8.24 Maximum Instance Size Examples 
 
These examples show that the algorithm could quite clearly account for significantly 
larger instances than those considered throughout this thesis, and would certainly be able 
to be applied to a wide variety of generating units found in the markets of New Zealand, 
Australia, and around the world. Of course, with larger instances sizes comes a 
corresponding increase in computational time required, but in this chapter we have 
shown that the rate at which this increases with instance size is significantly less than 
under alternative algorithms. In real-world situations, the trade-off between instance size 
and computational time would need to be made by each company using the algorithm, 
depending on their specific needs. 
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Note that there is also some potential to exploit parallel processing of different 
components of the algorithm (or different branches) on separate CPUs in order to 
improve the size of the models that can be considered with respect to both memory 
limits and computational time available. 
 
8.9 Conclusions 
 
Figure 8.26 presents a summary of the mean computational times and mean percentage 
errors under all possible algorithms and simplifications considered in this chapter67, as 
shown in Sections 8.4.3, 8.5.3, 8.6.3, and 8.7.3. 
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Naïve Water Approach
Perfectly Competitive Approach
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Mean Percentage of Optimal Achieved (%)
 
0 500 1000
Mean Computation Times (seconds)
80,324
 
 
Figure 8.26 Summary of Performance Measures for all Algorithms 
 
                                                 
67 Note that the values for the Direct MV curve and R&A approaches are based on the 320 replicates 
described in Section 8.4, while the rest are based on all 1600 replicates. 
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Those approaches highlighted in red are on the efficient frontier of the possible 
approaches, as demonstrated in Figure 8.27. In other words, for each of these algorithms, 
there is no alternative algorithm that is preferable under both performance measures 
(that dominates this algorithm). 
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Figure 8.27 Efficient Frontier of Approaches 
 
From this efficient frontier, we can conclude that there are only six algorithms worth 
considering, and the selection between them is dependent on the specific scenario that is 
being faced. Depending on the time available and the size of the instance being solved, 
the best choice of algorithm (from slowest with best mean percentage error to fastest 
with worst mean percentage error) will be either the: 
 
1. Value Curve approach with branching and with no interpolation, 
2. Value Curve approach with branching, solving only every 2nd reservoir level and 
interpolating the value curve between these points, and 
 369
3. Value Curve approach with branching, solving only every 5th reservoir level and 
interpolating the value curve between these points, and 
4. Value Curve approach with branching, solving only every 10th reservoir level 
and interpolating the value curve between these points, and 
5. Naïve Correlation Approach. 
6. Naïve Water Approach 
 
The detailed trade-offs between computational time and solution quality for these 
algorithms are presented in Table 8.25. 
 
 
Approach Value Curve 
Interp 
2 
Interp 
5 
Interp 
10 
Naïve 
Correlation
Naïve 
Water 
Mean (seconds) 52 42 25 19 1 0 Computational 
Time    vs VC Approach - Better Better Better Better Better 
Mean Percentage Error 1.186 1.242 1.487 1.867 3.080 36.009 
   vs VC Approach - Worse Worse Worse Worse Worse Algorithm 
Performance 
Worst Case 5.601 5.601 5.599 5.602 22.390 51.396 
 
Table 8.25 Summary of Results for the Best Algorithms 
 
Finally, given sufficient time resource, we have shown that it is beneficial to consider all 
of the following aspects of the generator offering decision process: 
 
- The underlying branched nature of the real-world 
- Sculpted, forward-sloping offers (rather than simple quantity or price-based 
offers) 
- Market outcome correlations 
- Water/fuel limitations 
- Market power. 
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Chapter 9  
 
OPTIMAL OFFER CONSTRUCTION 
ALGORITHM UNDER UNIT OPERATING RULES 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapters, we have proposed two two-phase algorithms, and shown that 
one of them, the Value Curve approach performs particularly well, with respect to both 
computational time and solution quality. This algorithm considered many of the 
intertemporal complexities faced by a fuel-constrained generator, including market 
uncertainty and correlation, uncertain inflows, and fuel conservation. In this chapter, we 
extend the model to deal with a whole new set of intertemporal constraints, regarding 
the operating rules of generating units. The rules and conditions that we extend the 
model to include are: 
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1. Minimum feasible generation level 
2. Start-up and shut-down costs 
3. Minimum up and down times 
4. Fixed start-up process 
5. Ramp rate restrictions 
 
The fixed start-up process defines the generation levels required over the s periods that it 
takes the particular generating unit to start up, while the minimum feasible generation 
level is the lowest feasible generation once the unit has completed its start-up process. 
Ramp rate restrictions place a limit on the difference between the levels of generation in 
consecutive periods. 
 
In Section 9.2 we deal with the first four rules listed, by adding an extra dimension to 
the DP which defines the state of the unit at any given time (in other words, whether it is 
off, starting up or on). In Section 9.3 we deal with the ramp rate restrictions by adding a 
further dimension to the DP, to record the previous generation level (which will affect 
the range of generation quantities in which we are able to offer in the current period). In 
Section 9.4, we provide a summary of our findings in this chapter. 
 
9.2 Incorporating Unit Rules 
 
In this section, we consider the addition of the following complexities to our VC model: 
 
1. Minimum feasible generation level 
2. Start-up and shut-down costs 
3. Minimum up and down times 
4. Fixed start-up process 
 
These complexities have not previously been considered together with the types of RD 
curve uncertainty and correlation that the VC model considers, and as such, the model 
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that we develop in this section contains additional contributions in the offer optimisation 
field to those developed in earlier chapters. 
 
9.2.1 Unit States Dimension - Simple 
 
Let us start by ignoring the minimum up and down times and the start-up process. Figure 
9.1 shows how at each (reservoir level, previous dispatch) state from the original VC 
algorithm, we can make a decision whether to 
 
- Keep the unit off or turn it on (if it is currently off), or 
- Keep the unit on or turn it off (if it is currently on) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Simple Unit State Dimension 
 
Therefore, we now have an extra dimension to the DP, making the state-space three-
dimensional.  The dimensions are now: 
 
1. Previous market outcome 
2. Reservoir level 
3. Unit state 
 
In order to describe the new recursion process, we define the following terms: 
 
( )URV Utrt ,,,     Value of storage at the beginning of period t, at reservoir level tR , 
given previous RD curve index r, and assuming state U at the end 
of period t 
SU   Start-up cost (occurs at the moment a generator is switched on) 
Off On 
 374
SD   Shut-down cost (occurs at the moment a generator is switched off) 
UtR ,   Reservoir level at beginning of period t, given that the unit has  
been in state U in the previous period 
 r  Residual demand curve index that occurred in the previous  
period 
 p  Residual demand curve index that occurs in the current period 
( )Utrt R ,θ  The optimal offer provided to the market in period t from  
reservoir level tR , given the previous market outcome r and 
previous state U, assuming that the unit is on and free to offer as it 
chooses above its minimum feasible generation level. 
maxR   Maximum reservoir level at any given time  
( )( )Utrtpt RQ ,θ  Release in period t, given residual demand curve outcome index p 
in this period, and offer ( )Utrt R ,θ  (which is based on residual 
demand curve index r having occurred in the previous period)  
( )( )Utrtpt RP ,θ  Price in period t, given residual demand curve outcome index p in 
this period, and offer ( )Utrt R ,θ  
prpr ,  Probability of residual demand curve outcome index tp , given 
residual demand curve outcome index r in the previous period. 
it ,infl   Level of inflow in period t under possible inflow index i 
 
 
If the unit is operating in period t, then the new reservoir level is defined as: 
 
( )( )( )max,,,,1 ,inflmin RRQRR itUtrtptUtont +−=+ θ  for { }offonU ,∈  
 
If the unit is not operating in period t, then the new reservoir level is defined as: 
 
{ }( )max,,,,1 ,inflmin RRR itoffonUtofft += ∈+  
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Therefore, the value curves are constructed as follows: 
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Figure 9.2 Constructing the Value Curve under Unit State Decisions – From On 
 
Figure 9.2 shows an example of how as the beginning reservoir level increases, it starts 
to become relatively better to keep the unit on rather than switch it off. Note that the 
position of these two value curves will be dependant on the situation faced and whether 
or not dispatch in the current period is desired, and as such they will not necessarily 
cross one another within the reservoir range. Note also that it is infeasible to stay on if 
the reservoir level is less than the minimum feasible generation level, and as such the 
value associated with this option is assumed to be ∞− . 
 
Value  
Reservoir Level 
Value (stay on) 
Value (turn off) 
Min Feasible 
Generation Level 
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( ) ( )stayoffturnonoffRV offtrt ,max,,, =  
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Figure 9.3 Constructing the Value Curve under Unit State Decisions – From Off 
 
Figure 9.3 shows an example for when the unit starts switched off. It becomes relatively 
better to switch the unit on as the reservoir level increases, as is the case where the unit 
starts switched on. We note here though that the point of cross-over, where it becomes 
optimal to switch the unit on/keep it on would be at a higher reservoir level than had the 
unit started switched on. This is because, at all reservoir levels, the value associated with 
switching on is lower than the value for staying on, and the value for staying off is 
higher than the value for switching off, as a result of the SU and SD costs. 
 
We know from Section 6.6 that if staying on is the only option, the MV curve would be 
monotonically non-increasing as long as the value curve for the following period is 
concave when the unit is on. We also know that if the only option is for the unit to stay 
Value 
Reservoir Level 
Value (turn on) 
Value (stay off) 
Min Feasible 
Generation Level 
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off, this is equivalent to providing an offer from which dispatch will always be zero, and 
as such, the MV associated with this offer will also be monotonically non-increasing, so 
long as the value curve for the following period is concave when the unit is off. In 
addition, we know that the SU and SD costs would be constant terms in the value curves 
in these two cases, and thus do not affect the MV curves. An example situation using 
this information is shown in Figure 9.4. Again, these MV curves may or may not cross 
one another. Note that the MV for the unit being switched on is not shown for values 
less than the minimum feasible generation level, as this is not a feasible range in which 
to be switched on. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4 MV Curves under Pre-Determined Decision 
 
Because these MV curves associated with each decision are decreasing, the associated 
value curves (presented in Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3), must be concave. Figure 9.5 
shows how the optimal decision changes from switching the unit off at r* to keeping it 
on (given the example presented in Figure 9.2), and that this produces a kink in the value 
curve when we are able to select the optimal option. This kink leads to a MV curve that 
is no longer monotonically non-increasing. 
 
Marginal  
Value
Reservoir Level 
MV (stay off/ 
switch off) 
MV (stay on/ 
switch on) 
Min Feasible 
Generation Level 
 378
 
 
Figure 9.5 Combined MV Curve Construction 
 
As mentioned above, this is only an example position of these respective value curves, 
but all possible combinations of positions will produce either this same result, with a 
single range of non-monotonicity in the MV curve, or will produce a MV curve that is 
naturally monotone. 
 
We noted earlier in this thesis that in order to produce offers from the OCFs that are 
monotonically non-decreasing, the MV curves must be monotonically non-increasing. 
As such, a modification needs to be made to this curve, and this is demonstrated in 
Figure 9.6. Note that this modification is the same as was required for the value and 
marginal value curves of the basic algorithm, as described in Section 6.6.1. 
 
r* Reservoir Level 
Value (stay on) 
Combined 
MV Curve 
Value (turn off) 
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Figure 9.6 Combined MV Curve Construction 
 
The effect of this change is a slight loss in accuracy compared to a purely primal 
approach. However, to achieve the computational gains from the marginalistic approach, 
this loss in necessary. The cause of the non-monotonicity is caused by the non-convex 
costs associated with unit commitment, and is well recognised in the literature, such as 
in O'Neill, Sotkiewicz, Hobbs, Rothkopf, & Stewart (2005). 
 
9.2.2 Unit States Dimension – Including Minimum Up and Down Times and a Start-
Up Process 
 
We will now consider how the dynamic program described in Section 9.2.1 changes if 
we include minimum up and down times and the start-up process. Figure 9.7 shows an 
example full unit states problem with a minimum up time of two periods, a minimum 
down time of two periods, and a two period start-up phase. The green nodes indicate 
Modifications to 
Value and MV 
curves for concavity 
r* Reservoir Level 
Value (combined) 
Combined MV 
Curve 
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unit states where decisions are made at the start of the period, and correspond to the only 
two nodes found in the simple unit states example in Section 9.2.1. In the yellow nodes, 
an offer curve decision is made, but the change in unit state is pre-defined. Clearly there 
are quite a number of unit states from which no decision needs to be made at all, and 
thus as the complexity of these aspects of the unit state rules increases, the 
computational time of the algorithm will be relatively unaffected. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.7 Full Unit State Dimension 
 
In order to describe the complete recursion process, we must define the following 
additional term(s): 
 
ssSUG   Required generation level in phase ss of the start-up phase  
DS  Number of “down” unit states/minimum down time 
US  Number of “up” unit states/minimum up time 
SS  Number of start-up states 
 
The reservoir balance equations and DP recursion equations are different depending on 
which state the unit is in at the beginning of the period. 
 
If the unit is in “Down” state ds at the start of period t ( DSds ≠ ), then the reservoir 
balance equation and value curves are constructed using: 
 
( )max,,1,1 ,inflmin RRR itdstdst +=++  
 
Off On SU1 SU2 Up1 Up2 Down1 Down2 
Stay Off 
Switch 
On 
Stay On 
Switch Off 
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( ) ( )1,, 1,1,1,, += +++ dsRVdsRV dstptdstrt  
 
If the unit is in the final “Down” state (DS) at the start of period t, then the reservoir 
balance equation and value curves are constructed using: 
 
( )max,,,1 ,inflmin RRR itDStOfft +=+  
 
( ) ( )OffRVDSRV offtptDStrt ,, ,1,1,, ++=  
 
If the unit is in the “Off” state at the start of period t, then the reservoir balance equation 
and value curves (where 1ss  is the first start-up state) are constructed using: 
 
( )max,1,,1 ,inflmin1 RSUGRR itOfftsst +−=+  or ( )max,,,1 ,inflmin RRR itOfftofft +=+  
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If the unit is in “SU” state ss at the start of period t ( SSss ≠ ), then the reservoir balance 
equation and value curves are constructed using: 
 
( )max,,1,1 ,inflmin RSUGRR itsssstsst +−=++  
 
( ) ( )1,, 1,1,1,, += +++ ssRVssRV sstptsstrt  
 
If the unit is in the final “SU” state at the start of period t, then the reservoir balance 
equation and value curves (where 1us  is the first up state) are constructed using: 
 
( )max,,,1 ,inflmin1 RSUGRR itSSSStust +−=+  
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( ) ( )1,1,1,, ,, 1 UpRVSSRV ustptSStrt ++=  
 
If the unit is in one of the “Up” states at the start of period t ( USus ≠ ), then the 
reservoir balance equation and value curves are constructed using: 
 
( )( )( )max,,,1,1 ,inflmin RRQRR itustrtptustust +−=++ θ  
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If the unit is in the final “Up” state at the start of period t, then the reservoir balance 
equation and value curves are constructed using: 
 
( )( )( )max,,,,1 ,inflmin RRQRR itUStrtptUStont +−=+ θ  
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If the unit is in the “On” state at the start of period t, then the reservoir balance equation 
and value curves are constructed using: 
 
( )( )( )max,,,,,1 ,inflmin RRQRR itontrtptontont +−=+ θ  or ( )max,,,1 ,inflmin1 RRR itontdst +=+  
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9.2.3 Experimental Evidence of Offer Construction Theories 
 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we demonstrated the desired dispatch behaviour of a 
generator that faces unit rules and deterministic scenarios. In this section we show, 
through the use of four examples, that these anticipated behaviours translate across to 
stochastic scenarios as well. Note that this section is not designed to prove that these 
results will always occur, but rather to show that the model is consistent with the 
offering behaviour logic under these sample cases. 
 
The first example has one very high-price period in the middle of the off-peak section of 
the planning horizon, the second example has one relatively low-price period in the 
middle of the peak section of the planning horizon, while the third example has half the 
horizon with very low prices (or RD curves), and then suddenly jumps up to high prices 
for the remainder of the horizon. The final example considers two possible branches 
(high-price and low-price) that we may traverse over the horizon. The high-price branch 
produces much more extreme prices in the peak-period than the low-price branch. Note 
that all scenarios presented are relatively extreme cases, enabling us to demonstrate the 
effect of the unit rule constraints and operational costs clearly. 
 
Example 9.2.3.1: Anomalous High-Price Period in the Off-Peak Range 
 
In this first example, the general height of the RD curves, or the “peakiness” of each 
period is shown in Figure 9.8. Clearly, there is one anomalous high-price period (period 
11) in the middle of the off-peak section of the planning horizon. 
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Figure 9.8 Peakiness Ratings for Example 9.2.3.1 
 
To begin with, let us consider how the expected payoff over the 24-period horizon is 
affected by the imposition of unit rules, and the subsequent adjustment (tightening) of 
these rules, for a random set of RD curves. For this example, the expected payoff 
ignoring any unit rules is $35,540. If we were to consider a “base set” of rules (startup 
and shutdown cost of $0, minimum feasible generation level = 2, two period minimum 
up and down times, and a two-period start-up phase), then the expected payoff drops to 
$34,222.80. This information, and a summary of subsequent (and independent) rule 
adjustments is shown in Table 9.1. 
 
Period 
Peakiness 
Rating 
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Case Expected Payoff 
No rules $35,540.95 
Base set of rules $34,222.80 
Changes:  
   1. Start-up and shut-down costs = $700 $31,110.79 
   2. Minimum up and down times = 3 periods $34,038.43 
   3. Three period start-up phase $33,922.31 
   4. Minimum feasible generation level = 4 $32,702.79 
Combining all changes $30,007.32 
 
Table 9.1 Effect on Expected Payoff of Rules 
Clearly the addition of constraints has reduced expected payoffs, simply confirming that 
the model is behaving as would be expected. 
 
In order to get an idea of the structure of the value curves for the different unit states, 
consider Figure 9.9, which shows the value curves for all states at the beginning of 
period 22, in the lead up to some very high-price periods. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.9 Value Curves for all Unit States at Beginning of Period 22 
 
Value 
($) 
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In this case, because of the approaching peak periods, the highest value curves are 
associated with the states where the unit is fully started up, and thus able to generate 
within the feasible bounds of generation. Next best are the start-up phase states, as they 
are on their way to being able to generate freely, while the off states have the lowest 
value curves (in fact, the value curves are almost identical for the two ‘on’ states and the 
final SU state). Intuitively, the value curve is lowest for the off state associated with the 
unit having just shut down, as this unit has to wait the longest before it is able to 
generate and take advantage of the forthcoming high-price periods. 
 
Now let us consider the offers and value curves that occur around the anomalous high-
price period (t=11). Figure 9.10 shows a subset of the optimal offers in period 11, 
ignoring any unit rules, and thus assuming the generator can be dispatched at any level, 
including zero. As it is a high-price period, the offers are relatively generous, leading to 
positive dispatch in all but the very lowest reservoir levels. On the other hand, Figure 
9.11 shows the equivalent subset of offers if the generating unit is switched off at the 
beginning of period 11, considering the unit rules. In both of these diagrams of offers, 
and many others presented in the remainder of this chapter, there are many pieces of 
information in the legend, for each offer plotted. The first number gives the reservoir 
level to which the offer relates, while the second number is the DP value from the start 
of this period onwards, given this starting reservoir level. In addition, if the graph is 
associated with a situation considering unit rules, the note in the legend ends with an 
arrow followed by a binary variable, indicating whether the unit will optimally be 
chosen to stay off/turn off (0) or stay on/turn on (1) in this period, from the given state68. 
For the RD curve lines, the information given in the legend are simply the RD curve 
index for this period, and the probability of that RD occurring under the given UMS. 
 
We can see from Figure 9.11 that the unit remains off, regardless of the reservoir level. 
This is because if it were to turn on at this point in time, it would be only in the first 
phase of the start-up process for this high-price period, and the minimum up-time rule 
                                                 
68 The offers shown in these figures are the offers assuming that the unit is switched on and able to 
generate freely within its generation bounds: if this is not the case, then the form of the offer is not a 
decision, but rather clearly defined by the unit operating start-up rules. 
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would force the unit to then stay on (generating at least the minimum feasible generation 
level) for the following two very low-price periods. 
 
 
Figure 9.10 Offers for Period 11 Ignoring Unit Rules 
 
Note that the terms in the legend indicate either the reservoir level to which the offer 
relates along with the expected value (current and future) from this point, or the RD 
curve index along with its probability of occurring. This is the same for all similar offer 
diagrams that appear in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 9.11 Offers for Period 11 Considering Unit Rules – from Off 
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Figure 9.12 shows the value curves for all possible unit states at the beginning of period 
11. The general order of these curves, from highest to lowest is: 
 
1. On (and free to shut down) 
On (and not free to shut down for one period) 
2. In start-up phase (and not free to shut down for two periods) 
3. Off (and free to start up) 
Off (and not free to start up for one period) 
4. In start-up phase (and not free to shut-down for three periods) 
 
 
 
Figure 9.12 Value Curves for all Unit States at Beginning of Period 11 
 
The reason for this order is that it is profitable to generate at a high level in this period, 
but costly to generate at all in the immediate following periods. The first two states 
listed enable the generator to capitalise on this high-price period, but then shut down 
immediately afterwards (as shown by the desired generating level of zero from all 
reservoir levels in Figure 9.13, which gives the offers assuming that the unit is on but 
free to switch off if it wishes). The final start-up phase state will mean that, due to the 
minimum up-time constraint, the generator will have to generate in one unprofitable 
period before being able to shut-down again. The lowest value curve is associated with 
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the first start-up phase state, because not only is it not able to generate freely in the high-
price period, it must stay on for at least two unprofitable periods beyond that point. The 
two states associated with the unit being off have a payoff slightly above this, even 
though they do not receive any benefit from the high-price period at all, they conserve 
fuel for use in later high-price periods, rather than wasting it on low-price periods as 
forced by the up-time constraint. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.13 Offers for Period 12 Considering Unit Rules – from On 
 
All this would imply that if the unit is switched off in the early periods of the horizon, 
but wants to take advantage of the high-price period 11, then it would need to begin its 
start-up phase earlier, in period 9, so that it is free to generate anywhere between the 
feasible generation bounds in period 11. Figure 9.14 shows that from relatively high 
reservoir levels in period 9, if the unit is switched off, then it is indeed optimal to start 
the unit up, proceeding through the start-up phases in periods 9 and 10, enabling a free 
choice of generation level in the high-price period 11. 
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Figure 9.14 Offers for Period 9 Considering Unit Rules – from Off 
 
It is interesting to observe how this decision in period 9 would change if the start-up and 
shut-down costs increased to $400 each (from the base case of $0). Clearly this 
discourages the short-term start-up planned to capitalise on the single high-price period, 
and Figure 9.15 shows that the reservoir level now needs to be higher in period 9 in 
order for it be optimal to start the unit up at this point. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.15 Offers for Period 9 Considering Unit Rules – from Off (Higher SU/SD Costs) 
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Example 9.2.3.2: Anomalous Low-Price Period in the Peak Range 
 
In this second example, the general height of the RD curves, or the “peakiness” of each 
period is shown in Figure 9.16. Clearly, there is one anomalous low-price period (period 
11) in the middle of the peak section of the planning horizon. 
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Figure 9.16 Peakiness Ratings for Example 9.2.3.2 
 
Figure 9.17 shows the offers in this very low-price period. We can see that unless the 
reservoir is almost empty, then the optimal decision is to keep the unit switched on 
(albeit generating at the lowest feasible level) over this period, despite the large 
opportunity costs associated with generating at this point rather than later in the horizon. 
The reason is quite clearly that the unit rules would mean that shutting the unit down 
near would mean missing out on the potential for high prices in the periods that follow 
immediately after this one. 
 
Period 
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Figure 9.17 Offers for Period 11 Considering Unit Rules – from On 
 
Example 9.2.3.3: Low-Price Periods Changing Suddenly to High-Price Periods 
 
In this third example, the general height of the RD curves, or the “peakiness” of each 
period is shown in Figure 9.18. We can see that the first half of the horizon has very low 
prices (or RD curves), but then at period 14, the prices suddenly become very high, and 
remain that way for the rest of the horizon. A situation such as this may occur if a 
“macro-state” event was expected to occur at this point in time. A simple example might 
be that an interconnector becomes binding, isolating the pricing of the region in which 
the generator operates.  
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Figure 9.18 Peakiness Ratings for Example 9.2.3.3 
 
This example is similar to Example 9.2.3.1, in that we are considering the matter of 
building up to generate in a high period, but the difference here is that we wish to keep 
the unit switched on beyond this point, as high prices continue. Given a two period start-
up process, the unit must be switched on in period 12 if it is to be free to generate 
anywhere within its feasible bounds in the very high-price period 14. Figure 9.28 
demonstrates that this switch is indeed the optimal decision in period 12, as long as the 
reservoir level is sufficiently high69. 
 
                                                 
69 note that the minimum feasible generation level in this example is 5 MW 
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Figure 9.19 Offers for Period 12 Considering Unit Rules – from Off 
 
In all periods prior to this it is only optimal to start the unit if the reservoir level is very 
high and the alternative is to spill the water/fuel that is arriving into the reservoir, as 
demonstrated for period 1 in Figure 9.20. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.20 Offers for Period 1 Considering Unit Rules – from Off 
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Figure 9.27 demonstrates the value curves for all possible unit states at the beginning of 
period 13, one period before the very high-price period. The general order of these 
curves is very similar to that in Figure 9.12, the major difference being that the value 
associated with the unit only just having been switched off is now lower than that 
associated with a unit that has cooled down and has almost satisfied its minimum down-
time requirement. The reason for this is that, as opposed to Example 9.2.3.1, at this point 
the generator is approaching a sustained set of high-priced periods, as opposed to just a 
one-off high-price period. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.21 Value Curves for all Unit States at Beginning of Period 13 
 
Example 9.2.3.4: Two Branches: One High and One Low-Priced 
 
This final example does not relate to unit rules, but still illustrates an idea presented in 
Chapter 3, that offers could potentially be counter intuitively more restrictive under 
higher prices in off-peak periods, when there is high correlation between the prices (or 
RD curve levels) in consecutive periods. The reason for this is that it would be desirable 
to save fuel for the peak periods, when the price levels may be even more extreme. Here, 
we consider two possible macro-states that the market could be in over the day, where 
the transition probabilities are such that it is highly unlikely that the market will switch 
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between the two states as the day progresses. Figure 9.27 demonstrates the “peakiness” 
of each period under the two possible states. The first state/branch corresponds to a 
high-price day, while the second state/branch corresponds to a low-price day, with 
relatively much lower extreme prices at the peak periods. 
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Figure 9.22 Peakiness Ratings for Example 9.2.3.4 
 
Consider the offers in period 1 under the low and high-price branches, shown in Figure 
9.24 and Figure 9.23 respectively. We can see that under the low-price branch, from the 
relatively high reservoir levels, dispatch becomes significantly positive, while there is no 
dispatch from any reservoir level under the high-price branch, despite its potential for far 
greater immediate profits.  
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Figure 9.23 Offers for Period 1 on Branch 1 
 
 
 
Figure 9.24 Offers for Period 1 on Branch 2 
 
The reason for this is, of course, that the higher-priced branch scenario recognises that 
there will be potential for even greater profits if fuel is saved for the peak periods. This 
is reflected in the corresponding sets of MC curves, as shown in Figure 9.25 and Figure 
9.26. 
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Figure 9.25 MC Curves for Period 1 on Branch 1 
 
 
 
Figure 9.26 MC Curves for Period 1 on Branch 2 
 
The MC curves for the higher-priced branch are clearly higher, reflecting the greater 
opportunity costs of generation discussed above. 
 
 399
9.3 Incorporating Ramp Rates 
 
In this section, we consider the addition of ramp rate restrictions to the unit rules VC 
model described in Section 9.2. As stated in that section, the state space for the DP is 
three dimensional. The dimensions are 
  
1. Previous market outcome 
2. Reservoir level 
3. Unit state 
 
In order to consider ramp rates, we need to add an extra dimension: 
 
4. Previous dispatch level 
 
In other words, the generation levels that are able to be achieved in the current period 
are dependant on the generation level at which the unit was dispatched in the previous 
period. Under the DP with a three-dimensional state space, there was a different value 
curve for each combination of previous market outcome and unit state, defined over 
reservoir level. This new DP requires a four-dimensional state space, and therefore  a 
different value surface is needed for each combination of previous market outcome, unit 
state, defined over the dimensions of reservoir level and previous dispatch level. 
 
In this section we will show how the four-dimensioned DP algorithm can be made to 
work efficiently, such that an extra dimension does not influence the computational 
time. The examples and analysis that we present here ignore the unit state dimension for 
simplicity, but are equally applicable to models with this dimension included. 
 
9.3.1 Constructing the MC Curve for a Given State with no Ramp Rates 
 
Recall from Section 6.6, that if we do not consider ramp rates then we construct p 
different Value and MV curves for the following period, t+1 (Section 1 of Figure 9.27). 
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For a given previously observed RD curve (period t-1), we then created a single 
weighted MV curve for the following period (t+1), based on the Markov probabilities of 
each RD occurring in the current period, t (Section 2 of Figure 9.27). Then, depending 
on the current reservoir level, the MOC curve is produced directly from this weighted 
MV curve (Section 3 of Figure 9.27). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.27 Construction of MC Curve with No Ramp Rates 
 
9.3.2 Constructing the MC Curve for a Given State with Ramp Rates 
 
As explained in Section 9.3, when ramp rates are considered, a set of three-dimensional 
value surfaces defined over reservoir level and previous dispatch level are required in 
each period, one for each possible previous RD curve (Section 1 of Figure 9.28). For 
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each of these previous RD curves, we must then create a weighted value surface based 
on the Markov chain probabilities of each of the RD curves occurring in the current 
period (Section 2 of Figure 9.28). 
 402
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.28 Construction of MC Curve with Ramp Rates 
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In this section we explain how the calculation of the MV curves (and hence the MOC 
curves for the previous period) is performed from these weighted value surfaces. 
 
Start by considering a generator that is heading towards an off-peak period, under a 
given previous RD curve, with a ramp rate of ± 2 MW/period. The value curve will, of 
course, be higher as the reservoir level increases (when you hold previous dispatch 
constant), and (generally speaking) higher for lower previous dispatch levels (when you 
hold the reservoir level constant, as it is desirable to be at a lower dispatch level when 
trying to ramp down). This situation is represented in a single three-dimensional Value 
curve, in Figure 9.29. Figure 9.30 shows a view of Figure 9.29 from above, where the 
line indicates all possible (reservoir level, previous dispatch level) states that could be 
reached in that period from the (23,0) state in the previous period (assuming no inflows). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.29 3D Value Surface for Period (t+1) as Off-Peak is Approached 
 
Reservoir level = 23, 
previous dispatch level = 0 
310.4 
298.3286.1
Reservoir level = 40, 
previous dispatch level = 0 
Reservoir level = 13, 
previous dispatch level = 10 
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Figure 9.30 Value Surface for Period (t+1) Viewed from Above, with Ramp Rate of ± 2 MW/Period 
 
Recall that in the case without ramp rates, if we are at reservoir level r in period t, then 
the MOC of the first unit of generation comes from the difference between the expected 
value at reservoir level r and level (r-1) in period (t+1), and so on. In the ramp rate 
model, the previous dispatch level must also be considered. In other words, if the 
reservoir is at level r in period t: 
 
MOC of the first unit of generation: comes from the difference between the expected 
value at reservoir level r under a previous dispatch level of “0” and the expected value at 
reservoir level (r-1) under a previous dispatch level of “1” in period (t+1) 
 
MOC of the second unit of generation: comes from the difference between the 
expected value at reservoir level (r-1) under a previous dispatch level of “1” and the 
expected value at reservoir level (r-2) under a previous dispatch level of “2” in period 
(t+1). 
 
and so on. 
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In other words, the MOC curve for a given (reservoir level, previous market outcome) 
state in period t is calculated in a ‘diagonal’ fashion, from the expected value surface for 
period (t+1) (Section 3 of Figure 9.28). For example, consider the case provided in 
Figure 9.29 and Figure 9.30, where the reservoir level is 23 in period t. If we were to 
generate one unit of electricity in this period, the future value component would fall 
from 310.4 to 298.3. Thus, the difference between these two values (12.1) gives our 
MOC of generating that first unit. Likewise, the MOC of generating the second unit is 
298.3 minus 286.1 (12.2). This process can be extended to provide the MOC for each 
feasible level of generation, for the given reservoir level (23) in period t. 
 
If there are no (or highly unrestrictive) ramp rates restrictions, then the value surface 
takes the same value regardless of the previous dispatch level. In this case, the MOC 
curve that we would produce from a given reservoir level collapses down to that which 
we would get if we only considered a two-dimensional value curve. 
 
Of course, when there are ramp rate restrictions, it is only a certain range of this MOC 
curve that is valid (or feasible). For example, in the case above with a maximum ramp 
rate of ± 2 MW/period, if the previous level of generation was 6MW, then only the 
section of the MOC curve corresponding to generation levels from 4 – 8MW are of any 
interest in the current period (as highlighted in red in Figure 9.30). The implication is 
that for a given (previous RD, reservoir level) state, if the previous dispatch level (t-1) 
moves from r to (r+1), then the MC of dispatching the (r+2)th  unit in the current period 
(t) would not change (assuming that the generation level is feasible in both cases in 
terms of ramping); it still comes from the same point on the expected value surface (for 
period (t+1)). This is important as it means computational complexity is not increased as 
much as one would normally expect as a result of adding a further dimension in the DP 
algorithm. This is discussed further in Section 9.3.5. Note also that the computational 
efficiency is greater, the tighter the ramp rates.  
 
Note that virtually all of the values in the matrix that are used to represent the Value 
surface are potentially used in determining the MC of generation for some period t state 
 406
or other. Therefore, all these values need to be calculated (or interpolated as discussed in 
Chapter 8). 
 
Unfortunately, because the MOC curves are constructed diagonally, some of the 
efficiency related to sliding along a single overall MOC curve is lost. This means that 
now, rather than having MOC curves for consecutive reservoir levels parallel to one 
another, they may take any form, so long as the MOC curve for the higher reservoir 
level is below that for the lower reservoir level. This concept is demonstrated in Figure 
9.31, where the figure on the left shows the set of MOC curves for a subset of reservoir 
levels ignoring ramp rates, and the figure on the right shows an equivalent set of MOC 
curves considering ramp rates. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.31 MOC Curve Comparison 
 
9.3.3 Monotonicity in the MOC curve under the Ramp Rate Model 
 
If we assume no ramp rate restrictions, then in order for the MOC curves to be 
monotone, the only condition was that the two-dimensional value curve for the 
following period had to be concave (i.e. the MV of storage was falling). Now that the 
MOC curves are being produced from the diagonal of a value surface, this condition 
becomes slightly more complex. 
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Ramping Down:  
 
If the generator is heading towards an off-peak period, and trying to ramp down as fast 
as possible, then the value surface for period (t+1) will be decreasing in the previous 
dispatch level and increasing in the reservoir level dimensions. In particular, let us 
assume that the value surface is concave in both dimensions. This is the case presented 
in Figure 9.29. Therefore, we know that as dispatch is increased (from any current 
reservoir level), future value is falling off at a faster rate in each of the two dimensions 
that it is defined over. Therefore, the MOC must be monotonically increasing as 
dispatch level increases. 
 
Ramping Up:  
 
If the generator is heading towards a peak period, and trying to ramp up as fast as 
possible, then the value surface for period (t+1) will be increasing in the previous 
dispatch level. 
 
 
Figure 9.32 Value Curve for Period (t+1) for a Unit Ramping Up 
 
Let us consider a specific example, where the value curve shown in Figure 9.32 is given 
by the equation: 
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 DispatchPrevious*20LevelReservoir *20Value +=  
 
In this case, the contribution to the future value from the reservoir level and the previous 
dispatch (period t) level can be treated independently, as we try to determine whether the 
MV/MOC curve will be monotonically increasing in the period t dispatch level. 
Therefore, we will also consider the contributions to the MOC to be independent of one 
another. 
 
Consider now a different example, where the future value contribution from the 
reservoir level decreases at an increasing rate as we increase the current dispatch, and 
the contribution from the previous dispatch level is increasing at a decreasing rate (i.e. 
the value surface is concave in both dimensions, and meets the conditions of the 
scenario that we are considering). A possible set of values are presented in Table 9.2. 
 
Dispatch 
(x) 
Reservoir Level 
Value Contribution 
Previous Dispatch 
Level Value 
Contribution 
Sum MV/MOC = Sum(x-1) – Sum(x) 
0 500 20 520  
1 480 120 600 -80 
2 450 200 650 -50 
3 410 260 670 -20 
4 350 310 660 10 
5 270 350 620 40 
6 170 380 550 70 
7 50 400 450 100 
 
Table 9.2 An Example of MOC Curve Production 
 
In this case, we are approaching a peak period, and thus it is desirable for the unit to be 
ramped up to a certain extent. This is reflected in the fact that the MOC of the first few 
units of generation are actually negative (in order to ensure that dispatch in period t is at 
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least at this level). In addition, we can observe that the MOC is monotonically 
increasing.  
 
We can prove that this is the case for all examples where the contributions from 
reservoir and previous dispatch levels are concave. 
 
If we consider the components independently, we can show that the MOC contributions 
from both the reservoir level and from the previous dispatch level are increasing as the 
generation level increases. 
 
Reservoir Level MOC Contribution: We know that the value curve is increasing and 
concave in the reservoir level variable. Therefore the MV must be falling as we increase 
the reservoir level or, alternatively, that the marginal value (MOC) must be 
monotonically non-decreasing as we increase the generation level in period t (thus 
reducing the reservoir level). 
 
Previous Dispatch Level Contribution: Because we are ramping up, we know that we 
would prefer to be at a higher generation level as we approach period (t+1). However, as 
the surface is concave in this variable, we know that the marginal benefit of being at 
higher and higher generation levels is falling. Therefore, the MOC contribution must be 
negative over the entire range of generation levels, but with the values approaching zero 
as the previous dispatch level increases. In other words, although the contribution of this 
term is negative, it is monotonically non-decreasing as the previous dispatch level 
increases. 
 
Therefore, as both terms that contribute to the MOC are monotonically non-decreasing, 
then the sum of the two terms must also be monotonically non-decreasing. This will be 
true as long as the value surface is concave in both dimensions, regardless of whether 
the value functions are increasing or decreasing. For example, if the most desirable 
previous dispatch level to be at is somewhere in the middle of the feasible dispatch 
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range, then the value surface may form a concave parabola around that previous dispatch 
level, and this would still give a monotone MOC curve. 
 
Therefore, this has shown that as long as the value surface is concave in both 
dimensions, then the offers produced will be monotone, as they are required to be. 
 
Unfortunately, although we need the value surface to be concave in both dimensions in 
order to produce increasing MOC curves (and thus monotone offers), due to the 
discretisation of the various problem dimensions, the value surfaces that are produced 
will not always take this form70. In these cases, we must perform an adjustment to the 
surface, so that they become concave, and will produce the required form of offers. 
 
9.3.4 Process for Producing Offers for all Previous Dispatch Levels with Ramp Rates 
 
In this section, we outline the process for producing the optimal offers under all previous 
dispatch levels for a given market and reservoir level state. The steps in this process are: 
 
1. Produce the MOC curve for a given (reservoir level, previous RD) state using the 
approach described in Section 9.3.2. 
2. Produce an unrestricted offer for the given state, based on this MC curve, as 
shown in Figure 9.33. In other words, this is an offer that ignores any ramping 
restrictions and thus goes all the way from zero to the maximum generation level 
(d). 
3. Work out the expected payoff from the dispatch at the intersection of each of the 
RD curves with the unrestricted offer (the red stars in Figure 9.33). 
4. Work through the previous dispatch levels, producing the offer as the feasible 
section (with respect to ramp rates) of the unrestricted offer, along with vertical 
and horizontal segments such that dispatch can only fall within this feasible 
                                                 
70 As was the case without ramp rates, demonstrated in Section 6.6.1. 
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range, regardless of the RD curve outcome (as shown in green in Figure 9.33)71. 
This will mean that the horizontal segment below (above) the lowest (highest) 
feasible generation level will be lower (higher) than any price that a RD curve 
could intersect within this range. 
5. Calculate the value of each offer. This is very computationally efficient when 
using the following steps. 
a. For any RD curves that naturally intersect the unrestricted offer in the 
feasible generation range (the middle two red stars in Figure 9.33), use 
the expected payoffs found in step 2. 
b. For the other RD curves, the resulting dispatch must either be at the 
lowest or the highest feasible generation level, therefore Q is easy to find, 
and hence so is P (as we have a defined P for each Q level under each RD 
curve). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.33 Unrestricted and Ramp Rate Restricted Offers 
                                                 
71 Note that we know this must be the optimal offer for the given previous generation level as the method 
explicitly considers the future value of getting to a higher (or lower) generation level in the current period 
(t) when determining the MOC of each additional unit of generation. Hence, the method deals with the 
strategic value of pushing generation higher or lower before it might be immediately desirable to do so. 
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9.3.5 Calculation Complexity Implications 
 
By considering the previous dispatch level, an extra dimension is added to the DP state 
space. Generally, adding dimensions in DP leads to the “curse of dimensionality”, 
meaning that computational times would also increase by a full extra dimension. 
However, in this section we show that because of the various structures of the problem 
faced here, this is not the case. 
 
The first point to note is that there will be no effect on the pre-processing phase of the 
algorithm. The same set of MC levels can still be used, and the UMSs have not changed. 
 
In Section 9.2.3 we explained that there is no need to produce a completely separate 
offer for each previous dispatch level under a given reservoir level. A single offer needs 
to be produced, ignoring the ramping restrictions, and then the feasible ranges of this 
become the optimal offer for each possible previous dispatch level. In addition, Section 
9.3.4 demonstrated that the calculation of the value of these partial offers is very 
computationally efficient.  
 
Unfortunately, under the ramp-rate model, separate MV/MOC curves need to be created 
for each reservoir level, rather than just a single one defined for all possible reservoir 
level positions.  
 
The overall computational complexity of the branched approach including ramp rates 
can be approximately summarised by Equation 9.1. 
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Equation 9.1 Computational Complexity of the Branched RT Phase with Ramp Rates in Full 
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Simplifying this down to the terms of the largest orders of magnitude, we can see that 
the algorithm is of order of complexity as shown in Equation 9.2. 
 
( ) tpMdbPdtpr ++  
 
Equation 9.2 Order of Computational Complexity for Branched RT Phase with Ramp Rates 
 
Recall the simplified computational complexity of the branched model without ramp 
rates, given in Equation 7.10 from Chapter 7: 
 
( ) tpMdbdPtpr +++  
 
Equation 7.10 Computational Complexity for Branched RT Phase without Ramp Rates 
 
When the previous dispatch level dimension is considered, it might be expected that the 
computational time would increase by a factor given by the size of this new DP 
dimension (i.e. the number of different possible dispatch levels, or d). However, the only 
difference between the complexity orders is that the terms tprdtprP + have changed to a 
single term, tprPd . While this is still a significant increase, it is certainly less than that 
of a whole dimension72. 
 
9.3.6 Further Experimental Evidence of Offer Construction Theories 
 
In this section, we will show the effect of implementing the ramp rate conditions on the 
offers that are made to the market, under three example scenarios. The first example has 
one very high-price period in the middle of the off-peak section of the planning horizon, 
the second example has two relatively low-price periods in the middle of the peak 
section of the planning horizon, while the third example has half the horizon with very 
low prices (or RD curves), and then suddenly jumps up to high prices for the remainder 
of the horizon. Note that, as with the cases presented in Section 9.2.3, all scenarios 
                                                 
72 In fact, in preliminary testing we have found that the percentage increase in computational time may be 
anywhere from 10 – 25% of its potential expected increase, as given by the term d. 
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presented are relatively extreme cases, enabling us to demonstrate the effect of the ramp 
rate constraints clearly. 
 
Example 9.3.6.1: Anomalous High-Price Period in the Off-Peak Range 
 
The first example that we use is the same as Example 9.2.3.1, except that we ignore the 
unit rules, and consider ramp rates only. Figure 9.34 demonstrates the optimal offer to 
provide to the market at a reservoir level of 90 in period 11 assuming that there are no 
ramp rate restrictions, while Figure 9.35 demonstrates the equivalent optimal offer 
assuming ramp rates must be considered. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.34 Offer for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 11 under No Ramp Rates 
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Figure 9.35 Offer for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 11 under Ramp Rates 
 
It is clear that if ramp rates do not need to be considered, then the optimal dispatch 
depends on the RD curve and can range anywhere from 3 to 19 MW (the maximum 
capacity of the unit considered). However, if ramp rates do exist, then the optimal offer 
is much more restrictive (with dispatch no higher than 4 MW), recognising that a low-
price period is to follow, and that it will be costly to be ramped too high at this point. 
Again consider the MC curves that lead to these two offers, as shown in Figure 9.36. In 
the ramp rate case, the model recognises the cost in being ramped up to a high dispatch 
level at the end of the period, and thus the MC curve is very high across most of the 
feasible generation range. This leads to the much more restrictive offer demonstrated in 
Figure 9.35. 
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Figure 9.36 MC Curve for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 11 under No Ramp Rates 
 
Again it is interesting to observe how the expected payoff over the horizon is affected by 
the restrictiveness of the ramping conditions. Table 9.3 shows that, as would be expected 
from standard optimisation theory, the expected payoff gets progressively lower as we 
decrease the generation range flexibility. 
 
Ramp Up/Down Limit Expected Payoff 
No Restrictions 35540.95 
20 35540.95 
10 34614.22 
5 33051.04 
2 29190.62 
1 25428.88 
 
Table 9.3 Expected Payoff vs Ramp Rate Restrictions 
 
Finally, Figure 9.37 shows an entire value surface for the end of period 11, considering 
ramp rates, for the above example. Note how the value surface is significantly greater at 
Price 
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lower previous dispatch levels, indicating the benefit of being ramped down to a low 
dispatch level at this point. This is the reason for the very high MC curve in this case. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.37 Value Surface with Ramp Rates just before an Off-Peak Period 
 
This example has demonstrated that the form of the offers is affected when ramp rates 
are considered, as the impact of current generation levels on the future must be 
considered. In addition, it has demonstrated that by progressively tightening the ramp 
rate restrictions, the negative impact on expected payoff escalates very quickly. The 
same general results, under different scenarios, are also produced in the following two 
examples. 
 
Example 9.3.6.2: Anomalous Low-Price Periods in the Peak Range 
 
In this second scenario, the general height of the RD curves, or the “peakiness” of each 
period is shown in Figure 9.38. Clearly, there are two anomalous low-price periods in 
the middle of the peak section of the planning horizon. 
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Figure 9.38 Peakiness Ratings for Scenario 1 
 
Figure 9.39 demonstrates the optimal offer to provide to the market at a reservoir level 
of 90 in period 11 assuming that there are no ramp rate restrictions, while Figure 9.40 
demonstrates the equivalent optimal offer assuming ramp rates must be considered. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.39 Offer for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 11 under No Ramp Rates 
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 419
 
 
Figure 9.40 Offer for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 11 under Ramp Rates 
 
It is clear that if ramp rates do not need to be considered, then it is not optimal to 
dispatch any electricity (release any fuel) in this low-price period. However, if ramp 
rates do exist, then there will be a positive offer, leading to dispatch between 10 and 13 
MW, depending on the RD curve that occurs. The reason for this is that the following 
period (12) is a very high price period, under which a high dispatch level is likely to be 
desired. Therefore, under ramp rate restrictions, the dispatch level in the current period 
must be relatively high, to enable the generator to reach these high desired dispatch 
levels in the following period. Another way of thinking about this is to consider that the 
offers provided in Figure 9.39 and Figure 9.40 are based on the MC curves shown in 
Figure 9.41. In the ramp rate case, the model recognises the value in being ramped up to 
a relatively high dispatch level at the end of the period, and thus the MC curve is very 
low across most of the feasible generation range. This leads to the much more generous 
offer demonstrated in Figure 9.40. 
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Figure 9.41 MC Curve for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 11 under No Ramp Rates 
 
It is also interesting to observe how the expected payoff over the horizon is affected by 
the restrictiveness of the ramping conditions. Table 9.4 shows that in this case, as we 
decrease the generation range flexibility, the expected payoff gets progressively lower. 
 
Ramp Up/Down Limit (MW/period) Expected Payoff 
No Restrictions 30575.06 
20 30575.06 
10 29471.61 
5 25639.81 
2 19765.59 
1 16943.66 
 
Table 9.4 Expected Payoff vs Ramp Rate Restrictions 
 
Finally, Figure 9.42 shows an entire value surface for the end of period 11, considering 
ramp rates, for the above example. The ‘zero’ values indicate infeasible regions due to 
ramp rate restrictions combined with limited fuel. Note how, particularly at high 
reservoir levels, the value surface is significantly greater at higher previous dispatch 
Price 
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levels, indicating the benefit of being ramped up to a high dispatch level at this point. 
This is the reason for the very low MC curve in this case. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.42 Value Surface with Ramp Rates just before a Peak Period 
 
Example 9.3.6.3: Low-Price Periods Changing Suddenly to High-Price Periods 
 
The third example that we consider is the same as Example 9.2.3.3, except that we 
ignore the unit rules, and consider ramp rates only. Figure 9.43 demonstrates the optimal 
offer to provide to the market at a reservoir level of 90 in period 13 assuming that there 
are no ramp rate restrictions, while Figure 9.44 demonstrates the equivalent optimal 
offer assuming ramp rates must be considered. 
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Figure 9.43 Offer for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 13 under No Ramp Rates 
 
 
 
Figure 9.44 Offer for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 13 under Ramp Rates 
 
If ramp rates do not need to be considered, then it is optimal to not dispatch any 
electricity (or release any fuel) in this final low-price period. However, if ramp rates do 
exist, then there will be a positive offer, leading to dispatch off 11 MW under all RD 
curves. This enables a relatively high level of dispatch in the first high price period, 
which otherwise would not have been possible. Again, look at the MC curves that lead 
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to this offers, as shown in Figure 9.45. We can see that up to a quantity of around 11 or 
12 MW, the MC curve for ramp rates is lower, while beyond this point it is higher. 
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Figure 9.45 MC Curve for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 13 under No Ramp Rates 
 
The reason for the crossover at this point is demonstrated in Figure 9.46. We can see 
that, with ramp rates, the optimal dispatch level in period 14 is between 14 and 15 MW. 
Given that this particular example was solved assuming a ramp limit of 3 MW/period, 
the optimal dispatch level of 11 MW in period 13 makes sense. The relative MC curves 
are clearly reflected in the offers shown above. 
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Figure 9.46 Offer for Reservoir Level 90 in Period 14 under No Ramp Rates 
 
9.4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have demonstrated how the Value Curve approach presented in the 
previous chapter can be modified to account of unit rules, including: 
 
1. Minimum feasible generation level 
2. Start-up and shut-down costs 
3. Minimum up and down times 
4. Fixed start-up process 
5. Ramp rate restrictions 
 
We have also demonstrated that although adding these additional complexities adds two 
dimensions to the state space of the DP (unit state and previous dispatch level), the 
computational complexity increases at a much slower rate than that which would be 
expected from the “curse of dimensionality”. In the case of the unit state dimension, this 
is because much of the computational complexity is in the production of the offers and 
their values, but for many of the unit states the offers are fixed and thus their value is 
easy to determine. In the case of the previous dispatch level dimension under ramp rate 
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restrictions, we have shown that for a given reservoir level, a single overall offer can be 
constructed and the feasible segment of this overall offer used as the optimal offer. In 
other words, there is no need to construct a completely separate offer from each previous 
dispatch level. 
 
We have demonstrated many of the offering behaviours hypothesised in Chapter 3 are as 
expected under stochastic scenarios, in addition to the deterministic scenarios presented 
there. With respect to the unit rules, we have shown how a unit may move through its 
start-up process during low-price periods (unprofitable in the short-term), in order to 
capitalise on high-price periods when they arrive. Alternatively, we have shown that a 
unit may remain switched on over very low price periods when it is costly to shut-down 
and start-up again, if they expect to be generating again in the short-term. We have also 
shown that ramp rate restrictions can have similar effects, promoting a generator to ramp 
up sufficiently in time for a peak set of periods, or alternatively, to ramp down in 
sufficient time for a set of off-peak periods. A final interesting behaviour that we have 
demonstrated is that a generator may, counter intuitively, provide a more generous offer 
under low RD curves than under high RD curves, if the correlation between the heights 
of these RD curves is high.  
 
In the following chapter we present extensions to the optimal offering models presented 
in this thesis, along with possible approaches to dealing with these extensions.
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Chapter 10  
 
EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we begin by describing some additional applications of the simulation 
model presented in Section 8.3, which would enable a generation firm to analyse the 
potential performance of their offering plan in advance of a planning horizon, or to make 
after-the-fact analysis of their performance over the planning horizon. The remainder of 
the chapter is dedicated to proposing possible extensions to the model presented in this 
thesis, and suggesting methods of addressing some of these. These extensions include 
accounting for contracts for the future supply of electricity, dealing with the cases of 
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multiple reservoirs in parallel or in series and using the model for gas generators who 
are able to buy more fuel at certain points in the planning horizon if they wish. 
 
10.2 Additional Applications of the Simulation Model 
 
In addition to the uses of the simulation described and applied already in this thesis, 
there are three further valuable applications of the simulation model, which a generating 
firm could employ either in advance to analyse the expected performance of a fixed 
offering plan that they are considering, or to perform after-the-fact analysis of their 
offering performance over a planning horizon. 
 
10.2.1 Finding Expected Payoff of a Given Offer Set 
 
The simulation model can be used to simulate the payoff that could be expected  for a 
single instance over a planning horizon for a given set of offers (one offer for each 
period), as opposed to an offering strategy (one offer for each possible state in each 
period) determined by one of the models discussed in this thesis. This given set of offers 
could be the offers that a generating firm is considering providing to the market for the 
horizon, or could come from any other sort of simple decision rule.  
 
Therefore, this feature could be used by a generator in advance of the horizon to 
estimate the difference in the expected payoff between what could be achieved using the 
offer optimisation model and what could be achieved using the current offers under 
consideration. 
 
Additionally, this feature would help in developing the input data to the optimisation 
model in preparation for online application. We would always expect the optimisation to 
produce a better quality of solution than a handmade offer set (if its input data accurately 
reflects the real world). If the handmade offer set is better, then this could be used as a 
feedback mechanism to improve the performance of the model (by improving the quality 
of its dataset). 
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10.2.2 Finding Payoff for a Given Residual Demand and Inflow Set 
 
The simulation model enables the user to provide a set of RD curve outcomes for the 
planning horizon and make a comparison between: 
 
1. The optimal decisions and payoff under Perfect Information (i.e. if we knew 
these sequences in advance) 
2. The optimal decisions and payoff under uncertainty that could have been made 
given the stochastic market and inflow information that could reasonably have 
been available at the time when the decisions were made 
3. The actual decisions and payoffs that were made and achieved in these periods 
 
These comparisons could be made in hindsight to compare how well the generator 
operator did with their offers (3) compared to how well they should have been able to do 
(2), had they used the offer strategy construction approach proposed in this thesis (given 
the stochastic information that they could reasonably have had at the time). As such, this 
would help a generator to evaluate the potential value-added of having this model over 
using their current strategy.  
 
Note that this feature also enables comparisons between the actual payoffs and the 
absolute optimal that could have been achieved under Perfect Information (1). 
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10.2.3 Evaluating Market Power Exploitation 
 
As described in Section 8.3, the simulation model can be used to produce the optimal 
offering strategy of a generator that behaves as a perfect competitor, always offering at 
marginal cost. As such, comparisons can be made between these perfectly competitive 
offers and those actually made over a given horizon by a particular generator. Such an 
analysis would be valuable from two perspectives. 
 
1. A market regulator could use this type of analysis to demonstrate that a 
generator’s offers are significantly raised above marginal cost and is thus 
exploiting market power, and should be further restricted in its offering 
behaviour, or 
2. A generator could use this type of analysis to defend its position that it is 
offering at or close to marginal cost and thus not exploiting market power, and 
the regulator thus has no reason to further restrict its behaviour. 
 
Clearly, the extent of market power that the model implies will depend on the 
assumptions made with respect to the input data (such as any generation costs other than 
opportunity costs, value placed on water, and expectations with respect to possible 
residual curves) used in the model, as well as the structure of the model (branched 
versus non-branched). The careful choice of such data and structure could produce either 
result as desired by the user, and so the choice of inputs would likely be the point of 
significant debate if this technique were used in such an inquiry. In addition, the 
generators would argue that it must be long-term marginal cost that is considered, as 
returns made must be sufficient to encourage necessary levels of investment in 
generation.  
 
10.3 Accounting for Contracts 
 
In the wholesale electricity market, generators may hold contracts for differences (CfDs) 
with various clients, effectively locking in a price for a certain proportion of their 
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generation. If a generator faces known CfD levels in each period of the planning 
horizon, it is a very simple matter to adjust the revenue function used in the construct of 
the offers accordingly. Let us define: 
 
 tR  = Revenue in period t 
tQ  = Quantity dispatch in period t 
( )tt QP  = Price level in period t as a result of dispatch level tQ  
 tK  = CfD level in period t 
 
Revenue in period t was determined by: 
 
( )tttt QPQR *=  
 
Accounting for CfDs, it is now: 
 
[ ] ( )ttttt QPKQR *−= 73 
 
In other words, if the dispatch level is greater than the CfD level, then the generator 
receives the market price for the excess generation. On the other hand, if the CfD level is 
greater than the dispatch level, the generator must purchase electricity from the market, 
at the market price, to meet its contractual supply commitments. 
 
Consider a very simple example with just one possible RD curve of the form 
tt QP 2120 −=  and a contract to supply 20MW of electricity in period t, as shown in 
Figure 10.1. 
 
                                                 
73 Note that the pre-determined revenue associated with the CfDs is not considered here because it is 
independent of any of the operating decisions that we make. 
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Figure 10.1 Revenue under CfDs 
 
Consider five different possible offers (1-5), passing through the RD curve at quantities 
of 0, 10, 20, 30, and 40 respectively. Note that there is only a single possible RD curve 
in this case, this is equivalent to just making a deterministic dispatch decision. 
 
Offer Market Clearing Price ($) 
Dispatch Level 
(MW) 
Excess Supply 
(MW) 
Revenue  
($) 
1 90 0 -20 -1800 
2 70 10 -10 -700 
3 50 20 0 0 
4 30 30 10 300 
5 10 40 20 200 
 
Table 10.1 Net Outcome Possibilities 
 
For this example, assuming zero marginal cost, the optimal decision out of these five 
options is clearly to provide Offer 4, leading to a dispatch level of 30MW, 10MW higher 
than the contracted level. 
Offer 1 
Offer 2 
Offer 3 
Offer 4 
Offer 5 
-$700 
$0 
$300 
$200 
-$1800 
20 30 40 10 
RD 
90 
Price ($/MWh) 
Quantity (MW) 
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Note that the modification that would be required under the R&A approach discussed 
earlier in this thesis would not be as straightforward. The reason for this relates to the 
inaccuracy of that algorithm as explained in Section 6.7.1. This inaccuracy means that it 
is possible to construct offers that do not register an intersection with all RD curves 
within the (price, quantity) space.  Because many of the revenues at the points of 
intersection will be negative when considering contracts, as shown in the example 
above, the incentives for the algorithm to avoid an intersection with RD curves is greatly 
increased, and offers produced by this approach would be distorted as such. In order to 
mitigate this problem, a constant term would need to be added to all payoffs ($1800 in 
this case) in order to make all payoffs non-negative. 
 
10.4 Physical Marginal Generation Cost Curve 
 
In the preceding chapters, we have assumed that the marginal cost associated with 
generation from a fuel-constrained generation unit comes solely from the cost associated 
with foregoing future use of that fuel (i.e. the marginal opportunity cost). However, it is 
possible that there may be other marginal costs associated with generation that also need 
to be considered. These are the more direct, physical marginal costs of generation, 
incurred in the actual operation of the generation unit itself, and are much more likely to 
occur in thermal generation units than hydro. 
 
Dealing with these physical marginal costs of generation requires a very simple 
adjustment to the RT phase algorithm presented in Section 6.6.2. Previously, the offers 
constructed were based directly on the MOC curve from the given state. When 
considering physical marginal generation costs, we must base offers on the total MC 
curve, which is the simple vertical sum of the MOC curve and the physical MC curve, as 
shown in Figure 10.2. We can easily determine that the total MC must be the vertical 
sum of the MOC and physical MC curves by considering the marginal cost to the 
generator of each successive unit of generation; there is a well defined marginal 
opportunity cost and marginal physical cost for each. 
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Figure 10.2 Total MC Curve 
 
10.5 Multiple Reservoirs 
 
Whether we have generation units attached to multiple reservoirs in parallel or in series, 
in order to apply the approach developed in this thesis, a single, collective offer to the 
market must be provided, rather than one for each unit. One of these offers must be 
provided for each state, as defined by the combination of the previous market outcome 
and the levels of all reservoirs ((n+1)-dimensional state space, where there are n separate 
reservoirs). 
 
The reason that a single offer must be provided from each state is that the generation 
company is offering into the same uncertain market scenario from all reservoirs, 
assuming block dispatch74. If separate offers were provided from each unit, then this 
would mean the residual situation faced by each unit would be affected, when the offers 
from all other units are adjusted. 
                                                 
74 Block dispatch allows the generator to provide its required dispatch from any of the units within a local 
block, regardless of which of these units provided the offer that led to the dispatch in the market clearing 
process. 
Physical MC 
Marginal Costs 
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In this section, we present the issues related to the construction of offers from multiple 
reservoirs that are either in parallel or in series, and suggest possible methods of solving 
these problems. For simplicity, the examples presented consider just two reservoirs. 
 
10.5.1 Parallel Reservoirs 
 
In order to extend the approach presented in this thesis to multiple parallel reservoirs, 
the value curve for each period would have to become multi-dimensional, defined over 
the storage levels for all reservoirs. The reason for this is that the total value of storage 
depends not only on the total level of storage amongst all reservoirs (as you might 
expect when all reservoirs are offering electricity to the same market node), but rather, 
the value depends on the split of storage between these reservoirs. To demonstrate this, 
consider the simplest case of two identical parallel reservoirs with maximum storage 
level M (total storage of 2M), each with a single generation unit with maximum 
generation level maxQ . Assume that the generator is coming into a peak period and it is 
desirable for it to generate as much electricity as possible from both reservoirs. If there 
was total available storage of M, then it would be more valuable to have each reservoir 
sitting at ½M, than to have one sitting at M and the other empty and unable to produce 
any electricity. The construction of the MC curves from such value surfaces is far more 
complex than from a single value curve. 
 
To begin to deal with this problem, we must consider the desirable balance between 
storage in the multiple parallel reservoirs. In a very simple case, such as that presented 
above, it is clear that it is optimal to distribute storage as evenly as possible. To this end, 
we construct a “Target Balance Line”, as demonstrated in Figure 10.3 (the original 
theory behind this concept is discussed in Read (1989)). 
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Figure 10.3 Simple Balance Line 
 
At each period, when determining the dispatch from each unit, we will be aiming to get 
as near to this target balance line as possible, subject to expectations about inflows at the 
respective reservoirs within the next period. Assuming that there are no generation costs 
other than opportunity costs, then in this case, we can effectively just aggregate the two 
reservoirs into one, with minimal loss of accuracy75. 
 
However, as the situation becomes more complex, these target balance lines will take 
different shapes, leaving us no longer able to simply aggregate the reservoir levels, and 
so the construction of the MOC curves on which to base the offers becomes much more 
difficult. As a simple example, if the generation unit at one of the reservoirs had a 
greater capacity than the one at the other reservoir, then it would be desirable to have a 
greater storage level at the reservoir with the larger-capacity unit. This is demonstrated 
in Figure 10.4, where reservoir 1 has the generation unit with the larger capacity.  
 
                                                 
75 As with the rest of this thesis, we assume here that the efficiency of the generation units is linear. Note, 
however, that the efficiencies of the different units do not need to be identical (i.e. generation unit 1 may 
require i cumecs of water flow to produce 1MW of electricity, while unit 2 may require j≠i cumecs). This 
can be dealt with by simply referring to reservoir levels in terms of possible units of electricity that can be 
produced, rather than volumes of water. 
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Figure 10.4 Balance Line under Non-Uniform Generation Units 
 
This concept of target balance lines is similar to the PRISM model’s “balance zone” 
approach (Read, Culy, Halliburton, & Winter (1988)) for balancing storage between the 
North and South Islands of New Zealand, but more complex, because in this thesis we 
are providing offers with uncertain release levels, rather than directly deciding release.  
 
One possible alternative to explicitly modelling an n dimensional value surface is to 
have a two dimensional value surface, where the dimensions are defined as “total 
storage” (the sum over all reservoirs), and “relative balance”, where the relative balance 
variable indicates how close to the target balance line you will likely end up, as a result 
of offering in the current period. This approach is considered beyond the scope of this 
thesis and is left to future research. 
 
10.5.2 Reservoirs in Series 
 
To consider reservoir in series (or reservoir chains), the situation is a lot more complex 
than the parallel reservoir case, as flows (and flow delays) between consecutive 
reservoirs must be modelled and optimised. This case is applicable only to hydro units, 
as thermal units will always be in parallel. The general concept of the approach that is 
described for parallel reservoirs is still valid; the value curve will need to be multi-
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Reservoir 1 
Level
Reservoir 2  
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dimensional and the target balance would (in most circumstances) favour the bulk of 
storage in the up-stream reservoir (as it could be used later to generate additional 
electricity at the downstream generator). However, the detailed application of this 
approach to the case of a reservoir chain is left to future research. 
 
10.6 Gas Generators 
 
In this section, we consider how the algorithm presented in this thesis might be applied 
to a gas generator which, rather than having a fixed fuel availability with uncertain 
additional inflows over the planning horizon, has a steady contracted flow of fuel (gas) 
into its “stockpile” over time, and at regular intervals can choose to either supplement 
this flow by purchasing gas from the gas spot market, or reduce the flow by selling gas 
on this spot market. We assume that flexibility in drawing gas from the pipeline 
effectively means that we have a small reservoir, with deterministic inflows each period 
equal to the net supply from the gas market. This means that gas does not need to be 
used immediately at the time at which it is injected at the start of the pipeline76, and thus 
can be saved for use in the short- to medium-term (depending on the physical constraints 
of the system). 
 
Depending on the market setup and the technology involved, those regular intervals 
might be once every eight hours, when the worker’s shift changes and the valve for the 
pipeline leading to the generator could be physically changed. We define a “gas supply 
period” to be the set of periods between each opportunity to adjust the gas inflow (16 
half-hour offering periods, in this case). This is demonstrated in Figure 10.5.  
 
                                                 
76 In fact, due to gas pipeline transit times, it could not be used immediately anyway. 
 439
 
 
Figure 10.5 Gas Market Purchase Level Alteration Opportunities - Timeline 
 
Before proceeding with a possible approach to this problem, we need to consider 
whether the gas generator has market power in the gas market (in addition to the 
electricity market). If they do not have market power, then in each period there will be 
fixed prices for purchasing gas from or selling gas to the gas market in any desired 
quantity, most likely with a spread between the prices. A deterministic case is shown in 
Figure 10.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.6 Fixed Gas Price Spread - No Market Power 
 
If the generator does have market power, then there will be a residual supply curve that 
defines a changing buy or sell price, which is dependant on the quantity of gas that we 
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trade with the market. Figure 10.7 shows how a deterministic residual supply curve is 
constructed by horizontally subtracting the rest-of-market demand curve from the supply 
curve (this is the exact opposite of the method for constructing the RD curves considered 
throughout this thesis). 
 
 
 
Figure 10.7 Residual Supply Curve for Gas - Market Power 
 
In this section we discuss the approach to this problem under two assumptions. The first 
is that there are a discrete number of possible decisions that can be made at the 
beginning of each gas supply period that will determine the flow for the following eight 
hours. The approach that we suggest to determining the optimal decision is based on the 
decision branch method presented in Section 7.2. The second assumption that we 
consider is that a different level of flow is possible in each period of the horizon. Under 
this assumption, we suggest optimising the desired flow separately for each period, 
which is a more accurate, but consequently slower, method. 
 
We recognise that the methods presented in this section deal with a very simplistic 
representation of the physical complexities of a gas generator and its supply pipeline, 
and leave more detailed analysis to further research. 
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10.6.1 Discrete Decisions – Branching Approach 
 
The approach that we present here assumes that there are a discrete number of possible 
decisions at the start of each gas supply period, regarding the (positive or negative) 
change of flow for that period. Under a discretised situation such as this, we are able to 
almost directly apply the branched version of the Value Curve algorithm presented in 
Figure 7.24 in Chapter 7, where we have one branch associated with each possible 
decision. At the source of those branches (the beginning of the gas supply period), we 
must decide, for each reservoir level, which of those branches is most beneficial to 
traverse, given that the future scenario from the end of the gas supply period will be 
identical under all options (i.e. it is a non-transitive branching tree which converges 
between each gas supply period). An example of this with just three possible decisions 
(decrease flow by 10 units per period, no change, and increase flow by 10 units per 
period) is shown in Figure 10.8.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.8 Non-Transitive Branching Tree for Discrete Gas Market Decisions 
 
The only change that needs to be made to the original algorithm is in the construction of 
the value curves as the algorithm works backwards through the gas supply period. These 
values must be adjusted each period to account for the expected cost or revenue 
associated with any additional purchases or sales of gas within the gas market, from 
Increase flow by 
10 units per period 
No change to flow 
Decrease flow by 
10 units per period 
t=2 t=3 t=17 t=1 
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each state. For the deterministic cases presented in Figure 10.6 and Figure 10.7, it is 
very simple to observe the price that will result from any given buy/sell decision, and 
thus to establish the value curve adjustments required. Under stochastic gas market 
scenarios, we simply take the expected price level at our given buy/sell decision, and 
base the value curve adjustments on these levels. 
 
Note that the computational requirements for the PP phase are not affected at all by 
considering interaction with the gas market, as the same uncertain electricity market 
scenarios on which the OCFs are constructed apply under all branches. 
 
Note also that this branched non-transitive structure would make it very easy to deal 
with a condition that required a generator to lock in its flow change decision a certain 
number of offering periods out from the start of a gas supply period. The decision would 
be based on the branch that has the highest value at the start of the gas supply period at 
the reservoir level that we expect to be at, at that time. 
 
10.6.2 Continuous Decisions – Optimisation 
 
If a generator wishes to have complete control over the amount of gas that they purchase 
from or sell to the market, the decision tree approach cannot be applied, as there would 
be a continuum of possible decisions, and thus an infinite number of possible branches. 
As such, the decision would need to be optimised on a period by period basis, given the 
expectations for both the gas and electricity markets. Although the decision is optimised 
period-by-period in this manner, we recognise that the overall gas flow decision should 
be a constant over the entire gas supply period. If we ignore this requirement and assume 
that the flow can be adjusted on a period-by-period basis, every half hour, once the 
generator knows its electricity dispatch for that period, then we can use the following 
approach. 
 
In order to construct the optimal offer from a given state, we must begin by constructing 
the MC curve on which to base this offer. In most of the models considered throughout 
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this thesis to this point, this MC curve is fully defined by the monotonically non-
decreasing MOC curve (which considers the future alternative uses of the fuel). In this 
case though, we must adjust this curve to consider possible interaction with the market, 
both buying and selling. To start with, let us consider the MC curve associated with the 
residual supply curve presented in Figure 10.7. We know that the MC curve should be 
twice as steep as the residual supply curve, with the same intercept on the vertical axis 
(in the same way that the MR curve is twice as steep as RD). We can show this by 
taking the derivative of the total cost function: 
 
( ) 2)(* bQaQbQaQQPQTCTotalCost +=+===  
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This is demonstrated in Figure 10.9. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.9 MC Curve for Gas Market Interaction 
 
Therefore, for each additional unit of generation, we can decide whether to source the 
necessary gas from our reservoir (at the cost indicated by the MOC) or from the gas 
market (at the cost indicated by the MC of additional purchase curve). As such, the 
combined MC curve is the horizontal sum of the MOC and the MC of purchasing from 
b 
2b
MC of Additional 
Purchase Curve
Additional Gas Purchase 
Residual 
Supply Curve Market Price, 
assuming we 
don’t demand 
anything, a 
Price 
MR of Selling Excess 
Gas to the Market
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the gas market. The values below a quantity of zero are the incremental value that could 
be gained by selling units of gas to the market.  
 
Figure 10.10 demonstrates how these two MC curves can be combined, leading to an 
offer that results in a “buy” decision with respect to the gas market. Figure 10.11 shows 
a case where the optimal offer based on the combined MC curve results in a “sell” 
decision with respect to the gas market. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.10 Example of Gas Market Interaction – Buy Gas from Market 
 
OBSERVED 
RD CURVE 
Q(gas bought 
from market) 
MC Clearing Level 
Offer 
Total Gas Used / 
Electricity Generated
Q(gas used 
from reservoir 
to generate)
Electricity 
Clearing Price 
MC (Buy Gas) 
MC (Combined) 
MV (Sell Gas) 
Value 
Quantity 
(Gas/Electricity) 
MOC (Generate from Res) 
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Figure 10.11 Example of Gas Market Interaction – Sell Gas to Market 
 
Note that if we were to make different assumptions regarding market power or the 
deterministic/stochastic nature of the gas market to those demonstrated in this example, 
the only effect would be to change the construction of this combined MC curve. We 
could potentially even consider problems where there is a correlation between the 
electricity and gas markets just by changing the way that we construct this curve. 
 
Finally, as with the branching approach to gas markets, the only difference between the 
approach suggested here and the original Value Curve algorithm, other than the MC 
curve construction, is that the value at each state will need to be adjusted to account for 
any revenues or costs associated with the optimal gas market interactions chosen at each 
state. 
 
OBSERVED 
RD CURVE 
Q(gas sold to 
the market) 
MC Clearing Level 
Offer 
Total Gas Removed 
from Reservoir
Q(gas used 
from reservoir 
to generate)
Electricity 
Clearing Price 
MC (Buy Gas) 
MC (Combined) 
MV (Sell Gas) 
Value 
Quantity 
(Gas/Electricity) 
MOC (Generate from Res) 
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We leave the case of constant flows under continuous decisions to future research. 
 
10.7 Other Extensions 
 
Other possible extensions that we have not dealt with specifically in this thesis include: 
 
Inflow Correlation 
 
The type of DP structure used in this thesis is ideally suited to modelling the correlation 
between inflows, but to do so would add an additional “previous inflow” dimension to 
the DP. We have chosen to exclude this as inflows are relatively predictable over the 
short-term horizon that these models consider, and as such, the additional computational 
burden is not justified. 
 
Offer Funnelling Rules 
 
Offer funnelling rules are rules that limit a generator’s ability to adjust their offers as 
real-time approaches, without having to explain their actions to the market authorities. 
We propose that pre-dispatch market outcomes could be used to assist in the 
optimisation of offers subject to these rules by helping a generator to predict the 
approximate desired position of their offer in these future periods. However, we consider 
this extension to be outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Offer Finalisation Rules 
 
An offer finalisation rule requires a generator to “lock in” their offer a certain number of 
periods ahead of the period in which the offer will apply. The difficulty in doing this is 
that the generator does not know what their reservoir level will be at that time (or even 
what “macro-state” the market will be in), and so is uncertain which of their future 
offers determined within the RT phase algorithm should be provided. One approach to 
this may be to combine, in some way, the offers that should be provided in that period, 
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under the different states that could be reached at that time, from the current state. 
However, we consider detailed analysis of this issue to be beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
10.8 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter started by demonstrating that the simulation model presented in Section 8.3 
can be applied in three further valuable ways to those which have already been 
discussed. Both of these applications could be used as intermediate steps towards an 
online implementation of the offer construction algorithm presented in this thesis. The 
first application would help a user to analyse possible offers in advance of a planning 
horizon, and thus help construct the required data sets, while the second application 
involved analysing offers after-the-fact, comparing how well a generator’s offers 
performed, with how well they could have been expected to perform under both 
uncertainty and certainty. 
 
We then discussed accounting for contracts for differences, and dealing with a physical 
marginal generation cost curve, and showed that they could be incorporated within the 
algorithm presented in this thesis, with only minor adjustments. 
 
Finally, we have proposed more complex extensions, including multiple reservoirs and 
gas market interaction, which are significantly more complex in all but the most basic 
cases. We consider these extensions to be beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter 11  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past 20 years, electricity markets around the world have shifted from 
government-coordinated central operation to deregulated, competitive markets where 
retailers and generators compete for the rights to buy and sell electricity. As such, there 
have been significant changes to the incentives and objectives of the players in the 
industry. Specifically, generating companies are now required to provide an offer into 
the market that describes the prices at which they are prepared to produce successive 
blocks of electricity. They provide these offers based on profit-driven operational 
strategies that are subject to various behavioural constraints and other considerations. In 
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particular, these considerations include intertemporal constraints that the generator may 
face over time, such as fuel limitations and thus conservation, market uncertainty and 
correlation, uncertain fuel inflows, and unit operational rules. 
  
It is the optimisation of the offering process subject to these intertemporal constraints 
that has been addressed in this thesis. A review of the literature in Chapter 3 identified 
the need for further research into this area, in order to optimise the behaviour of the 
generators considering all these intertemporal issues simultaneously, while simplifying 
the computational complexity of the method over those that have previously addressed 
similar issues. 
 
This thesis has presented a multi-dimensioned dynamic program for constructing 
optimal offers over a planning horizon, which uses a two-stage approach whose 
computational time increases at a substantially slower rate than previously published 
algorithms as the problem size increases, and thus is able to solve more realistically 
sized problems in real time. Another significant contribution of this thesis is the 
combination of dynamic programming with a decision analysis or branching structure, 
where the branches represent overall macro-states that either the market or the generator 
can be in at any given time. This has been developed as a general solution approach, and 
as such its application is not limited to the offer optimisation problem explored in this 
thesis. 
 
Section 11.2 outlines the main results and insights presented in this thesis, ignoring unit 
operation rules. Section 11.3 outlines the insights gained in this thesis, considering unit 
operation rules. Section 11.4 summarises the key research contributions. Section 11.5 
presents suggestions for future research. Section 11.6 provides some concluding 
reflections. 
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11.2 Multi-Period Offer Strategy Optimisation  
 
In this thesis, we have presented a two-phase approach to dynamic programming to 
optimise the behaviour of generators over a short-term planning horizon. The first phase 
involves pre-processing a large number of offers, which can be combined together in the 
second, real-time phase, to give the optimal offers for any given system state. The 
purpose of the phase separation was to bring the computationally intensive offer 
formation process out of real time, enabling this component of the algorithm to be 
performed in advance. The consequence of this separation is that problem scenarios of 
greater size and detail can now potentially be solved on-line, in a ‘reasonable’ amount of 
time, from the perspective of a generator providing offers into the market every half 
hour. The algorithm developed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 considers the construction of 
a set of sculpted offers for a generator with market power for the planning horizon, 
which are monotonically non-decreasing in both the price and quantity dimensions. 
These offers are optimised while considering the intertemporal complexities of limited 
fuel, residual demand curve uncertainty within a period, residual demand curve 
correlation between periods, and the existence of a branch structure in the real-world 
that defines the overall macro-state of the market at any given point in time. 
 
In Chapter 8, comparisons on the two performance measures of computational time and 
expected payoff were made between our algorithm and that presented in Rajaraman & 
Alvarado (2003), which was the only other algorithm in the literature that considered 
this specific problem. We showed that over a large representative set of scenarios, our 
model produced expected payoffs that were slightly closer to the optimal behaviour 
under perfect information, than those achieved by the R&A algorithm, and that it 
produced significantly better payoffs under the type of residual demand curves that we 
believe to most accurately represent those that a generator would face in a real market. 
In terms of computational times, we found that substantial gains could be made by 
converting the two-level nested dynamic program method of the R&A algorithm into the 
two-phase approach that was the basis of our algorithm. Specifically: 
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• If the real-world inherently reflected a branched structure (where you could 
identify the market as being in an overall macro-state), but this structure was 
ignored, then there was an average real-time (Phase 2) time saving of around 
99.88%. 
• If the real-world inherently reflected a branched structure and this structure was 
considered, there was an average real-time (Phase 2) time saving of around 
99.91%.  
• The main time saving by considering an underlying branched structure in the 
real-world was in Phase 1, the Pre-Processing phase, which is performed just 
once in advance of each planning horizon.  
• Ignoring the branched structure (or where the branched structure does not exist), 
the average Pre-Processing time required for our algorithm (4578 seconds, 76 
minutes) was on average around 5.7% of the time requirement for the R&A 
algorithm in each period (80324 seconds, 22.3 hours).  
• Considering a branched structure, the average Pre-Processing time (235 
seconds) fell to just 0.3% of the time requirement for the R&A algorithm in each 
period.  
 
Note that for both phases, the largest percentage time savings were under the larger, 
more realistic scenarios. 
 
We then compared our algorithm to various simplified versions, under the assumption 
that the real-world contains a branched structure, in order to identify the value in 
considering each of the complexities that our algorithm deals with. The simplified 
models and the conclusions were: 
 
Price-Based Offers:  
 
We found that if we restricted the set of feasible offers, requiring a generator to offer all 
their available capacity at a single price level, there would be only a small loss in 
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expected payoff, but the real-time computational time required would increase, as a two-
phase algorithm would not produce single-price offers and thus was not appropriate.   
 
Quantity-Based Offers: 
 
By requiring a generator to provide a fixed quantity to the market, regardless of the 
resulting price, there was a significant fall in the expected payoffs observed, but no 
significant change to the computational time required. 
 
Naïve Correlation: 
 
This simplification assumed that the decision maker ignored the impact of the current 
market state on the future market states which may occur. This had the effect of 
significantly reducing the computational time required, but at the expense of 
significantly worse expected payoffs. 
 
Naïve Water: 
 
By ignoring water limitations, the marginal opportunity cost of water falls to zero, thus 
leading to much more generous offers than those that would be provided were the 
generator to base their offers on the true marginal opportunity cost. As the offers are 
based on a single constant marginal cost, the computational time requirements in real-
time are negligible, and thus significantly less than those required by the algorithm that 
considers water limitations. However, the expected payoff is significantly and 
substantially lower under this simplification. 
 
Perfect Competitor: 
 
If the generator were to assume that they had no market power, then their optimal 
behaviour would be to offer their capacity into the market at marginal cost. The result of 
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this was a significant and substantially lower expected payoff, but with no significant 
difference in computational times. 
 
Value Curve Interpolation: 
 
Rather than determining the optimal offer and value of that offer for all possible 
reservoir levels in all periods of the horizon, this simplification required that offers were 
determined for just a subset of possible reservoir levels, and the value curve interpolated 
between this subset of points. As expected, we found that as the subset of points got 
smaller and smaller, the computational time fell, but at the expense of reduced expected 
payoff. 
 
We then produced an efficient frontier over the two performance dimensions of expected 
payoff and computational time for all these algorithms and concluded that there were 
only six algorithms worth considering, and that the selection between them is dependent 
on the specific scenario that is being faced. Depending on the time available and the size 
of the instance being solved, the best choice of algorithm according to this efficient 
frontier (from slowest with best mean percentage error to fastest with worst mean 
percentage error) would be one of: 
 
1. Value Curve approach with branching and with no interpolation, 
2. Value Curve approach with branching, solving only every 2nd reservoir level and 
interpolating the value curve between these points, and 
3. Value Curve approach with branching, solving only every 5th reservoir level and 
interpolating the value curve between these points, and 
4. Value Curve approach with branching, solving only every 10th reservoir level 
and interpolating the value curve between these points, and 
5. Naïve Correlation Approach. 
6. Naïve Water Approach 
 
 455
11.3 Multi-Period Offer Strategy Optimisation considering Unit Rules  
 
In Chapter 9, we showed how the algorithm presented could be extended to consider 
unit operating rules. These included:  
 
1. Minimum feasible generation level 
2. Start-up and shut-down costs 
3. Minimum up and down times 
4. Fixed start-up process 
5. Ramp rate restrictions 
 
We demonstrated that, although adding these additional complexities adds two 
dimensions to the state space of the DP (unit state and previous dispatch level), the 
computational complexity increases at a much slower rate than that which would be 
expected from the curse of dimensionality. In the case of the unit state dimension, this is 
because much of the computational complexity is in the production of the offers and 
their values, but for many of the unit states the offers are fixed and thus their value is 
easy to determine. In the case of ramp rate restrictions, we have shown that for a given 
reservoir level, a single overall offer can be constructed and the feasible segment of this 
overall offer used as the optimal offer. In other words, there is no need to construct a 
completely separate offer for each previous dispatch level. 
 
As expected, our results have illustrated that behaviour which is suboptimal in the short-
term may be the optimal behaviour when considering these additional intertemporal 
complexities. For example, with respect to the unit rules, we showed how a unit may 
move through its start-up process during low-price periods (unprofitable in the short-
term), in order to capitalise on high-price periods when they arrive. Alternatively, we 
showed that a unit may remain switched on over very low price periods when it is costly 
to shut-down and start-up again, if they expect to be generating again soon. We also 
illustrated how ramp rate restrictions can have similar effects, promoting a generator to 
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ramp up sufficiently in time for a peak set of periods, or alternatively, to ramp down in 
sufficient time for a set of off-peak periods.  
 
11.4 Research Contributions 
 
To summarise the key contributions made in this thesis, we have: 
 
1. Demonstrated that when taking intertemporal constraints into account in their 
offering process, a generator may, counter intuitively, provide a more generous 
offer under low RD curves than under high RD curves, if the correlation between 
the heights of these RD curves is high. This impact of correlations was 
previously hypothesised in Drayton-Bright (1997), but has not been 
demonstrated in the literature. The effect of this is that it is not possible to 
provide an offer to the market that is valid and optimal over multiple periods (as 
was required in the old England/Wales market). 
2. Developed a marginal cost based offer patching theory, which can significantly 
reduce the computational complexity of the offer strategy development problem. 
Based on this theory, we have developed and implemented a two-phase dynamic 
programming algorithm, which separates the construction of offers into separate 
Pre-Processing and Real-Time phases, in a manner not previously suggested in 
the literature. 
3. Determined theoretical extensions to this algorithm to deal with a combination of 
intertemporal constraints and considerations, including market correlation and 
uncertainty, fuel limitations, and unit rules (including ramp rates) that have not 
previously been considered together, while still maintaining feasible 
computational times, with respect to realistic marketplace requirements. These 
extensions have also been implemented. 
4. Developed an additional new technique that combines the concepts of dynamic 
programming and decision analysis by building in a branching structure to the 
overall state of the generator and the market at any point in time. As well as 
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being able to better represent a scenario that has this type of structure, this 
branching significantly reduces the computational complexity of the algorithm. 
 
11.5 Future Work 
 
The algorithms developed in this thesis have some limitations. Here we summarise 
potential research avenues that could improve electricity market generator offer strategy 
development. Some of these avenues were discussed in more detail in Chapter 10. 
 
• The techniques developed in this thesis apply to a generating unit or set of units 
attached to a single fuel reservoir. This is an accurate representation of a fuel-
constrained thermal station, but a hydro generator will generally possess multiple 
reservoirs, either along a river chain, or attached to separate rivers. We believe 
that extending the algorithms to consider multiple reservoirs simultaneously 
would be an important extension. 
• In Chapter 7, we developed a general description of a method that combines the 
techniques of dynamic programming and decision analysis and then applied this 
to the offer optimisation problem. This technique has much wider potential 
applications, and future research into these applications would be beneficial. 
• The marginalistic dynamic programs presented in this thesis have, out of 
necessity, involved a discretisation of the primal state-space (reservoir levels, 
and market states). A valuable course of future work would be to explore the 
possibility of generalising these approaches to a continuous state-space, as in the 
method of dual dynamic programming. 
• In this thesis, we have assumed that generators have a risk-neutral perspective. A 
valid future extension of this work would be to consider how offering strategies 
would change if risk aversion were to be considered. 
• Finally, in this thesis we have ignored two offering constraints, the first of which 
occurs commonly in real-world markets, and the second of which could be 
implemented in future markets or market modifications. Offer finalisation rules 
require a final offer to be provided a certain number of periods out from real-
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time (for example, four periods or two hours ahead in New Zealand), which can 
then only be changed in exceptional circumstances. Offer funnelling rules 
require that as real-time approaches, the offers made by generators cannot 
change too dramatically, thus encouraging correct signalling by generators in 
advance of finalised offers. It would be valuable to extend the methods 
developed in this thesis to consider these two constraints. 
 
11.6 Concluding Reflections 
 
In this thesis, we have seen that pre-computation is a valid and worthwhile approach to 
dealing with the offer strategy problem faced by generators in the deregulated electricity 
markets that currently exist around the world. We have also seen that there is value in 
applying a structured analytical approach, incorporating elements of both decision 
analysis and dynamic programming, in order to both create a better representation of the 
problem faced and to reduce the computational burden of solving that problem. 
Combined, these two developments mean that it is now practical to optimise an offer 
strategy in real-time, taking into account correlations and intertemporal issues, and 
considering a realistically detailed representation of the real-world and its complexities, 
at least for a single reservoir or fuel stockpile.  
 
While further developments will be required before these approaches can be applied to 
the real problems faced by many electricity generators, the results have already provided 
insights about the way in which optimal offering strategies should be structured, and 
evolve, when inter-temporal constraints are important.  And it also seems worthwhile 
noting that the basic analytical strategies applied here seem equally applicable to a wide 
variety of problems outside the electricity sector.  
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A. CONTRIBUTORY LINES 
 
 
 
The purpose of this appendix is to determine the form of the contributory line associated 
with a certain pair of marginal cost curve and residual demand curve slope. 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 MR and MC Curves 
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q 
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Consider the cost and revenue curves shown in Figure A.1. The form of the marginal 
cost curve is: 
 
 qMCMCMC slp+= int  
 
The form of the residual demand curve is: 
 
 ( ) ( )qqscbqscaRD ,, −=  
 
and hence the form of the marginal revenue curve (the derivative of the equation, 
quantity multiplied by price, as defined by the residual demand curve),  is: 
 
 ( ) ( )qqscbqscaMR ,2, −=  
 
where, under each residual demand curve scenario, the a and b functions are just 
constant values. 
 
The optimal dispatch quantity is given by the point where marginal revenue is equal to 
marginal cost. Therefore: 
 
 ( ) ( ) qMCMCqqscbqsca slp+=− int,2,  
 
 ( )( ) ( ) int,,2 MCqscaqscbMCq slp −=+  
 
 ( ) ( )qscbMC
MCqscaq
slp ,2
, int
+
−=  
 
The optimal price point to offer is then found at this quantity level on the residual 
demand curve: 
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 ( ) ( )qqscbqscaRD ,, −=  
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+
−−==
qscbMC
MCqscaqscbqscapRD
slp ,2
,,, int  
 
Now that we know the analytic form of the optimal dispatch point under any residual 
demand curve position, we can establish the form of the contributory line by finding its 
intercept and slope. 
 
To find the intercept of the CL, we simply need to determine the price level to offer 
where q = 0. Therefore, for q = 0, the optimal quantity equation tells us that: 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0,2
, int =+
−=
qscbMC
MCqscaq
slp
 
 
 ( ) int, MCqsca =  
 
We now need to substitute this into the optimal price equation: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+
−−=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+
−−=
qscbMC
MCMCqscbMC
qscbMC
MCqscaqscbqscap
slpslp ,2
,
,2
,,, intintintint  
 
( ) ( ) intint ,2
0, MC
qscbMC
qscbMCp
slp
=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+−=  
 
Therefore, the intercept of the CL is ( )int,0 MC . 
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Now, we need to know the slope of the CL. We find this by taking the derivative of the 
price and quantity each with respect to the parameter that is changing, ( )qsca , , and then 
compare the derivatives. 
 
 ( ) slpMCbqsca
q
+=∂
∂
2
1
,
 
 
 ( ) slpMCb
b
qsca
p
+−=∂
∂
2
1
,
 
 
 Slope of CL = ( )
( )
[ ] slsl
sl
MCbMCb
MCb
b
qsca
p
qsca
q
run
rise +=+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−=
∂
∂
∂
∂
= 2
2
1
,
,  
 
Therefore, the slope of the CL is slMCb + , giving the equation for the form of the CL to 
be: 
 
 [ ]qMCbMCp sl++= int  
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B. DIRECT MV CURVE APPROACHES UNDER 
INFLOW UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
This appendix reports the method used to construct MV curves for a given period 
directly from the MV curves for the following period, under the simple cases of no 
uncertainty and inflow uncertainty and correlation. Here, the decision is a fixed level of 
release for each period, rather than a more complex offer, as considered in Chapter 6. 
 
The following notation is used throughout this appendix: 
 
 tMVR    MV of releasing an additional unit of storage in period t 
 tMVS     MV of storing an additional unit of storage in period t for use in  
a later period 
tEMVS     Expected MV or storing an additional unit of storage in period t  
for use in a later period 
 tR   Storage level in period t 
 tQ   Release quantity in period t 
 478
1+tTR   Target reservoir level at period t+1 
 if   Level of inflow i 
 i  Inflow index 
 I  Number of possible inflow levels per period 
 iπ   Probability of inflow i 
 
1. Deterministic Case 
 
With no uncertainty, the optimality condition for determining release over a planning 
horizon is that the MV in all periods must align (ignoring reservoir limits). Therefore, in 
each period the condition is: 
 
tMVR = tMVS  
 
2. Inflow Uncertainty  
 
When inflow uncertainty is considered, the release level is chosen such that: 
 
tMVR  = tEMVS  
 
tEMVS  is calculated for all target storage levels as the weighted average of the tMVS  
that could be achieved as a result of inflow uncertainty if we targeted this storage level.  
 
( ) ( )∑
=
+ +=
I
i
ittitt fTRMVSTREMVS
1
1π  
 
where 
 
ttt QRTR −=+1  
 
 479
This is demonstrated with a numerical example in Figure 1442HB.1. 
 
 
 
Figure B.1 Equating MV’s under Inflow Uncertainty - Forwards 
 
Therefore, from a given reservoir level in a single period, we work forwards, equating 
tEMVS  and tMVR , where tMVR  is determined from either: 
 
1. The cost of the other units that we don’t have to run if we generate with this 
hydro unit (if it is a cost minimisation problem), or 
2. The marginal revenue (MR) associated with a single linear RD curve (if it is a 
revenue maximisation problem) 
 
tEMVS  will be upward sloping in release, as greater release leads to a lower EOP 
reservoir level, while tMVR  will be downward sloping because as the release is 
increased, generation begins to be substituted away from the more efficient alternative 
hydro generation units (or the MR falls if it is a revenue maximisation problem). This is 
shown in Figure B.2. 
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Figure B.2 Equating tEMVS  and tMVR  in a Single Period 
 
3. Inflow Uncertainty and Correlation 
 
There are now I different MVS curves in every period, indexed by the previously 
observed inflow, i.  Figure B.3 provides an example. 
tMVR  
tEMVS  
Dispatch 
Decision = tQ  
Q 
$ 
 481
 
 
Figure B.3 Equating MV’s under Inflow Uncertainty and Correlation 
 
Each previous inflow level has its own tEMVS , which is calculated as a weighted sum of 
the tMVS  curves (with probabilities depending on the previous inflow level). Release 
decisions are then made in the same way as the case without correlation. 
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The approach to constructing MV curves under market uncertainty is very similar to that 
under inflow uncertainty, as it does not really matter where the distribution of end-of-
period reservoir level comes from. 
 
The difficulty in extending this approach to market uncertainty, though, is that the 
decision becomes a market offer (rather than a fixed release) and as such, release 
depends on the market outcome. Therefore, under this structure, the concept of “target 
storage” no longer applies. 
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C. CONSTRUCTION OF THE BEGINNING-OF-
PERIOD MOC CURVE 
 
 
If there is no correlation between market outcomes in consecutive periods, then in any 
given period there is a single value curve for the following period, based on expectations 
of what the market will do from then on and how we will optimally be able to respond to 
them. This gives a single MV curve, and when limited fuel is considered, this is what 
provides us with our Marginal Opportunity Cost (MOC) curve for generation from a 
given reservoir level in the current period. 
 
However, when we have correlation between market uncertainty, a different value curve 
is needed for the following period for each RD curve (market state) that could possibly 
occur in the current period (number of possible RD curves denoted by p). This means 
that we have p MV curves for the following period and hence p MOC curves for the 
current period and state. In other words, for each RD curve that could occur in this 
period, there is a different associated MOC curve. 
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This implies that to be theoretically correct, we cannot simply base our offer for this 
period on a single MOC curve77. In this appendix, we will consider: 
  
1. How the offer should be constructed, given that the MOC curve is dependent on 
the RD curve that occurs, and is this approach practical and able to be solved in a 
reasonable time frame? 
2. What alternative methods could give similar results in a shorter time frame? 
 
1. How the Optimal Offer should be Constructed 
 
As mentioned above, the MOC curve faced by a generator in any given state is different, 
depending on which RD curve occurs in this state. As such, we would ideally like to 
construct an offer such that dispatch is set to its optimal position for each RD curve, 
based on each RD curve’s associated MOC curve. 
 
Figure 1450HC.1 demonstrates this process under a scenario with three possible RD 
curves in each period, with the following steps: 
 
i. For a reservoir level of x at the beginning of period t, with previous RD curve r, 
identify the three possible RD curves with associated probabilities of 1,rpr , 2,rpr  
and 3,rpr . 
ii. Each of these RD curves has its own associated MV curve for period t+1, which 
can be used to construct the associated MOC curves. Determine these MOC 
curves. 
iii. Determine the optimal dispatch point under each RD curve separately in their 
own plane, based on their own individual MOC curves78. 
iv. Bring these dispatch points into a single plane, to determine the overall optimal 
offer. 
                                                 
77 Note that the R&A approach does not face this problem because it is a completely primal approach, and 
as such decisions are not based on a MOC curve 
78 This quantity can be determined by the intersection between the marginal revenue (MR) curve and the 
MOC curve, while the price is given by the RD curve at this quantity. 
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v. Calculate the expected value of this offer and the associated future value and 
insert into the value curve for period t for the market state index r and reservoir 
level x. 
 
If the set of points found in step (iii) is monotone, then the overall optimal offer 
determined in step (iv) is simply this set along with arbitrary monotone connections, and 
is completely consistent with the possible 1+tMV  curves that could occur. However, as 
shown in Figure C.1, it is quite likely that they will not form a monotone set, and hence 
some way of determining the best trade-off within the regions of uncertainty (the shaded 
square) is needed.  
 
 
 
Figure C.1 Constructing an Offer that is Consistent with the 1+tMV  Curves 
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If we assume that the payoff along each of the RD curves is unimodal (which is true for 
a linear RD curve), then it is desirable to have the dispatch as close to its optimal point 
as possible, on each RD curve. As such, the approach required to determine the optimal 
monotone offer is very similar to that shown in Section 4.5, where optimality conditions 
were established to determine the best location of these horizontal and vertical segments 
over regions of uncertainty, under kinked RD curves. In that case it was the kink and the 
different RD slopes that led to the non-monotonicity, whereas in this case it is the 
different MOC curves associated with each RD curve that lead to the non-monotonicity. 
The optimal monotonised offer will therefore contain vertical and/or horizontal steps 
through the region of uncertainty. 
 
Unfortunately, as the number of RD curves considered increases, the number and size of 
regions of uncertainty will increase, and hence so does the complexity of the optimality 
conditions and the difficulty of performing this monotonisation, causing the approach to 
be very slow and thus impractical79. Therefore, we need an approach that will produce 
similar results but in significantly less computational time. 
 
2. Alternative Methods 
 
An obvious alternative to the approach described above is to take a vertically weighted 
average of the 1+tMV  curves, and base the offer purely on the single weighted MOC that 
results. This is demonstrated in Figure C.2, with the following steps: 
 
i. At state x now in period t, with previous RD curve 2, there are three possible RD 
curves here, with associated probabilities of 1,2pr , 2,2pr  and 3,2pr . 
ii. Construct the rtEMV ,  curve for this state based on these probabilities. 
                                                 
79 Alternatively, a DP could be performed over each area of uncertainty to find the optimal offer path. This 
is effectively what the R&A approach does when performing a DP over (price, quantity) space to find the 
optimal offer, and would mean that the benefits of a Two-Phase approach would be substantially lost. 
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iii. Produce the optimal offer over all possible RD curves using the DP approach 
described in this thesis, given the weighted MOC associated with the rtEMV ,  
curve. 
iv. Calculate the combined expected current and future value of this offer and insert 
into the value curve for period t for the market state index r = 2 and reservoir 
level x. 
 
 
 488
 
 
Figure C.2 Constructing an Offer based on a Weighted 1+tMV  Curve 
 
This approach is clearly far simpler than explicitly considering the separate MOC curves 
associated with each of the RD curves. In addition, this approach allows the algorithm to 
be split into a Two-Phase approach, as presented in this thesis. Before considering this 
approach to be acceptable, we need to know how much the quality of the solutions is 
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going to be affected by this simplification, and then decide whether this affect will be 
acceptable. 
 
Figure C.3 presents a simple example where there are two equally likely possible linear 
RD curves, and constant MOC levels of $30 and $10 associated with them, respectively. 
 
 
Figure C.3 Comparing the two Approaches 
 
We can see that the two optimal points under the individual MOC curves (white stars) 
do not form a monotone set, and so the offer cannot pass through both these points, and 
must be adjusted accordingly. Given that the payoff along the RD curves is unimodel, 
we can show that the optimal adjusted offer will contain a vertical step80 (red lines 
indicate possible examples) between these two RD curves, somewhere in the range 
indicated by the red arrow. The specific position of this vertical step will depend on the 
relative probabilities and values of being dispatched on either of the two RD curves. 
Recall from Section 4.5, that we know the offer must pass vertically between these two 
RD curves, because if we take any forward sloping segment between the two curves (as 
shown in blue), then we can get the points of intercept with the RD curves closer to their 
                                                 
80 Note that there could also be times when a horizontal segment would be needed. 
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optimal positions (red stars) by making it vertical (moving in direction indicated by blue 
arrows). 
 
On the other hand, the optimal overall offer to provide, based on a weighted MOC of 20 
is shown in green, along with the associated dispatch points on the two RD curves 
(green stars). We can clearly see that each of the red stars are in slightly better positions 
than the green stars, closer to the optimal dispatch points (white stars) under the given 
RD curves. This is as expected, but the question is how much worse off is the generator 
by providing the green offer, compared to the red? 
 
To answer this question, consider what would happen if the probability of RD1 was 
significantly higher than that of RD2. The optimal position of the vertical step (red line) 
would move to the left, towards the white star on RD1 with the now higher expected 
payoff (and further from the white star on RD2). Additionally, the weighted MOC 
would increase to closer to 30, moving the offer based on this weighted MOC upwards, 
and hence also closer to the white star on RD1 (and further away from the white star on 
RD2). In other words, the general directions of movement of the offers in response to 
changes in probability are the same for the two approaches. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this appendix, we have shown two ways under which offers could be formed when 
there is correlation between RD curves in consecutive periods, both based on MOC 
curves. 
 
The first method will work and produce a completely consistent outcome, but would not 
be particularly practical unless the optimal points under each of the market scenarios 
formed a monotone set.  
 
It is a relatively common simplification made in the literature to use the 1+tMV curve as 
the tMV  curve because they are likely to be pretty similar. This assumption is fairly 
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reasonable in practice, especially as time discretisation gets finer, yet not strictly 
accurate. This is effectively what the second method proposes, although it uses a 
weighted average of the EOP MV curves as the BOP MV curve. This simplification 
essentially implies that release is independent of the resulting market state. 
 
Therefore, if we perform this simplification and use an overall weighted MOC curve, we 
can expect to get a very similar result to the completely consistent approach, but for 
significantly less computational effort. As such, for we conclude that this simplification 
is not unreasonable, and that it will allow application of the resulting algorithm to much 
larger-scale scenarios than could be considered without the simplification. 
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D. PAIRWISE COMPARISON TESTS FOR 
COMPUTATIONAL TIME ON FULL MODELS 
NON-BRANCHED 
 
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 20 VCN, NumPeriods = 40 VCN 
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 20 VCN - NumPeriods = 40 VCN_1 
 
                    N      Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 20   160    59.806    55.505    4.388 
NumPeriods = 40   160   137.944   150.161   11.871 
Difference        160  -78.1375  106.7098   8.4362 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (-94.7989, -61.4761) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = -9.26  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 40 R&A, NumPeriods = 20 R&A  
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 40 R&A - NumPeriods = 20 R&A 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 40   160   106939    180030    14233 
NumPeriods = 20   160    53709     77103     6095 
Difference        160  53230.1  112035.6   8857.2 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (35737.2, 70723.0) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 6.01  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 20 R&A, NumPeriods = 20 VCN  
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Paired T for NumPeriods = 20 R&A - NumPeriods = 20 VCN 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 20   160  53708.7  77102.5   6095.5 
NumPeriods = 20   160     59.8     55.5      4.4 
Difference        160  53648.9  77054.4   6091.7 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (41617.8, 65679.9) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 8.81  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 40 R&A, NumPeriods = 40 VCN  
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 40 R&A - NumPeriods = 40 VCN 
 
                    N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 40   160  106939  180030    14233 
NumPeriods = 40   160     138     150       12 
Difference        160  106801  179918    14224 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (78709, 134893) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 7.51  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 VCN, NumResLevels = 100  VCN  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 VCN - NumResLevels = 100  VCN 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  319  138.571   149.494    8.370 
NumResLevels = 1  319   59.730    56.444    3.160 
Difference        319  78.8401  107.6241   6.0258 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (66.9847, 90.6956) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 13.08  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 R&A, NumResLevels = 100 R&A  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 R&A - NumResLevels = 100 R&A 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  319   114996    181423    10158 
NumResLevels = 1  319    46147     66708     3735 
Difference        319  68848.3  125061.0   7002.1 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (55072.1, 82624.6) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 9.83  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 100 R&A, NumResLevels = 100  VCN  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 100 R&A - NumResLevels = 100  VCN 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 1  319  46147.3  66708.0   3734.9 
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NumResLevels = 1  319     59.7     56.4      3.2 
Difference        319  46087.6  66662.1   3732.4 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (38744.3, 53430.8) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 12.35  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 R&A, NumResLevels = 300 VCN  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 R&A - NumResLevels = 300 VCN 
 
                    N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  319  114996  181423    10158 
NumResLevels = 3  319     139     149        8 
Difference        319  114857  181312    10152 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (94884, 134830) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 11.31  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 VCN, NumDispLevels = 20  VCN  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 VCN - NumDispLevels = 20  VCN 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   478  134.515   148.134    6.776 
NumDispLevels =   478   63.964    64.801    2.964 
Difference        478  70.5502  103.2597   4.7230 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (61.2698, 79.8306) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 14.94  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 R&A, NumDispLevels = 20 R&A  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 R&A - NumDispLevels = 20 R&A 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   478   121992    181482     8301 
NumDispLevels =   478    39310     58041     2655 
Difference        478  82681.1  137417.3   6285.3 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (70330.8, 95031.4) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 13.15  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 20 R&A, NumDispLevels = 20  VCN  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 20 R&A - NumDispLevels = 20  VCN 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   478  39310.4  58040.7   2654.7 
NumDispLevels =   478     64.0     64.8      3.0 
Difference        478  39246.4  57994.7   2652.6 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (34034.2, 44458.7) 
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T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 14.80  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 R&A, NumDispLevels = 40 VCN  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 R&A - NumDispLevels = 40 VCN 
 
                    N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   478  121992  181482     8301 
NumDispLevels =   478     135     148        7 
Difference        478  121857  181370     8296 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (105556, 138158) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 14.69  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 VCN, NumRDs = 25  VCN  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 100 VCN - NumRDs = 25  VCN 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumRDs = 100 VCN  637  143.141   146.014    5.785 
NumRDs = 25  VCN  637   55.433    58.785    2.329 
Difference        637  87.7080  112.5218   4.4583 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (78.9533, 96.4627) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 19.67  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 R&A, NumRDs = 25 R&A  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 100 R&A - NumRDs = 25 R&A 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumRDs = 100 R&A  637   129527    179509     7112 
NumRDs = 25 R&A   637    31856     52180     2067 
Difference        637  97670.8  146326.4   5797.7 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (86286.0, 109055.7) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 16.85  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 25 R&A, NumRDs = 25  VCN  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 25 R&A - NumRDs = 25  VCN 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumRDs = 25 R&A   637  31855.7  52180.3   2067.5 
NumRDs = 25  VCN  637     55.4     58.8      2.3 
Difference        637  31800.3  52137.5   2065.8 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (27743.7, 35856.8) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 15.39  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 R&A, NumRDs = 100 VCN  
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Paired T for NumRDs = 100 R&A - NumRDs = 100 VCN 
 
                    N    Mean   StDev  SE Mean 
NumRDs = 100 R&A  637  129527  179509     7112 
NumRDs = 100 VCN  637     143     146        6 
Difference        637  129383  179401     7108 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (115425, 143342) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 18.20  P-Value = 0.000 
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E. MINITAB OUTPUT FOR SOLUTION 
QUALITY FOR FULL MODELS NON-
BRANCHED 
 
General Linear Model: Percentage Error versus RD Type, Approach, ...  
 
Factor                     Type   Levels  Values 
RD Type                    fixed       5  Branch Different, Naturally Monotone, 
                                          Single Different, Single Similar, 
                                          Stepped 
Approach                   fixed       2  R&A Approach, Value Curve Approach 
                                          (not branched) 
NumPeriods                 fixed       2  20, 40 
NumResLevels               fixed       2  100, 300 
NumDispLevels              fixed       2  20, 40 
NumRDs                     fixed       2  25, 100 
NumInflows                 fixed       2  1, 5 
TransitionCorrelationType  fixed       2  Strong, Weak 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for Percentage Error, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source                               DF    Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F 
RD Type                               4   6665.53  6665.53  1666.38  432.93 
Approach                              1   1744.47  1744.47  1744.47  453.22 
RD Type*Approach                      4   3255.90  3255.90   813.97  211.47 
NumPeriods                            1     10.03    10.03    10.03    2.61 
Approach*NumPeriods                   1      0.18     0.18     0.18    0.05 
NumResLevels                          1    120.60   120.60   120.60   31.33 
Approach*NumResLevels                 1     17.08    17.08    17.08    4.44 
NumDispLevels                         1    375.50   375.50   375.50   97.55 
Approach*NumDispLevels                1    194.35   194.35   194.35   50.49 
NumRDs                                1     29.72    29.72    29.72    7.72 
Approach*NumRDs                       1     22.52    22.52    22.52    5.85 
 500
NumInflows                            1     17.11    17.11    17.11    4.45 
Approach*NumInflows                   1      0.03     0.03     0.03    0.01 
TransitionCorrelationType             1    184.15   184.15   184.15   47.84 
Approach*TransitionCorrelationType    1    120.27   120.27   120.27   31.25 
Error                               618   2378.73  2378.73     3.85 
Total                               639  15136.17 
 
Source                                  P 
RD Type                             0.000 
Approach                            0.000 
RD Type*Approach                    0.000 
NumPeriods                          0.107 
Approach*NumPeriods                 0.827 
NumResLevels                        0.000 
Approach*NumResLevels               0.036 
NumDispLevels                       0.000 
Approach*NumDispLevels              0.000 
NumRDs                              0.006 
Approach*NumRDs                     0.016 
NumInflows                          0.035 
Approach*NumInflows                 0.931 
TransitionCorrelationType           0.000 
Approach*TransitionCorrelationType  0.000 
Error 
Total 
 
 
S = 1.96191   R-Sq = 84.28%   R-Sq(adj) = 83.75% 
 
 
Least Squares Means for Percentage Error 
 
RD Type*Approach 
Branch Different R&A Approach                            5.3760   0.2452 
Branch Different Value Curve Approach (not branched)     2.0745   0.2452 
Naturally Monotone R&A Approach                          1.2484   0.2452 
Naturally Monotone Value Curve Approach (not branched)   1.1570   0.2452 
Single Different R&A Approach                            1.7344   0.2452 
Single Different Value Curve Approach (not branched)     0.9386   0.2452 
Single Similar R&A Approach                              1.0772   0.2452 
Single Similar Value Curve Approach (not branched)       0.7825   0.2452 
Stepped      R&A Approach                               15.4798   0.2452 
Stepped      Value Curve Approach (not branched)         3.4535   0.2452 
 
Approach*NumDispLevel 
R&A Approach 20                                          6.3002   0.1551 
R&A Approach 40                                          3.6661   0.1551 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 20                   1.8961   0.1551 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 40                   1.4663   0.1551 
 
Approach*TransitionCo 
R&A Approach Strong                                      4.0133   0.1551 
R&A Approach Weak                                        5.9531   0.1551 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Strong               1.5783   0.1551 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Weak                 1.7841   0.1551 
 
Approach*NumResLevels 
R&A Approach 100                                         5.5806   0.1551 
R&A Approach 300                                         4.3857   0.1551 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 100                  1.9519   0.1551 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 300                  1.4105   0.1551 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
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Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*NumDispLevels 
Approach = R&A Approach 
NumDispLevels = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                             NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference 
R&A Approach                         40                 -2.634      0.2193 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  20                 -4.404      0.2193 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  40                 -4.834      0.2193 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                             NumDispLevels  T-Value   P-Value 
R&A Approach                         40              -12.01    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  20              -20.08    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  40              -22.04    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = R&A Approach 
NumDispLevels = 40  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                             NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  20                 -1.770      0.2193 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  40                 -2.200      0.2193 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                             NumDispLevels  T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  20               -8.07    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  40              -10.03    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched) 
NumDispLevels = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                             NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  40                -0.4298      0.2193 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                             NumDispLevels  T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  40              -1.959    0.3030 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of RD Type*Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different 
Approach = R&A Approach  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
RD Type             Approach                               of Means  Difference 
Branch Different    Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -3.302      0.3468 
Naturally Monotone  R&A Approach                             -4.128      0.3468 
Naturally Monotone  Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -4.219      0.3468 
Single Different    R&A Approach                             -3.642      0.3468 
Single Different    Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -4.437      0.3468 
Single Similar      R&A Approach                             -4.299      0.3468 
Single Similar      Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -4.594      0.3468 
Stepped             R&A Approach                             10.104      0.3468 
Stepped             Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -1.923      0.3468 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
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RD Type             Approach                             T-Value   P-Value 
Branch Different    Value Curve Approach (not branched)    -9.52    0.0000 
Naturally Monotone  R&A Approach                          -11.90    0.0000 
Naturally Monotone  Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -12.16    0.0000 
Single Different    R&A Approach                          -10.50    0.0000 
Single Different    Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -12.79    0.0000 
Single Similar      R&A Approach                          -12.40    0.0000 
Single Similar      Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -13.24    0.0000 
Stepped             R&A Approach                           29.13    0.0000 
Stepped             Value Curve Approach (not branched)    -5.54    0.0000 
 
 
RD Type = Branch Different 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched)  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
RD Type             Approach                               of Means  Difference 
Naturally Monotone  R&A Approach                             -0.826      0.3468 
Naturally Monotone  Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -0.917      0.3468 
Single Different    R&A Approach                             -0.340      0.3468 
Single Different    Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -1.136      0.3468 
Single Similar      R&A Approach                             -0.997      0.3468 
Single Similar      Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -1.292      0.3468 
Stepped             R&A Approach                             13.405      0.3468 
Stepped             Value Curve Approach (not branched)       1.379      0.3468 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
RD Type             Approach                             T-Value   P-Value 
Naturally Monotone  R&A Approach                          -2.382    0.7888 
Naturally Monotone  Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -2.645    0.3766 
Single Different    R&A Approach                          -0.981    1.0000 
Single Different    Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -3.275    0.0502 
Single Similar      R&A Approach                          -2.876    0.1878 
Single Similar      Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -3.725    0.0096 
Stepped             R&A Approach                          38.652    0.0000 
Stepped             Value Curve Approach (not branched)    3.976    0.0035 
 
 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone 
Approach = R&A Approach  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
RD Type             Approach                               of Means  Difference 
Naturally Monotone  Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.0914      0.3468 
Single Different    R&A Approach                             0.4860      0.3468 
Single Different    Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.3098      0.3468 
Single Similar      R&A Approach                            -0.1712      0.3468 
Single Similar      Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.4659      0.3468 
Stepped             R&A Approach                            14.2314      0.3468 
Stepped             Value Curve Approach (not branched)      2.2050      0.3468 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
RD Type             Approach                             T-Value   P-Value 
Naturally Monotone  Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -0.264    1.0000 
Single Different    R&A Approach                           1.401    1.0000 
Single Different    Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -0.893    1.0000 
Single Similar      R&A Approach                          -0.494    1.0000 
Single Similar      Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -1.343    1.0000 
Stepped             R&A Approach                          41.034    0.0000 
Stepped             Value Curve Approach (not branched)    6.358    0.0000 
 
 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone 
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Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched)  subtracted from: 
 
                                                       Difference       SE of 
RD Type           Approach                               of Means  Difference 
Single Different  R&A Approach                             0.5774      0.3468 
Single Different  Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.2184      0.3468 
Single Similar    R&A Approach                            -0.0798      0.3468 
Single Similar    Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.3745      0.3468 
Stepped           R&A Approach                            14.3228      0.3468 
Stepped           Value Curve Approach (not branched)      2.2964      0.3468 
 
                                                                Adjusted 
RD Type           Approach                             T-Value   P-Value 
Single Different  R&A Approach                           1.665    1.0000 
Single Different  Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -0.630    1.0000 
Single Similar    R&A Approach                          -0.230    1.0000 
Single Similar    Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -1.080    1.0000 
Stepped           R&A Approach                          41.297    0.0000 
Stepped           Value Curve Approach (not branched)    6.621    0.0000 
 
 
RD Type = Single Different 
Approach = R&A Approach  subtracted from: 
 
                                                       Difference       SE of 
RD Type           Approach                               of Means  Difference 
Single Different  Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.7958      0.3468 
Single Similar    R&A Approach                            -0.6572      0.3468 
Single Similar    Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.9519      0.3468 
Stepped           R&A Approach                            13.7454      0.3468 
Stepped           Value Curve Approach (not branched)      1.7191      0.3468 
 
                                                                Adjusted 
RD Type           Approach                             T-Value   P-Value 
Single Different  Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -2.295    0.9941 
Single Similar    R&A Approach                          -1.895    1.0000 
Single Similar    Value Curve Approach (not branched)   -2.745    0.2805 
Stepped           R&A Approach                          39.633    0.0000 
Stepped           Value Curve Approach (not branched)    4.957    0.0000 
 
 
RD Type = Single Different 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched)  subtracted from: 
 
                                                     Difference       SE of 
RD Type         Approach                               of Means  Difference 
Single Similar  R&A Approach                             0.1386      0.3468 
Single Similar  Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.1561      0.3468 
Stepped         R&A Approach                            14.5412      0.3468 
Stepped         Value Curve Approach (not branched)      2.5149      0.3468 
 
                                                              Adjusted 
RD Type         Approach                             T-Value   P-Value 
Single Similar  R&A Approach                          0.3997    1.0000 
Single Similar  Value Curve Approach (not branched)  -0.4500    1.0000 
Stepped         R&A Approach                         41.9273    0.0000 
Stepped         Value Curve Approach (not branched)   7.2512    0.0000 
 
 
RD Type = Single Similar 
Approach = R&A Approach  subtracted from: 
 
                                                     Difference       SE of 
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RD Type         Approach                               of Means  Difference 
Single Similar  Value Curve Approach (not branched)     -0.2947      0.3468 
Stepped         R&A Approach                            14.4026      0.3468 
Stepped         Value Curve Approach (not branched)      2.3763      0.3468 
 
                                                              Adjusted 
RD Type         Approach                             T-Value   P-Value 
Single Similar  Value Curve Approach (not branched)  -0.8497    1.0000 
Stepped         R&A Approach                         41.5276    0.0000 
Stepped         Value Curve Approach (not branched)   6.8516    0.0000 
 
 
RD Type = Single Similar 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched)  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
RD Type  Approach                               of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Stepped  R&A Approach                             14.697      0.3468   42.377 
Stepped  Value Curve Approach (not branched)       2.671      0.3468    7.701 
 
                                              Adjusted 
RD Type  Approach                              P-Value 
Stepped  R&A Approach                           0.0000 
Stepped  Value Curve Approach (not branched)    0.0000 
 
 
RD Type = Stepped 
Approach = R&A Approach  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
RD Type  Approach                               of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Stepped  Value Curve Approach (not branched)      -12.03      0.3468   -34.68 
 
                                              Adjusted 
RD Type  Approach                              P-Value 
Stepped  Value Curve Approach (not branched)    0.0000 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*TransitionCorrelationType 
Approach = R&A Approach 
TransitionCorrelationType = Strong  subtracted from: 
 
                                                                Difference 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType    of Means 
R&A Approach                         Weak                            1.940 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Strong                         -2.435 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                           -2.229 
 
                                                                     SE of 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType  Difference 
R&A Approach                         Weak                           0.2193 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Strong                         0.2193 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                           0.2193 
 
 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType  T-Value 
R&A Approach                         Weak                          8.84 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Strong                      -11.10 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                        -10.16 
 
                                                                Adjusted 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType   P-Value 
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R&A Approach                         Weak                         0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Strong                       0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                         0.0000 
 
 
Approach = R&A Approach 
TransitionCorrelationType = Weak  subtracted from: 
 
                                                                Difference 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType    of Means 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Strong                         -4.375 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                           -4.169 
 
                                                                     SE of 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Strong                         0.2193 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                           0.2193 
 
 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType  T-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Strong                      -19.94 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                        -19.01 
 
                                                                Adjusted 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Strong                       0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                         0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched) 
TransitionCorrelationType = Strong  subtracted from: 
 
                                                                Difference 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType    of Means 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                           0.2058 
 
                                                                     SE of 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                           0.2193 
 
 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType  T-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                        0.9383 
 
                                                                Adjusted 
Approach                             TransitionCorrelationType   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Weak                          1.000 
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F. PAIRWISE COMPARISON TESTS FOR 
COMPUTATIONAL TIME ON FULL MODELS 
 
 
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - MVC, Time - VCN  
 
Paired T for Time - MVC - Time - VCN 
 
              N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
Time - MVC  320  999.438  1296.340   72.468 
Time - VCN  320   98.875   119.606    6.686 
Difference  320  900.563  1208.984   67.584 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (767.595, 1033.530) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 13.33  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - MVC, Time - VC  
 
Paired T for Time - MVC - Time - VC 
 
              N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
Time - MVC  320  999.438  1296.340   72.468 
Time - VC   320   74.166    73.562    4.112 
Difference  320  925.272  1241.824   69.420 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (788.693, 1061.851) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 13.33  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - VCN, Time - VC  
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Paired T for Time - VCN - Time - VC 
 
              N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
Time - VCN  320  98.8750  119.6056   6.6862 
Time - VC   320  74.1656   73.5616   4.1122 
Difference  320  24.7094   61.8994   3.4603 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (17.9015, 31.5172) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 7.14  P-Value = 0.000 
 
 
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Stepped - MVC, RD = Single Sim - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Stepped - MVC - RD = Single Sim - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
RD = Stepped - M  64  1570.98  1833.23   229.15 
RD = Single Sim   64   971.23  1257.71   157.21 
Difference        64  599.750  765.597   95.700 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (408.510, 790.990) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 6.27  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Stepped - MVC, RD = Single Diff - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Stepped - MVC - RD = Single Diff - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
RD = Stepped - M  64  1570.98   1833.23   229.15 
RD = Single Diff  64   740.48    965.97   120.75 
Difference        64  830.500  1071.154  133.894 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (562.934, 1098.066) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 6.20  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Stepped - MVC, RD = Branch Diff - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Stepped - MVC - RD = Branch Diff - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
RD = Stepped - M  64  1570.98  1833.23   229.15 
RD = Branch Diff  64   971.17  1124.36   140.55 
Difference        64  599.813  851.073  106.384 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (387.221, 812.404) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 5.64  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Stepped - MVC, RD = Nat Monotone - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Stepped - MVC - RD = Nat Monotone - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
RD = Stepped - M  64  1570.98  1833.23   229.15 
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RD = Nat Monoton  64   743.31   949.26   118.66 
Difference        64  827.672  974.979  121.872 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (584.129, 1071.214) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 6.79  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Single Sim - MVC, RD = Single Diff - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Single Sim - MVC - RD = Single Diff - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
RD = Single Sim   64  971.234  1257.712  157.214 
RD = Single Diff  64  740.484   965.971  120.746 
Difference        64  230.750   721.365   90.171 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (50.558, 410.942) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 2.56  P-Value = 0.013 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Single Sim - MVC, RD = Branch Diff - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Single Sim - MVC - RD = Branch Diff - MVC 
 
                   N      Mean       StDev    SE Mean 
RD = Single Sim   64   971.234    1257.712    157.214 
RD = Branch Diff  64   971.172    1124.360    140.545 
Difference        64  0.062500  561.576801  70.197100 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (-140.215211, 140.340211) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 0.00  P-Value = 0.999 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Single Sim - MVC, RD = Nat Monotone - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Single Sim - MVC - RD = Nat Monotone - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
RD = Single Sim   64  971.234  1257.712  157.214 
RD = Nat Monoton  64  743.313   949.264  118.658 
Difference        64  227.922   671.589   83.949 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (60.164, 395.680) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 2.72  P-Value = 0.009 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Branch Diff - MVC, RD = Single Diff - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Branch Diff - MVC - RD = Single Diff - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
RD = Branch Diff  64  971.172  1124.360  140.545 
RD = Single Diff  64  740.484   965.971  120.746 
Difference        64  230.688   531.927   66.491 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (97.816, 363.559) 
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T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 3.47  P-Value = 0.001 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Branch Diff - MVC, RD = Nat Monotone - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Branch Diff - MVC - RD = Nat Monotone - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
RD = Branch Diff  64  971.172  1124.360  140.545 
RD = Nat Monoton  64  743.313   949.264  118.658 
Difference        64  227.859   418.298   52.287 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (123.372, 332.347) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 4.36  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: RD = Nat Monotone - MVC, RD = Single Diff - MVC  
 
Paired T for RD = Nat Monotone - MVC - RD = Single Diff - MVC 
 
                   N     Mean      StDev   SE Mean 
RD = Nat Monoton  64  743.313    949.264   118.658 
RD = Single Diff  64  740.484    965.971   120.746 
Difference        64  2.82812  572.63644  71.57956 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (-140.21220, 145.86845) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 0.04  P-Value = 0.969 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 40 MVC, NumPeriods = 20 MVC  
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 40 MVC - NumPeriods = 20 MVC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 40   160  1335.48  1586.48   125.42 
NumPeriods = 20   160   663.40   792.08    62.62 
Difference        160  672.075  919.727   72.711 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (528.471, 815.679) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 9.24  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 - MVC, NumResLevels = 100 - MVC  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 - MVC - NumResLevels = 100 - MVC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  160  1550.24  1594.14   126.03 
NumResLevels = 1  160   448.63   468.72    37.06 
Difference        160  1101.61  1189.44    94.03 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (915.90, 1287.33) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 11.72  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 - MVC, NumDispLevels = 20 - MVC  
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Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 - MVC - NumDispLevels = 20 - MVC 
 
                    N      Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   160    867.41  1122.09    88.71 
NumDispLevels =   160   1131.47  1441.32   113.95 
Difference        160  -264.063  591.733   46.781 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (-356.454, -171.671) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = -5.64  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 - MVC, NumRDs = 25 - MVC  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 100 - MVC - NumRDs = 25 - MVC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumRDs = 100 - M  160  1764.07  1465.21   115.84 
NumRDs = 25 - MV  160   234.81   219.18    17.33 
Difference        160  1529.26  1291.99   102.14 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (1327.54, 1730.99) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 14.97  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 40 VC, NumPeriods = 20 VC  
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 40 VC - NumPeriods = 20 VC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 40   160  98.8062  88.8617   7.0251 
NumPeriods = 20   160  49.5250  41.6926   3.2961 
Difference        160  49.2813  50.2805   3.9750 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (41.4306, 57.1319) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 12.40  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 - VC, NumResLevels = 100 - VC  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 - VC - NumResLevels = 100 - VC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  160  105.938   87.075    6.884 
NumResLevels = 1  160   42.394   35.257    2.787 
Difference        160  63.5438  53.9706   4.2668 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (55.1169, 71.9706) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 14.89  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 - VC, NumDispLevels = 20 - VC  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 - VC - NumDispLevels = 20 - VC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   160  93.9625  87.7461   6.9369 
NumDispLevels =   160  54.3688  48.6672   3.8475 
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Difference        160  39.5938  42.1814   3.3347 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (33.0077, 46.1798) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 11.87  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 - VC, NumRDs = 25 - VC  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 100 - VC - NumRDs = 25 - VC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumRDs = 100 - V  160  119.706   79.740    6.304 
NumRDs = 25 - VC  160   28.625   18.004    1.423 
Difference        160  91.0812  62.9260   4.9747 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (81.2562, 100.9063) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 18.31  P-Value = 0.000 
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G. MINITAB OUTPUT FOR SOLUTION 
QUALITY FOR FULL MODELS 
 
 
General Linear Model: Percentage Error versus Approach, NumPeriods, ...  
 
Factor                     Type   Levels  Values 
Approach                   fixed       3  Direct MV Curve Approach, Value Curve 
                                          Approach (branched), Value Curve 
                                          Approach (not branched) 
NumPeriods                 fixed       2  20, 40 
NumResLevels               fixed       2  100, 300 
NumDispLevels              fixed       2  20, 40 
NumRDs                     fixed       2  25, 100 
NumInflows                 fixed       2  1, 5 
TransitionCorrelationType  fixed       2  Strong, Weak 
RD Type                    fixed       5  Branch Different, Naturally Monotone, 
                                          Single Different, Single Similar, 
                                          Stepped 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for Percentage Error, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source                               DF    Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F 
Approach                              2    24.870   24.870   12.435   19.86 
NumPeriods                            1     1.948    1.948    1.948    3.11 
Approach*NumPeriods                   2     1.918    1.918    0.959    1.53 
NumResLevels                          1   105.947  105.947  105.947  169.19 
Approach*NumResLevels                 2     2.612    2.612    1.306    2.09 
NumDispLevels                         1     6.922    6.922    6.922   11.05 
Approach*NumDispLevels                2     8.325    8.325    4.162    6.65 
NumRDs                                1     1.400    1.400    1.400    2.24 
Approach*NumRDs                       2     0.063    0.063    0.031    0.05 
NumInflows                            1    18.270   18.270   18.270   29.18 
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Approach*NumInflows                   2     0.781    0.781    0.391    0.62 
TransitionCorrelationType             1     4.681    4.681    4.681    7.48 
Approach*TransitionCorrelationType    2     0.667    0.667    0.334    0.53 
RD Type                               4   601.130  601.130  150.282  239.99 
Approach*RD Type                      8    23.400   23.400    2.925    4.67 
Error                               927   580.484  580.484    0.626 
Total                               959  1383.417 
 
Source                                  P 
Approach                            0.000 
NumPeriods                          0.078 
Approach*NumPeriods                 0.217 
NumResLevels                        0.000 
Approach*NumResLevels               0.125 
NumDispLevels                       0.001 
Approach*NumDispLevels              0.001 
NumRDs                              0.135 
Approach*NumRDs                     0.951 
NumInflows                          0.000 
Approach*NumInflows                 0.536 
TransitionCorrelationType           0.006 
Approach*TransitionCorrelationType  0.587 
RD Type                             0.000 
Approach*RD Type                    0.000 
Error 
Total 
 
 
S = 0.791325   R-Sq = 58.04%   R-Sq(adj) = 56.59% 
 
 
Least Squares Means for Percentage Error 
 
Approach                                                  Mean  SE Mean 
Direct MV Curve Approach                                1.4037  0.04424 
Value Curve Approach (branched)                         1.2999  0.04424 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)                     1.6812  0.04424 
 
NumPeriods 
20                                                      1.5066  0.03612 
40                                                      1.4165  0.03612 
 
Approach*NumPeriods 
Direct MV Curve Approach 20                             1.4175  0.06256 
Direct MV Curve Approach 40                             1.3898  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 20                      1.3130  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 40                      1.2869  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 20                  1.7895  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 40                  1.5730  0.06256 
 
NumResLevels 
100                                                     1.7938  0.03612 
300                                                     1.1294  0.03612 
 
Approach*NumResLevels 
Direct MV Curve Approach 100                            1.8019  0.06256 
Direct MV Curve Approach 300                            1.0054  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 100                     1.6276  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 300                     0.9723  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 100                 1.9519  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 300                 1.4105  0.06256 
 
NumDispLevel 
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20                                                      1.5465  0.03612 
40                                                      1.3767  0.03612 
 
Approach*NumDispLevel 
Direct MV Curve Approach 20                             1.4053  0.06256 
Direct MV Curve Approach 40                             1.4020  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 20                      1.3382  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 40                      1.2617  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 20                  1.8961  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 40                  1.4663  0.06256 
 
NumRDs 
 25                                                     1.4234  0.03612 
100                                                     1.4998  0.03612 
 
Approach*NumRDs 
Direct MV Curve Approach  25                            1.3647  0.06256 
Direct MV Curve Approach 100                            1.4426  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched)  25                     1.2523  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 100                     1.3476  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  25                 1.6533  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 100                 1.7091  0.06256 
 
NumInflows 
1                                                       1.3236  0.03612 
5                                                       1.5996  0.03612 
 
Approach*NumInflows 
Direct MV Curve Approach 1                              1.3060  0.06256 
Direct MV Curve Approach 5                              1.5013  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 1                       1.1405  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) 5                       1.4594  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 1                   1.5244  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) 5                   1.8380  0.06256 
 
TransitionCo 
Strong                                                  1.3918  0.03612 
Weak                                                    1.5314  0.03612 
 
Approach*TransitionCo 
Direct MV Curve Approach Strong                         1.3653  0.06256 
Direct MV Curve Approach Weak                           1.4420  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) Strong                  1.2317  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (branched) Weak                    1.3681  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Strong              1.5783  0.06256 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Weak                1.7841  0.06256 
 
RD Type 
Branch Different                                        1.7042  0.05711 
Naturally Monotone                                      1.1851  0.05711 
Single Different                                        0.8643  0.05711 
Single Similar                                          0.6727  0.05711 
Stepped                                                 2.8816  0.05711 
 
Approach*RD Type 
Direct MV Curve Approach Branch Different               1.5689  0.09892 
Direct MV Curve Approach Naturally Monotone             1.2449  0.09892 
Direct MV Curve Approach Single Different               0.9121  0.09892 
Direct MV Curve Approach Single Similar                 0.6710  0.09892 
Direct MV Curve Approach Stepped                        2.6212  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (branched) Branch Different        1.4692  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (branched) Naturally Monotone      1.1535  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (branched) Single Different        0.7422  0.09892 
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Value Curve Approach (branched) Single Similar          0.5646  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (branched) Stepped                 2.5702  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Branch Different    2.0745  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Naturally Monotone  1.1570  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Single Different    0.9386  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Single Similar      0.7825  0.09892 
Value Curve Approach (not branched) Stepped             3.4535  0.09892 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*RD Type 
Approach = Direct MV Curve Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Naturally Monotone      -0.324      0.1399 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Different        -0.657      0.1399 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Similar          -0.898      0.1399 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Stepped                  1.052      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Branch Different        -0.100      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Branch Different         0.506      0.1399 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Naturally Monotone   -2.316    1.0000 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Different     -4.695    0.0003 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Similar       -6.419    0.0000 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Stepped               7.522    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Branch Different     -0.713    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Branch Different      3.614    0.0334 
 
Approach = Direct MV Curve Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Different       -0.3328      0.1399 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Similar         -0.5739      0.1399 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Stepped                 1.3763      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Naturally Monotone     -0.0915      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Naturally Monotone     -0.0879      0.1399 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Different     -2.379    1.0000 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Similar       -4.103    0.0047 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Stepped               9.839    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Naturally Monotone   -0.654    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Naturally Monotone   -0.628    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Direct MV Curve Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Similar         -0.2411      0.1399 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Stepped                 1.7091      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Different       -0.1700      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Different        0.0264      0.1399 
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                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Single Similar       -1.724    1.0000 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Stepped              12.217    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Different     -1.215    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Different      0.189    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Direct MV Curve Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Stepped                 1.9502      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Similar         -0.1064      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar          0.1115      0.1399 
 
                                                                   Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Direct MV Curve Approach             Stepped             13.9411    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Similar      -0.7607    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar       0.7968    1.0000 
 
Approach = Direct MV Curve Approach 
RD Type = Stepped  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped                 -0.051      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped                  0.832      0.1399 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped               -0.36    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped                5.95    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (branched) 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Naturally Monotone     -0.3158      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Different       -0.7270      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Similar         -0.9046      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped                 1.1010      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Branch Different        0.6052      0.1399 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Naturally Monotone   -2.257    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Different     -5.197    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Similar       -6.467    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped               7.871    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Branch Different      4.327    0.0018 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (branched) 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Different       -0.4113      0.1399 
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Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Similar         -0.5888      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped                 1.4168      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Naturally Monotone      0.0036      0.1399 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Different     -2.940    0.3531 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Similar       -4.209    0.0030 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped              10.128    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Naturally Monotone    0.025    1.0000 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (branched) 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Similar         -0.1775      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped                 1.8280      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Different        0.1964      0.1399 
 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Single Similar       -1.269    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped              13.068    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Different      1.404    1.0000 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (branched) 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped                 2.0056      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar          0.2179      0.1399 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (branched)      Stepped              14.337    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar        1.557    1.0000 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (branched) 
RD Type = Stepped  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped                  0.883      0.1399 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped                6.31    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched) 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Naturally Monotone      -0.917      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Different        -1.136      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar          -1.292      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped                  1.379      0.1399 
 
                                                                  Adjusted 
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Approach                             RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Naturally Monotone   -6.558    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Different     -8.120    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar       -9.236    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped               9.858    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched) 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                       Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type             of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Different     -0.2184      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar       -0.3745      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped               2.2964      0.1399 
 
                                                                Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type           T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Different   -1.562    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar     -2.677    0.7932 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped            16.416    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched) 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                     Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type           of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar     -0.1561      0.1399 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped             2.5149      0.1399 
 
                                                              Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type         T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Single Similar   -1.116    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped          17.978    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach (not branched) 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                             RD Type    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped       2.671      0.1399    19.09 
 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                             RD Type   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach (not branched)  Stepped    0.0000 
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H. PAIRWISE COMPARISON TESTS FOR 
COMPUTATIONAL TIME ON SIMPLIFIED 
MODELS 
 
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - VC, Time - Quantity-Based Offers  
 
Paired T for Time - VC - Time - Quantity-Based Offers 
 
                     N       Mean      StDev   SE Mean 
Time - VC         1600    52.2431    47.5270    1.1882 
Time - Quantity-  1600    52.2950    51.8753    1.2969 
Difference        1600  -0.051875  16.797523  0.419938 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (-0.875562, 0.771812) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = -0.12  P-Value = 0.902 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - VC, Time - Price-Based Offers  
 
Paired T for Time - VC - Time - Price-Based Offers 
 
                     N      Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Time - VC         1600    52.243   47.527    1.188 
Time - Price-Bas  1600   409.603  573.801   14.345 
Difference        1600  -357.359  534.177   13.354 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (-383.553, -331.165) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = -26.76  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - VC, Time - Naïve Correlation Approa  
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Paired T for Time - VC - Time - Naïve Correlation Approa 
 
                     N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Time - VC         1600  52.2431  47.5270   1.1882 
Time - Naïve Cor  1600   1.4319   1.1011   0.0275 
Difference        1600  50.8113  46.8511   1.1713 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (48.5138, 53.1087) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 43.38  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - VC, Time - Perfectly Competitive Ap  
 
Paired T for Time - VC - Time - Perfectly Competitive Ap 
 
                     N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
Time - VC         1600  52.2431   47.5270   1.1882 
Time - Perfectly  1600  50.2250   58.0830   1.4521 
Difference        1600  2.01812  32.80256  0.82006 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (0.40961, 3.62664) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 2.46  P-Value = 0.014 
 
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 40 QB, NumPeriods = 20 QB  
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 40 QB - NumPeriods = 20 QB 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 40   160  101.806   99.369    7.856 
NumPeriods = 20   160   51.844   45.199    3.573 
Difference        160  49.9625  70.5057   5.5740 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (38.9539, 60.9711) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 8.96  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 - QB, NumResLevels = 100 - QB  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 - QB - NumResLevels = 100 - QB 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  160  109.038   95.240    7.529 
NumResLevels = 1  160   44.613   44.877    3.548 
Difference        160  64.4250  68.0197   5.3774 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (53.8046, 75.0454) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 11.98  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 - QB, NumDispLevels = 20 - QB  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 - QB - NumDispLevels = 20 - QB 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   160  96.3063  97.1735   7.6822 
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NumDispLevels =   160  57.3438  54.4660   4.3059 
Difference        160  38.9625  63.8207   5.0455 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (28.9977, 48.9273) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 7.72  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 - QB, NumRDs = 25 - QB  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 100 - QB - NumRDs = 25 - QB 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumRDs = 100 - Q  160  124.125   90.662    7.167 
NumRDs = 25 - QB  160   29.525   21.232    1.679 
Difference        160  94.6000  75.8213   5.9942 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (82.7615, 106.4385) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 15.78  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 40 PB, NumPeriods = 20 PB  
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 40 PB - NumPeriods = 20 PB 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 40   160  1049.62  1277.09   100.96 
NumPeriods = 20   160   610.56   728.26    57.57 
Difference        160  439.063  952.969   75.339 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (290.269, 587.856) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 5.83  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 - PB, NumResLevels = 100 - PB  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 - PB - NumResLevels = 100 - PB 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  160  1275.66   1313.15   103.81 
NumResLevels = 1  160   384.52    366.59    28.98 
Difference        160  891.137  1058.636   83.693 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (725.845, 1056.430) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 10.65  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 - PB, NumDispLevels = 20 - PB  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 - PB - NumDispLevels = 20 - PB 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   160  937.625  1211.408   95.770 
NumDispLevels =   160  722.550   876.086   69.261 
Difference        160  215.075   855.950   67.669 
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95% CI for mean difference: (81.429, 348.721) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 3.18  P-Value = 0.002 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 - PB, NumRDs = 25 - PB  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 100 - PB - NumRDs = 25 - PB 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumRDs = 100 - P  160  1459.68  1196.73    94.61 
NumRDs = 25 - PB  160   200.49   168.47    13.32 
Difference        160  1259.19  1100.95    87.04 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (1087.29, 1431.09) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 14.47  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 40 NC, NumPeriods = 20 NC  
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 40 NC - NumPeriods = 20 NC 
 
                    N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 40   160   1.94375   1.33764   0.10575 
NumPeriods = 20   160   1.00625   0.82031   0.06485 
Difference        160  0.937500  1.257368  0.099404 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (0.741178, 1.133822) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 9.43  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 - NC, NumResLevels = 100 - NC  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 - NC - NumResLevels = 100 - NC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  160  2.08125  1.23356  0.09752 
NumResLevels = 1  160  0.86875  0.80190  0.06340 
Difference        160  1.21250  1.16223  0.09188 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (1.03103, 1.39397) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 13.20  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 - NC, NumDispLevels = 20 - NC  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 - NC - NumDispLevels = 20 - NC 
 
                    N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   160   1.79375   1.42351   0.11254 
NumDispLevels =   160   1.15625   0.82070   0.06488 
Difference        160  0.637500  1.266340  0.100113 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (0.439777, 0.835223) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 6.37  P-Value = 0.000 
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Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 - NC, NumRDs = 25 - NC  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 100 - NC - NumRDs = 25 - NC 
 
                    N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
NumRDs = 100 - N  160   1.68750   1.29919   0.10271 
NumRDs = 25 - NC  160   1.26250   1.06096   0.08388 
Difference        160  0.425000  1.168507  0.092379 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (0.242553, 0.607447) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 4.60  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumPeriods = 40 PC, NumPeriods = 20 PC  
 
Paired T for NumPeriods = 40 PC - NumPeriods = 20 PC 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumPeriods = 40   160  106.213   123.291    9.747 
NumPeriods = 20   160   50.831    50.547    3.996 
Difference        160  55.3813  103.6858   8.1971 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (39.1920, 71.5705) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 6.76  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumResLevels = 300 - PC, NumResLevels = 100 - PC  
 
Paired T for NumResLevels = 300 - PC - NumResLevels = 100 - PC 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumResLevels = 3  160  112.456   119.902    9.479 
NumResLevels = 1  160   44.588    51.037    4.035 
Difference        160  67.8688  103.8586   8.2107 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (51.6526, 84.0849) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 8.27  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumDispLevels = 40 - PC, NumDispLevels = 20 - PC  
 
Paired T for NumDispLevels = 40 - PC - NumDispLevels = 20 - PC 
 
                    N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
NumDispLevels =   160  92.0875   91.8964   7.2650 
NumDispLevels =   160  64.9563  102.3890   8.0946 
Difference        160  27.1313   92.6026   7.3209 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (12.6725, 41.5900) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 3.71  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: NumRDs = 100 - PC, NumRDs = 25 - PC  
 
Paired T for NumRDs = 100 - PC - NumRDs = 25 - PC 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
 526
NumRDs = 100 - P  160  129.906  116.451    9.206 
NumRDs = 25 - PC  160   27.138   20.594    1.628 
Difference        160  102.769  107.396    8.490 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (86.000, 119.537) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 12.10  P-Value = 0.000 
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I. MINITAB OUTPUT ON SOLUTION 
QUALITY FOR SIMPLIFIED MODELS 
 
 
General Linear Model: Percentage Error versus Approach, NumPeriods, ...  
 
Factor                     Type   Levels  Values 
Approach                   fixed       6  Naive Correlation Approach, Naive 
                                          Water Approach, Perfectly Competitive 
                                          Approach, Price-Based Offer Approach, 
                                          Quantity-Based Offer Approach, Value 
                                          Curve Approach 
NumPeriods                 fixed       2  20, 40 
NumResLevels               fixed       2  100, 300 
NumDispLevels              fixed       2  20, 40 
NumRDs                     fixed       2  25, 100 
NumInflows                 fixed       2  1, 5 
TransitionCorrelationType  fixed       2  Strong, Weak 
RD Type                    fixed       5  Branch Different, Naturally Monotone, 
                                          Single Different, Single Similar, 
                                          Stepped 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for Percentage Error, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source                                DF   Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS         F 
Approach                               5  1429626  1429626  285925  11486.08 
NumPeriods                             1     1979     1979    1979     79.51 
Approach*NumPeriods                    5     3539     3539     708     28.43 
NumResLevels                           1     7724     7724    7724    310.28 
Approach*NumResLevels                  5     6836     6836    1367     54.92 
NumDispLevels                          1     3293     3293    3293    132.30 
Approach*NumDispLevels                 5    33092    33092    6618    265.87 
NumRDs                                 1        1        1       1      0.03 
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Approach*NumRDs                        5       48       48      10      0.39 
NumInflows                             1      899      899     899     36.10 
Approach*NumInflows                    5       61       61      12      0.49 
TransitionCorrelationType              1      259      259     259     10.42 
Approach*TransitionCorrelationType     5     3325     3325     665     26.72 
RD Type                                4    24861    24861    6215    249.68 
Approach*RD Type                      20   543371   543371   27169   1091.40 
Error                               9534   237332   237332      25 
Total                               9599  2296245 
 
Source                                  P 
Approach                            0.000 
NumPeriods                          0.000 
Approach*NumPeriods                 0.000 
NumResLevels                        0.000 
Approach*NumResLevels               0.000 
NumDispLevels                       0.000 
Approach*NumDispLevels              0.000 
NumRDs                              0.860 
Approach*NumRDs                     0.858 
NumInflows                          0.000 
Approach*NumInflows                 0.787 
TransitionCorrelationType           0.001 
Approach*TransitionCorrelationType  0.000 
RD Type                             0.000 
Approach*RD Type                    0.000 
Error 
Total 
 
 
S = 4.98931   R-Sq = 89.66%   R-Sq(adj) = 89.59% 
 
 
Least Squares Means for Percentage Error 
 
Approach                                              Mean  SE Mean 
Naive Correlation Approach                          3.0799  0.12473 
Naive Water Approach                               36.0085  0.12473 
Perfectly Competitive Approach                      9.3935  0.12473 
Price-Based Offer Approach                          2.3040  0.12473 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach                       4.1324  0.12473 
Value Curve Approach                                1.1858  0.12473 
NumPeriods 
 
20                                                  8.8966  0.07201 
40                                                  9.8048  0.07201 
 
Approach*NumPeriods 
Naive Correlation Approach 20                       2.6400  0.17640 
Naive Correlation Approach 40                       3.5199  0.17640 
Naive Water Approach 20                            36.1739  0.17640 
Naive Water Approach 40                            35.8431  0.17640 
Perfectly Competitive Approach 20                   7.7169  0.17640 
Perfectly Competitive Approach 40                  11.0701  0.17640 
Price-Based Offer Approach 20                       2.2456  0.17640 
Price-Based Offer Approach 40                       2.3623  0.17640 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach 20                    3.4939  0.17640 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach 40                    4.7710  0.17640 
Value Curve Approach 20                             1.1094  0.17640 
Value Curve Approach 40                             1.2621  0.17640 
 
NumResLevels 
100                                                10.2477  0.07201 
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300                                                 8.4537  0.07201 
 
Approach*NumResLevels 
Naive Correlation Approach 100                      4.0319  0.17640 
Naive Correlation Approach 300                      2.1279  0.17640 
Naive Water Approach 100                           35.6363  0.17640 
Naive Water Approach 300                           36.3807  0.17640 
Perfectly Competitive Approach 100                 11.8138  0.17640 
Perfectly Competitive Approach 300                  6.9732  0.17640 
Price-Based Offer Approach 100                      3.0989  0.17640 
Price-Based Offer Approach 300                      1.5091  0.17640 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach 100                   5.3171  0.17640 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach 300                   2.9478  0.17640 
Value Curve Approach 100                            1.5880  0.17640 
Value Curve Approach 300                            0.7835  0.17640 
 
NumDispLevel 
20                                                  8.7650  0.07201 
40                                                  9.9364  0.07201 
 
Approach*NumDispLevel 
Naive Correlation Approach 20                       3.2244  0.17640 
Naive Correlation Approach 40                       2.9355  0.17640 
Naive Water Approach 20                            31.3793  0.17640 
Naive Water Approach 40                            40.6378  0.17640 
Perfectly Competitive Approach 20                  10.4836  0.17640 
Perfectly Competitive Approach 40                   8.3034  0.17640 
Price-Based Offer Approach 20                       2.0530  0.17640 
Price-Based Offer Approach 40                       2.5549  0.17640 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach 20                    4.3205  0.17640 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach 40                    3.9444  0.17640 
Value Curve Approach 20                             1.1291  0.17640 
Value Curve Approach 40                             1.2424  0.17640 
 
 
NumInflows 
1                                                   9.0447  0.07201 
5                                                   9.6567  0.07201 
 
TransitionCo 
Strong                                              9.1864  0.07201 
Weak                                                9.5150  0.07201 
 
Approach*TransitionCo 
Naive Correlation Approach Strong                   3.2499  0.17640 
Naive Correlation Approach Weak                     2.9099  0.17640 
Naive Water Approach Strong                        35.5163  0.17640 
Naive Water Approach Weak                          36.5008  0.17640 
Perfectly Competitive Approach Strong               9.8821  0.17640 
Perfectly Competitive Approach Weak                 8.9049  0.17640 
Price-Based Offer Approach Strong                   2.3938  0.17640 
Price-Based Offer Approach Weak                     2.2141  0.17640 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach Strong                2.8218  0.17640 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach Weak                  5.4430  0.17640 
Value Curve Approach Strong                         1.2542  0.17640 
Value Curve Approach Weak                           1.1174  0.17640 
 
RD Type 
Branch Different                                   11.4421  0.11386 
Naturally Monotone                                  9.8792  0.11386 
Single Different                                    9.4473  0.11386 
Single Similar                                      9.5084  0.11386 
Stepped                                             6.4765  0.11386 
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Approach*RD Type 
Naive Correlation Approach Branch Different         3.1456  0.27891 
Naive Correlation Approach Naturally Monotone       1.7683  0.27891 
Naive Correlation Approach Single Different         1.7827  0.27891 
Naive Correlation Approach Single Similar           1.0896  0.27891 
Naive Correlation Approach Stepped                  7.6135  0.27891 
Naive Water Approach Branch Different              51.3956  0.27891 
Naive Water Approach Naturally Monotone            31.8425  0.27891 
Naive Water Approach Single Different              45.5510  0.27891 
Naive Water Approach Single Similar                47.6272  0.27891 
Naive Water Approach Stepped                        3.6263  0.27891 
Perfectly Competitive Approach Branch Different     7.5427  0.27891 
Perfectly Competitive Approach Naturally Monotone  11.3875  0.27891 
Perfectly Competitive Approach Single Different     2.4614  0.27891 
Perfectly Competitive Approach Single Similar       5.8485  0.27891 
Perfectly Competitive Approach Stepped             19.7274  0.27891 
Price-Based Offer Approach Branch Different         2.3133  0.27891 
Price-Based Offer Approach Naturally Monotone       4.8011  0.27891 
Price-Based Offer Approach Single Different         2.6113  0.27891 
Price-Based Offer Approach Single Similar           0.9725  0.27891 
Price-Based Offer Approach Stepped                  0.8217  0.27891 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach Branch Different      2.4309  0.27891 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach Naturally Monotone    7.7895  0.27891 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach Single Different      3.2839  0.27891 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach Single Similar        0.8252  0.27891 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach Stepped               6.3327  0.27891 
Value Curve Approach Branch Different               1.8245  0.27891 
Value Curve Approach Naturally Monotone             1.6861  0.27891 
Value Curve Approach Single Different               0.9934  0.27891 
Value Curve Approach Single Similar                 0.6875  0.27891 
Value Curve Approach Stepped                        0.7374  0.27891 
 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*NumPeriods 
Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
NumPeriods = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                            Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumPeriods    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      40               0.880      0.2495    3.527 
 
                                            Adjusted 
Approach                        NumPeriods   P-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      40            0.0279 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
NumPeriods = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                            Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumPeriods    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Naive Water Approach            40               -0.33      0.2495     -1.3 
 
                                            Adjusted 
Approach                        NumPeriods   P-Value 
Naive Water Approach            40            1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
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NumPeriods = 40  subtracted from: 
 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
NumPeriods = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                            Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumPeriods    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  40               3.353      0.2495    13.44 
 
                                            Adjusted 
Approach                        NumPeriods   P-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  40            0.0000 
 
 
 
Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
NumPeriods = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                           Difference       SE of 
Approach                       NumPeriods    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     40               0.117      0.2495    0.468 
 
                                           Adjusted 
Approach                       NumPeriods   P-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     40            1.0000 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
NumPeriods = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                           Difference       SE of 
Approach                       NumPeriods    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  40               1.277      0.2495    5.120 
 
                                           Adjusted 
Approach                       NumPeriods   P-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  40            0.0000 
 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
NumPeriods = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                  Difference       SE of           Adjusted 
Approach              NumPeriods    of Means  Difference  T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  40              0.1527      0.2495   0.6121     1.000 
 
 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*NumResLevels 
Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      300               -1.904      0.2495    -7.63 
 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                        NumResLevels   P-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      300             0.0000 
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Approach = Naive Water Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Naive Water Approach            300                 0.74      0.2495      3.0 
 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                        NumResLevels   P-Value 
Naive Water Approach            300             0.1882 
 
 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  300                -4.84      0.2495   -19.40 
 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                        NumResLevels   P-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  300             0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                             Difference       SE of 
Approach                       NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     300               -1.590      0.2495   -6.373 
 
                                             Adjusted 
Approach                       NumResLevels   P-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     300             0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                             Difference       SE of 
Approach                       NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  300               -2.369      0.2495    -9.50 
 
                                             Adjusted 
Approach                       NumResLevels   P-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  300             0.0000 
 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                    Difference       SE of           Adjusted 
Approach              NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  300              -0.8045      0.2495   -3.225    0.0834 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*TransitionCorrelationType 
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Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
TransitionCorrelationType = Strong  subtracted from: 
 
                                                           Difference 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType    of Means 
Naive Correlation Approach      Weak                           -0.340 
 
                                                                SE of 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType  Difference  T-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      Weak                           0.2495   -1.363 
 
                                                           Adjusted 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType   P-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      Weak                         1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
TransitionCorrelationType = Strong  subtracted from: 
 
                                                           Difference 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType    of Means 
Naive Water Approach            Weak                             0.98 
 
                                                                SE of 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType  Difference  T-Value 
Naive Water Approach            Weak                           0.2495      3.9 
 
                                                           Adjusted 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType   P-Value 
Naive Water Approach            Weak                         0.0053 
 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
TransitionCorrelationType = Strong  subtracted from: 
 
                                                           Difference 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType    of Means 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Weak                           -0.977 
 
                                                                SE of 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType  Difference  T-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Weak                           0.2495    -3.92 
 
                                                           Adjusted 
Approach                        TransitionCorrelationType   P-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Weak                         0.0060 
 
Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
TransitionCorrelationType = Strong  subtracted from: 
 
                                                          Difference 
Approach                       TransitionCorrelationType    of Means 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Weak                           -0.180 
                                                               SE of 
Approach                       TransitionCorrelationType  Difference  T-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Weak                           0.2495   -0.720 
 
                                                          Adjusted 
Approach                       TransitionCorrelationType   P-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Weak                         1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
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TransitionCorrelationType = Strong  subtracted from: 
 
                                                          Difference 
Approach                       TransitionCorrelationType    of Means 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Weak                            2.621 
 
                                                               SE of 
Approach                       TransitionCorrelationType  Difference  T-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Weak                           0.2495   10.507 
 
                                                          Adjusted 
Approach                       TransitionCorrelationType   P-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Weak                         0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
TransitionCorrelationType = Strong  subtracted from: 
 
                                                 Difference       SE of 
Approach              TransitionCorrelationType    of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach  Weak                          -0.1367      0.2495 
 
                                                          Adjusted 
Approach              TransitionCorrelationType  T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Weak                       -0.5482     1.000 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*NumDispLevels 
Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
NumDispLevels = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                               Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      40                 -0.289      0.2495   -1.158 
 
                                               Adjusted 
Approach                        NumDispLevels   P-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      40               1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
NumDispLevels = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                               Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Naive Water Approach            40                   9.26      0.2495     37.1 
 
                                               Adjusted 
Approach                        NumDispLevels   P-Value 
Naive Water Approach            40               0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
NumDispLevels = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                               Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  40                 -2.180      0.2495    -8.74 
 
                                               Adjusted 
Approach                        NumDispLevels   P-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  40               0.0000 
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Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
NumDispLevels = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                       NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     40                 0.5019      0.2495    2.012 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                       NumDispLevels   P-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     40               1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
NumDispLevels = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                       NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  40                 -0.376      0.2495    -1.51 
 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                       NumDispLevels   P-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  40               1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
NumDispLevels = 20  subtracted from: 
 
                                     Difference       SE of           Adjusted 
Approach              NumDispLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  40                 0.1133      0.2495   0.4542     1.000 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*RD Type 
Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Naive Correlation Approach      Naturally Monotone      -1.377      0.3944 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Different        -1.363      0.3944 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Similar          -2.056      0.3944 
Naive Correlation Approach      Stepped                  4.468      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Branch Different        -1.321      0.3944 
 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      Naturally Monotone   -3.492    0.2096 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Different     -3.455    0.2400 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Similar       -5.212    0.0001 
Naive Correlation Approach      Stepped              11.327    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Branch Different     -3.349    0.3538 
 
 
Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Different         0.014      0.3944 
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Naive Correlation Approach      Single Similar          -0.679      0.3944 
Naive Correlation Approach      Stepped                  5.845      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Naturally Monotone      -0.082      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Different      0.036    1.0000 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Similar       -1.721    1.0000 
Naive Correlation Approach      Stepped              14.819    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Naturally Monotone   -0.208    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Similar          -0.693      0.3944 
Naive Correlation Approach      Stepped                  5.831      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different        -0.789      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      Single Similar       -1.757    1.0000 
Naive Correlation Approach      Stepped              14.783    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different     -2.001    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Naive Correlation Approach      Stepped                 6.5239      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar         -0.4021      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Naive Correlation Approach      Stepped              16.540    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar       -1.019    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Correlation Approach 
RD Type = Stepped  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped                 -6.876      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped              -17.43    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Naive Water Approach            Naturally Monotone      -19.55      0.3944 
Naive Water Approach            Single Different         -5.84      0.3944 
Naive Water Approach            Single Similar           -3.77      0.3944 
Naive Water Approach            Stepped                 -47.77      0.3944 
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Value Curve Approach            Branch Different        -49.57      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Naive Water Approach            Naturally Monotone    -49.6    0.0000 
Naive Water Approach            Single Different      -14.8    0.0000 
Naive Water Approach            Single Similar         -9.6    0.0000 
Naive Water Approach            Stepped              -121.1    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Branch Different     -125.7    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Naive Water Approach            Single Different         13.71      0.3944 
Naive Water Approach            Single Similar           15.78      0.3944 
Naive Water Approach            Stepped                 -28.22      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Naturally Monotone      -30.16      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Naive Water Approach            Single Different      34.75    0.0000 
Naive Water Approach            Single Similar        40.02    0.0000 
Naive Water Approach            Stepped              -71.53    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Naturally Monotone   -76.45    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Naive Water Approach            Single Similar            2.08      0.3944 
Naive Water Approach            Stepped                 -41.92      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different        -44.56      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Naive Water Approach            Single Similar          5.3    0.0001 
Naive Water Approach            Stepped              -106.3    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different     -113.0    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Naive Water Approach            Stepped                 -44.00      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar          -46.94      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Naive Water Approach            Stepped              -111.6    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar       -119.0    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Naive Water Approach 
RD Type = Stepped  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
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Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped                 -2.889      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped              -7.324    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Naturally Monotone       3.845      0.3944 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Different        -5.081      0.3944 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Similar          -1.694      0.3944 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Stepped                 12.185      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Branch Different        -5.718      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Naturally Monotone     9.75    0.0000 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Different     -12.88    0.0000 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Similar        -4.30    0.0077 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Stepped               30.89    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Branch Different     -14.50    0.0000 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Different         -8.93      0.3944 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Similar           -5.54      0.3944 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Stepped                   8.34      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Naturally Monotone       -9.70      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Different     -22.63    0.0000 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Similar       -14.04    0.0000 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Stepped               21.14    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Naturally Monotone   -24.60    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Similar           3.387      0.3944 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Stepped                 17.266      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different        -1.468      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Single Similar        8.587    0.0000 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Stepped              43.774    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different     -3.722    0.0865 
 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
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                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Stepped                 13.879      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar          -5.161      0.3944 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Perfectly Competitive Approach  Stepped               35.19    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar       -13.08    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Perfectly Competitive Approach 
RD Type = Stepped  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach           Stepped                 -18.99      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach           Stepped              -48.14    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Naturally Monotone       2.488      0.3944 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Different         0.298      0.3944 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Similar          -1.341      0.3944 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Stepped                 -1.492      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach           Branch Different        -0.489      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Naturally Monotone    6.307    0.0000 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Different      0.756    1.0000 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Similar       -3.399    0.2953 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Stepped              -3.782    0.0682 
Value Curve Approach           Branch Different     -1.239    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Different        -2.190      0.3944 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Similar          -3.829      0.3944 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Stepped                 -3.979      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach           Naturally Monotone      -3.115      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Different      -5.55    0.0000 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Similar        -9.71    0.0000 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Stepped              -10.09    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach           Naturally Monotone    -7.90    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
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RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Similar          -1.639      0.3944 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Stepped                 -1.790      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach           Single Different        -1.618      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Single Similar       -4.155    0.0143 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Stepped              -4.537    0.0025 
Value Curve Approach           Single Different     -4.102    0.0180 
 
 
Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Stepped                -0.1508      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach           Single Similar         -0.2850      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Price-Based Offer Approach     Stepped             -0.3824    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach           Single Similar      -0.7225    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Price-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Stepped  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach           Stepped                -0.0843      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach           Stepped             -0.2137    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Naturally Monotone       5.359      0.3944 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Different         0.853      0.3944 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Similar          -1.606      0.3944 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Stepped                  3.902      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach           Branch Different        -0.606      0.3944 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Naturally Monotone   13.586    0.0000 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Different      2.163    1.0000 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Similar       -4.071    0.0206 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Stepped               9.892    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach           Branch Different     -1.537    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
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                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Different        -4.506      0.3944 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Similar          -6.964      0.3944 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Stepped                 -1.457      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach           Naturally Monotone      -6.103      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Different     -11.42    0.0000 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Similar       -17.66    0.0000 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Stepped               -3.69    0.0967 
Value Curve Approach           Naturally Monotone   -15.47    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Similar          -2.459      0.3944 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Stepped                  3.049      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach           Single Different        -2.291      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Single Similar       -6.233    0.0000 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Stepped               7.729    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach           Single Different     -5.807    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                   Difference       SE of 
Approach                       RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Stepped                 5.5075      0.3944 
Value Curve Approach           Single Similar         -0.1377      0.3944 
 
                                                            Adjusted 
Approach                       RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Quantity-Based Offer Approach  Stepped             13.9627    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach           Single Similar      -0.3490    1.0000 
 
 
Approach = Quantity-Based Offer Approach 
RD Type = Stepped  subtracted from: 
 
                                          Difference       SE of 
Approach              RD Type               of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Branch Different        -4.508      0.3944   -11.43 
Value Curve Approach  Naturally Monotone      -4.647      0.3944   -11.78 
Value Curve Approach  Single Different        -5.339      0.3944   -13.54 
Value Curve Approach  Single Similar          -5.645      0.3944   -14.31 
Value Curve Approach  Stepped                 -5.595      0.3944   -14.19 
 
                                          Adjusted 
Approach              RD Type              P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Branch Different      0.0000 
Value Curve Approach  Naturally Monotone    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach  Single Different      0.0000 
Value Curve Approach  Single Similar        0.0000 
Value Curve Approach  Stepped               0.0000 
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Approach = Value Curve Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                          Difference       SE of 
Approach              RD Type               of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Naturally Monotone      -0.138      0.3944   -0.351 
Value Curve Approach  Single Different        -0.831      0.3944   -2.107 
Value Curve Approach  Single Similar          -1.137      0.3944   -2.883 
Value Curve Approach  Stepped                 -1.087      0.3944   -2.756 
 
                                          Adjusted 
Approach              RD Type              P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Naturally Monotone     1.000 
Value Curve Approach  Single Different       1.000 
Value Curve Approach  Single Similar         1.000 
Value Curve Approach  Stepped                1.000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                        Difference       SE of 
Approach              RD Type             of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Single Different     -0.6928      0.3944   -1.756 
Value Curve Approach  Single Similar       -0.9986      0.3944   -2.532 
Value Curve Approach  Stepped              -0.9488      0.3944   -2.405 
 
                                        Adjusted 
Approach              RD Type            P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Single Different     1.000 
Value Curve Approach  Single Similar       1.000 
Value Curve Approach  Stepped              1.000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                      Difference       SE of           Adjusted 
Approach              RD Type           of Means  Difference  T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Single Similar     -0.3058      0.3944  -0.7753     1.000 
Value Curve Approach  Stepped            -0.2560      0.3944  -0.6490     1.000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                               Difference       SE of           Adjusted 
Approach              RD Type    of Means  Difference  T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach  Stepped     0.04984      0.3944   0.1264     1.000 
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J. PAIRWISE COMPARISON TESTS FOR 
COMPUTATIONAL TIME ON INTERPOLATION 
MODELS 
 
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - No Interp, Time - Interp 2  
 
Paired T for Time - No Interp - Time - Interp 2 
 
                     N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Time - No Interp  1600  52.2431  47.5270   1.1882 
Time - Interp 2   1600  42.2406  64.4952   1.6124 
Difference        1600  10.0025  44.4326   1.1108 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (7.8237, 12.1813) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 9.00  P-Value = 0.000 
 
 
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - Interp 2, Time - Interp 5  
 
Paired T for Time - Interp 2 - Time - Interp 5 
 
                    N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean 
Time - Interp 2  1600  42.2406  64.4952   1.6124 
Time - Interp 5  1600  25.4319  42.7665   1.0692 
Difference       1600  16.8088  32.8591   0.8215 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (15.1975, 18.4200) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 20.46  P-Value = 0.000 
 
  
Paired T-Test and CI: Time - Interp 5, Time - Interp 10  
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Paired T for Time - Interp 5 - Time - Interp 10 
 
                     N     Mean     StDev  SE Mean 
Time - Interp 5   1600  25.4319   42.7665   1.0692 
Time - Interp 10  1600  18.9200   33.8102   0.8453 
Difference        1600  6.51187  20.22444  0.50561 
 
 
95% CI for mean difference: (5.52014, 7.50361) 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = 12.88  P-Value = 0.000 
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K. MINITAB OUTPUT ON SOLUTION 
QUALITY FOR INTERPOLATION MODELS 
 
 
General Linear Model: Simulated Value versus Approach, NumPeriods, ...  
 
Factor                     Type   Levels  Values 
Approach                   fixed       4  Value Curve Approach, x Interp 2nd - 
                                          Value Approach, y Interp 5th - Value 
                                          Approach, z Interp 10th - Value 
                                          Approach 
NumPeriods                 fixed       2  20, 40 
NumResLevels               fixed       2  100, 300 
NumDispLevels              fixed       2  20, 40 
NumRDs                     fixed       2  25, 100 
NumInflows                 fixed       2  1, 5 
TransitionCorrelationType  fixed       2  Strong, Weak 
RD Type                    fixed       5  Branch Different, Naturally Monotone, 
                                          Single Different, Single Similar, 
                                          Stepped 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for Simulated Value, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source                                DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS        F 
Approach                               3   460.91   460.91   153.64   295.45 
NumPeriods                             1    25.24    25.24    25.24    48.55 
Approach*NumPeriods                    3     1.22     1.22     0.41     0.79 
NumResLevels                           1  1625.71  1625.71  1625.71  3126.30 
Approach*NumResLevels                  3    71.44    71.44    23.81    45.79 
NumDispLevels                          1    22.96    22.96    22.96    44.16 
Approach*NumDispLevels                 3     0.22     0.22     0.07     0.14 
NumRDs                                 1     0.32     0.32     0.32     0.62 
Approach*NumRDs                        3     0.01     0.01     0.00     0.01 
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NumInflows                             1   833.52   833.52   833.52  1602.89 
Approach*NumInflows                    3    19.42    19.42     6.47    12.45 
TransitionCorrelationType              1    25.33    25.33    25.33    48.71 
Approach*TransitionCorrelationType     3     0.23     0.23     0.08     0.15 
RD Type                                4  1475.90  1475.90   368.97   709.55 
Approach*RD Type                      12   121.17   121.17    10.10    19.42 
Error                               6356  3305.19  3305.19     0.52 
Total                               6399  7988.79 
 
Source                                  P 
Approach                            0.000 
NumPeriods                          0.000 
Approach*NumPeriods                 0.502 
NumResLevels                        0.000 
Approach*NumResLevels               0.000 
NumDispLevels                       0.000 
Approach*NumDispLevels              0.936 
NumRDs                              0.430 
Approach*NumRDs                     0.999 
NumInflows                          0.000 
Approach*NumInflows                 0.000 
TransitionCorrelationType           0.000 
Approach*TransitionCorrelationType  0.932 
RD Type                             0.000 
Approach*RD Type                    0.000 
Error 
Total 
 
 
S = 0.721118   R-Sq = 58.63%   R-Sq(adj) = 58.35% 
 
 
Least Squares Means for Simulated Value 
 
Approach                                             Mean  SE Mean 
Value Curve Approach                               1.1858  0.01803 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach                      1.2424  0.01803 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach                      1.4871  0.01803 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach                     1.8670  0.01803 
 
NumPeriods 
20                                                 1.3828  0.01275 
40                                                 1.5084  0.01275 
 
NumResLevels 
100                                                1.9496  0.01275 
300                                                0.9416  0.01275 
 
Approach*NumResLevels 
Value Curve Approach 100                           1.5880  0.02550 
Value Curve Approach 300                           0.7835  0.02550 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 100                  1.6667  0.02550 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 300                  0.8181  0.02550 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach 100                  2.0060  0.02550 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach 300                  0.9681  0.02550 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach 100                 2.5375  0.02550 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach 300                 1.1965  0.02550 
 
NumDispLevel 
20                                                 1.3857  0.01275 
40                                                 1.5055  0.01275 
 
NumInflows 
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1                                                  1.0847  0.01275 
5                                                  1.8065  0.01275 
 
Approach*NumInflows 
Value Curve Approach 1                             0.8230  0.02550 
Value Curve Approach 5                             1.5486  0.02550 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 1                    0.9048  0.02550 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 5                    1.5800  0.02550 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach 1                    1.1909  0.02550 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach 5                    1.7833  0.02550 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach 1                   1.4200  0.02550 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach 5                   2.3139  0.02550 
 
TransitionCo 
Strong                                             1.5085  0.01275 
Weak                                               1.3827  0.01275 
 
RD Type 
Branch Different                                   2.0598  0.02016 
Naturally Monotone                                 1.8955  0.02016 
Single Different                                   1.4035  0.02016 
Single Similar                                     1.0913  0.02016 
Stepped                                            0.7777  0.02016 
 
Approach*RD Type 
Value Curve Approach Branch Different              1.8245  0.04031 
Value Curve Approach Naturally Monotone            1.6861  0.04031 
Value Curve Approach Single Different              0.9934  0.04031 
Value Curve Approach Single Similar                0.6875  0.04031 
Value Curve Approach Stepped                       0.7374  0.04031 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach Branch Different     1.8702  0.04031 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach Naturally Monotone   1.7260  0.04031 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach Single Different     1.0862  0.04031 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach Single Similar       0.7886  0.04031 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach Stepped              0.7411  0.04031 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach Branch Different     2.1073  0.04031 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach Naturally Monotone   1.9181  0.04031 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach Single Different     1.4791  0.04031 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach Single Similar       1.1526  0.04031 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach Stepped              0.7783  0.04031 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach Branch Different    2.4374  0.04031 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach Naturally Monotone  2.2516  0.04031 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach Single Different    2.0553  0.04031 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach Single Similar      1.7365  0.04031 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach Stepped             0.8541  0.04031 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Simulated Value 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*NumResLevels 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Value Curve Approach            300              -0.8045     0.03606   -22.31 
 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                        NumResLevels   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach            300             0.0000 
 
 
Approach = x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 
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NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   300              -0.8486     0.03606   -23.54 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                        NumResLevels   P-Value 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   300             0.0000 
 
Approach = y Interp 5th - Value Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   300               -1.038     0.03606   -28.79 
 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                        NumResLevels   P-Value 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   300             0.0000 
 
Approach = z Interp 10th - Value Approach 
NumResLevels = 100  subtracted from: 
 
                                              Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumResLevels    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  300               -1.341     0.03606   -37.19 
 
                                              Adjusted 
Approach                        NumResLevels   P-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  300             0.0000 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*NumInflows 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
NumInflows = 1  subtracted from: 
 
                                            Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumInflows    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
Value Curve Approach            5              0.72555     0.03606   20.123 
 
                                            Adjusted 
Approach                        NumInflows   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach            5             0.0000 
 
 
Approach = x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 
NumInflows = 1  subtracted from: 
 
                                            Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumInflows    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   5               0.6752     0.03606   18.726 
 
                                            Adjusted 
Approach                        NumInflows   P-Value 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   5             0.0000 
 
 
Approach = y Interp 5th - Value Approach 
NumInflows = 1  subtracted from: 
 
                                            Difference       SE of 
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Approach                        NumInflows    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   5               0.5924     0.03606   16.430 
 
                                            Adjusted 
Approach                        NumInflows   P-Value 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   5             0.0000 
 
 
Approach = z Interp 10th - Value Approach 
NumInflows = 1  subtracted from: 
 
                                            Difference       SE of 
Approach                        NumInflows    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  5               0.8939     0.03606    24.79 
 
                                            Adjusted 
Approach                        NumInflows   P-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  5             0.0000 
 
 
Bonferroni Simultaneous Tests 
Response Variable Percentage Error 
All Pairwise Comparisons among Levels of Approach*RD Type 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach            Naturally Monotone      -0.138     0.05701 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different        -0.831     0.05701 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar          -1.137     0.05701 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped                 -1.087     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach            Naturally Monotone    -2.43    1.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different     -14.58    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar       -19.94    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped              -19.07    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different       -0.6928     0.05701 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar         -0.9986     0.05701 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped                -0.9488     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach            Single Different     -12.15    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar       -17.52    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped              -16.64    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar         -0.3058     0.05701 
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Value Curve Approach            Stepped                -0.2560     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach            Single Similar       -5.364    0.0000 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped              -4.490    0.0014 
 
 
Approach = Value Curve Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped                0.04984     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
Value Curve Approach            Stepped              0.8743    1.0000 
 
 
 
Approach = x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Naturally Monotone      -0.144     0.05701 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Different        -0.784     0.05701 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Similar          -1.082     0.05701 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Stepped                 -1.129     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Naturally Monotone    -2.53    1.0000 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Different     -13.75    0.0000 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Similar       -18.97    0.0000 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Stepped              -19.81    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Different       -0.6399     0.05701 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Similar         -0.9374     0.05701 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Stepped                -0.9849     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Different     -11.22    0.0000 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Similar       -16.44    0.0000 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Stepped              -17.28    0.0000 
 
Approach = x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Similar         -0.2975     0.05701 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Stepped                -0.3451     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
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Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Single Similar       -5.219    0.0000 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Stepped              -6.053    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = x Interp 2nd - Value Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Stepped               -0.04757     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
x Interp 2nd - Value Approach   Stepped             -0.8345    1.0000 
 
 
 
Approach = y Interp 5th - Value Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Naturally Monotone      -0.189     0.05701 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Different        -0.628     0.05701 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Similar          -0.955     0.05701 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Stepped                 -1.329     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Naturally Monotone    -3.32    0.1732 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Different     -11.02    0.0000 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Similar       -16.74    0.0000 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Stepped              -23.31    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = y Interp 5th - Value Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Different        -0.439     0.05701 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Similar          -0.765     0.05701 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Stepped                 -1.140     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Different      -7.70    0.0000 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Similar       -13.43    0.0000 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Stepped              -19.99    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = y Interp 5th - Value Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Similar         -0.3264     0.05701 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Stepped                -0.7008     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Single Similar        -5.73    0.0000 
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y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Stepped              -12.29    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = y Interp 5th - Value Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Stepped                -0.3744     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
y Interp 5th - Value Approach   Stepped              -6.567    0.0000 
 
 
 
Approach = z Interp 10th - Value Approach 
RD Type = Branch Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                    Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type               of Means  Difference 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Naturally Monotone      -0.186     0.05701 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Different        -0.382     0.05701 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Similar          -0.701     0.05701 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Stepped                 -1.583     0.05701 
 
                                                             Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type             T-Value   P-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Naturally Monotone    -3.26    0.2143 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Different      -6.70    0.0000 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Similar       -12.29    0.0000 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Stepped              -27.77    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = z Interp 10th - Value Approach 
RD Type = Naturally Monotone  subtracted from: 
 
                                                  Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type             of Means  Difference 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Different      -0.196     0.05701 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Similar        -0.515     0.05701 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Stepped               -1.398     0.05701 
 
                                                           Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type           T-Value   P-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Different    -3.44    0.1095 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Similar      -9.04    0.0000 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Stepped            -24.51    0.0000 
 
 
Approach = z Interp 10th - Value Approach 
RD Type = Single Different  subtracted from: 
 
                                                Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type           of Means  Difference  T-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Similar      -0.319     0.05701    -5.59 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Stepped             -1.201     0.05701   -21.07 
 
                                                Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type          P-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Single Similar    0.0000 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Stepped           0.0000 
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Approach = z Interp 10th - Value Approach 
RD Type = Single Similar  subtracted from: 
 
                                         Difference       SE of 
Approach                        RD Type    of Means  Difference  T-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Stepped     -0.8825     0.05701   -15.48 
 
                                         Adjusted 
Approach                        RD Type   P-Value 
z Interp 10th - Value Approach  Stepped    0.0000 
 
 
